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THE B LeHER-MEYER CONTROVERSY 
Abstract 
The BUcher-Meyer Controversy: the Nature of the Ancient Economy in Modern 
Ideology 
The Bucher-Meyer Controversy is a famous debate about the fundamental character 
of the ancient economy. The disagreement arose with Karl Bucher's thesis that the ancient 
economy apparently never overcome the economic stage of the 'closed household 
economy', which the author formulated in his 1893 publication 'The Formation of the 
National Economy'. Bucher's stance stimulated immediately rigorous rejections from the 
elite scholars of ancient history. Eduard Meyer and Karl Julius Beloch both dismissed 
Bucher's claim being an unscientific and ill-founded description of the ancient economy. 
Both assumed instead that some periods in ancient history are economically comparable 
with early modem capitalism. Part I investigates the arguments on both sides and aims to 
highlight some initial misunderstandings and methodological divergences between the 
opposed positions, which would have negative consequences for the future course of the 
debate. 
What initially may appear a highly subject specific debate with no wider academic 
relevance turned quickly into a bitter feud between the established historicist 
historiography, which dominated ancient history and the increasingly popular empiricist 
conceptual approaches in political economy, sociology and psychology. The swift 
rejection of Bucher's stance also highlighted the serious difficulty for social and cultural 
history to win scientific credibility against the long-established and predominant political 
historiography. However, the debate about the proper scientific historiographical method, 
which accompanied the Bucher-Meyer Controversy, brought to light a variety of 
additional, often deep rooted ideological disagreements within the German academic 
community, which were fuelled by the highly sensitive 'national' and 'social question' in 
Germany at the tum of the 19th century. The turbulent political and social climate 
frequently called the purpose of classical and historical scholarship into question and by 
doing so elevated the Bucher-Meyer Controversy beyond being merely an intellectual 
debate about the nature of the ancient economy. These issues are discussed in Part II. 
Max Weber's contribution to ancient history and his theory of concept formation in 
history aimed to overcome the rift between Bucher and Meyer that was dependent on the 
methodological and ideological differences surrounding these scholars. In order to do so, 
Weber aimed to develop Bucher's weakly defined concept of the 'closed household 
economy' into an 'ideal type'. On the other hand, Weber learned from Meyer's complex 
and differentiated view of antiquity and described antiquity as a 'slave, city and coastal 
culture'. It is argued that Weber did not hold a 'middle position' between Bucher and 
Meyer as it has been frequently assumed. Rather, by constructing the 'ideal type' as a 
practical methodological tool, he added a new dimension to all previous attempts of 
characterising the ancient economic history. This is outlined in Part III. 1. 
Unfortunately Weber was unable to offer a solution to the controversy which was 
acceptable to both sides. During the 1920s the issues surrounding the ancient economy 
were further debated mainly by Friedrich Oertel, Johannes Hasebroek, Bernard Laum and 
Michael I. Rostovtzeff, unfortunately without the analytical depth and methodological 
rigour that was propounded by Max Weber. The aftermath of the controversy will is 
outlined in Part III.2. 
The abuse of ancient history, along with almost every other academic discipline in 
Nazi Germany, made a possible solution to the controversy ever more unlikely. Whilst 
contemporary scholars refer to the controversy usually only in brief and whilst they seem 
to be unified in branding Bucher's and Meyer's position as extreme or over-simple, this 
work aims to revisit the old arguments and the highly complex background of the 
controversy and will compare them with the often false and oversimplified interpretation of 
the debate in the contemporary literature. The bibliography section provides a 
comprehensive list of all relevant publications regarding the controversy and its 
surrounding issues. 
The importance of the material conditions of human life and the role of antiquity in 
general to provide possible parallels for modem social phenomena kept this debate alive 
throughout the 20th century. Unfortunately, a solution to the controversy seems still not in 
site. However, one of the reasons could be the lack of clarity and appreciation of Bucher's 
and Meyer's contributions that would certainly be beneficial for acknowledging that the 
Bucher-Meyer Controversy is a significant example for showing that debates about history 
are not merely fought for the sake of historical truths, but also on the grounds of 
ideological and political differences that in tum have significance for a particular 
interrr~tation of history. 
Word count excluding bibliography: 118 000 
(Permission was granted to exceed the word limit by 20 000 words to 120 000). 
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THE BUCHER-MEYER CONTROVERSY 
General Introduction and Methodology 
This thesis has four inter-related aims. 
Firstly, to elucidate the arguments between Karl BUcher and Eduard Meyer about the 
nature of the ancient economy in detail and to contrast them with the contemporary 
interpretation of this famous controversy. Paul Millett in his book Lending and Borrowing 
in Ancient Athens asserted in the introduction that 'in view of the surveys of the 
controversy that already exist, there is no need to rehearse the arguments in full.' 1 Millett 
is referring us to a number of publications that, at best, summarise aspects of this 
controversy and in some cases are schematising and oversimplifying the debate as one 
between 'primitivism vs. modernism'. It seems that the positions of BUcher and Meyer as 
well as other earlier participants are judged in the contemporary literature as dated and 
false. This explains why so few scholars have bothered to analyse the arguments afresh, 
and in all their historiographical complexity, beyond introductory sketches. We aim to 
deliver a more complex account, which is required for an appropriate understanding of the 
controversy in its almost 'classical significance' in the history of historiography.2 
Secondly, we will analyse the methodological complicity of BUcher's and Meyer's 
stances in the light of the wider controversy about the proper scientific character of the 
historical investigation and concept formation. The way in which ideological and political 
differences, as well as contemporary issues, played a part in the course of the debate will be 
detailed. 
Thirdly, we will attempt to elucidate and clarify Max Weber's contribution to this 
debate. We hope to show that Weber's suggestions for solving the question of the 
character of the ancient economy is not simply a compromise or 'middle position' between 
BUcher and Meyer, as Demandt and others have maintained.3 We will also shed light onto 
Weber's highly complex methodology of historical sociology and investigate in how far it 
affected his view of the character of the ancient economy. 
Finally, we will summarise the aftermath of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy during 
the 1920s and 1930s. The challenge for us is to investigate in what way the continuing 
debate over the reorientation of historical scholarship has influenced the arguments over 
1 Milltett (1991) p. 9 f. 
2 BUrgin (1993) p. 68 
3 Demandt in Caler III (1990) p. 144 
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the nature of the ancient economy. By doing so, we hoped to show why this debate, which 
may appear at first glance only a highly specialised academic quarrel, achieved the 
interdisciplinary prominence which it still has for us today. 
Regarding the methodology employed in this work, we face an inevitable difficulty. 
The subject of the history of historiography is a very recent field of academic interest. It 
tends to reflect on methodological issues surrounding the historical scholarship and the 
nature of the historical explanation and concept formation. We propose to discuss the 
BUcher-Meyer Controversy and selected further contributions to this subject by other 
scholars, by assuming that historical scholarship and the method that is propagated along 
with it, is in parts influenced by popular epistemological interests and the Zeitgeist that 
accompany this subject. The observations and analyses put forward in this work are of 
course not excluded from our own historical dependencies that partly form our 
interpretation of the Controversy. In addition, when translating phrases and quotations 
from German into English, which were written by scholars over a hundred years ago, we 
will perhaps encounter the difficulty of finding adequate expressions for what they may 
have had in mind. This is because the concepts and language as a whole are also 
undergoing historical change. 
It is hoped that the Selected Bibliography will provide the reader with a solid source 
from late 19th and early 20th century writings in German historiography about the ancient 
economy and the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. 
THE BUCHER-MEYER CONTROVERSY 
Part I. Biicher vs. Meyer - The Arguments of the Controversy 
'Every eXIstmg thing is an analogy of 
everything existing, that is why our existence appears to 
us as separate and connected at the same time. If one 
follows an analogy too much, then everything' falls 
identically together; if one avoids it, then everything is 
scattered into infinity. In both cases contemplation 
stagnates, at one time as over-lively, some other time as 
dead'. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETIIE 
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Introduction 
The BUcher-Meyer Controversy was sparked off by the Gennan economist Karl 
BUcher with his publication 'Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft' (,The Fonnation of the 
National Economy') [EdV] of 1893 and by the reply of the ancient historian, Eduard 
Meyer, entitled 'Die Wirtschaftliche Entwciklung des Altertums' ('The Economic 
Development of Antiquity') [WEdA] of 1885. As indicated in the 'General Introduction', 
the contemporary scholarship regarded the debate as being based on misunderstandings and 
problematic premises. This part attempts to bring alive the old arguments central to 
BUcher's and Meyer's position, which found their way only in a highly condensed fonn 
into contemporary scholarship. 
Chapter 1 shall deal extensively with BUcher's arguments and aims to defy the 
commonly accepted view that BUcher was a 'primitivist' in the sense that he had claimed 
that the entire ancient economy was underdeveloped and indigent. We aim to show that 
BUcher directed his concerns against what he understood to be 'modernising' tendencies 
within the interpretation of sources. 
By looking at Meyer's arguments and methodological presuppositions in Chapter 2, 
we shall inquire whether BUcher's criticism is well founded. Also, Meyer was frequently 
accused of having maintained that the whole of antiquity corresponded to modem 
capitalism. By maintaining such an analogy, he was accused of modernising the entire 
ancient 'economic life'.4 We shall question in this chapter whether Meyer, besides the 
construction of a complex picture of a sophisticated classical and Hellenic civilisation, 
indeed projected modem political and economic concepts into this age. 
Finley's collection of essays 'The BUcher-Meyer Controversy' also includes two 
articles by the Gennan historian Karl Julius Beloch, a contemporary of BUcher and friend 
of Meyer. Beloch's name appears also in the context of the controversy, as he shares 
Meyer's opposition to BUcher's methodology and liberal political orientation.5 Although 
Beloch's evaluation of the ancient economy is perhaps less central to the controversy, 
aspects of Beloch's theory are highly original and mark an important milestone in the 
histotj~graphy of ancient history. It will also be interesting to see how Beloch dealt with 
4 See Humphreys (1978) p. 137, Love (1991) p. 34. Pearson (1957) p. 7 ff. See also Ausitn & Vidal-Naquet 
(1977) p. 3 f., who argued that the debate is primarily about 'modernism' vs. 'primitivism' 
5 There is fairly little assessment on Karl Julius Beloch's work. However, see Christ's biographical study 
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Bucher's theory of economic development (Chapter 3). 
In Chapter 4 we shall investigate whether in the direct aftermath of Meyer's harsh 
criticism, Bucher was prepared to make any concessions and modifications to his own 
position and what impact Bucher's reply to Meyer had on the further course of the 
controversy. The relevance of the 'Biographical Note' on Bucher, Meyer and Beloch at the 
beginning of each chapter are perhaps for the time being only of informative character~ but 
should foster a better understanding of the origin and the manifold political commitments 
surrounding the writings of these scholars, which will be further examined in Part II. 
(1972), pp. 248-285. More briefly Christ (1982) pp. 104-106 and Momigliano (1966) pp. 32-45. 
PART I. BUClIER VS. MEYER 
1. Karl Bucher - the 'Closed Household Economy' and the Method of 
Economic History6 
l. Biographical Note? 
11 
Karl BUcher (1847-1930) was born near Wiesbaden as the son of an indigent 
farmer's family. Through material austerity and hard work, his father managed to send him 
to a Gymnasium. BUcher's dreams to study at a university came true when in 1866 he 
entered the University of Bonn. Initially he wanted to become a Gymnasium teacher and 
started his studies in classical philology and history. After a two-semester spell at 
Gottingen he returned to Bonn and graduated with a doctoral degree of ancient history and 
gained teaching qualifications in philology and history. His versatile interests were 
encouraged with a teaching post at the Wohler-Gymnasium Frankfurt (1873-1878), but 
soon BUcher started to develop an interest on the theory and method of a new science, 
NationalOkonomie. This new orientation of his academic work is indicated by his 
participation in the newly established Verein for Sozialpolitik (est. 1872). BUcher was a 
member of this organisation and started to report about the meetings in the liberal 
newspaper Frankfurter Zeitung (today Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung). His new field of 
interest led him eventually in 1878 to leave his teaching profession and to join this paper as 
a journalist in the economy and social policy department. Influenced by his friend Alfred 
Schaffle, BUcher started his postdoctoral degree at Munich and graduated in 1881 in 
statistics and political economy (Volkswirtschaftslehre).8 After professorships at Dorpat 
6 The life and work of Karl Willhelm BUcher (1847-1930) is not very well documented. The dispute with 
Eduard Meyer is usually only very briefly commented upon: Most extensively is Braeuer (1950, pp. 205-
206), who has summarised BUcher's work as an political economist and its impact up to its time. It is also 
unfortunate that only one volume of BUcher's autobiography was published and ends in the year 1892 - one 
year before the dispute with Meyer. Other sources, which deal with BUcher's academic achievements, are 
Drechsler (1997), Braubach (1963), Lindenlaub (1967) and Heuss (1997) p. 277-285. 
7The biographical note is largely inspired by Heuss (1957) pp. 277-285. This is also the most detailed 
biographical sketch of BUcher's work, which includes a short index of reviews of BUcher's works. Heuss' 
claim (1957 p. 282) that BUcher was influenced by Schaffle with regard to Darwin's theory of evolution and' 
Hegel's philosophy of history is true in so far as Schaffle was a pupil of Hegel in Tubingen and wrote 
extensively in this tradition. See Braubach (1963) p. 382. 
8 The fruitful intellectual relationship and personal friendship between Schaftle and Bucher is well 
documented by B raubach (1963). 
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(1882-83),9 Basel (1883-90) and a short spell at Karlsruhe (1890-92), he accepted a chair at 
Leipzig where he taught and Ii ved until his death. His main interests were centred on 
topics in economic history and publishing studies. 1O BUcher achieved a remarkable career: 
from a farmer's son to a university professor of international standing, which certainly 
underlines his intelligence, industriousness, adaptability and determination. However, 
beside this remarkable steep and unusual career he remained a very modest man, a 
passionate democrat and a constant advocate of individual liberties and democratic 
political justice. Besides his renowned achievements as one of the first scholars in 
publishing studies, he will remain an influential scholar in the field of economic history 
and historical political economy. His controversial essay collection 'Die Entstheung der 
VolkswirtschaJt' ('The Emergence of the National Economy'), which also forms one of his 
major works, shall be the primary source of our investigation below. Besides this 
influential work, BUcher published a work in 1896 on 'Labour and Rhythm' CArbeit und 
Rythmus '), which was one of the first studies in the new field of labour and work 
psychology. 
As one of the co-editors, and after 1903 as senior editor of the ZeitschriJt for die 
Gesamte StaatswissenschaJt, a post which he held until 1923, BUcher earned himself a 
permanent remembrance even amongst his intellectual and political opponents. 
9 See Drechsler (1997). 
10 See Heuss (1957) pp. l75-176. An overview about his works can be found in Braeuer (1934) pp. 718-719. 
Braeuer (1952) p. 718. See BUcher (1981) on writings in publishing studies. 
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ii. The Emergence of the 'National Economy' 
The controversy emerged from a reply by Eduard Meyer, professor of ancient 
history at the 'Martin Luther UniversiUit' of Halle, at the 3rd Conference of Gennan 
Historians 1895 in Frankfurt, to a previously published paper by Karl BUcher, who had just 
started his professorship in Political Economy at the University of Leipzig. BUcher's essay 
dealt with the topic of the nature and the stage of development of the economy of ancient 
Greece and focused on the classical period in particular. However, to deliver a picture of 
the character of the entire ancient economy was not his intended aim, though his 
generalisations were clearly reaching beyond this period. He points out that in the essay 
collection EdV 'all papers are dominated by the unifonn view of a law-like course of the 
economic development and a similar methodological treatment of the facts' .11 
Based on the EdV's 5th edition published in 1906 and reprinted in Finley (1972), 
Karl BUcher fonnulated the thesis, which maintained that the fonnation of the 'national 
economy' (Volswirtschaft) was a result of change between economic stages or modes. In 
respect of these 'stages of economic development' ('wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstufen'), 
the economy of antiquity was labelled by BUcher as an 'integrated or closed household 
economy' ('geschlossene Hauswirtschaft').I2 However, it is a common misconception that 
BUcher denied that Athens and Rome never witnessed the exchange of produce between 
individuals at a local agora or forum. 13 'Geschlossen' is rather the tenn to explain that the 
level of production of artefacts was depended on the needs of the household and that the 
II BUcher (1908) p. 5. Reil (1940) critically reviews the views of the German NationalOkomen, such as List, 
Schmoller Hildebrand, Sombart, Roscher, Knies and BUcher on the idea of economic laws and theories of 
economic development ('Entwicklungsgesetze') This point shall be further elaborated under Part II.6. and 
Part III.2. 
I2 BUcher (1906) p. 116. Many contemporary authors use the phrase 'closed household economy' as a direct 
translation of 'geschlossene Hauswirtschaft'. See Millett (1992) p. 11, Pearson (1957) p. 6 and Humphreys 
(1978) p. 137. Love translated it as 'oikos economy' See Love (1991) p. 34. This translation is perhaps not 
in accordance with what BUcher intended it to mean. See EdV p. 114 ff. For his understanding of 
'geschlossen' and compare with the meaning of 'integrated household economy'. The translation of the term 
'economy' from the German 'Wirtschaft' bears some difficulty too because of the difference in its 
etymological roots. It is very difficult to create a term that would be appropriate to the history of this concept 
in German as 'Wirtschaft'. See A. Demadt (1990) for a short discussion on this problem. Also recently 
Cartledge (1998) p. 5 'Economy (economies): what's in a name?' 
13 EdVp. 109 f. It is important to note that the term 'development' bears an ambiguity. To BUcher it refers to 
'Entsteliung', also 'formation', but not as in the 1901 English translation as 'evolution'. It is misleading to 
think that 'wirtschaftliche Entwicklung' is equivalent with the suggested title 'Industrial Evolutioll '. One 
could have had expected that BUcher, if he meant evolution for 'Entwicklung', he surely would have used the 
already popular German word 'Evolution' to make his stance more plain. ElltY·;icklung probably means 
something like continuing process, though 'continuing development' is not supposed to be mistaken with 
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di vision of labour never reached a national scale as in the 'Volkswirtschaft'. Modern 
scholars reinterpreted the stage of the 'integrated household economy' frequently as the 
'primitive' stage of the economy, hence the derivative term 'primitivism' .14 BUcher himself 
rarely used the term 'primitive' (,primitiv') and if so usually only in the context of the 
conditions of the tribal societies. I5 However, in his later work 'On Greek Economic 
History' (ZGlV), BUcher pointed out that 'it has always been striking to me that the science 
of the Hellenics, which knew no human secrets, although making it to a highly developed 
political theory, but only to a very poor theory of the economy, which remained stuck in 
ethics. This economy remained always firmly as a private economy. We cannot speak 
seriously about a theory of the national economy back then' .16 His contemporaries also 
often asserted that the 'primitivists' assumed a strictly 'linear economic progress' and that 
economic evolution is natural, and results in improved efficiency and productivity and is 
therefore desirable. 17 
In order to prove whether or not the ancient economy possessed the same 
qualitative characteristics as the modern 'national economy' (Volkswirtschaft).18 BUcher's 
'steady development' 
14 See Millett (1992) p. 16, Wittenburg in Flasher (1995) p. 270, Christ (1983) vol. III p. 103 ff., and Pearson 
(1957) p. 6 f. 
15 See EdV p. 92, BUcher (1898) 
16 ZGW (1902) p. 5. See Spahn (1984) p. 301. The context of the ZGW allows for an interpretation of the 
term 'oikos economy' as a 'private economy' and should not be confused with a modem notion of perhaps 
'private business economy'. However, in some way this term invites misunderstanding. 
17 This misconception is still present in contemporary literature See Parkins (1998) p. 234 f and Millett 
(1992) p. 16 f. Millett also points out that the term primitive 'is a complex term', and should not simply be 
associated with 'early ancient, old-fashioned, simple ... uncivilised' etc. Whether this applies to BUcher and 
Hasebroek is not quite clear. Whether the term 'primitive' assigned to mean indeed uncivilised or just pre-
Western culture reflects nevertheless on the way we are looking at cultures of the past or different to us and 
leaves in some way a negative coating. 'That, then, would seem to be the motive behind the recurring 
impulse to present the Greeks as economically sophisticated, which is assumed to mean "capitalistic" or 
"proto-capitalistic". Millett (1992).p. 17. According to Millett (1992) p. 17, a further aspect to the meaning 
of 'primitive' was added by 'Lowry's study The Archaeology of Economic Ideas (1987). Intrigued by the 
analogy of "our ancient debts in areas of physics to city planning, politics and philosophy to mathematics to 
exact sciences" (p. xiv). Millett noted correctly that 'Lowrey attempts to trace the ancient Greek origins of 
modern economic theory' and that such an effort 'is heroic but misguided'. Millett (1992) p. 17. Millet 
seems to agree with Firth and Yamey (1964) p. 32 that 'observers of credit operations in the present and 
primitive societies have often been struck by the great proliferation of credit relationships'. Cited by Millett 
(1992) p. 17. According to Millett (1992) p. 17. This 'reveals complex networks of lending and borrowing 
that can hardly be classed as "economic" in the conventional neo-classical sense'. Worth considering on the 
subject of the nature of the ancient 'economy' is also Polany's 'holistic' stance that saw the economy in 
antiquity as not separable from the political goals and ethos of the city life. See Polanyi (1990). Also 
interesting is Meikle's distinction between the 'use value' economy of the ancient cities and the classification 
of the modern capitalist economy as an 'exchange value' economy, with capital accumulation as its primary 
purpose by the means of commodity production and exchange for profit. See Meikle (1995b) p.l 03 f. 160 f. 
18 BUcher voiced some self-criticism about the first edition of the EdV in 1893. In a letter to Alois Schulte 
dated 15/03/1893 he admits that by revisiting his essay 'Die Entstelzllllg der FolkSIl·irtschaJt·. it still shows 
some weaknesses. 'I was perhaps a little too light-headed when I undertook the publication', but the work 
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EdV starts off with the question of how the national economy is defined In order to do so, 
BUcher defines the Volkswirtschaft (literally 'the people's economy') as 'the totality of 
events, organisations and processes which bring about the satisfaction of a whole nation's 
needs>19. It should not be ignored that this 'national economy', which BUcher refers to, 
shows significant differences to contemporary definitions of the 'market economies' in the 
late 20th century.20 Despite the emergence of world trade and international markets, political 
and national ideas and goals dominated the economic sphere of the Western European 
countries at the end of the 19th century. This is why we should continue to use the term 
'national economy' when we use the phrase in the BUcherian sense of 'Volkswirtschaft' as 
opposed to 'people's economy', which perhaps could misleadingly suggest a kind of 'state 
socialist' economy. 
BUcher argues further that if the economist aIms to trace the roots of political 
economy (NationalOkonmie), as the science of running the national economy, he must 
compare it to other forms of economic organisation. Therefore, he asks, 'is this economy 
national?,21 Directed against the 'Historical School' of NationalOkonomie, BUcher asserts 
that their followers failed to address this central question. He points out that due to this 
systematic error, they apply categories and social phenomena of the 'national economy' to 
other stages of economic development. He says, 'without a doubt did they [the members of 
the 'Historical School'], for this very reason, block their way to a scientific handling of 
those historical events' .22 By not realising the fundamental difference between these 
economic stages, the 'Historical School' tries to grasp the economic phenomena of the past 
with modern categories.23 
For BUcher, to comprehend and analyse economIC history properly one should 
was, in his own words 'for me of very high importance. I am also convinced that I am on the right way. I 
considered most of what I wrote ten times until I wrote it down. But I also fear that I have overlooked things, 
that certain points are expressed not brief enough, others not clear enough'. See Braubach (1963) p. 384 f. 
19 BUcher (1906) p. 85. 
20 Rutherford in his Dictionary of Economics defines the market economy 'as an economy with extensive 
private ownership of capital and allocation of goods and services by the price mechanism the absence of 
government intervention. For a market economy to flourish goods must be available in competitive markets 
at prices which reflect their long run scarcities and business must be motivated by profit'. See Rutherford 
(1992) p. 287. Whether this is a good description of modern market economies is not relevant for our 
discussion. This definition, however, exemplifies that the concept of the market economy is not easily 
applical:5le the concept of the national economy of the 19th century that was used by BUcher and Meyer. 
21 See BUcher (1906) p. 86 'Is this economy a national economy? Are its characteristics fundamentally the 
same or different from ours?' EdV p. 86 
22 EdV. p.87 
23 BUcher's criticism also attacks some ideological goals of the 'Historical School' to which we shall return in 
Part II and III. 
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employ a theory of 'economic stages of development' (wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstufen 
or also Wirtschaftsstufen) , as the essential tool, 'through which the main-features of 
economic development are summarised by keywords' .24 Even if the use of economic stages 
as an essential methodological tool in order to systemise economic history was not 
personally invented by BUcher, his argument seems to require at least some further 
justification. That his 'theory of economic stages' ('Wirtschaftsstufentheorie') is an 
'indispensable methodological auxiliary means' in order to systematise economic history 
properly, is a presupposition that is not necessarily true. 25 We could simply argue that one 
does not have to fall back into a 'moderniser fallacy' without using the Wirtschaftsstufen. 26 
For BUcher, the crucial aspects in order to distinguish the different economic stages 
qualitatively from one another, were the position and the nature of the commodity 
exchange and the character of production in each of these stages.27 
Similar to the economist Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917), BUcher characterises the 
formation of the modem national economy as a product of a gradual development from the 
'integrated household economy', the 'city economy' to 'national economy' (,geschlossene 
Hauswirtschaft, Stadtwirtschaft and Volkswirtschaft'.).28 BUcher identifies each stage 
eventually with a corresponding stage in human history, which makes his previous attempt 
24 EdVp. 97. 
25 EdV p. 97. Theories of economic stages were a popular methodological tool in political economy in late 
19th century Germany mainly due to the reception of Adam Smith and the use of different social modes in his 
'Wealth of Nation's'. See Braeuer (1952) p. 149 f. Regarding the reception of Adam Smith by the German 
NationalOkonomie see Burgin (1993) pp 366-390 and Winkel (1977) p. 7 ff, see also Bucher EdV p. 89. 
26 Obvious examples are Finley (1973) and Polanyi (1957). These authors profited to a degree from the 
previous detailed and systematic criticism by Reil (1940). 
27 As emphasised above, theories of economic stages were a highly fashionable methodological tool amongst 
economists towards the end of the 19th century and had a rich tradition. Bucher's predecessors Friedrich List 
(1789-1846) and Bruno Hildebrand (1812-1878) added more economic aspects to Smith's initial social stages 
'herdsmen, farming and industrial society'. See Braeuer (1952) p. 149 f The criteria of defining these stages 
differed considerable between these scholars. List's criterion of classification of the economic sphere was the 
different modes of production an economy was characterised as. He defined the 'agricultural state', the 
'agricultural and manufacture state' and the 'agricultural-manufacture-commercial state'. Hildebrand divided 
economic history into 'barter economy' (,Naturalwirtschaft'), 'money economy' CGeldwirtsclzaft') and 
'credit economy' (,Kreditwirtschaft') See Schneider (1990) p. 419 f For more detail see Rei! (1940) p. 17-
18. The fundamental error, which List and Hildebrand committed, according to Bucher, was that they 
admitted economic change only in different forms of production and exchange (,Verkehr') in different periods 
of human civilisation, but that the basic characteristics of economic life remained unchanged to the present 
day. This is to say that the former authors already saw a kind of 'Volkswirtschaft' in antiquity. See. Reil 
(1940) p. 21. Bucher regarded this as a fundamental and consequential mistake by these and other members 
of the 'Historical School', a 'mistake' which led to a whole tradition in the interpretation of economic history 
and is-Often referred to as modernism. See Wittnburg in Flasher (1995) p. 270, Pearson (1957) p. 6, 
Humphreys (1978) p. 137, Austin & Vidal-Naquet (1977) p. 3 f, and Will (1954) P 10. This is to say that 
List and Hildebrand assumed that economic rationality and the mechanisms of demand and supply are 
constant companions of human social interaction. Only forms of possession and production may have 
changed. 
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to separate the economic history from general history rather questionable. 29 Antiquity is 
clearly associated with the stage of the 'integrated household economy', whereas the 'city 
economy' applies to the later middle ages. 3D However, as BUcher emphasised, these stages 
are not to be applied rigidly.31 According to him, the changes in the character of the 
economic spheres in different periods of human civilisation took place sometimes over 
very long periods of time, sometimes very quickly and rapidly, but he also warned that 
these Wirtschaftsstufen 'should not be confused with the 'Zeitepochen' in which the 
historian divides his stuff in' .32 BUcher adds though, that this method abstracts from any 
intermediate stages or rudiments of older stages preserved in some remote areas of the 
modem world and tries to grasp it in its pure essence?3 Alfred BUrgin has recently asserted 
that 'no matter how such stages [stages of economic development] are constructed - be it 
through Friedrich List34, Karl Rodbertus35 or through Gustav Schmoller6 -, none of this 
corresponds to a real historical epoch; and Karl BUcher's, the one of the 'integrated 
household economy ... , the city economy and the national economy do not form an 
adequate picture of the historical development' .37 In the light of BUcher's intentions 
mentioned above, to develop a separate and differentiated model to analyse the coming into 
being of the 'Volkswirtschaft', this criticism is perhaps based on a misunderstanding of 
BUcher's theory. BUcher ventured to write a theory of economic development instead of 
28 See Reil (1940) p. 20-21 f. 
29 EdVp.115 f. 
30 Indeed as Finley put it, 'for BUcher the theory of economic stagers is a necessary tool' (Finley 1979 p. 84), 
but it is difficult to see as to why these stages have to be theoretical abstractions of economic life, that are 
deliberately disconnected from historical periods. Was it BUcher's intention to separate the 'economic reality 
from the historical processes? Or did he think that historical writings are dealing fundamentally with different 
objects of inquiry? We should also note that BUcher discusses the concept of 'economy' ('Wirtschaft') not as 
a theoretical concept, but as something historically developed. See his discussion in BUcher (1808) p. 30 ff. 
We refer to the 6th edition of the essay collection Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft (1908) pp. 5-28. The 
essay is entitled 'Der Wirtschaftliche Urzustand'. 
31 That BUcher applied his stages vigorously and rigidly, was later a central point of criticism against him. 
BUcher points this out at the very beginning of his chapter on the 'Stadtwirtschaft' in EdV (1906) p. 116. See 
also EdV p 116 n2.and see 'City-types of Five Millennia' CGrojJstadt-Typen aus fonf lahrtausenden' in 
BUcher EdV (1908) pp. 355-382. 
32 BUcher (1906) pp. 87-88. BUcher seems to refer here to 'event history' (,Ereignisgeschichte'), which 
identifies historical epochs by aristocratic leadership or war. 
33 See BUcher EdV p. 91. We may add that BUcher's concept of the 'integrated household economy' shows 
some similarities to Weber's 'ideal-type', but the fundamental differences between them shall be elucidated 
under Part III. 
34 See friedrich List's 'Das National System der Politischen Okonomie' (1841) cited in BUrgin (1993) p. 68 
n112. 
35 See Karl Rodbertus, 'Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der Nationaldkollomie des Klassischen Altertllllls' 
in ljNS 9 (1868) p. 339 ff..cit. in BUrgin (1993) p. 68 f. n 113. 
36 See Gustav Schmoller 'GrundrifJ der allgemeinen Volks~virtschaftslehre vol. 2 (Leipzig 1904) p 666 ff.. 
37 BUrgin (1993) p. 68 f. 
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writing a history of the economy. Whether this theory of economic stages can give a 
plausible account of the course of economic development or whether it is still caught up in 
economic history shall become clearer after we have discussed BUcher's account of the 
'geschlossene Hauswirtschaft' ('closed or integrated household economy') in more detail. 
Nevertheless, the title of his essay and his famous essay collection 'The Emergence of the 
National Economy' seems to indicate that we are dealing with a work in the field of 
economic history rather than economic theory. 
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iii. 'Geschlossene Hauswirtschaft' 
BUcher arrived at his classification of antiquity as a 'geschlossene Hauswirtschaft' 
from Karl Rodbertus' premise that the ancient economy was based on the oikos and that 
this institution remained economically predominant throughout antiquity and even until the 
early middle ages.38 By doing so, BUcher focused in particular on the purpose of production 
and consumption as the key or criterion for his theory of the economic stages. According 
to BUcher the 'oikos economy' is characterised by 'production for personal use' 
('Eigenproduktion '), whereas In the 'city economy' 'production on demand' 
(,Kundenproduktion') was dominant. BUcher stressed that only the 'national economy' can 
be associated with 'commodity production' (,Warenproduktion ,).39 BUcher emphasises 
that the 'integrated household economy' is characterised by the fact that production and 
consumption take place within the same household (or family). Unlike the modem 
economy, the level of production is not determined by a market demand but solely 
determined by the need of the members in the household. This applies to the supply of raw 
material too, which is collected by the different members of the household rather than 
provided or sold by a third party. Regarding the circulation of produce, it never gains the 
status of a commodity (Ware) because it is never exchanged on a market. The produce 
remains with the producers until it is consumed by them. 'The sphere of production 
(Erwerbswirtschaft) and household are not separable' .40 
However, how can BUcher explain that certain households are much better off than 
others are, if exchange is solely confined to the oikos and the village community? 
According to BUcher, the success of a particular household driven community does not 
only depend on the skills of its members, but also on the fertility of the soil. A third 
precondition for running of a prosperous household is, for BUcher, that producer and 
landowner are one and the same. In other words, the ownership of land is the precondition 
of being able to plan and improve the results of their labour; it gives the household security 
and integrity. Furthermore, in order to satisfy BUcher's definition of the 'integrated 
household economy', all sorts of tools and devices have to be produced by the household 
38 Rodbertus' and BUcher's position are often seen as identical, which can of course only be attributed to their 
shared views on the character and extent of the ancient economy as dominated by the household. See Salin 
(1967) p. 16. 
39 EdV p. 87. 
40 EdV p. 92. 
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on its own too, an act which demanded an enormous variety of skills of which the 'cultured 
man' of modem times has hardly any knowledge or appreciation' .41 This seems to be quite 
a sarcastic remark against the 'modernisers'. Like them, BUcher was aware of the cultural 
sophistication and material splendour of the ancient cities. But, unlike his opponents, he 
did not conclude that the wealth of the ancient city originated in commerce and commodity 
exchange. BUcher explains the increases in the level satisfaction of household's member's 
needs as being due to the distribution of tasks and produce according to age, sex and ability 
amongst them. Although an expansion in the division of tasks and a certain specialisation 
in craftsmanship is an undisputed fact in the development of the household economy, an 
increase in the 'collective effort' was also an important contributing factor in satisfying the 
growing material needs and wants of the community. The 'closed household economy' is 
therefore not only characterised by a certain division of manual labour within the oikos, but 
also by the 'Arbeitsgemeinschaft' (working community) of its members.42 
BUcher does not only attribute the 'integrated household economy' to pre-modern 
village and clan communities of the 'grey past', he also claims that many communities in 
parts of Russia, Korea or Africa were still (in BUcher's times) very much incorporated in a 
system of an 'integrated household economy'. Although production during later stages of 
the household economy involved exchange of produce amongst the wider community (one 
may think perhaps of neighbours, for example), the unification of the work effort between 
households was mostly temporary or took place as a result of marriage or inheritance.43 
As we can see, BUcher does not only use evidence from fragments to support his 
claims, but seems to employ a comparative method of historical explanation too, which 
despite all its merits in accounting for the differences in the rationality of human 
interaction, assesses ancient social life alongside a modern concept of need for the tribal 
peoples. BUcher then makes the very error of which he accuses his opponents. 
In basing his theory on Rodbertus' position, BUcher pointed out that through the 
affiliation of strangers and enslavement of people in the Greek and Roman antiquity 'the 
house is not only a place of living, but means also the co-operative working group 
(otKE't(xt), .44 BUcher argued that despite the fact that with the emergence of mass slavery the 
size and organisation of the household changed considerably, products were almost entirely 
41 EdVp. 93. 
42 EdVp. 94. 
43 A consideration of compensatory justice in distribution does not seem to come into play in BUcher. 
44 EdVp. 99. 
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still produced for domestic use. However, the pater familias became the power who not 
only governed and ruled over the distribution of produce, but also decided over the life and 
death of the household members. Due to the concentration of all power in the hands of the 
pater familias the household experiences a much stronger economic power. 'All indi vidual 
existence has disappeared; state and law are only separated by families; they [state and law] 
regulate the relationship between house and house, but not between men and men' .45 
Bucher points out that 'from the economic autonomy of the slave-owning oikos originates 
the whole social history and a large part of the political history of ancient Rome' .46 The 
emergence of social tensions and change are explained with the following statement: 'If 
now a richer household forces a less wealthy owner off his house and farm, then he makes 
him a proletarian'47 - a person free of land and free of any means of production. The 
absence of business capital and the absence of wage labour and any kind of industry 
consequently forces land-free people into slavery, as it constitutes the only means of 
survival. They become, according to Bucher, craftsmen-slaves (,Handwerkssklaven '). The 
emergence of large-scale households kept the buying and selling of items at the local 
market place as an occasional measure. Bucher points out that the high degree of self-
sufficiency of the large estates was only possible due to the sophisticated degree of 
specialisation of those craftsmen slaves.48 At this point however, Bucher cannot resist 
comparing this high level of specialisation and the variety of produce under 'one roof' in 
the 'giant households' with the multitudinous shops of a modem city. The concentration of 
human capital indicates to Bucher an increase in the owner's assets, 'which can only be 
compared with the giant capital gains of the modem millionaires' .49 Another reason for the 
predominant self-sufficiency of the large estates, according to Bucher, was the ethos of the 
Romans in being proud to be able to produce all that is needed and wanted by them.50 
Bucher undoubtedly paints a very detailed picture about the organisation of the 
household in ancient Rome, which we do not need to reproduce in every aspect. It is 
important simply to highlight that in Bucher's account the numerous varieties of skills 
exercised, the work carried out and people living together did not change the character of 
the ancient economy qualitatively. Even though the landlord accumulated and acquired the 
45 EdY- p. 99. 
46 EdVp. 99. 
47 EdVp. 99. 
48 See EdV p. 100 n7 BUcher's example is Poma's Tit Popmae Phrysii de operis sen'orum tiber of 1672 
49 EdV p. 101. 
50 See EdV p. 102-103 f., EdV p. Ill. 
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produce of the farmers, and left them often with only the very basics, this produce was 
usually only consumption goods and intended for direct use. BUcher points out that over a 
very long period of time especially in feudalism, the trade of luxury goods was rare. 
Unfortunately, BUcher never clarifies what the farmers can expect by this 'certain service in 
return'. Secondly, rarity and the scope of commercial trade is not clearly defined by 
BUcher. 
BUcher further maintained that even during the early middle ages the household 
based economy remained largely intact, as the predominant fonn of economic organisation. 
The main difference between ancient Rome and feudalism consisted for BUcher in the fact 
that apparently under the latter system the clod farmer, for example, was able to keep a 
certain kind of 'economic' independence from the feudal lord. Whereas in Rome a farmer 
who was forced off his land was not any longer able to pay his taxes or to duties to the 
state, which led BUcher to conclude that 'the economic progress in antiquity was bought at 
the expense of the 'proletarisation' of the 'landless farmers' and craftsmen' .51 
BUcher points out that after the demise of the large Roman estates, the early feudal 
system did not replace the household economy. We should consider that at that time 
several villages created a large 'economic' organism. This maintained the ancient purpose 
of production, which was to satisfy the material needs of the community. This goal is still 
predominant in the feudal village economies of the early middle ages, which function 
internally and externally like a single enlarged household of antiquity and is therefore still 
regarded by BUcher as an 'integrated' or 'closed' system. 'Only the city states saw an 
industrious market intercourse in foods' .52 We see from this that BUcher never denied that 
produce was interchanged inside the boundaries of the community, but emphasised that the 
'small household economy' developed only quantitatively (in its size, degree of planning 
and level of organisation). Its self-sufficient character and autonomy remained an essential 
characteristic throughout antiquity and a long period of the middle ages. Lending and 
borrowing of food and tools works on the basis of solidarity and reciprocity.53 Trade hit the 
'integrated household economy' only on the surface. In other words, BUcher is willing to 
admit the existence of trade and the planned export of goods for sale beyond luxury items. 
But such appearances 'do not touch the inner structure of economic life. The household 
51 EdV p. 114. 
52 EdVp. 113. 
53 See EdV p. 109. 
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economy still receIves its impulse and direction from its own needs' .54 Hence, BUcher 
clearly does not exclude a possible existence of trade or moneymaking, but simply 
characterises it as negligible in the overall inner structure of the ancient economy. This is 
to say that in comparison to the modern economic system of capitalism, where trade is the 
most characteristic and the most powerful force, ancient social and 'economic' life 
remained fundamentally rural and self-sufficient. 
54 EdV p. Ill. 
PART I. BUCHER VS. MEYER 
iv. Exchange and Money 
Linked to BUcher's notion of the 'oikos economy' is a distinct definition of the role 
of exchange and money in antiquity and the early middle ages. Although it can be said that 
the latter role of money received a rather brief treatment by the author. BUcher's notion of 
exchange forms an argument against the well-established 'Prussian School' of political 
history.55 According to BUcher, these scholars claimed that exchange and circulation of 
commodities constituted a permanent feature or characteristic of almost every stage of 
human economic life and accused them of metamorphosing this assumption into an 
attribute of human nature far too uncritically and swiftly. In other words, they presumed 
that exchange is an essential component of human nature. BUcher asserted that such an 
attribution is problematic. BUcher argued in opposition to them that in the light of Smith's 
and Ricardo's value theories, exchange is only a result of an increasing division of labour.56 
Only the latter form of division of labour is held to be natural, BUcher added without 
explaining why and concluded from this that 'exchange' ('Tausch') is hence not a result of 
some sort of natural inclination by humans towards it, but that it is rather a result from a 
qualitatively increased division of labour. In antiquity, beyond and outside the household 
existed only 'temporary labour sharing communities' or a mutual temporary lending and 
borrowing of tools in cases of personal misfortune.57 This is not an economy in which 'the 
economic agent does not produce what he needs for himself, rather what [in his opinion] is 
needed by other agents'. In other words, 'the collaboration of many, or everyone is needed 
in order to satisfy the needs of one' .58 The latter part of this phrase constitutes possibly a 
meaningful definition of the 'national economy' (,Volkswirtschaft'). However, the 
problem concerning the above argument is whether or not we can apply this definition to 
all periods of human civilisation in general and to antiquity in particular. BUcher, by 
following Smith at this occaSIOn, argued that the 'exchange economy' 
(,Verkehrswirtschaft') was a very recent phenomenon and that mankind had lived and 
worked for thousands of years without exchange in its modem use of this term, but under 
forms of bartering products - a form which never involved production for export as in the 
'national economy'. BUcher suggests instead that exchange is not natural to men. It is not 
55 For a detailed discussion of this traditon see Part II.l and II.2.ii. 
56 See BUrgin (1993) p. 388 f. 
57 EdVp. 97. 
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permanently desired by civilisations. By using a weak etymological argument to support 
his claim, BUcher emphasises that 'Tausch' and 'tduschen' (exchange and cheating) have 
one and the same root in the old German language. In order to strengthen his point, BUcher 
adds that often when deals and contacts were made, at least a third person had to witness 
the deal, and illustrates that often afterwards one would be kept preoccupied by the 
possibility of having been cheated. BUcher noted that exchange among people had to be 
always characterised by mutuality. 'Not without any reason did Roman public law 
prescribe five witnesses for each deal that was taking place on a market place', BUcher 
stresses.59 The very rigid formalities concerning deals with outsiders and amongst citizens, 
not only in ancient Rome but also throughout antiquity, should give us enough reason to 
cast some doubt upon an antiquity of flourishing trade and commercial exchange, which 
the modem world knows. However, BUcher was only able to poinLout that ancient 
governments kept a close eye on what 'modernisers' may wish to call 'commerce' and that 
there was general awareness of the likely negative moral and political consequences of 
exchange for profit. Yet this does not constitute a sufficient argument to eliminate the 
possibility of a state controlled market economy.60 This weakness does not ease off with 
BUcher's claim that people generally do not like to give away the products of their own 
labour, since they would belong naturally to the producer. 61 BUcher simply replaces one 
presupposition about human nature with another, which looks equally arbitrary. BUcher 
concludes from this and the previous argument that nowhere during the stage of the 
'integrated household economy' did a 'dissected exchange take place' .62 This is a puzzling 
result. Did the ancients not use coinage, minting and standardised measures and scales in 
order to evaluate money and commodities brought into the polis? Is the existence of 
permanent local market places not itself proof enough to all sceptics that exchange of 
produce reached a highly sophisticated level and is therefore in principal very much like 
ours? 
Aimed against this critique, BUcher stressed that the function of money and 
measures are not introduced in order to engage into commercial exchange with other 
communities or outsider parties, but in order to fix general standards for paying due fines 
58 EdVp. 89. 
59 See EdV p. 113 
60 See Pohlmann (1913) p. 89 f. 
61 See EdV p. 96 f. 
62 EdVp. 97. 
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or tributes.63 Money in antiquity, BUcher highlights, was not simply a medium of exchange 
but also a means to pay tributes, fees, fines, gifts, taxes and compensations, etc. The 
introduction and circulation of coinage was primarily intended to improve bartering with 
produce inside a community but never intended to engage in trade with other city-states. 
As long as the paying farmers can expect a certain service in return for their tributes, 
BUcher believes that the 'integrated household economy', maturing in size and in degree of 
organisation as antiquity progressed, did not have specific prices, interest rates, wages or 
rent. BUcher adds that 'buying and selling, leasehold and rent could not have been daily 
affairs' .64 On the contrary, he points out that 'one should not get confused about the 
apparent opulent use of money .. .in early historic periods. Money is not only a 'means of 
exchange' ('Tauschmittel'), but also a 'measure of value' ('Wertmafi'), a 'means of pay' 
('Zahlungsmittel') and 'means of custody' ('Mittel der Wertaujbewahrung'). The latter 
purpose of money is the predominant one in antiquity. Because large quantities of 
payments, besides taxes and gifts, are originally rendered in the form of household produce 
(com, meat, slaves, etc.)65 'income and assets constitute a non-distinguishable unit 
('Masse') meaning non-separable' .66 The canonical ban on interest rates is not, therefore, 
for Bucher an arbitrary moral-theological act, but was rather economically necessitated in 
order to maintain the closed household economy. The Roman asset tax (tributum civium) 
was not introduced to restrict the profits of the landlord, but rather to finance public needs 
(ships, wars, celebrations etc.). Loans amongst households may have taken place, but they 
were usually interest-free and served consumption purposes and should thus be understood 
as 'friendly loans'. Capital loans are not system-compatible. As soon as interest rates 
enter the social sphere, it appears as unnatural and, as known from the Greek and Roman 
history, entails the perdition of the debtor' .67 
The use of money and the exchange of produce are neither explicitly denied by 
BUcher, but they all take place in order to acquire those goods, which the single person or 
household was occasionally unable to produce by themselves or within their community. 
Even if money was a common feature of 'economic life' in the 'integrated household 
economies', in BUcher's opinion, people were very suspicious about using it beyond a 
63 EdV pp 107-108 f. 
64 EdV p. 113. 
65 See EdV pp. 112, 115. 
66 EdV p. 115. 
67 EdV p. 115. 
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means of exchange. 
After a detailed description of the character and the developments inside the 
household, BUcher comes to the conclusion that the self-sufficient economic structure of 
the household, which primarily aims for the satisfaction of its own needs, is of an entirely 
different character from the modem 'national economies'. This is mainly due to the fact 
that a 'national economy' with multinational trade links and commercial export did at no 
occasion emerge in antiquity. There was no division of labour on a national scale, wage 
labour, businesses; neither were there commodities nor a circulation of them.68 However, 
whether this is a good argument to defy the possible claim that the ancient economy only 
differed quantitatively from the modem international economies of the late 19th century 
shall be investigated in the next chapter. 
68 See EdV p. 115. 
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v. Critique 
As we have seen, BUcher clearly argued that the character of exchange and the 
nature of production in antiquity were dominated by the oikos. His statement that 
'exchange was initially totally unknown '69 to mankind is not to say that BUcher 
categorically denied the existence of exchange, but claimed that its purpose is radically 
different from the way exchange operates in the 'Volkswirtschaft'. The oikos orientation of 
antiquity is then not to be understood as a mere reality, but as a theoretical abstraction or 
reduction in order to formulate a general characterisation of the ancient economy. The 
oikos type or mode of economy must therefore be seen as a meta-economical phenomenon, 
which dominated the material sphere of antiquity so fundamentally and transparently that 
even certain elements, which are economically influential in the modem economy, could 
only penetrate the household structure of antiquity on its very surface. If our interpretation 
of BUcher's view is justified, then assertions like those by Aubin do not present BUcher's 
position correctly: 'The opinion ... by BUcher, that there was necessarily a step-by-step 
development from the territorial economy, through the national economy to the world 
economy, describes the process of the growing interregional integration incorrectly' .70 As it 
is clear from the above remarks and to anyone who has read the EdV, BUcher does not use 
terms such as 'world economy' and 'territorial economy'. Also economic development did 
not take place strictly in stages, according to BUcher. As BUcher describes it, the processes 
of transition may be relatively brief, but he clarifies that 'the integrated household economy 
is transformed into the city economy during a process which lasted over hundreds of 
years' .71 BUcher's theory of modes or stages is a tool, which the economist can and should 
use in order to categorise the economic development (,wirtschaftliche Entwicklung '). 
However, we may object that the use of such 'stage theories of economic development' to 
classify the economic life of antiquity are nevertheless themselves products of the 
empirical/positivist movement inside the German NationalOkonomie at the end of the 19th 
century and therefore modernise the ancient world by the dubious application of modem 
methods and concepts. 
69 EdVp. 92. 
70 Aubin (1976) p. 222. 
71 EdV p.116. Even the transition from the 'city economy' to the modern 'national econo~y' span! centuries, 
from the end of the Middle Ages right into the creation of the nation-states of the late 18 and 19 centuries. 
See EdV p. 135 f. 
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Another weakness in Bucher's theory is that although he can perhaps accommodate 
what may at first glance look like a contradiction regarding the extent of the existence of 
exchange, the problem of the significance of money and commerce still remains. For 
example, Bucher stated that 'exchange is an alien element to the integrated household 
economy,n, but as he had previously pointed out that exchange of goods existed and that 
coinage had purchasing power, he should have defined the insignificance of the 
commercial elements more accurately. 
Also, throughout his essay, Bucher IS unfortunately not free from employing 
modem social and economic concepts such as 'proletariat' and 'competition'73, these 
concepts are part of the modem economic vocabulary. It is even puzzling in the first place 
as to where the competing incentive between households would come from if those 
households worked entirely self-sufficiently. Regarding the Greek polasi one may interject 
that one polis wanted to be more powerful or splendiferous than the other one. This would 
lead to an assumption that the ancient city-state operated like one oikos, an argument which 
Bucher does not entertain. The large estates of Rome may perhaps have competed against 
each other because of the greedy attitude of the pater /amilias, but Bucher did not introduce 
this possibility. 
A further controversial point relates to Bucher's argument of men's 'natural 
aversion towards exchange'. 'Cheating' and 'exchange' have different roots in ancient 
Greece and Latin.74 That they may have shared the same etymological root in Old German 
is irrelevant in respect of ancient Greece and Rome. Apart from this etymological 
misreading, Bucher's psychological speculations about our 'natural aversion' towards 
exchange is, to say the least, highly problematic. Using an empirical approach to 
characterise a certain part of human nature, based on some 'authenticated documents', 
immediately creates a burden of proof. Bucher did not supersede the conservative 
argument that exchange is natural to man; he simply stated an equally weak argument to 
counter it by saying that it is unnatural. As we saw, it is obvious that the nature of this 
argument is based upon mere speculation. Without knowing more about the 
anthropological determination of the human psyche, agency and the essence of the human 
society, we can never prove successfully what is natural, or unnatural, to us in an economic 
sense. Leaving aside the general question about the anthropological presuppositions about 
72 EdV p. 113. 
73 EdV p. 114. Here we hear also of entrepreneurs and profit making. 
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human nature. A fruitful result of this discussion was that we clarified BUcher's notion of 
exchange and contrasted it against the naiVe understanding held by his critics.75 
Regarding Bucher's argument that antiquity and feudalism were lacking the main 
characteristics of the 'exchange economy', that is that every service demands a specific 
return in the form of money/6 it is questionable whether the absence of such returns would 
not allow for commercial activity on a larger scale. BUcher's definition of money is 
insufficient here. The handing-over of slaves, certain luxury products or services could 
similarly be used as universal means of returns. 
Admitting that commodity circulation, transport, and exchange of goods and 
services were a reality in feudalism, Bucher argued that those exchanges did not take place 
amongst independent business partners. This claim that the free interaction of economic 
units (,Wirtschaftseinheiten') is 'alien to antiquity and feudalism, which depend to some 
extent on one another and which interact on the basis of specific communal contracts '77, 
does not automatically create a separate economic realm for antiquity. First of all, the 
'national economies' of the mid/late 19th century were also state controlled and commercial 
behaviour was sometimes heavily regulated (e.g. the economy of the Wilhelmian 
Germany). Secondly, the interaction of the large estates in the late Roman Empire was 
legislated and controlled by Roman law as it was in BUcher's time too. What antiquity and 
the early Middle Ages certainly did not have was an institutionalised economy on a 
national and international scale. This point was later added by Max Weber (see Part II). 
Bucher's claim that 'during the regular course of the economy there were no 
commodities, no price, commodity circulation, no income distribution and accordingly no 
wages' etc.78 has little argumentative strength. This appears to be a very ambiguous view, 
especially in respect of the 'regular course of the economy'. One may wonder, for how 
long and how significant were the 'irregular events' in ancient economic history? 
According to BUcher's model, the mutual give and take ('Austausch') among the 
members of the community was mainly based on co-operation, but never on competition. 
However, his point that a 'farmer is not a good farmer, who has to buy what his own field 
could give him' ,79 may give us a good insight into the ethos of the ancients, but does not 
74 Lat.Exchange = muto. To deceive = decipio 
75 Humphreys (1978) p. 137, Austin-Vidal-Naquet (1977) p. 3 f. and Love (191) p. 34 f. 
76 EdV p. 116. 
77 EdV p. 116. 
78 EdV p. 114. 
79 EdV p. Ill. 
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exclude the possibility of production by customers or export demand, as he is willing to 
admit for the 'city economy' of the later middle ages. After all, BUcher's model lacks 
clarity about what according to the law and documentation was prohibited or encouraged 
and what the social and 'economic' reality was like in Aegina or Constantinople. 
However, one of the most common criticisms against BUcher, that he categorically denied 
any kind of exchange in antiquity, has clearly been proven not to be true and is therefore a 
very inaccurate reading of the EdV and the ZGW. 80 
BUcher was most widely criticised for his claim that antiquity never escaped the 
stage of the 'geschlossene Hauswirtschaft', but also admitted the existence of exchange. 
Besides the advantages of such a theoretical model, the major weakness in this account lies 
with the definition of the 'household' itself, which is far too wide. BUcher seems to 
assume only a quantitative difference between what are essentially different 'economic' 
units. Do the large-scale estates and the ancient city operate 'economically' and 
consequently socially in the very same way as a small rural household situated in the 
vicinity of the pOliS?81 BUcher does not only face the problem that his definition of 
'production on demand' (,Kundenproduktion '), which is the main characteristic for the 
'city economy', takes place evidently in the ancient city and predominantly in the modern 
'national economy' too. If 'production on demand' was a significant characteristic in the 
city-states, then we could assert that small-scale capitalism existed in these areas. 
However, BUcher's categorical denial of the existence of flexible capital (in the form of 
wage labour) and export markets makes it difficult to argue that a national economy of the 
likes of the 1 ih/18th century could have flourished in ancient cities. However, the 
difference between the economies of the ancient city-state and the medieval city were not 
clearly drawn or discussed. These definitional weaknesses are sometimes overlooked in 
the contemporary assessment of BUcher's work.82 'Despite the plausibility of BUcher's 
position concerning the agrarian dominance of the ancient empires in general, it seems 
doubtful, given the evidence of the time, that BUcher could successfully convince his 
audience that the 'integrated household economy' persisted throughout the entire period of 
80 See E(JV p. 114. 
81 It might be possible that BUcher misread Aristotle's analogies between household and polis, but the analogy 
is, as Aristotle states it, not a parallel or an equating of the two. Pol. [1252b26] 
82 'Undoubtedly, the predominance of slave labour was in BUcher's eyes the more important explanation of 
the stagnation of antiquity, but the contrast between the progressive medieval city and the ancient community 
was already clearly drawn'. [by BUcher} Morley (1996) p. 17 
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antiquity and for most of the middle ages.83 Some of BUcher's contemporaries such 
Bluemner still regarded his position, despite this major error, as 'plausible'. Even if 
BUcher did not define the 'oikos economy' rigorously as an 'ideal-type', we clearly worked 
out on the grounds of his essay that the 'integrated household economy' is a theoretical 
abstraction and not a completely permanent feature of ancient sociallife.84 BUcher does not 
regard Athens or Rome as closed or integrated households, but the production of items 
remained confined to the oikos or the latifundium. The problem remains, however, as to 
whether the entertainment of a theoretical model of economic stages in which the 
undoubtedly diverse character of ancient 'economic' life is brought under the concept of 
the 'integrated household economy' is indeed an adequate and justifiable theorisation. 
Some other important questions also remain unrecognised by BUcher. For example, 
did the craftsman in the workshops of Athens produce his goods by customer orders? 
What kind of function and implications had the local agora for the life of the ancient 
citizens? To what extent did exchange playa part in the everyday life of the ancient 
communities? Even if the proportion of exchange was very minor indeed, as BUcher tells 
us, did it have perhaps a more significant cultural or social impact? Did, for example, the 
state-authorised transport of produce to other cities have any other function than to prevent 
famine or food shortages elsewhere? BUcher's failure or reluctance to address these crucial 
questions and to clear up some terminological confusions and light-hearted assumptions 
about human nature almost invites the polemic remarks and harsh criticism which it 
attracted from Meyer and his colleagues in ancient and political history; to which we shall 
tum to in the following chapters. Even though some of these criticisms are justified, they 
should not deflect from BUcher's achievements in developing 'a differentiated picture of 
ancient economy,85. He highlighted well before Hasebroek, Polanyi and Finley that 
exchange and trade played a much more insignificant role in antiquity than some 
modernisers, both today and in BUcher's time, would advocate. BUcher has successfully 
exposed the largely rural character of antiquity together with the purpose of production, 
predominantly for direct use by the members of the household or the estate. But he does 
not meet the methodological rigour, which he demanded so vigorously from his opponents 
83 EdV p. 116. BUcher speak of development that lasts for centuries and aims not to associate the middle ages 
entirely with the 'city economy' . 
84 BUcher does not use the term 'ideal-type' as Weber did later, but already attempted to define the ancient 
economy in its 'typical pure form' EdVp. 9l. 
85 Schneider (1990) p. 422. 
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in ancient history and political economy either. However, with Schneider's claim that 'the 
sources of ancient economic history show in opposition [to BUcher] that 'economic' 
development existed already in Archaic times, of which the most important characteristics 
was demographic growth, urbanisation and an expansion of trade,86, then we seem to be 
back to square one in the debate. BUcher acknowledged the existence of an 'economic 
development', and we pointed out the ambiguity of these words in the English language 
already. However, it is on Schneider's side of little help to introduce concepts such as 
'urbanisation' and 'expansion of trade'. As for these and other terms, they have no place in 
the preserved literature of the ancients. That BUcher developed a static model of the 
ancient economy or a stereotypical account of the 'economic' can only be said justifiably 
about the term 'integrated household economy', which BUcher was eager to keep as a valid 
theoretical description of the ancient economy. Its definition is by no means rigid, if not a 
little too lose. It seems that no event or political crisis, no war or slave uprising could 
shake the fundamental aikas character of antiquity and beyond. We must conclude that any 
change in the political conditions, no matter how fundamental, had at the same time an 
effect on cultural change, and had according to BUcher no fundamental effect on the 
'economic' organisation of Hellas or Rome. The social and 'economic' effects of slavery 
for example has hardly any mention. He claims that 'the entire social and a good part of 
the political history of ancient Rome can be explained from the economic autonomy of the 
slave-owning household' .87 
Finally, it is often asserted that BUcher's account of economic development is 
linked to a notion of 'economic evolution', which necessitates the emergence of the 
national economy. This problem together with some corrections that BUcher made to his 
own position after having been heavily criticised, shall be discussed in the end of this Part 
and in Part II. 
86 Schneider (1990) p. 423. 
87 EdVp. 99. 
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2. Eduard Meyer - the Modern Face of Antiquity 
and the Proper Task of History 
l. Biographical Note 88 
34 
Eduard Meyer (1855-1930) was born in Hamburg. He came from a lower middle 
class background. His father was a teacher, which allowed him to attend the well 
renowned lohanninum Gymnasium in Hamburg. Aged 24, he completed his postdoctoral 
thesis at Leipzig and chaired professorships at Breslau (Wrozwav), Halle and from 1902 
was in Berlin where he was a professor of ancient history until his retirement in 1923. 
Besides his many journeys to the Mediterrean, he visited England, Scotland and in 1925 the 
Soviet Union. He was also a visiting professor at Chicago between 1909-10. 
The Geschichte des Altertums (GdA) (first edition 1884-1907) was Meyer's most 
influential work and scholarly bequest to us, which gave him international prestige beyond 
the academic world of Germany.89 The American academic community flattered him when 
they acclaimed his standing as 'the most eminent living historian in the American public' .90 
His scholarly reputation earned him seven honorary doctoral degrees most notably from 
Harvard and Oxford. In 1919 Meyer became rector-principal of the prestigous Humboldt 
Universitat of Berlin. 
Although Meyer enjoyed his work abroad and the pluralism of the European 
cultures, his political pamphlets during World War I and his anti-Anglo-Saxon attitude 
mixed with a lavish dose of anti-Semitism during the 1920s did not benefit his previously 
renowned reputation in the eyes of American, English and French scholars after his death. 
Meyer's patriotic nationalism should however not be confused with what occured during 
the 1930s in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. During the World War and in particular 
during the years of economic and political hardship of the 1920s, Meyer headed and 
supported the 'Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft', an organisation which aimed 
88 The -following information was largely presented by Demandt (1990) p. 161 f. and Christ (1972) 286 ff. A 
very detailed portrait of Meyer's social background, education and early career steps can be found in 
Hoffmann (1990) pp. 208-254. and in 'Eduard Meyer - Zu Zeit und Werk' (1991) 
89 Unte (1990) p. 505 f. 
90 Demandt (1990) p. 16l. 
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to continue scientific research and provide higher education during a period of political and 
economic instability and chaos, which consequently led to desolate conditions at the once 
proud German universities. 91 
91 Unte (1990) pp. 505-537. The author highlights also an interesting aspect of the German economic and 
intellectual situation during the 1920s. 
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ii. Ancient History vs. Economic Theory 
BUcher's thesis of the oikos character of antiquity and of the early middle ages 
together with his theory of economic stages with which he challenged the method of the 
established historiography, were regarded as highly provocative by scholars of ancient 
history. However, the treatment of BUcher's arguments did not take place solely o~ the 
basis of a factual dispute, but were discussed in a polemic fashion right from their very 
occurrence.92 Although ignorance and a little dose of scholarly snobbishness were more 
deeply rooted on Meyer's side, BUcher and his followers were themselves not free from 
comments against the 'outdated' and 'conservative' methods in historiography. This 
created additional misunderstanding and hampered a compromise between the contrary 
positions. However, before we analyse those reasons, which left the BUcher-Meyer 
Controversy until the present without a satisfactory solution, we may first look at Eduard 
Meyer's counter arguments against BUcher's thesis. 
Meyer expressed his opposition to BUcher's position in a paper, which he gave at 
the 3rd Conference of German Historians in Frankfurt in 1895.93 Entitled 'The Economic 
Development of Antiquity' (,Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Altertum '), his essay 
intended 'to talk about a subject field of a general interest, which would clearly be of 
importance for today' .94 According to Meyer's judgement the subject of the 'economic 
development of antiquity' was of obvious importance. Amongst those theories was Karl 
Rodbertus' 'oikos theory', which Meyer deemed as 'widespread' especially amongst 
economists.95 'The position of those outstanding scholars', he remarks a little ironically, 'in 
support of this theory are however erroneous and yet, I believe, this theory stands 
hampering in the way of the proper understanding of antiquity in particular, but also of 
92 See Mazza (1985) p. 508 
93 Schneider (1990). The author emphasised first in brief the situation in the historical studies, before he 
turned to Meyer's arguments against BUcher. We shall analyse both sides of the argument first before 
analysing the intellectual background of the controversy in Part II . 
94 WEdA p. 81. The essay was first published in fjNS 9 (1895) and was reprinted in Finley (1979) The 
original page numbers are kept in the Finley collection. The essay is abbreviated as WEdA, The edition used 
here is reprinted in Meyer, Kleine Schriften 1 (1924). We shall also use his additional remarks in Meyer's 
essay on 'Slavery in Antiquity' (Die Sklaverei im Altertum) (SA) in Meyer (1924) 1 pp. 169-212. since both 
papers complements to Meyer's position about the character of the 'economic' development of antiquity See 
Schneider (1990) p. 431. From letters by M. I. Rostovtzeff and Georg von Below to Eduard Meyer it 
becomes apparent that Meyer planned an encyclopaedia of ancient economic history. See 'Eduard Meyer -
Zu Zeit und Werk' (1991) p. 17 f. 
95 WEdA p. 81. 
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world historical development in general,.96 Meyer argued that Rodbertus' theory, which 
defined 'the ancient economy as an oikos economy, ... contradicted all that we know about 
the state of affairs in antiquity' and is therefore hardly supported in the 'classics' 
(' Alte rtumswissenschaJt ').97 
However, from where did this 'widespread support' for the 'oikos economy' come? 
According to Meyer, its 'almost dominant' influence was present amongst. the 
'NationalOkonomie' and freshly restated with BUcher's paper Die Enstehung der 
VolkswirtschaJt, which should become the main target of Meyer's counterattack in the 
WEdA. 
We do not need to repeat Meyer's sketchy elucidation of BUcher's 'theory of 
economic stages'. However, although the selected detail of BUcher's arguments is 
displayed correctly in the WEdA, it must be conspicuous to everyone who read the EdV 
carefully, that Meyer's interpretation is focused on those passages which suggest that 
BUcher regarded the ancient economy as having experienced no exchange, mere production 
for personal consumption within the household and that the entire circle of production and 
consumption was inextricably linked and confined to the household.98 Besides Meyer's 
simplification of BUcher's position, he asserted that rudiments of the 'city economy' in 
antiquity are admitted by BUcher, but points out correctly with regard to BUcher position 
that any beginnings of a 'national economy' are not visible until the 15th and 16th century. 
In his own words, Meyer describes BUcher's stance as 'that an established economic 
structure with a richly developed transport system and a lively exchange of goods amongst 
the entire population, institutionalised trade and a cast of traders as procurers between 
production and consumption are plainly denied' by the latter. 99 Although Meyer does not 
deny the autonomous character of the oikos and its development into the large estate, the 
permanent presence of autarchic and self-sufficient households, which excludes the 
possibility of wage labour on a significant scale, are strongly challenged.lOo Meyer is also 
96 WEdA p. 81. 
97 WEdA p. 81. Meyer refers here an elsewhere mainly to Rodbertus' article 'Die Geschiclzte der Rdmisc/zen 
Tributsteuern' (,The History of the Roman Tribute Taxes') JfNS vol. 4 (1865), See also Rodbertus thesis in 
JfNS 9 (1968) 339 ff. 
98 See WEdA p. 82 ff. 
99 WEdA p. 82-83. 
100 In order to support this point, Meyer refers for the very first time to Weber's post-doctoral thesis Die 
Rdmische Agrargeschichte. Meyer supported Weber's point that the phenomenon of the 'closed household 
economy' was temporary and did not exist throughout the entire Roman Empire. See WEdA p. 83 n3. Note 
too that Meyer clearly acknowledges a village and household basis of the 'economy' of the primitive tribes. 
GdA vol. 1.1. p. 63 f. 
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concerned with the term 'autonomous household' (,Autarkie des Haushaltes') introduced 
by Rodbertus and re-employed by BUcher. Meyer used Aristotle's apparent claim that the 
'autarki' may apply to the polis but not strictly to the oikos' .101 For Meyer, BUcher's 
'integrated household economy' takes 'the character of a utopia ... a kind of 'isolated 
state' 102, which does not seem to take the diversity between ancient cities and during 
different historical periods sufficiently into account. Although Meyer granted BUcher that 
in antiquity farmers did indeed follow the wisdom 'that this one is a useless farmer, who 
has to buy what his own farm can provide him with>l03, as Meyer added, this wisdom does 
not constitute a peculiarity to antiquity only and supports therefore Varo's utterances, who 
demanded that 'the farmer shall rather sell and not buy' .104 The absence, or as occasionally 
qualified by MeyerlOS , the complete unimportance of institutionalised trade, wage labour, 
exchange and independent craftsmen throughout the entire antiquity, were however not the 
only assertions against BUcher and his followers. 106 
We saw earlier that BUcher aimed at a clear separation of his model of the 
'emergence of the national economy' from the method and periods which the 'historian 
divides his stuff in' .107 Meyer was made aware of this argument through Werner Sombart's 
theoretical attacks on Georg von Below, historian at Leipzig, at the 5th 'Conference of 
German Historians' at Heidelberg in 1903.108 We recall that BUcher saw his own 
presupposition of the 'closed household economy' in antiquity as a paradigm of economic 
theory, not economic history or a complete picture of reality.l09 To speak in Sombart's 
terms, such paradigms are designed to understand 'our modem economic life', and 
therefore, 'how the real circumstances were in the middle ages is not of interest to them', 
adds Meyer. 110 BUcher's theory of 'economic stages' aims indeed at an explanation of how 
the modem 'Volkswirtschaft' developed 'genetically' from the past and not how life in 
101 WEdA p. 88. 
102 WEdA p. 87 n4. 
103 WEdA p. 85. 
104 WEdA p. 85. 
105 WEdA p. 84 f. 
106 What also added fuel to Meyer's assertions was the point that BUcher, in his 2nd edition of the EdV left out 
the phrase that 'closed household economy' was predominant from the beginning of human culture to the 
beginning of the second millennium AD. From the third edition onwards, the line is drawn more vaguely With 
the 'earty Middle Ages' See EdV (1893) p. 116. 
107 See EdV pp. 87-88. .' . 
108 See Sombart (1902) WEdA p. 85 n4 ff. See also the newspaper comments about the Hlstonan Conferences 
in Schumann (1974) 
109 WEdA p. 85 n4 
liD See Sombart (1902). 
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antiquity or during Middle Ages really was. 111 The problem for Meyer here is that these 
models do not simply remain theory, but as we saw earlier, they employ specific historic 
and political facts.ll2 They use non-economic (theoretical) vocabulary and interpret these 
terms in a fashion to suit and justify the theory of 'economic development' in stages or 
steps. In other words, they aim to show how the modem economy developed from the 'city 
economy' and the 'city economy' from the 'integrated household economy'. In ord~r to 
achieve this goal, BUcher thought it was legitimate to abstract from anything accidental or 
irregular in order to focus solely on what was the normal or 'regular course of the 
economy' .113 
Meyer's criticism is fully justified if we set aside the pervasive polemic tone. 
Indeed BUcher did not discuss the problems surrounding such a theoretical approach 
sufficiently. For example, how significant are such irregular or accidental events for the 
characterisation of the ancient economy that do not fit the paradigm of the 'integrated 
household economy'. If all 'economic' (,volkwirtschaftlichen') phenomena are at the same 
time historical and cultural phenomena too,114 then BUcher is clearly not developing 
economic theories but is theorising over human history. If the paradigm of the 
'Oikenwirtschaft' would hold true and if indeed all 'economic' phenomena are at the same 
time cultural and historical, then it would follow that because of the absence of a 
'Volkswirtschaft', any form of production and labour carried out under the 'roof' of the 
household, small or large, would not have had any impact on the shaping of any historical 
event or any cultural impact in antiquity at all. If we now connect his aim to show 
historians how the 'Volkswirtschaft' really emerged, then we can understand perhaps 
Meyer's furious reaction over the hidden universality claim in BUcher's method over 
ancient history and not just economic theory. BUcher would have to admit that in fact he 
does not remain merely theoretical with the content of the EdV, but that he clearly entered 
the field of historical investigation. Otherwise his theory would remain merely a theory for 
its own sake and would not explain any phenomena at all. 
The polemical and furious responses by the established guild of German ancient 
historians, especially those matching the standing and academic influence of Meyer, Georg 
von Below for example, had in general little sympathy for such intrusions into historical 
III See EdVp. 86. 
m See EdV p .. 98 ff. 
113 See EdV p. 114. 
114 EdV p. 86. 
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studies stemming from those 'far higher ideas of the NationalOkonomie'.115 Meyer's cynical 
remarks become understandable in the light of the fact that during and shortly after 
BUcher's provocative EdV, 'Volkswirtschaftlehre' (the science of the national economy) 
was at that time in Germany still struggling to gain a distinctive methodological and 
historical foundation and to establish itself with an acceptable scientific basis. 116 
Further, Meyer asserted against liberal minded scholars such as BUcher that "they 
were 'obsessed by the aspiration to degrade the power and the importance of the state in 
practice and theory. Instead they intend to highlight the individual rights to freedom of 
movement and the importance of those organisation which were not founded by the 
state' .117 
We also noted above that BUcher regretted that the first edition of the EdV in 1893 
was a rushed piece of work. However, in the nine editions of the EdV, which were yet to 
follow, BUcher was only prepared to make very few modifications and amendments to his 
original thesis. These small alterations could not move Meyer at all to change his 
unfavourable judgement about BUcher's position. ll8 On the contrary, the 'absurdity' of 
BUcher's stance made it unnecessary for Meyer to take notice of any other later papers, in 
which BUcher aimed to clarify his theory to some degree. 119 Whether Meyer was correct in 
remaining ignorant towards BUcher shall be assessed in the final chapter of this part. Also 
any personal correspondence, however unlikely, between BUcher and Meyer, which could 
have cleared up some misunderstandings and perhaps opened up a dialogue in order to find 
a solution to the controversy, did not, as far as we are aware, take place. Besides the 
theoretical differences between the two scholars, there seems to exist an ideological divide 
between them, which went beyond the question of the nature of the ancient economy and 
any personal animosities. However, before we assess the possibility that these two 
positions were fostered in different political camps, we may sketch out first Meyer's 
counter position on the character of economic development in antiquity. 
115 See the polemic remarks by Meyer in WEdA p. 85 n4 f. and the criticisms by Meyer's pupil Gummerus 
(1906) and Parvan (1909) cited WEdA p. 88 n1. 
116 The situation in political economy, historical studies and in classics is assessed in Part 11.2-3. 
117GdAvol.I.1. p.16. 
118 Fineey (1979) respective in Meyer (1924). 
119 See Part 1.1 and 1.6. 
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iii. The Early Modern Character of the Economy of Classical Greece 
Meyer suggests instead of a linear and steady progressing economic development 
from the oikos to the 'Volkswirtschaft' a la BUcher, that each period civilisation, for 
example antiquity, lives through a stages of slavery, feudalism and capitalism. He argues 
that 'the first epoch of antiquity, the Homeric period ... stands in one line with the epoch of 
the Christian-Germanic nations and deserves to be regarded as the middle ages' .120 The 
classical or aristocratic period of ancient Greece correlates the 'early modem' period. 121 
Consequently, this meant for Meyer that slavery did not dominate the productive life in the 
classical period. Instead flexible capital in the form of wage labour and private property 
dominated, which makes classical antiquity economically comparable with the early ages 
of modem capitalism. Finally, the dramatic decline of the Roman Empire and a fallback 
into barbarism shows to Meyer that the 'economic development' of antiquity goes through 
a circle of rise, prosperity and decline and is not steadily progressing from the lower to the 
more sophisticated, as BUcher has maintained. This also forms the conclusion of Meyer's 
essay on ancient slavery (SA): 'Hence the circle is closed. The development returns to that 
point where it started from~ the medieval world order forms its rule for a second time'.122 
At this point we could perhaps suspect that BUcher's and Meyer's views on the 
oikos character of early antiquity and the early Middle Ages are very similar. Meyer indeed 
does believe that antiquity in Homer's and Hesiod's times (ca. 750-700) was dominated by 
household production. However, unlike BUcher, Meyer does not exclude the possibility of 
trade (,Handel '), which may have existed even prior to this period. 123 Although Meyer 
admits that in the early period of human civilisation a much smaller volume of trade 
existed, he nevertheless strongly 'suspected' that already 'even under very primitive 
circumstances trade, the exchange of foreign commodities for one's own produce, played a 
very big role'. In any case it is clear that, for all peoples who are considered in history, 
trade is one of the most influential factors in cultural development' .124 Meyer regards a 
sample of rare documentation of the ancient Orient and Babylon, Saba and ancient Egypt as 
120 SA p. 188 
121 See Brockmeyer (1979) p. 18 ff. 
122 SA - ." 212 P & . . 
123 WEdA p. 90. The term 'Handel' is used in the sense of the 'swapping of own products lor foreIgn 
commodities'. It is not the use of the word Handel, which is problematic here, but its application to 
'commodity' exchange in the barter 'economy'. 
12-l WEdA p, 90. 
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sufficient evidence in order to illustrate the highly developed character of ancient 
'economic life' as early as the 3rd millennium. 125 We hear of the Phoenicians that they have 
dominated the whole Mediterranean with their 'trade', the 'exchange of precious metal', 
'selling and buying of farms and houses, 'loans' (with interest rates of up to 17 - 20 % 
APR), 'rented labour and houses', 'inheritances' and so on. 126 According to Meyer, the 
evidence for this is to be found in the monuments and documents, which appar~ntly 
provide us with the certainty that the whole area of the Syrian-Arabic desert was 
'evidently' a network for trade with the cities constituting its centres that were holding the 
'industry'. Even in self-sufficient ancient Egypt of the second dynasty money played an 
important role. How important exchange and money really were, and what social impact 
they may have had, is unfortunately not clearly analysed by Meyer. 
When reading Meyer's WEdA it is difficult to resist the thought that Meyer was 
simply impressed by the grandeur of those early cities and the splendid quality of their 
produced artefacts. For many who know a little about the controversy itself, Meyer's 
picture of a buzzing economy in early antiquity described with modem economic concepts, 
this would perhaps be enough to conclude that Meyer had modernised antiquity 
irrespective of cultural and regional differences, but the matter is more complex. Meyer, 
like most ancient historians, had a strong enthusiasm for the legacy of antiquity and its 
complex, highly developed culture; religion, philosophy, the organisation of its states and 
so on. It is also difficult to see how the rise and fall of the great ancient cities and their 
cultures can leave anyone who has the slightest appreciation for the ancient world without 
fascination and amazement. It is also a common place for historians to fill in the gaps 
between historical evidence with speculation or conjecture. This was certainly the case for 
Meyer and many of his colleagues, as long as such speculations were not completely 
unfounded. The picture Meyer paints is most certainly a complex one, but not associated 
with modem capitalism, as Finley and Millett for example have argued. 127 However, both 
of the above arguments are obviously not convincing as they stand. Meyer argues that 
125 See WEdA p. 90 f. 
126 See WEdA pp. 90-98. 
127 See Millett (1991) p. 10 The fine difference is that the modern economy, which Meyer used as an analogy 
to the economy of the classical period was no near a developed capitalist market economy of the 20th century. 
Finley _and Millett face the danger to suppose that Meyer's understanding of early modern capitalism can be 
modernised as if Meyer supposed economic structures of the 20th century. As we have seen, even for BUcher, 
the characteristic of the modern economy was its national character. Meyer added the importance of the state 
in the ancient and early modern economy. This latter aspect seems to diminish rapidly nowadays. which 
makes 20th century capitalism distinct from its previous forms. The question what makes an age capitalistic 
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despite the strong dominance of the barter economy, goods have been traded and metal has 
been coined. The difference between these different epochs lies rather in the political 
constitutions of the polei, the organisation of work and the impact of slavery on society. 
The pre-Homeric period is therefore much more suitable to be compared with well-
developed feudalism instead of early modern capitalism, which has its parallel with the 
first millennium AD with its diverse forms of production and exchange. This is to say that 
although the household and the 'village economy' played a dominant part in the material 
supply of the community, trade and coining featured too. Although the trend towards 
urbanisation continued, villages shared a co-existence with the city and the former 
maintained their feudal power.128 Homeric Greece (ca. 750 BC) is thus characterised by 
Meyer with 'small farms, tenants, day labourers and beggars'.129 'The large estates owned 
by the wealthy landlords employed numerous workers' .130 Even though 'bought slave-
labour rarely existed during this period' , Meyer argued that due to an increase in the social 
rift between the classes, social tensions between the small farmers and the large estate 
owners were increasingly evident. This factor benefited the gradual rise in the number of 
recognised and distinct professions, which were emerging quickly mainly on the large 
estates in order to satisfy the ever-increasing demand for luxury goods of their aristocratic 
owners. With this ability to produce sophisticated pieces of art, weaponry, amphorae, etc., 
'the 8th century BC, experienced an enormous boom in trade' .131 More luxury goods and 
artefacts were available to satisfy the demands for these products elsewhere. Those 
precious 'treasures', which previously had to be often stolen or bought very dearly, could 
now be produced at home in even better quality. Hence, 'a flourishing sea trade begins, 
exporting commodities and importing raw-materials and the desperately needed corn'. \32 
We should note at this point that Meyer's argument rests on two premises, that of 
an ever increasing desire for luxury goods throughout antiquity and secondly the shortage 
of corn and home grown food in general, forcing the Greek cities into export. Proof of this 
is, for Meyer, that even the morally minded Homer had to admit that sea trade during that 
period played an important part in the regular acquisition of such agricultural produce. 
However, Meyer presents Homer's Odyssey in a way as if every ordinary citizen was 
shall be-dicussed again in Part III. 
128 WEdA p. 10 1. See 'the autonomous economy of the single household is the predominant form of Ii fe' 
129 WEdA p. 101. 
130 WEdA p. 101. 
131 WEdA p. 104. 
132 See WEdA p. 104. 
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forced and able to sail over the dangerous oceans of the world in order to purchase food for 
his family and in return to sell any half-decent artefact that his family made over the cold 
winter months abroad. Unfortunately Meyer's audience is left in doubt again over the 
intensity and regularity of such commercial endeavours. 133 One can of course imagine that 
during a drought, people had to resort to sell any home-made artefacts to the city, which 
were then sold off for food purchases by the government on board their hired fleets. This 
kind of exchange and the production of artefacts were not intended to be used for 
commerce i.e. profit making, but to prevent a famine. 134 Meyer's position at this point 
contradicts nothing that BUcher had not pointed out before about the predominantly self-
sufficient character of the satisfaction of material needs during this period. Than 'one 
neighbour helps the other' or the existence of Athenian produce found at Naukratis is not 
the same as commercial trade.135 To Meyer, despite the predominant rural character of 
Homeric Greece, 'these are the days of colonisation, during which all coasts of the 
Mediterranean .... are occupied by the Hellenics' .136 
The start of this Greek colonisation apparently boosted a dynamic economic growth 
with trade on a large-scale and in a large trading area. I37 'After Corinth and Chalcis, 
Athens took the lead in production and trade of export produce in the Classical period (6th_ 
5th century).138 'The Greek merchant even penetrates the centres of oriental trade and 
competes successfully with the Phoenicians and the Syrians'. And further, 'the 
development of commercial - very often also political - control of those enormous trading 
areas presupposes the production of export articles. Considering the smallness and the 
poverty, this could only have been farming products' .139 
Meyer faced the difficulty with his suggestion: how are we supposed to envisage 
the economic predominance of Greece at the end of the 6th century if its 'economic' 
landscape remained poor, small and largely rural? On what basis can a flourishing export 
industry develop if the ordinary farmer has difficulty in making ends meet? We could 
simply argue that those most affected by poor food supply were forced to settle abroad and 
133 Meyer refers here to a comment by Hesiod, who allegedly pointed out that 'besides farming, the second 
activity in which a decent man has to engage in is seamanship'. (WEdA p. 104) Besides the fact that Meyer 
does not leave us with a proper reference on Hesiod's thought, we may also wonder how frequently the 
ordinary farmer has to walk off his place and has to engage in seamanship. 
134 See Finley (1999) p. 169 ff. 
135 See Prinz (1908). 
136 WEdA p. 104, GdA vol. II 362 ff. 
137 WEdA p. 105, SA p. 188f, GdA vol. II p. 547. 
138 WEdA p. 114. 
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took their skills and gifts with them, but this would obviously not solve the problem. 
Meyer believed that with the export of artefacts, slaves were simultaneously imported to 
satisfy the increasing industrial demand and to bind workers to the 'large estates' 
(,Groj3betrieb ').140 Assuming an ongoing process of enslavement, the social and economic 
relationships and living conditions would change considerably, transforming Archaic 
Hellas into the 'money economy' of Classical Greece. Among the social consequences 
was the emergence of a new class of 'traders', 'salesmen' and 'factory owners' .141 The 
emergence of ancient entrepreneurs, was connected to increasing hardship of the existing 
farming class, which forced many of them to leave their land and to join seasonal and 
permanent work in the urban centres. This must have added to the pressure against the 
ruling aristocracy by strengthening the power of the merchants and factory owners at the 
same time. This gradual process eventually transformed the previously self-sufficient and 
largely rural character of Archaic Greece into a trade-dependent nation. 142 The further 
antiquity progresses, 'the more it penetrates the industrialisation of the Greek world and 
with it a progressive division of labour' .143 For instance, he claims that according to 
Xenophone's example, the increasing division of labour in the large cities as opposed to 
the variety of skills still performed by one craftsman in the small towns, 'can word for 
word be applied to the present conditions in the small country town of a few thousand 
inhabitants and the modem city' .144 However, Meyer is not prepared to characterise the 
'economic' relationships between towns and cities in antiquity in terms of BUcher's 'city-
economy' (,Stadtwirtschaft') and its production on the basis of customer orders. He added 
that 'that the large cities are rather a result of the thriving element of trade, which created 
export production, luxury and a further increased division of labour' .145 
The continuous urbanisation required constant economic expansion or colonisation 
of the entire Orient during the Hellenic period (4th - early 2nd century).146 If this course of 
social events really did take place in the scope and character described by Meyer, then 
parallels to the colonial past of the early modem times do indeed become apparent and 
139 WEdA p. 104 f. 
140 'GrojJbetrieb' is often translated as 'industrial estate'. However, the German term 'industrial' around 
1900 was generally more used to describe a production process known in the 18 th and 19th century. 
141 See WEdA p. III 
142 _. 
GdA vol. 1.2. p.555. 
143 WEdA p. 116. Meyer uses Xenophon (Cyrop, VIII, 2, 5), 
144 WEdA p. 116. 
145 WEdA p. 116. 
146 WEdA p. 135. 
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appear a logical conclusion. Undeniably, by comparing the economic circumstances of the 
14th and 15th century with Archaic Hellas, Meyer comes to the conclusion that both periods 
are very similar regarding the emergence and the spreading of manufacturing and 
commercial trade. 147 The classical period of the 5th until the mid 4th century BC is then 
associated with the early capitalist age of the 16th and 1 i h century, since the latter produced 
even more commodities for export purposes and was characterised by intensifying divi.sion 
of labour and flexible available capital. 
Meyer concludes the parallel nature of the ancient and western cultures that 'one 
recognises, how untenable the picture is, which BUcher has designed about the 
development of antiquity. The i h and 6th century in Greek history corresponds to the 
development in the modem times of the 14th and 15th century AD, the 5th corresponds with 
the 16th, /48 he adds, 'One cannot imagine enough the modernity of the ancient 
circumstance [regarding the 5th and until the mid 4th century BC], .149 
However, to any political theorist, Aristotle's words may come to mind 'that 
exchange for profit has no end other than 'getting a fund of money, and that only by the 
method of conducting the exchange of commodities' .150 And one may wonder, how such an 
early capitalist mode of economy could have emerged if they ancients are so conscious of 
the evilness of chrematisicae, the love of money.151 Meyer addresses this point by claiming 
that the real life practices differed considerably from the ethical demands and imposed 
sanctions of the philosophers. For Meyer, their moral appeals and condemnations of 
commerce by the means of philosophy and rhetoric are instead indications that the political 
reali ty had far from high moral standards. 152 He claimed that the state had to threaten to 
punish those who are living unjustifiably from state benefit, idlers or those merchants 
whose greed led to unacceptable exploitative behaviour. Meyer suggested instead that the 
high level of corruption indirectly led Aristotle to make pointed condemning and 
systematic remarks about the free tradesman in his Politics, but also to pay the whole 
b· h' 153 su ~ect not too muc attentIOn. 
147 WEdA p. 118 f. See Schneider (1990) p. 435. 
148 WEdA pp. 116-117. On the following pages see Meyer's discussion of 'democracy' and the difference in 
antiquity compared to modern democracies. 
149 Ed\! p. 14l. 
150 Pol. [1257b21 ff] cited in Meikle (1995b) p. 59 f. 
151 See Wilamowitz (1893) vol. 2 p. 353 f. 
152 WEdA p. 126. 
153 A . t tl P I II 4 13 5,6. and I, 5, 10. 111,2,8. 3,1 ff. See also Meyer's appreciation of Wilamowitz' 
-- ns 0 eo. ,., . 
(1893) vol. :2 p. 357 n5:2. 
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No doubt, this is one of Meyer's weakest arguments. Even if in times of 
'economic' crises the amount of corruption, petty crime and ruthless exploitation may be 
unusually high, for instance around the time of the birth of Christ or in the early 20th 
century, to interpret Aristotle's ethics as having been written as a polemic against the 
immorality of the ancients, is mere speculation on Meyer's side. This becomes even more 
apparent when we consider the classical period as a time of relative wealth and poli.tical 
stability. Meyer needs to demonstrate that during such crises, ethical philosophical 
literature booms and authorities tend to suppress reports on immoral social practices. The 
intuitive suspicion that it may often have been so perhaps holds some truth, but is in this 
instance too weakly argued. 
Although it is now clear that Meyer perceives particularly the archaic and classical 
Greece in many ways through the modem eye, we may also underline the fact that it is an 
invalid simplification to argue that Meyer assigned a modem character to antiquity as a 
whole. 154 It is also wrong to state that in respect of an alleged modem capitalist character of 
the classical period, Meyer did idealise such a system. Instead, this period receives very 
little appraisal in respect of the 'economic' circumstances of his own time. As we have 
pointed out above in conjunction with the classical period, Athens 'lived from hand to 
mouth' especially during the 4th century. According to Meyer, the picture in other cities 
was often worse. The behaviour of the 'big capitalists, who through skill and often through 
unscrupulous exploitation of every favourable situation ... created a proletariat increasing in 
numbers, leaving it with not having enough to live or to die, having to make ends meet 
either by mercenary services or by becoming bandits or pirates' .155 His illuminating reports 
about the great hardship of the ancient craftsman are frequently paved with comparisons to 
those early modem towns with their farmers and artisans living in deep poverty. For 
example, he states that 'the farmer is unable to exchange what he has produced for the 
things he needs; money gets in between, and the market prices are now dependent on the 
constellation of the large-scale commodity traffic, from the import of oversees products' .156 
According to Meyer, it is in fact the emergence of the money economy itself, oversees 
trade, etc., which brought the old patriarchal archaic system on to its knees. Excessive 
interest rates went hand in hand with the decline of the strong agrarian sector, which led to 
land tosses and impoverishment of farmers, who, from then on, had to trade their crafts as 
154 Finley (1980) p. 30. See 'Beloch-Meyer modernism'. 
155 WEdA p. 133. 
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free labourers in the cities. 
Besides the undeniable comparisons between certain periods of antiquity and 
modernity in Meyer's WEdA, the SA and the GdA, he elucidates also an additional and 
often overlooked fact. In opposition to some authors, Meyer clearly did not create a 
homogenous and monochrome picture of the ancient 'economic' life and underlined clearly 
the existence and importance of sometimes very 'far reaching' economic and cultural 
relationships between kingdoms and city-states. I57 Although 'economic' considerations 
play an important part in Meyer's assessment of the modem character of the classical 
period (economic history also became a fashionable subject in the late 19th century), he also 
highlighted the differences between what we may call 'ancient' and 'modem' capitalism. 158 
This dissimilarity is for Meyer to be found in the role of the polis, which is in antiquity the 
'only carrier of economic life' .159 The state seems to fulfil a central role in authorising and 
governing commercial activity, but how significant its role may have been in respect of 
'economic' matters remains unspecified by Meyer. BUcher too argued that 'economic' 
relationships did not take place between independent trading partners. It seems that at least 
for the archaic and the early classical period, Meyer casts some doubt over the 
institutionalisation of private business as unconstrained agents. 
Until this point Meyer had restrained himself from comparing Hellenic Greece (late 
4th to early 2nd century) with the 18th or the 19th century. Only on one occasion we hear of 
Carthage, which was already in the classical period due to its aggressive repression of 
'everything foreign' had a similarly large economic influence as Venice or the European 
colonial powers during the 1 i h and 18th century.160 The reason for the absence of the 19th 
century in antiquity will be elucidated below. By doing so, we shall find that Meyer's 
account of the cyclic economic development of the ancient cultures finds its conclusion 
with an analysis of the decline of the Hellenic world and the Roman Empire. Here his 
comparisons and parallels between modernity and late antiquity become most apparent and 
methodologically questionable. 
156 WEaA p. 109. 
157 WEdA p. 98 and p. 112 . 
158 We need to note that the term 'ancient capitalism' does not appear in the WEdA and In SA 
159 WEdA p. Ill. 
160 See WEdA p. 134. 
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iv. The Decline of Hellas and Ancient Rome 
"'The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" is still one of the most fascinating 
topics in historical studies in general' .161 This is how Karl Christ describes a topic to which 
Eduard Meyer has substantially contributed and which is still of great interest today. 
Meyer's relatively short but concise essays WEdA and SA regarding the subject of the 
'economic' and political decline of antiquity show much more explicitly the author's 
political commitments, worries and his philosophical background than his famous 
encyclopaedia Die Geschichte des Altertums (GdA) does. Perhaps Meyer expected that his 
papers would find a wider audience and would gain publicity, since they were presented to 
scholars working in a variety of different academic disciplines and therefore included 
political comments. The 5th volume of the GdA, however, deals similarly concisely with 
the issue of the demise of Hellas and Rome. With this investigation into the Hellenic 
period Meyer paints a rather bleak, but at the same time very complex, picture of a 
catastrophic ending of Greek civilisation. Besides its encyclopaedic qualities, Meyer's 
work also shows an intense reflection on problems and topics raised by Oswald Spengler's 
work Der Untergang des Abendlandes (The Decline of the Occident).162 
The decline of Hellas was sealed with the 'Hellenisation' of the entire Orient, 
which allowed overpopulated Greece to spread into Asia and found new cities, which were 
in general throughout antiquity the dominating carrier of culture. According to Meyer, 
through this process the Hellenic culture rises to become a 'world culture' (,Weltkultur').163 
The spreading of Greek civilisation and its artefacts led to an ever-increased concentration 
of the export industry in the large cities. Their serious advantage over the division of 
labour led eventually to the decline of the smaller, still largely self-sufficient country 
towns. The demise of Hellas emerged from the wealth of the cities, which crowded-out 
farming. Its impoverished rural population was forced to move into the towns and from the 
towns into the cities by selling their labour power 'as in modem times in England' .164 
Besides the development of large-scale capital, pauperism rose and the existence of large-
scale slavery made it difficult to absorb the roaming free labour, since slave owners were 
making migration difficult, by undercutting wages and efficiency in production. 'As town 
161 Christ (1983) p. 199. 
162 See Lehmann (1993) p. 78. 
163 See WEdA p. 135 f. 
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absorbs country, so does the city absorb the town' .165 The formation of such a metropolis of 
trade and production driven by the Hellenic expansions is by all means a modern character 
(18th century), which according to Meyer left the centres of Hellas increasingly depopulated 
and remote from the new trading roots and the centres of production. Internally, the 
increase of bureaucracy, a catastrophic public finance situation, property changes and the 
disintegrating power of Athens moved the whole of ancient Greek 'motherland' deeper-and 
deeper into crisis and eventually into decline. The result of this massive urbanisation 
connected with the decline of the smaller country towns now situated off the major trade 
roots, is of course not a sign of the recurrence of the early feudal system. 166 The social rift 
in property possession and political power has shifted to a deep social divide between the 
masses of proletarians and the 'ancient bourgeoisie'. The concentration of unimaginable 
wealth and luxury on the one hand, and devastating poverty on the other, led to a decline in 
production resulting in a desolate farming sector and a decline of the handicraft skills due 
to a backdrop of demand. The high degree of specialisation in the crafts created also a 
further inflexibility in adapting to broader and more basic demands. For Meyer, the blame 
for this devastation is to be carried by men's greed and improvidence, which led to a 
dramatic drop in birth rates and marriages for mere selfish reasons. 167 Besides this 
psychological or sociological point, we should not overlook the fact that 'slavery had a 
corroding impact' on the political stability in the polis. 168 The fruits of the Hellenic 
expansion are for Meyer visible in the 'Lagidenreich' of Alexandria, which 'governs now 
the powers of modem life - trade, money and education - which are concentrated in its 
capital' .169 Meyer pointed out in respect to this period that in 'opposition to the commonly 
held view, which is also vulgarised amongst the scientific community, we cannot think 
modern enough' .170 He also adds in a footnote that 'it is a tale, which causes a lot of 
mischief that the ancient scholars thought differently from modem scholars' about the 
nature of mankind. 171 This modem understanding of the decline of Hellas should however, 
according to Meyer, not be applied to the 19th century, but to the 1 i h and 18th century, a 
position which he would modify later. Meyer points out that in those days 'wind and 
164 WEdA p_ 133 f. 
165 WEdA p. 137. 
166 See- WEdA p. 138. 
167 See WEdA p. 139 f. 
168 See WEdA p. 129. 
169 WEdA p_ 139. 
170 WEdA p_ 141. 
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weather' as well as the transport conditions often hampered a flourishing sea traffic, which 
was also disturbed by devastating wars. This is however not to say that Meyer denied that 
a 'Volkswirtschaft' in the Bticherian sense did not exist already in this period. 172 The reason 
for this brief sketch of Meyer's ancient history is not only of historiographical interest. His 
account of the decline of Hellas was strongly influenced by the traditional scholarship of 
Blichsenschtitz, Bockh and also Pohlmann, all mentioning some geological considerations 
too. However, the data and significance for a meteorological investigation is a little 
dubious and has only recently become subject to detailed geological analysis. 
Meyer's application of modem terminology such as 'plant' or 'industry' In the 
context of the Hellenic and the Roman Empire is not only due to a lack of distinct concepts 
in economic history as Schneider asserted, but rather intentional. 173 If we allow that Meyer 
knew about the difference between 'Fabrik' and 'Werkstadt' ('plant' and 'workshop'), then 
the reason for using such modem concepts must lie elsewhere. Meyer did not only draw 
parallels between archaic Greece and the Middle Ages, but saw also similarities between 
Hellenic Greece and Rome. He claimed that when the Greek culture spread out from 
Askra, Athens and Alexandria, it became shallower and therefore more vulnerable. This 
fact allowed for the rise of the Roman Empire, which played previously only a marginal 
role. Rome went through a similar course of social development. From a rural small scale 
farming economy to large-scale capitalism. 
Rome's attainment of 'world domination during the period of the Republic (300 
BC-68 AD) could only be achieved by expanding its territories. This power 'was the work 
of the publicly and militarily organised farmer cast' .174 During the Roman Republic farmers 
were still carrying out most of the work by themselves or with the help of a few slaves. 'In 
the cities namely of the south but also in Rome has a not unimportant industry developed, 
trade and financial transactions playa big role' .175 The fast emerging progress led, however, 
to a shift in the political powers from the farming class to those new wealthy citizens of the 
cities. The crowding-out of the essential conditions of the small farmers' existence led to 
'devastating and permanent agrarian crisis'.176 Similarly, during the Hellenic period, the 
increase in human wants and the concentration of wealth in the cities led to a dramatic 
171 WEdA p. 141 n2. 
172 WEdA p. 14l. 
173 Schneider (1990) p. 435. 
174 SA p. 203. 
175 SA p. 203. 
176 SA p. 204. 
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increase in the migration to the cities. However, the main cause for the decline of the rural 
stand was the increase in cheap com imports and 'the small farmer cannot any longer defy 
the foreign competition'.177 The more efficient slave farming latifundi relatively quickly 
crowded out the institutionalised small farming stand. 
'The city economy based on tenant-ship and free craftsmanship is no longer 
effective; instead large numbers of prisoners, which the big wars threw onto the market 
annually, form the material which costs little money and can be fully exploited'.178 How the 
destruction of the countryside by the latifundi went ahead is not primarily important to 
Meyer. However, the intensity of the exploitation of the slaves constitutes a well known 
explanation for the insurrections of the 1st and 2nd century AD. 'They were of course not 
reactions against the institution of slavery per se - since no one was able to pose a serious 
threat against it', but because the latifundi had to resort to enslavement of previously free 
citizens of Greece and Egypt in order to satisfy the fast-increasing demand for more 
labourers. 179 'This is how the devastating effects of slavery can appear to us. One may 
maintain that a similar development in modem times - the period of free labour, is 
absolutely impossible. I would like to doubt whether this is correct' .180 'The idea to import 
Chinese drudges into Germany will be difficult to realise, but how significantly the rural 
population has declined and drained off into the cities is well known' .181 The examples 
used by Meyer are the poor rural areas of the Lausitz in north-eastern Saxony - the south-
east Elbian territories about which Max Weber has written his influential post-doctoral 
thesis. 182 The vast concentration of capital and its uprooting power led, as previously in 
Hellenic antiquity, to the decline of the independent cities with a shortage of resources and 
a loss of identity. The downfall of the Roman Empire, which preceded the return to the 
barter economy (,Naturalwirtschaft') indicates that the circle of economic development of 
antiquity is complete once again. I83 However, there is a comment by Meyer which is often 
overlooked which indicates that he did not apply the problems of modem Germany to all 
aspects of the Hellenic period or the late Roman empire. The main reason for Meyer is that 
'the ancient world became culturally and politically a unity and therefore did not have the 
177 SA p. 204. 
178 SA p .. 205. 
179 See SA p. 206. 
180 SA p. 207. 
181 SA p. 207 f. 
182 See Weber (1991). 
183 W£dA. p. 150. 
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necessary export markets'. In contrast 'modem heavy industry does crucially depend on 
the development of and the extension of foreign export markets' .184 From the period of the 
emperors (2nd century) the system of slavery was in decline. For this time, Meyer asserts 
that the large estates did indeed live and produce for their own needs and wants, but what 
may be correct for the late Roman empire cannot so easily be applied to antiquity as a 
whole as the 'popular understanding' likes to argue. 185 This assertion is obviously directed 
against BUcher's and Rodbertus' 'Oikenwirtschaft'. The ebbing of slavery caused by the 
enfranchisement of slaves led to a strengthening of the rural areas, which were previously 
neglected. However, the decline of antiquity is not to be explained with industrialisation 
and free wage labour, but is rather due to a shift from the urban centres back to a feudal 
system. Meyer argues vehemently against the positions held by Schmoller and Mommsen 
that the institution of slavery led to antiquity's decline. 186 'The best proof that slavery did 
not playa role in antiquity's decline is that the 'question of slavery' (,Sklavenfrage') did 
not exist anymore during the period of the emperors, and significant uprisings of slaves did 
not occur any more ... slavery died out gradually until the beginning of the modem period 
['Neuzeit'] , which was exclusively due to the transition of the 'economic' 
circumstances' .187 'The development returns to the point where it began; the mediaeval 
world-order gains power for the second time' .188 
This period of decline (mainly the Augustan 354-430AD period) was called by 
Theodor Mommsen the 'evening' ,189 Eduard Schwartz called it 'the autumn'l90 and Eduard 
Meyer called it the 'old man's age' of the Roman Empire. 191 This was the last period before 
the final collapse of the empire leading up to the disappearance of the ancient civilisation 
all together. Meyer, as well as Mommsen, blamed the decline of the Roman Empire, 
politically, on imperialism, economically on capitalism and morally or culturally on the 
d d f · . l'f 192 eca ence 0 ancIent CIty I e. 
184 SA p. 208. 
185 SA p. 208. 
186 See SA p. 210 f. 
187 SA p; 210. 
188 SA p. 210. This is the final remark of Meyer's SA. 
189 Mommsen (1856/1909) vol. III p. 630. 
190 See Schwartz 'Weltreich und Weltfriede' [Speech 01/10116] in Schwartz (1936/63) vol. I p. 173 f. 
191 See Demandt (1990) p. 166. 
192 Demandt (1990) p. 165. 
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v. 'Et Pax Anglosaxonia Pax Romana ESt,193 
The well-balanced and differentiated picture of the gradual decline of ancient 
Hellas and Rome elaborated in the GdA, the SA and the WEdA, earned Meyer the reputation 
of being one of the 'most eminent historians of his time' .194 From the above sketch of his 
account on the character of the 'economic' development of antiquity, it is perhaps diffIcult 
to see why his opponents, mainly amongst the 'NationalOkonomie', argued with such 
harshness against his position. Meyer's political commitments and views are essential 
ingredients in understanding the polemic course of the Controversy in all its aspects. 
Meyer himself was a dedicated supporter of the 'Prussian-German nation state'; as 
an enthusiastic historian he warned frequently about the danger if politics is no longer able 
to control the enticement of wealth and power in modern politics. Such failure had its 
devastating historical examples in 'capitalist' Hellenic Greece and in 'imperialistic' 
Augustinian Rome, which led due to the economic transition, to their cultural decline. 195 
For Meyer with the social and economic crisis of Western Europe during the second 
quarter of the 19th century and the first quarter of the 20th century, the vicious historical 
circle of decline was reached again. For example, Meyer raised the question whether mass 
unemployment like in the German Reich could not have had parallels to economic 
problems in the ancient cities, when they lost their export markets?196 Most worrying to 
Meyer was that certain essential contemporary problems showed, according to him, 'the 
very same structure and pattern as certain political crises in antiquity', which in the latter 
case, led eventually to antiquity's decline and disintegration. He thought that this would 
also be conceivable for the German 'Kaiserreich', which faced the very same existential 
crisis as ancient Rome did. Meyer was however not a fatalist. If this demise of Germany 
would be the logical consequence, or the rational conclusion of history, then every decent 
patriotic scholar must stand firmly against those political and social forces that could 
seriously contribute to the decline of the German nation. 197 Meyer's committed patriotism 
manifested itself most clearly in his writings at the outbreak of, and during, the World War, 
193 The idea for this headline stems from a similar article title by Meikle (1989). 
194 See Badian 'Eduard Meyer's America Paralipomena' in Demandt (1990) p. 161. 
195 See Schneider (1990) p. 443. 
196 SA p. 201. 
197 See Meyer (1924). For Meyer's America and England 'picture' see 'Eduard Meyer - Zu 
Zeit und Werk' (1991) pp. 45-54. 
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which was a crucial historical event and forced the established historical scholarship to 
rethink their theoretical positions. The new dimension in German historiography was the 
attempt to agitate against the fatal effects of a possible American or Russian domination of 
Europe. This includes of course a scientific effort to predict history instead of restraining 
oneself to the mere 'understanding' of the past. 198 For Meyer, the fundamental example was 
the decline and collapse of ancient cultures put into the context of a possible demise of 
Western culture. We noted above that in the WEdA and the SA the analogies between 
antiquity and modem times ('Neuzeit') fell silent with the 17th and 18th century. Apart 
from one occasion, Meyer excluded explicitly the late 19th century for any comparisons 
with late Rome or the Hellenics. 199 The character and sheer scale of the World War changed 
the explanatory importance of the decline of ancient Rome in the minds of German 
historians and in Eduard Meyer's perception in particular. Never before had Meyer drawn 
such straight and drastic parallels between the modem and the Roman worlds as in his 
political and polemic essays and 'war papers' ('Kriegsvortrage'), where history had to 
serve certain ideological ends.20o 
After the Napoleonic liberty wars, the early-mid 19th century Europe was largely 
characterised by the peaceful and sometimes bellicose formation of competing and 
coexisting industrial national cultures. The optimistic, commerce-driven spirit of 
modernity, which rested largely upon the Enlightenment ideal of the superiority of mankind 
to be able to control nature by the means of the empirical sciences, ran dry and into a deep 
crisis with the outbreak of the World War, through which Europe witnessed a culminating 
struggle for universal hegemony.201 For Meyer, as during the period of Hannibal, modem 
Europe had lived out its zenith and he predicted that it would lose its political importance 
or would exhaust itself in wars between its battling nations. 202 This event and its gloomy 
prospect must have had a strong psychological impact on Meyer. Whilst during the 1890s 
and into the first decade of the 20th century, Meyer's analogies between modem and ancient 
times were carefully thought out and expressed a differentiated picture, his later political 
writings, in particular during and after the World War, seem to be 'more the works of 
198 This aspect shall be further investigated in Part I.2.v and shall be extensively discussed in Part II. 
199 Demandt's claim that these parallels ended in the 16th century already is incorrect. (1990) p. 165 See 
Meyedl91O) p. 1258. . 
200 The following points are linked to Meyer's essays 'Nordamerika und Deutsc/zland, . Weltgesclllclzt~, 
Haniball' and 'England wzd der Krieg' in Meyer (1924a). The basic idea is taken from Demandt (1990) In 
Calder III (1990) pp. 163-207. 
201 Demandt (1990) p. 166. 
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passion than the work of science', his friend and colleague Friedrich Meinecke had 
remarked in 1913.203 
According to Meyer, Europe had lost its dominating power in the world and after its 
archaic and its classical period had now entered its late period ('Spiitzeit') - the last act had 
begun. The only open question was who would benefit from this dramatic conflict? At the 
very beginning of the war, Meyer thought that Germany played the role of Rome.. If 
Germany was to lose this war Russia would overrun it, he claimed.204 If both nations would 
bellicosely exhaust themselves against each other, Meyer feared that the Asian nations 
would benefit and gain a predominant power in Europe.2os However, this perception was to 
change considerably towards the end of the war when its tragic outcome and sheer scale of 
mass destruction loomed as an unavoidable consequence. Now Hannibal became 
Hindenburg, in the sense that both political figures were patriots and fighters for a 
pluralism of coexisting nation states, and Germany was Carthage.206 Here we are reminded 
of Brecht's famous analogy expressed when the Nazis came to power 1933.207 Analogies of 
this kind are common in poetic literature, but do they have a place in scientific historical 
writing? In order to draw such analogies, Meyer must have set aside almost every 
substantial political difference between modem Germany and ancient Carthage. Or did 
Meyer reduce the political circumstances to its greatest common denominator? Although 
the Semitic Carthagian culture was not usually regarded in a sympathetic light by 
academics and politicians across Europe during the late 19th and early 20th century, it was 
nevertheless for Meyer a highly suitable example of what could happen to a flourishing 
nation if culturally and politically run over by an aggressor. 208 
In the years of war, Meyer also drew analogies between Rome and Germany, both 
domestically and in respect of their international relations~ this formed 'a striking 
202 Demandt (1990) p. 161 n30. 
203 Demandt (1990) p. 162 nIl. Cf. Meinecke (1962) vol. VI p.61. 
204 See Meyer (1910) p. 214, 256. Meyer (1915) p. 200 ff. And see also Meinecke's comments on Meyer's 
pessimism during the World War in Meinecke (1962) vol. VI p. 76. 
205 See Demandt (1990) p. 166. 
206 Meyer (l924a) vol. II p. 543. 
207 'The Great Cartage led three wars. After the first one it was still powerful. After the second one it was 
still inhabitable. After the third war one could not find it anymore'. Brecht (1933). 
208 GdA vol. 1.2. p. 415 f. If we compare GdA vol. 1.1. pp. 73-80. It is clear that Meyer rejects any racially 
discriminating and anti-Semitic arguments as part of social anthropology. He highlights instead the ancient 
civilisations did not know any discrimination on the basis of race, even not against the 'Negro cultures' and 
that the term 'race' (Rasse) is a rather modern concept. On the subject of intellectual and popular anti-
Semitism before the Holocaust see very recently Lindemann (2000). 
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analogy' .209 Meyer reaffirmed the old reproach against America that what is often 
interpreted as Rome's 'just wars' against other peoples, were in fact aggressive wars. The 
claim to preserve world-peace and peoples brotherhood were for Meyer purely hypothetical 
and artificial constructions to shield the imperialist intentions of ancient Rome and now of 
modern America. 210 According to Meyer, Rome was culturally colonised by the Greeks and 
then went on to dominate the world economically. America was also built on European 
culture and was now about to Americanise Europe commercially.211 Such swift 
comparisons occurred in Meyer's writings in particular towards the end of the World War, 
where the images of rising 'Dollar Sun' and of the 'American Way of Life' started to gain a 
foothold in Western Europe influencing millions, poor and rich, to try their luck across the 
ocean. America's cultural representation across Europe was for Meyer a clear sign of a 
cultural and political decline in Europe culture, and he was certainly not alone with his 
anti-Anglo-Saxon fears and sentiments. Encouraged and infuriated by the Versailles 
Treaty, nationalism and racism found a fertile ground amongst the German public and in 
parts amongst its intellectuals. Even parts of the dethroned German aristocracy and parts 
of the social democrats and communists joined the anti-America campaign, which was 
primarily directed against its commercial values and so called 'libertarian principles'. As 
with the rejection of 'Manchester Capitalism' in the late 19th century, to Meyer and many 
others it was clear that commercial freedom fitted well with America's economic strategy 
to make Europe commercially and hence politically dependent. 
For Meyer though, cultural progress and flourishing societies could only develop 
inside and amongst free nations, which are able to coexist with one another peacefully and 
only with a minimum of bellicose force, but never with the aim of eradicating neighbouring 
countries. Once occupied and run as a satellite or colony, the cultural decline of the 
particular nation is inevitable. In history, according to Meyer, this was particularly true for 
the Roman Empire and was to repeat itself for the European nations if they would not resist 
this cultural and economic annexation. Rome was blamed for the downfall of antiquity. 
Now, 'the guilt for the decline of Europe is to be carried partly by England but mainly by 
America' .212 A last opportunity to avert the demise of Europe was missed with the failure of 
209 Meyer (l915b) p. 37. 
210 Meyer (l915b) p. 250 cited in Demandt (1990) p. 170. 
211 Meyer (1915b) p. 260. 
212 Meyer (1915) p. 21:2. 
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the Southern States to create a counterbalancing power to the Union States.213 
Such fears of an American global superpower were common place amongst 
European historians and were particularly drastically formulated by German scholars for 
obvious reasons. For example, Friedrich Meinecke argued alongside Meyer that analogous 
to the Pax Romana, a Pax Anglosaxonia would govern the world economically and 
politically.214 That is to say, that as the Greek city-states in the Roman Empire were forced 
to do so, the nations of Western Europe might continue to exist, but only as 'shadows' of 
their former selves and by sacrificing their national integrity. 'However, almost certainly 
we can expect a cultural mishmash under an Anglo-Saxon rule', of which Meyer as well as 
Meinecke were both not very fond of. 'The autonomy of the states and nations is from a 
world-historic viewpoint eventually over' ?15 Meinecke's concerns are similar to Meyer's, 
that of a 'cultural uniformity of a denationalised global empire' .216 As we noted above, 
Meyer maintained that Prussia-Germany and America are related to each other like 
Carthage to Rome. However, Meinecke compared Germany rather with Macedonian-
Greece, which has at least some justification in the light of the great but doomed effort to 
recreate the spirit of Hellas by the German Romanticists such as Herder and Schiller and 
the legacy of classical Greece amongst the Humanists like Holderlin and the Humboldt 
brothers.217 This idealisation of the Greeks for education, architecture and German literature 
could of course not escape the sarcastic and ironic comments by the 'free spirits' Heinrich 
Heine, and later Friedrich Nietzsche. 218 For Meyer and Meinecke, Germany was the last 
serious power of pan-European nationalism, which stood against the decline of European 
cultural coexistence and was therefore a nation which deserved for itself a 'place in the 
sun' .219 This was a strong attack against American cultural and corporate imperialism, 
which according to Meyer imprints its morality, its economic capitalism and culture onto 
213 Meyer (1924a) vol. I p. 256. See also Meyer's pupil and colleague Ulrich Kahrstedt (1925). 
214 A good overview about the life and academic achievements of Friedrich Meinecke can be found in Heuss 
(1957) pp. 329-350. 
215 Meinecke (1919) p. 98 ff. 
216 Meyer (1916) p. 23. 
217 The sympathy of the German 'Geist' towards Greece goes back as early as the 16th century, which was re-
emphasised and re-employed in various different ways by the German enlightenment thinkers Winkelmann 
and Herder, Schiller, Goethe and Holderlin that influenced critical thought in the 19 th century. 
218 Characteristic of the enlightenment view of human nature was to regard all humans as being of the same 
anthropological nature, which led to an idealisation of human reasoning in theor~es of the n~tural. right. 
'Naturrecht', which has its roots in antiquity. Heine and Nietzsche did not argue agamst Aristotle s ethiCS ot 
character building within the just polis, but against the romanticism of the ancient ethos by Herder, Goethe 
and Schiller. See Heuss (1957) p. 354 f. 
219 See Demandt (1990) p. 168. 
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the nations of Europe. 
When in 1919 international demands for the extradition of war criminals were 
raised by the allied forces, including the German Kaiser Willhelm II, a storm of protest 
broke out at German universities and amongst politicians across existing ideological 
divides, turning Meyer's previous affiliation with British and American universities sour. 
He blurted out proudly that he 'ripped apart his honourable doctoral degrees from Oxford, 
Liverpool, St Andrews, Chicago and Harvard' .220 According to Meyer, the outcome of the 
war and the economic stranglehold of the Treaty of Versailles programmed an 
unforeseeable number of wars yet to come.221 As we know, Meyer was right in his 
assessment, but he gave a one-sided prediction about future causes of such conflicts.222 
Still, in 1929 he wrote in a letter to Oswald Spengler that America was to him 'one of our 
most disgusting enemies' .223 
Always aware of the changing political climate, Meyer in his 'Principal Speech' at 
the Humboldt University Berlin in 1919 argued that with the emergence of the Weimar 
Republic, the collapsed German monarchy only formed an intermediate stage in the 
development of the German nation. This was a point which Meyer had not previously 
made. Although Meyer rejected the newly constituted democratic system in Germany 
because it would apparently remove individual responsibility and replace it with state 
administration;224 he acknowledged at the same time that in opposition to French 
materialism or Anglo-Saxon individualism, the German Social Democrats preserved at 
least a kind of idealism. 225 This was certainly true for many parts of 'Sozialdemokratie' who 
regardless of their internationalist manifesto prioritised the 'national question' not only in 
the cross-parliamentary agreement of 1914, but also during the 1920s. However, in a letter 
to Oswald Spengler, Meyer ascertained with regret, that the German Social Democracies 
have failed badly in the struggle against the 'terrible guise of the soulless, merely 
220 Meyer (1924a) vol. I p. vi. 
221 See Meyer (1915). 
222 Meyer's patriotism for the German nation state comes also to light in a remark made in the Von-vort to the 
5 th edition of the GdA vol. 1.1 (April 12 1925) p. III-IV: 'I believed in summer 1914 that I came to the stage, 
after the first volume of my Geschichte des Altertums was ready in its third edition, that I would be able to 
start energetically with its revision. This made the outbreak of the World War impossible. The defence war 
for the existence of our people, to which destruction our enemies from all over the world have ailed 
themse)ves in predacious aggression, forced me to subordinate all of my powers and activity for the one 
important aim'. 
223 Demandt (1990) p. 169. 
224 Meyer (1924a) II p. 584. . 
225 Meyer (l924a) II p. 58 .. +. 557 ff. A similar pessimistic position was held by Spengler and earlIer by Sybel 
and Treitschke. See Schleier (1965). 
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mechanical capitalism' .226 Although Meyer rejected wholeheartedly the Weimar Republic, 
he spoke out against the assassination of Walter Rahtenau, the Social Democrat Mayor of 
Munich, in 1924 and advocated the agrarian reforms of the same year.227 It is suggested that 
Meyer in his younger years was sympathetic towards socialism and that Meyer's domestic 
political opinion was in accordance with Spengler's idea of 'PreuJ3entum und 
Sozialismus'.228 It is difficult to see any evidence of this in his later work. However, what 
seems to be fairly clear is that Meyer believed in the core of Prussian values such as duty, 
justice and appreciation of hard and honest labour as the panacea to Germany's 
misfortunes. He did not support the decadence of the German monarchy in particular and 
the aristocracy in general, but approved of their right to exist as an institution as long as 
they would fulfil their social and political responsibilities. However, it became clear to 
Meyer that they failed to do so not only in Germany but also in Tsarist Russia. Alexander 
Demandt argued that his support for certain aspects of the new Soviet Russia became more 
transparent in his sympathetic judgements of Lenin's NEP (New Economic Policy) in 
1922. That Meyer judged Lenin as one of the greatest statesmen after Bismarck indicates 
his great respect and appreciation for a strong historical figure. This connects much more 
realistically with Meyer's compassion towards an implementation of Prussian-Protestant 
ethical standards or political ethos, than sympathising alternatively towards the Bolsheviks 
and the working-class movement in general. It seems that the last resort to avert the 
demise of Germany is its 'east-orientation' towards Soviet Russia.229 
Meyer's Prussian-nationalist commitment and conservative ethos led him to reject 
the idea of continuous progress in history. Especially the decades after the tum of the 
century represented to him the demise of the European cultures at the hands of the 
Americans. In that respect 'Prussian-Germany is Carthage' and America is Rome. His 
political compassion blinded him to the fundamental differences between Ancient Rome 
and America culturally and politically, and damaged his scholarly reputation in Western 
Europe. However, besides Meyer's political motivation to equip us with lessons from the 
past, his methodology has a serious philosophical background and an established tradition. 
By elucidating his method and philosophy of history, we should be able to understand 
226 See Spengler (1963) p. 202 ff. 
227 See Naf (1990) p. 308. 
228 Cited from Vossisclze Zeitung (19/09/1915). See Spengler (1921) . 
229 For more detail about Meyer's orientation towards the East and his visit to Moscow and Lenmgrad see 
Deamndt (1990) p. 170 f. 
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better how such parallels can be drawn between past and present without merely projecting 
one's personal views onto history and its particular events. 
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vi. Meyer's Philosophy of History 
We ended the last chapter on an almost anecdotal note of Meyer's later works and 
views on world politics during the 1920s. This was an important move in order to show 
how current affairs can have considerable effects on the interpretation of the comparability 
of past and present. However, it would be unfair and too one-sided if we ended our 
discussion of Meyer's work with a harsh criticism of the poorly judged and exaggerated 
parallels of an ageing scholar. More interesting than his bitter political outbursts is the 
explanation of his early comparisons between Classical Greece and the 17th and 18th 
centuries. On what basis, if at all, are such comparisons possible? Is not every historical 
period and its events unique? Such questions may concern perhaps those who believe in 
the ultimate individuality of human experience. However, Meyer's philosophical starting 
point originates in a different tradition - the tradition of German historicism. 
The historicist approach in German historiography with which Meyer largely 
concurred begins its analyses from the present or current perspective. This appears even 
clearer, if one regards the past as connected to the present via causality and analogy. This 
is not to say that only those past events are important, which had a crucial influence or 
effect on how the present emerged from the past. 230 However, Meyer maintained that we 
could only investigate into history in as far as events have left traces in the present.231 Thus, 
for Meyer, 'through the reciprocal illumination of history the present becomes important 
and through the illumination of the present history becomes comprehensible'.232 
Meyer has sketched out his account of the nature of historical studies mainly in two 
works. The basis for his work on this subject is the 'Einleitung' of the Geschichte des 
Altertums (1884).233 Those first theoretical considerations formed the basis to his essay Zur 
Theorie und Methodik der Geschichte (THEORIE) of 1902. This essay forms a more 
sophisticated attempt to deal with the methodological and historio-theoretical challenges 
which materialism and empiricism posed to the traditional historiography. The first edition 
of Meyer's THEORIE found an important critical reception and appreciation in Max 
Weber's Kritische Studien der Kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik of 1906 and later in Emile 
230 CdA vo!'!'1 p. 191, Meyer (1924) va!. II p. 583 and CdA vo!'!'1 p. 188. 
231 See Demandt (1990) p. 165 n27. See CdA va!' I.1 p. 188 f., p. 191 f. THEORIE p. 58::1. 
"12 5 
-. Demandt (1990) p. 16 . . 
233 See Naf in Calder III (1990) p. 288 f. For an analysis about the background at the CdA. 
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Durkheim's work.234 The fairly few alterations of his position in the first edition of the 
Kleine Schriften (1910, 2nd ed. 1924) did not have an additional impact on the theoretical 
discussion in German historiography.235 We shall therefore concentrate on the 1902 text but 
complementary to this for the understanding of Meyer's position is the 'Einleitung' of the 
GdA.236 
The THEORIE starts with the provocative statement that 'history is not a systematic 
science'.237 By elaborating his argument he stresses that the 'historical method' 
(Historische Methode) does not fall into the fallacy of giving an account of historical 
studies as an integrated universal system. 'The practice of the historian follows its own 
inner commands, which the material itself imposes onto the composition'.238 According to 
Meyer, the 'historical method' formulates only those rules and experiences and 'knack', 
which do belong to the specific historical subject or branch (e.g. the numismatics), but this 
is not the same as following the 'crazy belief' to be able to subsume all history under a 
single method or principle. Instead the historian faces the challenge of understanding the 
particular historical problem. The discovery of its solution can only be borne from within 
the mind of the scientist.239 His teacher can only explain, how according to his experience, 
he approaches the problem; but a historian must develop their own understanding by 
dealing with the matter freely, and only partly by guidance. 24o The more creative 
independence is involved the gradually higher or more important is the particular research 
field in amongst others. A particular human action or event is then more important and is 
generally also seen as such when it is not easily comprehensible under a single rule or law. 
Meyer argues implicitly against the method associated with Marxist historical materialism, 
which in Meyer's view 'measures the value of labour activity solely in terms of the 
"socially required" working time'.241 Initially the historian faces his material as a mere 
accumulation of unconnected past events. The question which then emerges is how these 
facts relate to human knowledge in general and the sciences. According to Meyer, this is 
234 See Naf in Calder III (1990) p. 296. 
235 Naf in Calder III (1990) p. 299 nd .. 
236 GdA vol. I.!. Cited 5 th edition (1925), which is almost unchanged from the 2 edItIon (1907). 
Extensively on Meyer's Anthropology see Mippel in Calder III (1990) pp. 312-328. 
237 THEORIE p. 1. 
238 THEORIE p. 1. 
239 THEORIE p. 2. 
240 See THEORIE p. 2. 
2-l1 THEORIE p. 2. 
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the task of the philosopher, but it also concerned him deeply as a historian. W The definition 
and demarcation of history is particularly important in respect of the task of anthropology 
or sociology. These latter sciences, Meyer ascertained, claimed to have the only valid and 
practical conception of historical studies in order to satisfy the needs of the 'modem way of 
thought' .243 The threat of those modem ideas originated mainly in materialism and 
empiricism, which both attained, in different forms and versions, increasing populat:ity 
especially amongst the 'NationalOkonomie' and amongst the natural sciences. By 
postulating that the previous methodology of history was wrong, they aim to subsume and 
reform the previously well established and 'higher standing' historical studies under the 
methodology of 'science' .244 This manifests mainly in three claims against historical 
studies. First, like the natural sciences, history should look for laws of recurrence of 
certain events. The discovery of such laws, which connect 'cause and effect necessarily 
with one another' belittles and degrades the historical event to a mere sign of those 
universally operating laws which govern the world of human affairs. 245 Consequently, the 
'individual moments', which were previously magisterial in order to explain the course of 
history, are now subsumed by the quest for historic laws. This applies especially to the 
denial of the notion of 'accident' ('Zufall') in history. Secondly, the 'free and self-
determining will' has no place in history anymore and therefore leaves the particular 
'personality' (,Personlichkeit') in history as insignificant. The same fate awaits any 
significance of 'ideas' ('Jdeen'), which are born out of the free will and have influenced 
human conduct and our intentions during any particular historical period or era. 
In a new methodological approach to history introduced by Karl Lamprecht, these 
ideas are denigrated as mere expressions of those material laws, which necessitated their 
creation in the first place.246 Therefore Lamprecht's approach underlines the importance of 
what is the 'typical' and 'regularly observable' in history and not what is particular, 
outstanding and individual in history. This means that a certain period is not shaped by its 
crucial moments or historical figures, but by its underlining patterns and material driving 
forces which the 'modem' historian should aim to uncover. This leads Meyer to the , 
conclusion that history as an empirical 'science' deals with social groups, classes and 
242 See _ THEORIE p. 3 Meyer refers here to his detailed remarks about this subject at the Eillleitullg 
('Allthropologie') to his Geschichte des A/tertums (GdA) vol. 1.1. p.189. 
243 See THEORIE p. 3. 
244 See THEORIE p. 4. 
245 THEORIE p. 4 f. 
246 See THEORIE p. 5 f. 
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societies. Thus, its objects proper 'are the human societies and their change'.247 On this 
occasion we cannot analyse every aspect of the criticism which Meyer levelled against this 
approach. However, the account of 'empirical history', which regards itself as following 
the same methods as any descriptive natural science, emphasises the task to show the 
'development of mankind'. In order to achieve this aim, the sociologists Barth and 
Bernheim (both contemporaries of BUcher and Meyer) divided human history into 'types of 
societies' in order to discover the 'principles, which dominated the development from an 
earlier society to a later one' .248 Although Karl BUcher's methodological considerations are 
very rare, parallels to his theory of 'economic stages' become apparent. By referring to 
Lamprecht's stages in cultural history (,Kulturgeschichte'), Meyer argues that such simple 
formulae, including BUcher's theory of economic stages, try nothing more than to 'belittle 
the riches of human history! The lively personalities have been clubbed to death, and its 
place is taken by mere phantoms and vague generalisations' .249 By referring to the 
modernistic spirit of his times, Meyer regrets that 'unfortunately our time is dominated by 
the drive towards keywords and by the delusion to know and to understand a phenomenon, 
if one simply throws about such keywords. We have experienced, and experience it still 
daily, how some political economists believe it to be legitimate to comprehend the secret of 
the historical development with the schema of the barter, money and credit economy and to 
bring it down to a single simple formula' .250 Meyer's anger is not only directed against 
Lamprecht and BUcher, but also against the general tendency amongst the 
NationalOkonomie to oversimplify human history with the application of 'stages of 
economic development'.251 This objection is directly linked to his previous methodological 
concerns about the universal nature of the deterministic and evolutionary world view a la 
Darwin and by materialists, such as Kautsky and Engels. 252 This theory, according to 
Meyer, carries a false but pervasive presupposition about the continuous social progress of 
the human civilisation - from primitive antiquity to the sophisticated and rationalised 
modernity.253 However, Meyer's swift and categorical rejection of theories of the 'linear 
247 See THEORIE p. 5 f. Meyer quotes at this occasion the sociologist Paul Barth (1897) p. 4. 
248 See Barth (1897) p. 8 and Bernheim (1894) p. 5. 
249 THEORIE p. 9 
250 THEORIE p. 8. 
251 See Part Ll.ii. 
252 The belief that the human sciences work according to a similar methodological procedure as the natural 
sciences and that the world of human affairs according to Kautsky and Engels are indeed driven by 
evolutionary progress has been recently noted by Marriott (2000) p. 168 f.. . 
253 One may not conclude from this that Meyer did not acknowledge the diversity In these 'modern accounts. 
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development of human society' did not have the desired impact on the social SCIences, 
since such theories were never very popular amongst them anyway.254 
Hegel's philosophy of universal history (' Universalgeschichte'), which is according 
to Meyer, 'rather postulates a certain state of mind', but not a theory of history255, and 
therefore 'does barely require any mention' 256 is also too swiftly dismissed. However, it 
seems that Meyer overlooked the fact that Hegel's notion of 'dialectical progress in history' 
is clearly distinct from materialistic and positivistic conceptions of 'linear development', 
which he criticised so heavily in his contemporaries.257 However, the groundless polemic 
against Hegel perhaps originated in the popular rejection of Hegel's 'historical dialectic', 
which reached almost institutionalised forms amongst the historicist tradition before 
Meyer's scholarly career and may have therefore blurred his view.258 From the context of 
the anti-Hegelian critique, it is conceivable that his main objection was bound up with 
Hegel's claim that every event and process whether recognised as significant or not by the 
historian is part of history. As we shall see below, Meyer argued exactly against the claim 
that any event or cause, no matter how unimportant and, to us, insignificant it may be, 
counts as historical (,historisch '). As a historicist, he rejected Hegel as well as the 
contemporary phenomenologist Wilhelm Dilthey, because both, according to Meyer, 
believed in the objectivity of a historical science in which laws aim to prove the existence 
of irremovable historical truth.259 Although Meyer had faith in the omnipotence of 
scientific-rational thought analogous to the omnipotence of the natural sciences, laws and 
generalisations do not govern human history, and should therefore not concern the 
historian. Our actions and decision-making processes are rather part of human rationality, 
which does not remain secretive and hidden but is accessible by reason. 
Although we may acknowledge that it was probably never Meyer's intention to 
formulate a comprehensive critique of the methods of alternative accounts to 'traditional 
historical studies'; Meyer blaming Hegel's and Darwin's ideas as largely responsible for 
having substantially fuelled the theoretical attacks of sociologists and economists in 
but they are not relevant here in order to map out Meyer's own account of the nature of history and its 
purpose. See THEORIE p. 3,4. 
254 WEdA p. 88. This misreading of BUcher is still present in the contemporary literature about the 
controversy. See Parkins (1998) p. 234 f. 
255 GdA vol. 1.1, 18If. 
256 THEORIE p. 6 n3. 
257 Demandt (1990) p. 162. 
258 See Part 11.1-2. 
259 See Dilthey (1996). 
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Germany and Britain against the predominance of 'traditional history' is one-sided.260 
Meyer directed his objections heavily against the fact that certain circles within 
'NationalOkonomie' and 'Soziologie' started to employ and to reinterpret political and 
economic history in their attempt to equip themselves with a historic-theoretical 
groundwork by using an alternative view of history all together. This, however, is not to 
say that Meyer argued against Darwin's theory of evolution in genera1.261 Meyer objected to 
the application of Darwin's evolutionary theory and Hegel's concept of 
'Universalgeschichte' in historical studies for yet another reason. According to Meyer, 
both scholars found representation in fashionable theories of class struggle a la Marx and in 
Lamprecht's ideas about 'the influential social units', which in their 'mass occurrences and 
their development' would allegedly dominate the course of the nations, a theory to which 
we shall return in more detail in Part II.262 Meyer's main problem with these theories rests 
with the presupposition that the 'particular individual' is barely of any historical 
significance at all anymore and that the 'historical subject' is completely subsumed under 
the role of the masses in history. A 'reorientation' of historical studies of this kind, away 
from the individual and the 'particular', manifests itself in the 'perverted' task of the 
'modem' historian to the study of mass-psychology,263 or as Lamprecht expressed it, to 
study of 'the social-psychological stages of development' .264 
Diametrically opposed to Lamprecht's putative laws of 'mass-psychology', Meyer's 
own position is at first glance firmly rooted in the established tradition of German idealism 
a la Ranke and Kant. The Kantian influence on his philosophy came to light with the 
emphasis on the centrality of 'free will' (freier Wille) and 'accident' (Zufall) as a core 
notion of the historical enquiry.265 Accident in history, for Meyer, is not to be understood as 
if a particular event did not have a cause. However, because of the fact that every action or 
event can be seen as being an effect and a potential cause at the same time, every human 
being faces the problem of reducing the occurrence of an event down to a finite number of 
causes. This is impossible for Meyer unless one reduces every event down to one ultimate 
and first cause: God, for instance. Yet this would only constitute a prima facie proof. 
260 See Nat in Calder III (1990) p. 285 
261 See GdA vol. 1.1. p. 7 He acknowledges clearly its validity for the development of the human brain. . 
262 THEORIE p. 7. The 'Methodenstreit' around Karl Lamprecht and its influence on the later course ot the 
controversy are dealt with in Part II.3.ii. 
263 THEORIE p. 8. 
264 Lamprecht (1886/97) p. 8 cit. THEORIE p. 8. 
265 THEORIE p. 13 f. 
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Accident and free will undeniably have their place in human epistemology. As it was for 
Kant, Meyer also believed that man is capable of willing his own actions. The ability to 
will one's actions freely - the capacity of self-determination, is a proof of the 
epistemological existence of such a 'free will' .266 In this way, the historian is not interested 
in the causes of actions or events but in reasons, which are not reducible to a single 
overpowering force. Yet this is not to say that Meyer would deny the existence of physi~al 
or 'ideological' determination of an event. This causal analysis, besides its validity and 
scientific attractiveness, is however not the nature of the historical explanation proper.267 
The historian's task is to give a teleological explanation; he seeks to grasp what a certain 
decision or event could have aimed at, and not primarily what caused it. Meyer's 
compatibalist view of the human will as both free and determined does not create a 
putative contradiction between accident and necessity, since they do not exist within the 
objects themselves. The latter are still subject to causality, but accident and necessity are 
properties of the categories, under which we subsume the particular phenomena 
('Erschreinung ').268 
However, Meyer's analysis of the epistemological existence of 'free will' and 
'accident' to which he devotes a good half of the THEORIE (pp. 5-34), appears elusive; in 
its quest to defend the fundamental importance of subjectivity and individuality in history it 
forms primarily a polemic against Lamprecht. 269 For Meyer one of the many examples used 
in order to elucidate the possibility of 'accident' and 'free will' as predominant and an 
epistemological necessity in history, is the outbreak of the Second Punic War. According 
to Meyer, the historian should not consider primarily external causes, but rather treat them 
as results of a conscious decision (,Willensentschluss ').270 Therefore, history deals with the 
analysis of the particular event; judging its importance by whether it had an impact on the 
world of human affairs, primarily politically but also culturally. Directed against his 
opponents Meyer argued that the 'first fundamental task of the historian is to ascertain the 
facts (,Thatsachen '), which once existed in reality. If he does not follow this task ... if he 
does not know the particularities of the event...then his endeavour is non-
representational ... He might - and this case does happen perpetually - create the nicest and 
266 See THEORIE p. 14. 
267 See THEORIE p. 14. 
268 See THEORIE p. 17 f. 
269 A slightly more concise notion of 'accident' and 'free will' as being intuitively gIven to human 
understanding is discussed in GdA vol. I.l. p. 187. 
270 See THEORIE p. 17. 
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most profoundest theories and combinations ... this all is of no worth whatsoever and leads 
the reader only astray into a world of fantasy, instead of into the real world'. 271 
Besides confining the primary task of the historian as basing his interpretation on 
the facts, Meyer lashes out once more against his opponents in the familiar guise of Karl 
Lamprecht and Karl BUcher. His accusations against them can be summarised under three 
points. First, to attempt to form generalisations about 'history life', which take a similar 
shape to the laws of natural sciences; laws can never be the object of history but only the 
precondition. Instead, 'the object of history is everywhere the enquiry and representation 
of the particular event' - 'the individual' ('das Individuelle ').272 Secondly, that they sought 
to deny the 'predominant influence of accident and the will of the individual 
personalities ... on the thoughts and views of the individual and the masses'.273 Third, he 
complained that they aimed to 'postulate the dominant importance of mass phenomena, in 
particular economic 'laws', even though it is obvious that the whole economic 
development of wealth and the social shaping of a state or people (Volk) is dependent on 
political impulses' .274 For Meyer, the main error lies in the 'the idea of monism in the 
scientific world-view' and secondly in the geographical and mass-psychological 
approaches.275 
Meyer highlights instead that the centrality of the event forms the basis of 
Ereignisgeschichte, ('event history'), which consists primarily in the documentation of 
facts. However, from generation to generation, history would put an ever-increasing 
burden of facts upon mankind, facing us with the problem of handling its sheer quantity. 
This Kantian consideration played an important part in Meyer's interpretation of antiquity. 
Friedrich Nietzsche, who became popular at the tum of the century, suggested that history 
should only be pursued for the sake of its usefulness to our present situation and not as an 
end in itself. This would mean that the historian's task does not exhaust itself in the 
occupation of the archivist or the heraldic story writer, but also in the critical investigation 
of the particular worth or value of an event or fact for our present. Such an analysis can 
only take place if the historian himself possesses the correct historical worldview.276 Meyer 
271 THEORIE p. 35. 
272 THEORIE p. 29. 
213 THE-ORIE p. 3l. 
274 THEORIE p. 3l. 
275 THEORIE p. 32. . . .. 
276 The concept of 'event history' 'Ereigllisgesc/zic/zte' was not invented by Meyer, b~t shows s.lmIlant1es 
with Nietzsche's concept of 'kritisclze Gesclziclzte' in his Second Untimely Mediations of 1874. Ct Demandt 
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argued that the selection of what is historically important involves directly the present 
interests of the historian in 'what was effective and influential.277 He understood too that 
the interests and value judgements of the historian also come into play in his interpretation 
of historical events.278 
Immediately, the question comes to mind as to what kind of criteria should the 
historian apply in order to distinguish between what has been influential and what has been 
trivial or worthless? At this point Meyer's methodology faces substantial difficulties. 'The 
answer can only be taken from the present; its selection lies within the historical interests, 
which have some kind of an effect onto the present' .279 Therefore, the starting point of the 
historical investigation has to be always the present, whereas the historical presentation 
starts with the earliest findings.280 Yet Meyer shows openness as to what this field of 
interest may be, which may catch the historian's attention. 'Sometimes it's this, sometimes 
it's that', he says, 'which appears in the foreground, politics, religion, economic history, 
literature and art and so forth. An absolute norm does not exist' .281 The only deterrent is 
therefore solely its effect on the particular present. At first glance it looks as if such a 
philosophy would create a scientific basis to allow any individual, state or nation to 
become the subject of historical investigation, however Meyer's whole endeavour runs into 
difficulties when he tries to assess which questions are important for the understanding of 
present. He wonders, since the future has not yet happened, how can we indeed assess 
which historical moments are able to enlighten us and which once may lead us on the 
wrong path? As for the historical personality, the historical event can be anything that the 
historian declares as important when determining the cause for a particular political 
decision made in the present. A historical tool such as this could be open to abuse and 
would not equip us with a standard to judge whether the historian has picked the 'right' 
events or not. However, Meyer does not allow for such an arbitrary and subjective 
selection, which would only lead into historical relativism. He argues that the 'more far 
reaching the circle of the effect of a particular historical event, the more important it is and 
the greater is the interest which we assign to it' .282 Besides the great cultural-historical 
(1990) p. 159. Also see THEORIE p. 37. 
277 THEORIE p. 37. See also GdA vol. 1.1. p. 188. 
278 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 191. 
279 THEORIE p. 37. 
280 See GdA vol. 1.1. p. 208 f. 
281 THEORIE p. 38. 
282 THEORIE p. 38. 
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phenomena, religion, literature, the political events including the character of political 
constitutions are what bear primarily a historical momentum or element. For Meyer, the 
latter have by nature a great impact on the structure and organisation of human social 
interaction. Since these interactions form the major part of human nature, the magnitude of 
political history dominates over all other aspects. It lies near to compare Meyer's view 
with Aristotle's thesis that 'the state is older than the human being', which does explain 
Meyer's faith in the all incorporating power of the nation state, defending the citizen's 
interests best.283 The political always precedes the material, social or economical. For him 
the spirit of the past, previous political institutions and social forms, ideologies and 
scientific discoveries need still to operate in some form in our days. If they do so, they 
count as historically important. One may however not interpret Meyer's view as reading 
the idea and political constitution of the Prussian Nation State back into the political 
organisation of the Roman Empire as a whole. Instead, by highlighting the complexity of 
the particular forms of a 'nation' and 'nationhood' during different periods of antiquity, he 
is able to show how certain political decisions and forms have left their mark in one way or 
another in the present. 284 Although Meyer does not underestimate the importance of 
cultural, economic or religious events in human history, he emphasises that they are all 
only part of political history. However, if history is unable to give us any tool in order to 
make predictions about the future, what worth then does any historical inquiry have beyond 
the collection and representation of the facts? Is it, for example, historically more 
important that Friedrich Willhelm IV rejected Germany's Kaiser crown, than the biography 
and social world of his tailor?285 
Nevertheless, there has to be some standard by which the historian should judge the 
importance and the value of a historical event. However, in order to do so, one needs to 
have 'unified, historically substantiated Weltanschauung', from which the historian can 
judge the causes by knowing the effects.286 Although this 'Weltanschauung' is not 
systematically sketched out in the THEORIE, Meyer acknowledges the subjective character 
of the historical evaluation depending on the particular present period and its political 
283 Pol. 1II.4 [1276b37] f. See GdA vol. I.1. p. 9 f. It is worth noting that Meyer agreed with Aristotle's 
effort to explain the existence of the state out of the political nature of man, but Meyer surprisingly also 
accused Aristotle of not emphasising the importance and priority of the state enough. GdA vol. 1.1. p. 15. 
This is -to say, that not 'society' (,Gesellschaft') protects its citizens from cultural, racial, and linguistic 
decline, but it is rather the state ('der Staat') See GdA vol. I.1. p. 74 f. 
284 See THEORIE pp. 33-34. 
285 See THEORIE p. 37. 
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settings. Indications of what the 'freely willing' historian should consider in his analysis of 
what is historically important are however given and create a problem for the transparency 
of Meyer's philosophy of history.287 He argues that such interest should be focused on those 
cultures which reached a higher standing; 'those which have an immediate effect on the 
present'.288 Although it is not clear to which present Meyer refers to, 'the external and 
internal history of primitive cultures and some Negro kingdoms' seem not to be' of 
historical significance, but could be perhaps of anthropological interest, he points OUt. 289 
This is however not to say that those cultures can never be regarded as historically 
important. That they did not leave any significant traces in our present, is not to say that 
they never will be influential in the future. If they do so, then they become an 'object of 
historical interest and thereby a subject of historical investigation similar to the advanced 
civilisations (,CulturvOlker')' .290 
In the same way as present conditions can never be an object of historical inquiry -
they can only become such an object like any other object - mass-phenomena or personality 
of the past can only gain historical interest if they have a recognisable effect on present 
politics. That history could have followed any possible directions if only a certain event or 
personality would not have occurred, is of course possible but mere conjecture and 
worthless speculation. The 'great men' of history are, for Meyer, very rare and dependent 
on decision making and accident.291 
For Meyer, the past can only come to light through the present, and the present is 
dominated by the past. 'The task of the historical genius is therefore to construct a 
parallelogram of forces correctly of which the diagonal i.e. what became, where one knows 
the nature and masses of the working forces and persons, and to abstract from those even 
where one does not know these forces exactly'.292 Since antiquity takes the central place in 
Meyer's work, he was also fascinated with its great legacy. Therefore, the ancient 
civilisations are not just a stepping stone in the development of human cultures from the 
28623/05/1915 letter to Dove in Meinecke (1962) vol. IV 61f See THEORIE p. 43. 
287 The word 'Weltanschauung' finds hardly mentioning in the EinLeitung (GdA vol. 1.1.). Meyer seems to be 
using more frequently the less bold term 'wissenschaJtliche Kritik' (GdA vol. 1.1. p. 208 f) 
288 THEORIE p. 47. 
289 That Meyer aimed to sketch out the anthropology of whole development of mankind can perhaps be 
inferred from the ambitious aims set out in the GdA vol. I. 1. 
290 THEORIE p. 47. Also Niif in Calder III (1990) p. 293, highlighted only the former ~oi~t, which may give 
his readers the impression that Meyer somehow looked down on such cultures. ThIS IS In the extended 
context of Meyer's argument not true. 
291 THEORIE p. 52 f . ,. . . 
292 Cit THEORIE p. 53 n3. The somehow puzzling quote has been Meyer taken trom Kant s Krill/.: der reillell 
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primitive ancients to sophisticated modem mankind - which was the VIew many 
economists and sociologists held, according to Meyer. The spirit of the ancients, their 
personalities and events have influenced modem history and are noticeable in the ideas and 
political constitutions of the independent and coexisting nation states of Europe. However, 
Meyer does not idealise and transfigure the ancient world as a paragon for the modem 
cultures. Its downsides and failures are brusquely elucidated. In this way Athens is not 
only 'the city to which we owe everything we possess in culture and education. Without it, 
we would still be Barbarians' ,293 but also, and more importantly, a showcase of modem 
Europe especially the Prussian-Germanic nations.294 The possibility of comparing the 
modem present with the ancient past emerges from Meyer's assumption that three factors 
interplay in the course of historical change. Firstly, the conscious decision-making of 
historical personalities. Secondly, the ideas dominating a certain epoch and third, the 
accidental events.295 History does not only constitute the present, but also provides us with 
the experience and knowledge to shape the world according to our intentions and goals. 
History might express rational decision-making, but the capacity to exercise 'free will' 
does have an impact on how history changes in its course. In other words, what is certain 
about history is that it continues and that we can learn and benefit from the 'great' events 
and masters of the past. Yet to Meyer, the quest for the discovery of fundamental law, 
which governs all historical development of mankind, will always remain a pointless 
endeavour, since such a law is only an illusion and can therefore never be a subject of 
historical inquiry proper. Instead, history is subjectively coercive or accidental. All 
cultures have therefore their own fate in their hands and can change and shape its political 
surroundings within its limits.296 The driving forces are however not the masses or the 
forces from below. In particular the idea of cultural and national identity and unity are to 
be considered powerful political ideas; realisable and enforceable only from 'above'. This 
could perhaps provide a good reason as to why Meyer was highly patriotic and active in 
Vernullft. See GdA vol. I.1. p. 202 f. 
293 Cit. Demandt (1990) p. 162 n13. 
294 Demandt (1990) p. 162 argues that Meyer thought that the 'fate' of the Greek cultures forms. only a sm~lIer 
scale compared to the modern political situation. This however, does somehow belittle the pomt that beSides 
all similarities and frequent comparisons, Meyer highlights also the fundamental differences between Bellas 
and modern Europe in particular with regard to the religious influence over the character of these nations. 
See Meyer GdA vol. I. 1. ch. 2. 
295 See THEORIE p. 53. 
296 See Meyer (192..J.) p. 1764. 
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gathering support during the Germany's 'defensive war'.297 That certain historical events 
can perhaps teach us a lesson for our own fate; that certain aspects and preconditions in the 
shaping of the political life of modem times share similarities and links with events in 
antiquity and its peoples, is not the same as naively equating the two epochs with one 
another. 
Meyer also emphasised that all historical critique 'demands a standard, which 
allows an objective criterion, or rather criteria. The first criterion lies in the general, 
always constant conditions of real life' .298 Those conditions of what may have been 
externally possible or impossible should be investigated by the sciences. The second 
criterion applies to historical studies itself, to investigate what was psychologically possible 
and able to manifest itself. Any historical inquiry starts from the present perspective and is 
influenced by [present] conditions and opinions; 'the historical critique has the task of 
emancipating itself from them, to understand the past in its own conditions ... therefore the 
historian has to place himself, and his thought processes into the past; he has to touch it 
and live in it. If done so, it becomes a reality and he can then begin to comprehend the 
events as if he would himself experience them'.299 On the contrary, he maintained that 
'every immersion into the past is always relative, since the observer can never escape the 
realm of his own present and his own individuality. He constantly carries these conditions 
with him no matter how hard he tries to control them through critical thinking' .300 It seems 
indeed that Meyer appeals to the self-discipline and open-mindedness of the historian to 
develop a critical ability, but this is a fallacy. A historical subject of general interest like 
antiquity, which appeals to people of high intellectual standing because of its significance 
for our present use, is often commented upon by them solely on the basis of their 'common 
sense' and their 'experience' .301 This is not to say that a historian is infallible. However, 
and this point is perhaps also directed against the sociological methodology, the expertise 
of the historian rests with his knowledge of the sources and his intuitive ability to envisage 
the causes of the historical evene02 In order to present the historical details the historian 
himself can and should use any means at his disposal to create a lively picture of past 
297 Even the liberal Wilamowitz called Meyer 'one of the bravest fighters for the honour of our Fatherland' 
(1925) 1". 55ff. 
298 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 305. 
299 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 306. 
300 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 307. 
301 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 309. 
302 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 309. 
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events. This includes for Meyer that his imagination should flourish, but unlike the 'freely 
operating artistic fantasy of the poet, who created the object himself; it [the imagination] is 
rather bound up with the historical fact. It is therefore only allowed to recreate; it should 
awake once more the past into a lively object in our mind in order to show us how it really 
was' .303 It is now clear how analogies and comparisons between past and present and the 
use of modern terminology should be understood in Meyer's works. The philosophical 
tradition and background of his views are examined in part II. However, even if Meyer's 
philosophy of history appears as a more sophisticated doctrine than admitted by modem 
authors such as Moses I. Finley, the reproach remains that the many loose ends in Meyer's 
doctrine create the impression that Meyer's theory 'is not fully consistent', as Mansfield 
phrased it delicately.304 
303 GdA vol. I.l. p. 310. 
304 Mansfield (1990) p. 256. 
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Vll. Critique 
Meyer ended his THEORIE with a strong defence of the historicist histiography 
with 'Altertumswissenschaft' as one of its main pillars. This follows clearly from Meyer's 
emphasis of the priority of the historical personality and the power of the historical 
occaSIOn. Those decisions by the historic personalities are reported to us in the historic 
documents and reports. Hence, sociology, archaeology, geography or statistics have no 
place in ancient history since they differ fundamentally in method and object of enquiry. 
However, as we saw, Meyer's theoretical considerations are of an epistemological nature 
and address the question of what we should consider as historical knowledge. It is here 
that Meyer's 'philosophy of history' has its deepest difficulties. 
We noted above that in particular the elucidation of the notion of 'free will' and 
'accident', which form the central premises of his theory, are ambiguous and partly 
contradictory. This is particularly true of 'free will', for which Meyer acknowledges causal 
and ethical or teleological elements, but does not clearly distinguish between them. That is 
to say, Meyer seems to mix judgements of expediency. For example, if we describe 
Hannibal's tactics in defending Carthage during the Second Punic War (220-201 Be) as an 
art of warfare in order to achieve a certain political gain, then we make a value judgement 
about Hannibal's action from the perspective of the 'substantiated world view of the 
historian'. The former causal explanation based on hypothetical imperatives taken for 
itself has validity. 
Confusion also grabs hold of the reader concerning Meyer's distinction of the 
'individual', 'particular' or 'unique' in history in contrast to the historically 'general' or 
'ordinary'. The latter does not attract great attention in Meyer's philosophy since it, 
allegedly, forms only the causal background for the appearance of the former, which is the 
more important historically. However, if the 'general' is seen as part of some kind of 
regular influence on the specific, particular event, then they must be considered as equally 
important to the historian. This would contradict the above distinction. Although elements 
of a holistic approach are visible in Meyer's analysis of which part of history is primarily 
impo~ant, he separates and disregards the elements of social cultural history instead of 
absorbing them into the all-encompassing priority of political history, which could soften 
and obliterate the narrow notion of 'political history'. 
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Ambiguous too is Meyer's definition of the object of history - 'what was effective 
and exciting' .305 Here Meyer is clearly impressed by Ranke's attempt to create a 
historiographical method in order to show 'how it really was' ('wie es wirklich gewesen '). 
However, again it seems that Meyer does not distinguish clearly between what event had 
perhaps a real impact on other events, and what we may learn from this particular event or 
decision. This basically establishes the fundamental weakness in Meyer's approach, which 
has a lack of conceptual rigour in the distinction between causal and value analysis in 
history. It can therefore not come as a surprise that Meyer's 'historically substantiated 
world-view' lacks any limit as to how far the historian is entitled to use modern concepts 
and parallels in order to establish what we can learn from history. Max Weber noted in 
criticism of Meyer's method that his 'concept of the historical ['das Historische'] as the 
effecti ve [' das Wirksame'] lacks any distinction between the "primary" historical object, 
which acknowledges the interests of the evaluating individual as being part of a particular 
cultural individualism, and, of a "secondary" historical fact, the cause, which influenced 
this individual as part of a causal regress' .306 Hence, it is impossible to find any basis for an 
'objective' notion of what was historically important. With Meyer, history remains 
subjective and cannot escape the realm of the judgements and values of the particular 
historian. Meyer did not see this as a serious problem, since he clearly uni versalised and 
patriotically highlighted the development of the ideas, personalities and political events 
which brought about and strengthened the 'independent Prussian-German nation state' and 
its constitutional rise. 
A serious revision of his theory and a clear response to Weber's criticism are 
missing in the second edition of the THEORIE. Meyer only remarked laconically that 
'Weber just spelled out what he thought anyway' .307 However, a small shift towards the 
relation of historical studies and the elements of anthropology are admitted in the similarly 
entitled Einleitung - Elemente der Anthropologie to the 2nd edition of the GdA (vol. 1.1 
1907). Here he complains that some of his critics argued that his method was not modem 
enough and even backward. Such reactions could not deflect from the great appreciation 
and support Meyer's method received mainly from the later followers of the traditional 
historicist tradition. On the other hand, the majority of reviews mentioned in Marohl's 
Meyer bibliography focus mainly on historical detail - those concerned with 
305 See THEORIE p. 36. 
306 Nat in Calder III (1990) p. 298. 
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methodological elucidation are rare. 308 Even if some younger historians, such as Lenschau 
and Croiset disagreed mildly with certain aspects of Meyer's theory, it was regarded as a 
methodological spearhead against the new methodological approaches introduced by 
Lamprecht and the historical materialists demanding a 'reorientation' of historical 
studies.309 
Meyer's extensive use of modem terminology and the 'uncovering' of circles of the 
cultural development, which are peculiar to human civilisations have their roots in the 
object of history and the historic interests of the historian. However, not only does the 
premise of the priority of 'historical accident' and the 'free will' in history show serious 
deficiencies, but the theory of the cyclic development of civilisations deserves some critical 
attention as well. 
In the Einleitung to the GdA he concludes the chapter on the 'Fundamentals of the 
historical development' by stating that 'all human life moves in between two tendencies, 
the out-balancing and the individualising tendency; their ever continuing conflict 
encapsulates the most inner essence of mankind. This antagonism is the basis that all 
human bonds (other than the animals) have a development (,Entwicklung') and therefore 
have a history. If ever one of these two tendencies would gain absolute power, be it the 
complete chaos of bellum omnium contra omnes (the war of all against all), or be it an 
absolute hegemony of a homogenous solely individualistic element that supersedes culture, 
a further development would not be possible anymore and humanity itself would be 
transformed into a race which is alien and indifferent to US'.31O If now religion and spiritual 
development ('geistige Entwicklung') move or develop in between the very same 
tendencies, that of individuality with and against homogeneity, then it can be argued that 
the relationship between the individual and society, between state and its institutions etc. -
the entire realm of human thought and civilisation moves along these tendencies.3Il The 
antagonism of mental and external, political and material factors create the historical idea, 
which the highest development of human individuality is able to embrace.312 We know that 
Meyer rejected any claim that history operates according to laws. However, it is not clear 
307 See Nlif in Calder III (1990) p. 300, n23, n24. 
308 See Marohl (1941). 
309 Lenschau (1932) p. 88 and Croiset (1932) p. 22 f. 
310 d I I 1 84 G Avo . .. p. . 
311 On the important aspect of religion in the Greek polis see (GdA vol. 1.1. p. 157-161), on philosophy (ibid. 
pp. 163-64), science (ibid. p. 166 f.) and art (ibid. 172 f.). 
312 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 182. 
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how significant external material factors are III the formation and perhaps partial 
determination of ideas. The logic of the circular economic development of cultures 
struggles with a contradiction. On the one hand, Meyer highlights the diversity of the 
development of ancient and modern cultures. He argues that 'every culture and every one 
of its particular epochs ... awaits the same fate, setting the limits, which cannot be exceeded. 
Whether it [the culture] fulfils its potentialities completely or not, which it has within these 
limits, this then depends on the accident that determines the particular events 
everywhere'.313 On the other hand, he states that 'every culture shows the means of its 
demise when it reached its zenith' .314 If these means are peculiar to every culture, as Meyer 
believes, we could not go any further than to conclude with the platitude 'that nothing in 
history lasts forever'. The problem is how can we draw parallels between particular epochs 
within particular cultures with one another, but we cannot compare cultures in general with 
one another. If the political whole of one culture is entirely different from another culture, 
how can its parts be comparable? Although Meyer frequently shows awareness of the 
dangers of inductive generalisation, it is problematic to maintain that all civilised cultures 
went through cultural circles driven by the eternal conflict of the antagonism between 
individuality and external material necessity. Is it really true that 'every idea, as soon as it 
becomes reality, turns into its opposite, because not one thought is capable of grasping 
reality in its totality? This transformation (' Umschlag ') of the idea is prominent in all the 
whole of historical life; the tragedy of history rests upon it.315 'This is how the circle of 
historical experience reoccurs again and again; however, in every particular case the 
individual composition ('Gestaltung), of creative human beings is different and therefore 
also the result of this composition. The internal unity as well as the eternal composition of 
history rests upon it' .316 
Hence, it is clear that Meyer did not argue that antiquity is the same as the modem 
age entirely and that he did not abuse antiquity for mere vested political interest. However, 
we must highlight that Meyer made extensive use of the 'analogy' as a means to make 
historical conclusions.317 With the analogy, he points out, 'we try to grasp the external 
313 Meyer (1924) p. 1764. 
314 Nat in Calder III (1990) p. 307 f. . . 
315 Meyer mentions examples of such a constant rise and decline in the development and demIse of partIcular 
religions, the emergence of Greek freedom and its destruction by Alexander the Great etc. CdA vol. I.1 p. 
182 f. 
316 CdA vol. I. 1. p.183. 
317 Cd;t vol. I.1. p. 203. 
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forces, which have influenced the 'Gestalt' of an event, but also the inner psychological 
moments, which have brought about particular political circumstances in order to 
understand 'individuality in its totality'.318 Meyer argues that the analogy is made when we 
infer a general tendency from a particular action and apply it to other events. Meyer is well 
aware of the dangers of using the analogy as a means of historical studies too. He asserts 
that 'we also stand very near the limits of what is still scientifically legitimate about 
induction. The analogy should only be used carefully as an assisting means for the real 
task, the portrayal of the historical facts in their becoming and effectiveness'.319 However, 
this does not solve the problem of how far a resemblance can be realistically applied and 
used appropriately. As we have seen, Meyer's analogies are not always chosen with great 
sensitivity and are by no means free from emotive language. Even if most of his 
exaggerated comparisons between America and Rome, for example, are to be found in his 
political papers, expertise and self-discipline, which he demands from his colleagues, are 
not always met by himself. It also seems that the 'historical method' and the 'historical 
critique' are intuitively given to the historian's perception making certain events stand out 
as significant per se. In order to perceive these events as crucial and significant, Meyer 
argues the historian just has to imagine the past and study the facts hard enough.320 If this is 
indeed the precondition for historical expertise and critical ability then it is really not clear 
as to why scholars like Lamprecht and BUcher should not hypothesise over the nature of 
ancient 'economic' life. Both were also well-trained historians and certainly did not 
indiscriminately create their theories of economic development. Also if history is always 
subjective as frequently maintained, how can the enlightened, well-trained, careful and 
open-minded historian ever know how it really was? If Meyer would argue that every 
historian should make up his own mind about the prominence of historical events, why 
bother arguing against the contrary position, which does not so much dispute the historical 
facts but rather their interpretation. Regarding the 'objective standards' or criteria of 
historical investigation, Meyer does not acknowledge that even the natural sciences like 
geology and archaeology can never be completely objective. What is possible or 
impossible changes with new findings and with potential paradigm shifts within these 
sciences.321 This applies also to 'chronology', which forms the basis of any historical 
318 GdA vol. I. 1. p. 303. 
319 GdA vol. I.l. p. 304. 
320 GdA vol. 1.1. p. 304. . . . .. 
321 Thomas Kuhn has pointed out that the value judgements and prejudice of the SCientIst himself Influence 
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in vestigati on. 322 
Meyer's philosophy of history carries a fundamental contradiction at its core. On 
the one hand, he highlights the centrality of the subjective character of history. On the 
other hand, he continues to believe in the existence of a self-evident rationalism, which 
allows the historian to grasp the historically 'outstanding' and influential events. Secondly, 
he tries to unite the 'general' and 'individual' in history. However, it is then not clear why 
the predominance or driving force in the historical process remains the idea, which 
manifests itself in Meyer's emphasis and support for the creative individual, the 
predominant political ideas in their concurrence and discord with a particular political 
system of a powerful but individuality-preserving state. Meyer insists that the historian 
ought to judge his subject matter from the present, from those concepts and views which 
are at his disposition. It attempts to be universal, but excludes certain cultures, at least for 
the time being. It emphasises the superiority of the European cultures against 'lower' 
cultures, the priority of the political ideas and constitutions against social and material 
factors.323 Modem nationalism and ancient nationhood was one of the most noble and 
creative ideas for one of Germany's most famous and well-established ancient historians, 
who aimed to expose and warn against the modem connection between democracy and 
capitalism in dramatic pictures taken from the ancients.324 This section comprehensively 
explains Meyer's parallels and analogies in detail, but we have also cast serious doubts 
about the methodological legitimacy and argumentative coherence of his stance. 
the interpretation of the findings and the results of the scientific inquiry. See Kuhn (1996) p. 29 f. .Theref()r~. 
at times of revolution, when the normal scientific tradition changes, the scientist's perceptIon of hIs 
environment must be re-educated. In some familiar situations he must learn to see a new gestalt. After he has 
done so-the world of his research will seem, here and there, incommensurable with the world he had inhabited 
before'. Kuhn (1996) p. 112 f. 
322 See GdA vol. I.1 p. 234 f. . . . 
323 See Nat in Calder III (1990) p. 309. Naf also adds here the 'exclusion of the disdained masses In Meyer s 
philosophy, which in the light of Meyer's political writings goes however too far. 
324 Kaerst (1925) p. 219. 
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3. Karl Julius Beloch - Demography and the Capitalist Character of the 
Ancient Polis 
i. Biographical Note32S 
Karl Julius Beloch (1854-1929) was born as the son of a lord of the manor in 
Nieder-Petschkendorf (Prussia). Due to a mixed marriage Beloch's background was semi-
aristocratic. Becoming a land owner or a university professor was for him the only true 
ambition worth pursuing in order to be his own free man. His main interests in his studies 
were political history, geography and statistics. Philology and classical languages, 
however, were not his strength and never excited him. Beloch dismissed these subjects as 
'mere memory stuff' .326 Due to bronchitis, Beloch chose to spend more time in the mild 
climate of the Italian Mediterranean mostly in Sorrento. 
In 1872 Beloch started his studies in classics at Palermo. A year later he went to 
Rome where he began to enjoy life for the first time, even though he felt that there was 
little to learn, since ancient history at that time was in a desolate state.327 Beloch turned his 
attention instead to the museums, galleries and the archaeological library where he studied 
epigraphs and inscriptions. He became acquainted with Bartelomeo Capasso, who drew 
Beloch's attention towards the topography of ancient Athens. A year later, after moving to 
Rome, he became influenced by the works of the ancient historian Ronghi, the linguist 
Lignana, the epigraphist de Ruggiero and attended lectures and seminars at the German 
Archaeological Institute of Rome.328 
According to Beloch' s autobiographical reflections, his PhD at Heidelberg was not 
so much a matter of academic pride, but rather that he knew that without it he would have 
difficulty in being taken seriously in academic circles. Karl Christ inferred from this that 
'the development of his strong ego might have been influenced by the fact that Beloch 
reacted throughout his life very sensitively if his works were not acknowledged and 
325 Beloch disliked engaging into manual labour and rather believed that the 'ordinary chap' should carry out 
activiti~s of this kind. In his autobiographical reflections we hear that 'manual labour 'as recommended by 
education scholars and as it was forced onto me in the past, was never my lust nor my skill....I never 
understood how it should benefit us, us who belong to the leading class'. Beloch (1925) p. 4 
326 'As long as the Greeks were independent they never learned any foreign languages and still they were 
great guys'. Beloch (1925) p. 2. 
321 Beloch (1925) p. 6. 
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suffered from the fact that the 'Ragazzi capitolini' at the Institute looked down on him' .329 
He graduated from Heidelberg in 1875 with a distinction. Aged only twenty-five Beloch 
became an extraordinary professor of ancient history at Rome, where he maintained his 
post until 1912. 
His major academic achievements during his stay in Rome was the Griechische 
Geschichte (completed in 1913) and his early work Die Bevolkerung der Griechis~h­
Romischen Welt (1886) earned him a distinguished international reputation and both 
studies influenced the direction of ancient history during the early 20th century 
significantly. This achievement rests not so much on his often rather impassioned 
treatment of Karl BUcher's or Karl Rodbertus' 'oikos economy', but more with his efforts 
to involve creatively new methodological tools and approaches such as demographic 
surveys and socio-geographical statistics in ancient Greek and Roman history.330 In 1912 
Beloch went to Leipzig to take up a chair of ancient history, where BUcher, Lamprecht and 
also Georg von Below held professorships in political economy and modem history. His 
acceptance of the offer had however nothing to do with the controversy between Meyer and 
BUcher, which had, in a narrower sense, already ended with BUcher's reply in the ZGW of 
1902. It is more likely that Beloch was dissatisfied with the progress on his academic 
research on the Griechische Geschichte, which had slowed down due to an increase in 
administrative and teaching duties, and secondly that Leipzig enjoyed a great reputation in 
political economy, history, philosophy and other humanities disciplines. 33I 
Like many of his fellow German historians, Beloch developed a dedicated passion 
for politics and for German patriotism. However, whilst the Prussian School swore loyalty 
to Bismarck and the aristocracy, Beloch maintained that he himself stood always on the 
side of the parliamentarians. Even if he felt he had not yet fully understood politics during 
his younger years, he had already seen with disgust 'how Bismarck kicked the rights of the 
people, and I have not forgiven him for this even to this day. I always regarded freedom as 
the highest good and remained throughout my life a republican'. Beloch's republicanism 
was not unlike the social democratic type. 'A republic under Freidrich Ebert in which 
328 See Momigliano (1966) p. 3. 
329 Christ (1972) p. 250. This judgement might not be quite accurate. Beloch was only concerned to be able 
to live ~decently' in this academic circle. Beloch (1925) p. 7. . ' 
330 The use of statistics as an enrichment for ancient political history becomes already aparent In one of hiS 
early word. 'The Italian alliance under Rome's Hegemony - public legal and statistical inquireies' (1880). 
See also the appriciative comments by Lehmann-Haupt (1930) p. 103 f. . . 
331 Beloch (1925) p. 15 f. It took him 7 years to complete the first volume of this work In 1909, but Beloch 
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socialists and Jews are in control was nothing I ever wanted. But even this political order 
was still better than the feudal lord state and the two dozen monarchs, who fled in the most 
disgraceful way from their little thrones after they led our nation into catastrophe'.332 
Perhaps his forty-year long marriage to Bella Bailey, whose father was a personal friend of 
Lincoln, Seward and Summer influenced Beloch in his anti-establishment standpoint, 
which was not always strictly anti-aristocratic.333 
Beloch's professorship at Leipzig also did not last for long. Due to the illness of 
his wife he was forced to return to Rome after only one semester.334 The dramatic events in 
the months and years ahead, the erratic political decision-making of the Italian government 
during the World Warsaw Beloch losing his professorship at the Institute, his villa and 
most sadly his wife. Never having been able to participate long and intensely enough in the 
political affairs of his fatherland, was something Beloch regretted deeply in almost an 
Aristotelian fashion that this highest good for man, to participate in political affairs, was 
somehow denied to him. Nevertheless, he expressed his hope and faith that the German 
people will always remember about themselves that 'the God, who let iron grow did not 
want slaves', which emphasises his patriotism.335 
did never despise the academic teaching burden. 
332 Beloch (1925) p. 16 f. 
333 Beloch (1925) p. 9 f. . 
334 The-title of his inaugural speech at Leipzig in autumn 1912. 'The Census of population as Factor and 
Indicator of the Historical Development', illustrates that Beloch seemed to have moved further towards the 
statistical method than the traditional historiography of the Prussian School would ever have found 
acceptable: See Beloch (1913b). . . 
335 Beloch (1925) p. 27. On the subject of Antisemitism before the 1930s see very recently Lindemann 
(2000) 
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ii. Demographic Analysis and Large Scale Industry in Classical Antiquity 
In the foreword to Beloch's first major work 'Die Bevolkerung der Griechisch 
Romischen Welt' of 1880, he points out that economic history as a science was just about to 
emerge and that historical demography had never been dealt with in a scientific manner. 336 
Beloch's work was a very ambitious undertaking to combine the latest modern statistical 
methods with the materials ancient historians usually dealt with. Beloch had to admit 
many years later that he himself in this early work, Die Bevolkerung, had not processed the 
scarcely available statistical sources critically enough. Nevertheless, a first attempt was 
made to move away from pure political history, which dominated the historical scholarship 
in Germany.337 Unlike Meyer, Beloch placed less importance on the role of the individual 
in history, 'the great men' and so on, without intending to deny the importance of the 
political and ideological factors. Beloch maintained that the economic and the spiritual 
development in history are influencing each other and did not simply assigned priority to 
political and demographic factors. Beloch recognised that changes in 'spirit and collective 
consciousness expressed in our actions, do change the social environment'.338 On the other 
hand, man's social life is not strictly dominated or strongly led by single historic 
personalities. They play for Beloch a rather less significant role in the course of these 
processes.339 Indeed only in the field of fine art Beloch ascribes the individual more or less 
an unlimited historical importance. His understanding of the historical development as a 
result of material and economic conditions and processes are primarily responsible for 
political changes. At this point one may interpret Beloch' s rudimentary methodological 
concerns as being influenced by Marx's ideas of social development on the basis of 
economic conditions and class struggle. This perhaps becomes apparent when we consider 
the following observation as an exemplar: 'if the conditions for scientific discovery or a 
technological invention are once present, then this innovation will be made, whether by 
Hinz or by Kunz does not matter at all' .340 However, this somewhat ironic comment 
concerning the influence of historical personalities has nothing to do with a materialistic or 
336 Beloch (1880) p. 1. 
337 Beloch (1925) p. 14. 
338 Beloch (l913a) I p. 308 ff. 
339 Beloch (l913a) I p. 1 f. . , 
340 Beloch (l913a) I p. 3. Such a view remained not unscrutinised, since it stood agamst B u~ckhardt sand 
Ranke's assumption about the effecti veness of the single individual in a historical process. Ct. Otto (1905) 
p. 701. Hinz and Kunz are aliases for 'Joe Public'. 
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dialectic view of historical development. Beloch categorically rejected any connection of 
his philosophy of history with Marx's historical materialism.341 Similar to Hobbes and Mill 
, 
Beloch reinterpreted all human actions as being motivated by utility or usefulness (desire 
satisfaction).342 An explanation for Beloch's disregard for historic personalities and the 
power of the underprivileged masses can perhaps be found in his personality, which shows 
certain signs of eccentric attitude towards his environment.343 Another example for the 
importance of economic or demo graphical factors over the spiritual is the structure of his 
main work Griechische Geschichte, which deals with the economic history prior to the 
cultural aspects of the ancients' life. 
Although Die BevOikerung aimed to give a systematic account and an evaluation of 
the scarce and differentiated statistical findings beyond historical transcripts, especially this 
data evaluation was marked by significant overestimation, which sparked controversy not 
only amongst ancient historians but also under political economists. For example, Beloch 
assumed that during the classical period the Greeks were a nation of over eight million, 
which allowed them to outnumber other smaller nations in military conflicts. Hence, he 
concluded that this allowed the Greeks to playa more dominant military and cultural role 
in antiquity.344 
Beloch assumed that the absolute number of citizens in a state is an expression of 
the political power of such a state. To him, the relative number compared with other cities 
is a wealth indicator and 'expresses the economic stage which a country has achieved', 
given that the fertility of the land and the access to essential raw materials is fairly 
similar.345 Demographic statistics and its related modem methods had been ignored and 
neglected by both historians and statisticians in their relevance to ancient history, according 
to Beloch. He tries to illustrate this by claiming that statistical and numerical 
considerations already played an important part for the Romans and during the Middle 
Ages. Hans Delbruck's Military History is praised for emphasising the 'fundamental role 
of the numerical strength of the troops.346 He rather stressed that 'the size of the population 
of a country is nothing else but a product of historic and economic factors; and where we 
341 See Beloch vol. l.l. (l913a) p. 4. Beloch discusses the problem of the personality in history extensively 
and argues against both sides, materialism and 'the naiVe historiography that only acknowledges heroes: the 
masses that stand behind them are not worth considering'. 
342 See Hobbes' Leivathan (1996) I.6.2 p. 40 f. and Mill's Utilitarianism (1997) p. 169 ff. 
343 See Christ (1972) p. 264. See also the introduction to his Griechische Geschichte (1913). 
344 Beloch (1913b) p. 321 f. 
J-IS Beloch (1913b) p. 322. 
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know the factors, there we can account for the product' .347 
Even though Beloch's aim was to substantiate the basis for 'a history of the 
population of Europe' and his Bevolkerungsgeschichte [taliens may have been an important 
step towards this goal - a book which assigned major significance to the demographic 
changes as an expression of the political and economic development.348 However, Beloch 
admitted himself, that his pioneering studies could only approximately state the data 
correctly. He even admitted error margins of more than 25 % amongst the accounting of 
ordinary citizens and even more than 50 % in the number of slaves.349 Beloch attempted to 
deliver a statistical basis of 'Minimalzahlen' (a basic set of numbers of minimally reliable 
data) but also admitted that 'every so often I might have aimed too high, ... However, all in 
all, one would not estimate the population of antiquity considerably lower, as I have done 
it' ?50 Any scepticism against Beloch's method, which he never fully discussed in great 
detail, is brushed aside as 'the general phrases with which the non-believers want to fob us 
off...is nothing more than scientific cowardice. It only proves that those who hold this 
view have not deeply thought about this matter'.351 
Beloch may have carefully listed and organised the material in demographic 
movements and may have indeed inferred some military and 'cultural economic' strength 
of Hellas, but we may wonder whether the application of modem concepts such as heavy 
and large-scale industry are not just based on total conjecture and have even less credibility 
and reliability than a weather forecast. However, this does not refute Beloch's argument. 
One could argue, as he implicitly did, that having an unreliable forecast or estimation over 
the population and its demographic development is still better than having none 
whatsoever. The main error lies elsewhere. 
Although we have to grant Beloch that he did not jump unfoundedly and 
immediately to conclusions about the compatibility of ancient and modem economic life, 
his works from 1900 onwards show an almost indiscriminate use of modem terminology in 
his descriptions of the classical period and beyond. Criticism did not only come from 
BUcher, but also from amongst his own ranks in ancient history. For example, Otto Seek, a 
pupil of Theodor Mommsen, attacked Beloch's Bevolkerung as a conjectural statistics and 
346 See Beloch (1913b) p. 323. See also Delbriick (1911) vol. 1 p. 37 f. 
347 Belo-ch (1913b) p. 325. 
348 See Beloch (1937-61). 
349 See Momigliano (1966) p. 6. 
350 Beloch (1897) p. 343 f. 
.151 Beloch (1913b) p. 324 ff. 
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concluded that 'hence, he hovers in free air over the solid grounds of the tradition, and with 
him play clouds and wind' .352 Seek argued that besides Beloch's respectable efforts to 
collect all the relevant statistical sources, his lack of methodological clarity in the 
interpretation of sources, which every historian should possess, became apparent. 353 
Although Seek's assertion was generally justifiable, Beloch merely replied that the former 
criticism did not even 'locket einen Hund hinter den Olen hervor' ('entice a dog to come 
out from behind the oven').354 
Beloch was generally lauded by his contemporaries for delivering 'for the 7th and 
6th century Be a differentiated and clear picture of the substantial changes in the economic 
life. He also acknowledged the start of the money economy and its consequences'.355 Such 
appreciative observations are certainly correct with regard to Beloch's systematic rigour 
and detailed knowledge of almost all aspects of ancient history. However Beloch left us in 
the dark about the nature of such a 'money economy' and the nature of the 'economic' 
during the Homeric period. 
Beloch's demographical and statistical inferences are based on a further assumption 
that the ancient thinkers, in particular the philosophers, had little awareness of the 
'economic' conditions and demographic structure that was present even in ancient times. 
'Bockh's Staatshaushaltung der Athener was completely written in vain for them' .356 
However, he also acknowledged that 'all cultural progress is in its last instance progress of 
knowledge' .357 This is certainly acknowledged by Beloch with regard to the appreciation of 
the works and the influence of Demokrit, Epicur and Aristotle. However, just because they 
had little to say about the 'economy' is not proof that the classical period was economically 
essentially like the modem economy.358 
However, the analysis of any possible problem of 'propagating traditions' is not 
addressed in earnest by Beloch. He only pointed out laconically that 'every tradition has to 
be critically backed-up. The most influential traditions must do so most rigorously, 
352 Seek cited in Christ (1972) p. 258. 
353 Seek did not only provoke Beloch, he displeased also Meyer in his attempt to explain the collapse of the 
Roman Empire by referring to a misguiding concept of ancient history of a reversed Darwinian selection 
according to which the best were extinguished and the weak and faint hearted survived. See Meyer's WEdA 
p. 145.-
354 Beloch (1897) p. 343. 
355 Christ (1972) p. 266 f. 
356 Beloch I (1913a) p. 94. 
357 Beloch II.l (l913a) p. 221. 
358 See Meikle (l995b) p. 148 f. 
PART I. BUCHER VS. MEYER 89 
because we are far too easy caught up by authority'.359 This is perhaps why Beloch did not 
rate classical philology very highly. Indeed his hostility towards those scholars is clearly 
brought out in the Greek History: 'the philologist believes what is mentioned in the sources 
until one proves to him that it is wrong; the historian believes in it only if it is proven that it 
is correct...Philology simply reports the contents of sources, whereas the historian should 
stand above his material, make guesses about the connection of those sources, but also 
doubts their integrity. The historian should discover what event caused a certain other 
event'. This is in Beloch's philosophy a process of 'climbing up' to the causes. 360 
We shall discuss the questionability of such statements below. For the moment we 
shall consider Meyer's and Beloch's terminological problems. By using terms such as 
'heavy industry', 'world trade' and 'inflation' did Beloch draw such convenient parallels 
indiscriminately? It is fairly safe to say that we have good reason to believe, as Beloch did 
over a hundred years ago, that Athens around 329 BC had to import com despite the 
absence of a drought or a plague. Beloch however claims that, for example, Kleomenes of 
Naukratis' com speculations were responsible for a inflationary increase in its price, and 
that the very same type of speculations were occurring at the City exchequer of London. 
This is a parallel is difficult to support.361 We could argue that someone exploiting their 
position of power to make the wealthy and themselves even more prosperous by leaving 
the ordinary man out of pocket, is indeed what nowadays characterises a capitalist form of 
behaviour. The London exchequer however, was already an institutionalisation of the 
market economy with a separately operating and highly influential financial sector. The 
Athenian historians and philosophers did not report on the existence of such a vibrant 
community of speculators even on a smaller scale. The moneylender or shopkeeper who 
may have sold his produce primarily to earn more money was not organised in a guild 
which shaped the polis politics to suit their trade. 
359 Beloch II .1 (l913a) p. 74 ff. 
360 Beloch I (1913a) p. 15 f. 
361 Cf. Beloch (1885) p. 260 f. 
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iii. Bucher's 'Fallacy' 
Beloch raised his concerns against BUcher's thesis after the publication of the 
second edition of EdV in 1895. Like Meyer two years before, Beloch's complaint targeted 
BUcher's apparently central premise 'that during the whole of antiquity and until the early 
middle ages, the objects of daily use were not subject to a regular exchange' .362 Beloch ~nd 
Meyer both agreed in principle that this claim is by all means acceptable for the Homeric 
period, but not for the classical period. BUcher claimed in a short article in 1884 'that one 
has to arrive at an exaggeration of the scope of ancient trade if someone does not use a 
quantitative method' .363 Beloch attempted to satisfy BUcher's request in order to show that 
the ancient economy at least quantitatively can show parallels with the 'modem' economy, 
as Beloch defined it. 
It is in this response to BUcher where historians, both then and now, often become 
perplexed. Out of nothing emerges an exchange rate between the Greek Talente and the 
German Reichsmark. According to some unsubstantiated data, the commodity tax of 
Peiraeus was 2 % of all imported and exported goods added up to 30 to 400 Talentes. This 
number is then used to calculate to a total trade of this city. Although Beloch repudiated 
Bockh's Staatshaushaltung earlier as out-dated he proudly notes that even the latter author 
has calculated in the same way.364 By comparing ancient and modem silver values, Beloch 
ends up with a total trade value of 11 million Reichsmark. Taking inflation and currency 
devaluation into account, Beloch calculates 40 million RM for Peiraeus. Together with 
Beloch's demographical survey he concludes that the economic strength of Attica per 
citizen was not of the scale of Hamburg as a centre of modem world trade, but only of 
Denmark in the early 1890s. Given the economic depression, which Beloch observes for 
the period around 400 Be 'there can be no doubt that the trading transactions of Attica are 
far lower than modem industrial centres' .365 The example is to show that Beloch's 
objections against BUcher do not lie with the latter's methodology, at least not at this point. 
Beloch took issue with BUcher's denial and claim of negligibility of trade for consumption 
and production purposes. 'Should we really believe that a family of five did spend per 
annum around 1000 Marks on luxury items during a period where Athens was 
362 See again EdV p. 81 (1997) 2nd ed. EdV (1906) 5th ed. p. 85. 
363 See Beloch (1899) p. p. 626 n 1. 
:l(,.J Beloch (1897) p. 627 n 1. 
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economically on its knees. With a daily wage for unskilled labour of 1 Y2 - 2 Marks?'366 
Beloch's long-winded example shows clearly that with regard to the classical period he 
simply questioned BUcher's observation that in antiquity only lUxury items were traded on 
a large scale. Beloch therefore does not engage in a methodological discussion of BUcher's 
theory of economic stages, but takes his opponent's observations as a fact of economic 
history, which BUcher explicitly wanted to avoid. The purely economic performance of 
Hellas overall is not compared with any modem state or territory because of the absence of 
a unified tax system. Regarding the economic strength of antiquity, Beloch is more 
optimistic in the developments towards the 1 st century AD. Here he argues that 
Vespasina's Roman Empire was only limping 30 percent behind Europe of 1835. 'Hardly 
any other fact is more suitable in order to gain an understanding about the grandiosity of 
the world trade in antiquity' .367 
Beloch's short paper does not, of course, go into detail as to how the whole course 
of trade in antiquity progressed. He always tried to point out that his estimations were 
incomplete and had large error margins. However, we do not need to criticise Beloch from 
a modem point of view that we may have more accurate numbers nowadays. It is the 
principle or methodology with which we have to take issue. Beloch' s exchange rate and 
currency devaluation presume compatibility between the ancient world and the modem 
capitalist economy of Europe. We clearly see that he is only willing to admit a quantitative 
difference between the ancient and the Western civilisation. His further contributions to 
the BUcher-Meyer Controversy seem to underline this.368 
Two further publications which are included in the Finley collection deal directly 
with BUcher's 'closed household economy' ?69 In his article 'On Greek Economic History' 
(1902) Beloch opposes BUcher's predecessor Karl Rodbertus for arguing that the ancient 
polis, due to its ethical omnipotence, demanded more political engagement from its 
citizens than the modem state in Beloch's time did.370 He argues that Rodbertus was wrong 
to believe that the polis of classical Greece, in particular during peaceful times, demanded 
365 Beloch (1897) p. 628. 
366 Beloch (1897) p. 629 f. 
367 Beloch (1897) p. 631. Titus Vespasinus Flavius (9-79), founder of the Flavian dynasty. 
368 A further example for Beloch's lack of awarness for the difference in the social and political character of 
antiquity and modernity is also his caculation of the balance of trade in Athens around 4~ Be _which he 
equates with Denmark around 1890 (250 Krone). See Beloch (l899a) p. 628. The whole article I~ tilled \\Ith 
conjectural comparisons. 
369 See Beloch (1899) and Beloch (1902). 
370 See Rodbertus ( 1864) p. 346. 
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heavy taxes and material contributions or military conscription. Beloch maintained that 
during 'normal times' the Greek polis demanded significantly smaller contributions than 
the German State did. Even with 'the execution of their polemical rights, the citizen of the 
ancient polis took it like us and displayed the same apathy in political matters as the 
modem man. Although everyone could go to public meetings, in reality only a few 
attended, unless something very important was put on the agenda'.37\ Two observations 
come to mind: firstly, Beloch would have to define what he meant by 'normal times'. 
Peace, material and political stability was never a given reality. Secondly, it cannot be 
surprising that an essentially aristocratic and imperialist orientated state like Germany 
around 1900 demanded great sacrifices from its citizens for its world political ambitions. 
With regard to the ancients' apathy, one could cynically answer that indeed nothing may 
have changed since then and that Beloch himself should not be bitter about the lack of 
interest which his own electorate showed in his excursions into local politics. 
A third argument is based on Rodbertus's and BUcher's premise that slave labour 
dominated the production on the large-scale latifundi of the Roman empire. In opposition 
Beloch states that slavery was only occasionally and in 'industrial' cities predominant, 'but 
even here the slave population never exceeded half of the total population'.372 Instead large 
groups of free craftsmen characterised the production of commodities, which were, to a 
great degree, designed to be sold. Beloch's position is in this respect diametrically 
opposed to BUcher's, who claimed in the EdVthat in 'the ancient civilisation until the early 
Middle Ages, artefacts of daily use were not subject to a regular exchange'.373 Rodbertus 
and BUcher's alleged misjudgement was, as previously maintained by Meyer, blamed on 
the predicament that neither was sufficiently trained in the profession of ancient history and 
philology. This is surprising, because as we have seen, Beloch regarded the former guild 
highly, including the cultural historian Karl Lamprecht for whom he had great respect.374 
Beloch believed that he had discovered a fundamental problem in BUcher's work. 
On the one hand, BUcher tries to construct a 'primitive' picture of classical antiquity and 
beyond. On the other hand, Beloch noted a shift in BUcher's theory in his own position and 
claimed that BUcher believed that the main commodity traded in antiquity was the human 
371 Beloch (1902) p. 95 ff. 
372 Beloch (1902) p. 96 f. 
373 EdV 2nd ed. (1897) p. 81. 
314 Beloch (1925) p. 22. 
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being.375 For Beloch it is rather absurd that someone like BUcher, who assumed such a 
limited scope of exchange in antiquity, could ascribe to the belief of large-scale slavery, 
and even tourism, to antiquity in order to explain the movements of people circa 400 Be. 
It is highly unlikely for Beloch that about 60,000 people between 401-399 travelled to 
Athens for mere pleasure or even for study purposes. He states that 'almost no one 
travelled during Alexander's times for the purpose of pleasure, for the purpose of studying 
very few; those who travelled, travelled in business affairs, hence mainly for trade' .376 The 
assertion is correct, but unsurprisingly Beloch can only think of one reason for travelling, 
that of commerce. Beloch' s conjectural account of historical explanation becomes also 
apparent in the following statement: 'An important, export geared industry is led by itself 
towards the large-scale industrial plant, and we have to assume this for Greek antiquity too, 
even if nothing would have been testified about this'.377 
In many ways, Beloch' s view on the modem character of the ancient economy is 
even more outspoken than Meyer's, but is methodologically closer to BUcher's. Only for 
the times of the Homeric Sagas, is all kind of productive and industrial activity rather 
'primitive,?78 Primitive, however, does not mean self-sufficient, associated with no trade 
and commerce etc. Contrary to Meyer, Beloch claims that the state of the 'closed 
household economy' cannot even be applied strictly to the Homeric period. Production on 
customer demand already took place; goods were imported, but mostly raw materials and 
on a very small scale. The liveliness of such 'economic' activity is compared with the 
modem industrial age. In relation to the latter, there is no doubt for Beloch that the 
economy of Attica during the classical period and before that was rather primitive. By 
'primitive' he seems to have meant 'simple'. 
Beloch's paper 'Heavy Industry in Antiquity' (1899) led Finley and others to 
swiftly conclude that Beloch's position was preposterous.379 Indeed the title alone casts 
doubt over the academic value of his works. Besides the fact that Beloch processes the 
historical material with great detail, here too he falls short of a complex explanation as to 
why production, exchange and large-scale transport of commodities were conducted by the 
ancients. The reader never quite finds out why the amount of free wage labour artisans 
375 Beloch (1902) p. 169. 
376 Beloch (1902) p. 171. 
377 Beloch (1902) p. 176. 
378 Beloch (1899) p. 18. 
379 Schneider (1990) p. 434. 
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offering their services to the customer was indeed so high. On the one hand Beloch argues 
that 'slave labour was only lucrative for large-scale factories. Because the small artisan 
could hardly have had the capital to buy slaves, it is even more unlikely that he would 
expose himself to the risk that his only slave runs away, or dies or even is unable to work 
due to illness. Therefore the small artisan will always have preferred to work with free 
assistants' ?80 Due to competition, the larger factories which employ slaves are, according 
to Beloch, more efficient than the smaller workshops, which leads to a concentration of 
wealth in the hands of the large-scale factories. This is what Beloch infers, but he does not 
inquire into the purpose of 'economic activity' by the ancients. BUcher assumed on the 
contrary that the end or goal of production was primarily and dominantly for direct 
consumption inside the household. The two positions collide because Beloch assumes the 
predominant influence of 'modem economic motives' such as profit maximisation or cost 
minimisation and competition over certain markets for example, the amphorae market. 
If for Meyer, political decision-making dominated to some considerable degree the 
economic life in the cities, for Beloch such an influence was of a rather minor 
importance.38J Beloch argues that the restrictions and governmental regulations let us rather 
conclude the existence of a vibrant large-scale industry. The existence of large-scale textile 
plants and dye-work plants does, however not follow from the ethical considerations of 
Plato and Aristotle or the 'commercially' restrictive laws of Solon, The 'argument from 
silence does not hold true. Just because an influential politician does not speak about a 
subject matter that he morally despises, it is not to say that it exists beyond the fringes of 
society, to use a modem term. However, we need to stress that when reading Beloch he 
clearly does not assume the forms of commercial activity as they exist today. The large-
scale shoe factory owned by Timachos had in total 10 to 11 workers employed.382 This and 
many other examples highlights Beloch's weakness in finding appropriate descriptions of 
what must have been, even in his times, the size of the 'industrial infrastructure' of a little 
village like his home Nieder-Petschkendorf in north-east Prussia. 
380 Beloch (1899) p. 20. 
381 Beloch (1899) p. 23 f. 
382 Beloch (1899) p. 23. 
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iv. Critique 
Beloch's position within the BUcher-Meyer Controversy cannot easily be confirmed 
as being strictly on Meyer's side, although it might be tempting to argue that since Beloch 
agreed with Meyer's criticism of BUcher's claim that the ancient economy even in the late 
classical period did not really develop beyond a stage of the self-sufficient oikos. 
Regarding the rationale of those large-scale factory owners and businessmen, 
Beloch underlined the modem character of the ancient economy and society of the late 
classical period and for Rome in the first and second century AD even more strongly than 
Meyer did. By doing so he presupposed and universalised what may well have been the 
driving forces of modem capitalism as also having been the dominant rationale of the 
ancient Greek and Romans. This constitutes a highly problematic assumption about human 
nature, since it presupposes that the ancients used their rationality as a capacity in the very 
same way as the modem man does - at least in what Beloch would have called in 
'economic' (,wirtschaftliche ') matters. However, no serious methodological and 
conceptual framework exists in Beloch' s historiography apart from some sporadic 
considerations. This also comes to light in his inaugural speech at Leipzig in 1913, where 
he stated 'enough, more than enough about method. Let's get to the point'. Whereas 
BUcher and Meyer seem to be both part of more or less clearly separable, OppOSIng 
traditions in their methods of interpretation of textual or archaeological sources, Beloch 
seems to have little need for deeper analysis and rejects the philological and materialistic 
traditions in the reading of history almost off-hand. Yet he uses some 'practical' aspects of 
both here and there without exhausting himself over philosophy and the notion of a 
'historical tradition'. If the ancient philosophers are so suspicious of not disclosing the 
'economic reality' or condemning what was really ongoing in the 'industrial centres', we 
may wonder how his statistical calculations may warrant us more certainty than the 
inscriptions and reports of philosophers and chronologists. 
The lack of methodological clarity leads him to commit another major error, that of 
using a modem economic term in a quite inappropriate fashion, which put him eventually 
into Finley's straightjacket of being a 'modernist'.383 Even if Beloch can rely on sources. 
which support the claim that a considerable amount of goods and materials wcre hcing 
383 finley (1980) p. 30. 
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transported, imported and exported, it is difficult to see that all this was primarily driven by 
commercial interests. The scope of trade did not seem to matter to Beloch, since he 
assumes that a quantitative compatibility or parallel is no doubt possible. A discussion of 
the degree of 'considerability' was not seriously attempted and it still should have been 
demonstrated by Beloch how things of different kind, such as two different cultural and 
historical entities, can be meaningfully compared with one another. Beloch and also 
BUcher are in favour of quantitative methods in economic history, but the latter at least 
does not subsume the peculiarity of the ancient world under the profit-driven rationale of 
Beloch's capitalism. If Attica did indeed have such a small trading value with the outside 
world compared to modem times then any quantitative comparison becomes pointless, 
since in such a society what Beloch and others may call 'economic' activity played only a 
marginal role, whereas in ours it is essential. 
It is also surprising that Beloch criticised BUcher so vehemently for the use of 'case 
studies' into the demographic statistics of early modem Frankfurt or the tax edict by 
Deokletos.384 Beloch himself uses this technique and is even more ready than BUcher with 
generalisations and 'obvious' answers, in which he applies the results of one or a few 
particular cases to almost any number of 'similar' cases, whereby the similarity is often 
made on the grounds of conjectural analysis. 
However, his efforts to link social and economic history with demographic data 
undoubtedly constituted a noteworthy effort to break new ground and shed a critical light 
onto the established conservative guild of historians who almost glorified the role of the 
historic personality. Nevertheless, it is difficult to call this a remarkable achievement,385 
since the interpretation and representation of his historic sources triggered strong criticism 
not only by the political economist Karl BUcher, but also amongst ancient historians such 
as Mommsen and MUnzer.386 His pupil Friedrich Oertel reflects Beloch's scholarly 
influence in the course of his testimonial.387 Beloch was probably one of the first historians 
who acknowledged demographic data and movements as an important indicator and 
module in economic history and aimed to lay down the scientific basis of such a theory. 
The question of how meaningful such enquiries are remains unanswered, since Beloch 
384 See Bucher (1894), Bucher (1895). Cf. Beloch (1902) p. 96. 
385 See Brunt (1971). 
386 Mommsen, Th. (1908) p. 262 ff. Munzer (1927) pp. 595-599. See Seek (1897) pp. 161-176. 
387 Beloch (1925) p. 22. 
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himself deemed this data as unreliable.388 
388 Beloch influenced primarily quantitative economic history. See recently on this subject Crafts (1991) and 
Cohen (1992) and Duncan-Johnes (1994). 
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4. Bucher's 'Reply' - the Nature and the Scope of Exchange in Antiquity 
In the direct aftermath of the controversy BUcher was disappointed that an open 
exchange of arguments between him and Meyer never came about. He noted in his essay 
'Zur Griechische Wirtschaftsgeschichte' (ZGW) of 1901 that after Meyer had given his 
paper WEdA at the German Historian Conference in 1895, an opportunity to answer 
Meyer's attacks was denied him.389 'Since a discussion afterwards was not endorsed, I had 
to resort to putting my question in private to the orator: I asked him how he [Meyer] could 
explain that the Romans, given the character he ascribed to their economy, never lapsed to 
offer their state mail services to the usage of private news agencies? He still owes me an 
answer to this' .390 
Although it is not clear whether the ZGW was indeed intended to be a reply to the 
manifold assertions against BUcher, it has been treated as one in the later literature 
surrounding the issues in question. Even if the ZGW had no further impact on either 
Beloch's or Meyer's position, it will perhaps be interesting to see whether BUcher was able 
to answer some of the assertions, which Meyer and also Beloch raised against him. 
BUcher argued that the criticism against his theory was rather selective and 'nit-
picking' . His first line of defence was to emphasise that different historiographical 
methods can lead to very different results regarding the interpretation of the historical 
sources.391 Unfortunately he does not pursue or elaborate upon the argument of the 
diversity of scientific methodologies dependent on the discipline or epistemological 
interest of the scientist himself. His reply to the mounting criticism of his theorem of the 
'closed household economy' remains therefore confined to a further criticism of some of 
Beloch's and Meyer's interpretation of sources. By doing so he seems to stress far less the 
importance of economic modelling or any theories of 'economic stages', which he 
elaborated in such a detailed way in the EdV. Yet it was the application of just such a 
theory, which led him to the conclusion that the ancient economy never left the stage of the 
'closed household economy'.392 
389 The ZGWwas first published in 1901 and repuiblished in extended length in Bucher ZGW2nd(l9~2). 
390 ZGW 1st ed.(l901) p. 2 f. There is no evidence that both scholars have even been in postal contact atalL 
391 We suggest that BUcher aimed to silence the incorrect criticism of his stance by referring at the begInn~ng 
of this work to Jacob Burckhart, whose philosophy of history influenced also Nietzsche and i\1cyer. ZGB p. 
l. 
392 See EdV p. 90. 
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BUcher was justified in answering his harsh critics in an equally robust fashion. 
However, he could not avoid having to admit in the ZGW, by referring to the Ed V, that 
although maintaining that he was right with regard to the 'general impetus and content of 
his work. .. some arguments were not as thoroughly set out as they should have been' .393 
However, small errors in the philological detail, which a well-read ancient historian could 
have exposed fairly easily were not BUcher's prime concern. Given the negative reaction 
of his opponents to BUcher's open invitation to debate the issues regarding the controversy 
in the ZeitschriJt fUr die Gesamte StaatswissenschaJt, BUcher could only conclude that they 
either must have remained intentionally ignorant toward the main issues or that a shift of 
the debate into mere technical minutiae was on their agenda.394 Whether BUcher was correct 
in his judgement shall be examined in Part II, when ideological divisions and 
methodological differences between the participants move into the centre of our attention. 
BUcher's 'reply' is based on three arguments, which in one form or another 
appeared already in the EdV. Firstly, BUcher points out that the ancients were different 
from later cultures and even from other ancient Oriental civilisations.395 This is expressed 
in their ethical resentment to exchange in the form of chrematisicae. As we recall Beloch 
found this argument especially difficult to accept, but the latter's counter explanation is 
even less convincing. 
Secondly, and this is perhaps a stronger claim, BUcher seriously questioned the 
extent of 'free labour'. Instead he argued that slavery constituted the highest form of 
development of the 'closed household economy'396 This is not meant in an ethical way of 
course. The cultural difference of the Greeks did not mean for BUcher exclusiveness or 
isolation from migration and external cultural influences. We noted that Beloch and Meyer 
assumed a lively migration of artisans offering their services in the urban centres and 
pointed out the inefficiency of maintaining slaves in small workshops. 
Thirdly, BUcher excuses some of his inaccuracies and generalisations in the EdV on 
the grounds that his paper was written for a wider audience and was rushed since he had to 
393 Two points are worth noting: Firstly, BUcher stresses the point that his paper 'Die Enfsfe!wl/g d~r 
Volkswirtschaft' was written for on audience of different backgrounds. Secondly, he e~pressed hIS 
dissatisfaction with the paper in a letter to his colloquies and friend Alois Schulte 3/VU1895 In Braubach 
(1963) p. 378 n6. Here also more about BUcher's life and intellectual friendship with Schulte. . 
394 It should be noted that Beloch's (1902) puublication Zur Griechisclzen Wirtsclzajtsgesclllte does nol 
address or consider BUcher's arguments in the ZGw. It seems that Beloch has not read or had knowlegde ot 
its publication. . 
395 This was heavily disputed by Meyer in his WEdA and by his colleague Kurt BreysIg (1901) vol. II p. 95. 
396 ZGW p. :2 See also EdV p. 23. 
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step in for another speaker at the Gennan Historian Conference.397 This is certainly a point 
many of his opponents would have forgiven him. However, it is a pity with regard to the 
outcome of the controversy that BUcher did not go beyond some counterattacks and a 
reinterpretation of selected philological sources, which aimed to underline the qualitative 
difference between ancient and modem economic life. 
A few examples may serve us as an illustration of the merits and shortcomings of 
his reply. Firstly, by referring to Burckhardt's cultural historical theory about the nature of 
ancient political life, BUcher describes the peculiarities of the ancient economy as a 'private 
economy'. This means for BUcher a 'non-national economy'. Therefore he concludes we 
cannot apply the presuppositions of 'a theory of national economy' to antiquity. Here 
BUcher argues in particular against Beloch's speculations about the amount of factories and 
its 'free' workforce. On the contrary, BUcher pointed out that seasonal demands and 
personnel fluctuation constituted a kind of manufactory very different from the modem 
regIme. Unfortunately, BUcher does not pursue the quest for a qualitative distinction 
between the ancient and modem economy, when it comes to the economic practices. A 
'Wurst-seller', for example, was according to BUcher primarily a 'Wurst-maker' and not 
someone who traded the product.398 Besides the fact that this is also a speculation, it is 
difficult to see what this point is supposed to achieve. Even nowadays, farmers and 
butchers sell their produce directly to the consumer. This was even more the case a 
hundred years ago. 
Secondly, BUcher admits that import and export of commodities for daily use took 
place, but remained adamant that its extent was small and non-regular. In this context, 
BUcher voiced concern against Beloch's statistical inquires. This is surpnsmg smce 
BUcher himself constructs tables and analyses numerical data in order to make what has 
now become primarily a quantitative argument. 399 However, it needs to be pointed out that 
those quantitative elements nevertheless constitute a smaller proportion than in Beloch's 
analysis. BUcher also voiced his scepticism about the universality of the statistical method 
in economic history, since it is difficult to detennine the reliability of such sporadic data, 
which the ancients left us with. Throughout the discussion BUcher intended to show how 
unacceptable Beloch's statistical method was, since its method of evaluation is a direct 
descendent of the modem economy. By doing so BUcher fails to realise that his opponents 
397 ZGWp. 2. 
398 ZGWp. 15. 
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could have equally resorted to the argument that different methods achieve different results 
and that thereby his theory of 'economic stages' is also a product of the modern science of 
political economy. BUcher does not regard this as endangering the correctness of his 
position. 
The third argument raises an interesting question over the institutionalisation of 
trade or rather lack of institutionalisation of commerce in antiquity. BUcher points out that 
a modem export system or export trade would have demanded and required special 
attention in peace negotiations. Large-scale commercial enterprises would certainly have 
been discussed at political and elders' meetings, but there is no record of this. BUcher 
primarily questions Beloch's stance that if trade played such a significant part in the 
economy of classical Greece such that it can be at least quantitatively be compared with 
capitalism of the 18th and early 19th century, why did none of the ancient Greek city-state 
holders consider it as a powerful tool and recognise its positive or negative effects in 
lengthy discussions ?400 
As we have seen, Beloch tried to prove the modern export character of classical 
Greece with large findings of Greek amphorae in many parts of the Mediterranean world. 
Beloch infers the existence of large-scale factories from the signatures on the amphorae by 
the master. BUcher holds against this claim that 'we simply do not know whether we are 
dealing with an entrepreneur or a worker. And in the former case, whether we are dealing 
with a factory owner or a handicraftsman. In the latter instance, we do not know whether 
we are dealing with free men or slaves. If one intends to attribute industrial importance to 
the signatures, it is best for our understanding if we assume we are dealing with workers, 
who had to indicate how many vases each of them had produced since they were perhaps 
paid by the quantity which they have produced' .401 Other possibilities are considered too, 
but it becomes apparent in this statement that BUcher himself can not refute Beloch's 
position and declares the ancient economy as 'primitive' meaning 'underdeveloped'. All 
he seems to say is that we simply do not know what to conclude from this. This is of 
course not a satisfactory result for a historian, who would admit that no one will ever quite 
know exactly what the nature of 'economic life' in Greece's Golden Age was really about. 
However difficult the process of interpretation of the historical sources might be, a 
historian will nevertheless provide his audience with the best possible scenario based on 
399 See ZGW pp. 85-86. 
400 ZGW p. 29 f. 
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the available materials. 
BUcher's reply; in the ZGW, constitutes a shift in his original position, which he 
cannot simply brand as a clarification since some premises of his argument have clearly 
changed. Against the rigid application of the concept of 'closed household economy', 
which he had earlier stated was characteristic for antiquity as a whole, he now redefined the 
nature of the ancient economy as a 'private economy' .402 'Private economy' is still defi~ed 
by BUcher as a large household or community based economy. BUcher also answers the 
criticism that he was previously too generalist and superficial in the EdV by acknowledging 
the different scope of productive activity between the Athenian and the Persian household, 
the difference in scope and size of the local agora and elucidating the complex political 
function of money.403 
Unfortunately, BUcher's 'Contribution to Greek economic history' (ZGl-V) did not 
result in any convergence or compromises between the participant of the debate. If at all, 
we can only laud BUcher's attempt to reply to his critics. His efforts to clarify and to a 
small degree modify his own position had the positive effect of a good critique of Beloch's 
arguments although the qualitative analysis is not carried through with consistency and 
depth. 
Meyer initially complained that BUcher denied the existence of commodity exports 
and pressed the economy of the whole antiquity into the theoretical model of the stage of 
the 'closed' or 'integrated' household economy. BUcher's ZGW seemed to give a marginal 
treatment to the theoretical model of economic stages, which raises the question over 
BUcher's commitment to his previously vehemently defended theory. The lack of 
methodological reflection has the unfortunate effect that BUcher does not clearly work out 
the fundamental difference between capitalist forms of production and any other form of 
economy. That the ancient economy was not of a national or international scale is only a 
quantitative matter since it does not sufficiently accommodate and refute the arguments of 
'commercial practices' in antiquity i.e. profit making, banking etc. The existence of 
customer production and production for export purpose was eventually admitted in the 
ZGW and constitutes a shift in his position, but does not resolve the debate.404 
BUcher's hopes that political economists and ancient historians could collaborate to 
·101 ZGWp. 81 ff. 
.j02 ZGW p. 31 ff. 
403 ZGW p. 30 ff. 
.j().j ZGW p. 46. 
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analyse all available materials and sources in order to create a discussion platform about 
the nature of ancient economic life were disappointed. Partially responsible was the lack of 
clarity on all sides and the lack of a common methodological framework, which left the 
most crucial question, whether the ancient economy was different in nature or only in scope 
or scale from the modem economy, still unresolved. 
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For Meyer, culture, history and politics are interconnected to one another. 
However, his parallels between antiquity and the rise of capitalism are somewhat dubious 
observations. It seems that Meyer sees a threat to civilisation and prosperity with the rise 
of modem free market capitalism. His efforts to draw similarities between the economic 
decline of antiquity and his concerns about the political threat to the German monarchy by 
the bourgeoisie and the socialist make his works in ancient economic history suspicious of 
being an instrument to further an ideology, a suggestion which we shall discuss in the next 
part. 
Meyer's substantial contribution to ancient history was to constitute a previously 
untried attempt to grasp all aspects of the development and decline of the ancient 
civilisation by acknowledging cultural achievements and diversity, but also to create a 
lively awareness of the problems which every culture faces in political and 'economic' 
matters.405 
The BUcher-Meyer Controversy was quickly recognised as an important battlefield 
for a great number of historians, economists, philosophers and sociologists, who felt 
obliged to participate in the debate in varies ways. Already L. M. Hartmann in 1896 
criticised Meyer's conclusion because the latter did not treat the ancient economy as 
essentially different from our modem economy.406 We have seen that such a conclusion is 
unjustified Johannes Hasebroek in his work, Griechische Wirtschafts- und 
Gesellschaftsgeschichte, added even more categorically that the used evidences which is 
supposed to support a modem interpretation of the ancient economy, cannot survive at 
close examination.407 This is even truer when we view the debate from the contemporary 
knowledge about those sources. The crucial point is however not the evidence per se, but 
its understanding or interpretation. 
Regarding BUcher, despite any sympathies with his original stance, one cannot and 
should not overlook the clear weaknesses in his approach. He was unable to prove to his 
audience the fundamentally different nature of the economy of classical Greece and 
beyond. The Roman 'economy' is not considered at all. Also, it is difficult to see how 
405 0 See WEdA p. 1 1 n1. 
406 See Hartmann (1896) p.1S3 f and Christ (1982) p. 70 ff. 
407 Hasebroek (1931) p. 10. 
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economIC history can be compressed into stages of economic development. The 
'economic' life of antiquity, in fact social life in general was, and remains, too complex in 
order to characterise it in such a formal and, regarding the EdV, in an almost mechanical 
way. Such theories are also a product of the enlightenment and the science of political 
economy which emerged with modernism. BUcher fails to demonstrate that the oikos based 
economy is indeed the 'economically' dominating institution throughout ancient world and 
that any commercial activities are of no significance for the general character of this 
economy. 
With the detailed elucidation of the original arguments between BUcher, Meyer and 
Beloch, we hope to have shown so far that the controversy involved a much richer content 
and depth that admitted by those contemporary authors, who are more often as not satisfied 
with the condensed and oversimplified versions of the debate. 
Although with Meyer and Beloch we are clearly dealing with attempts to interpret 
the historical detail of the ancient economy with modem capitalism, such parallels are 
explicitly only drawn between certain periods of antiquity such as the late classical period 
and Rome in the late 1st century AD. A plain modernism, which understands the ancient 
social life solely in modem terms and with a modem perspective for pragmatic purposes in 
order to make room or propagate the modem market economy, for example, has never 
occurred in the works of any serious participant in the controversy. Meyer's and Beloch's 
exaggerations of certain periods also have to be seen in the context of their highly 
differentiated and complex pictures of antiquity and their enthusiasm for the historical 
discipline. However, apart from Meyer's methodological considerations a clear debate on 
method is missing in both BUcher and Beloch. Hence, the question remains as to why the 
controversy was so bitterly fought and failed to establish any compromise between the 
participants. Many arguments and the amount of polemic discussions indicate a deep 
ideological gulf between the subjects of political economy and ancient history. We shall 
explore in the next part how complex and significant the ideological and political struggle 
was in those subjects and beyond between the 1890s and the 1920s. 
THE BUCHER-MEYER CONTROVERSY 
Part II. Method or Ideology? The Political and Philosophical 
Context of the Bucher-Meyer Controversy 
'Scientific truths are not the acquisition of one human 
being only. They are determined through repeatable 
observation by different scientists and in mutual 
discussion. Hereunto rests the justification of the 
scientific critique.' KARL LAMPRECHT 
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Introduction 
During the first part we have indicated that the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
involved a whole range of interconnecting historical and methodological problems. We 
shall see whether their conflicting positions also reflect upon the political and 
philosophical Weltanschauung, and in what way such divisions dominated their 
methodology. It is necessary to investigate whether the apparent misunderstandings in the 
debate and polemic exchanges between BUcher, Meyer and Beloch bring to light some 
contrary standpoints over specific political and social questions of their time, and whether 
they stand in some connection to the different methodologies in ancient history and 
economic theory. In order to achieve a deeper understanding of the causes and the 
dissatisfying outcome of the controversy, we shall examine the intellectual context of the 
arguments in more detail. Coinciding methodological debates within ancient history and 
political economy will also be assessed in the light of the political, social and ideological 
climate of late 19th century Germany. More specifically, this means we shall focus on the 
historiographical and methodological aspects of Meyer's theory affected as it was by the 
diminishing, but still predominant, influence of Historicism over the human SCIences 
('Geisteswissenschaften ') in Germany during the second half of the 19th century. 
The results of the above discussion shall be contrasted with new methodological 
approaches in the new academic territories of sociology, psychology, cultural history and 
political economy, which started to question seriously the domination of historical studies 
and its methodology. The delayed, but in comparison more dramatically changing, social 
and economic environment in the second half of the 19th century shall also be examined in 
order to investigate whether such factors are of any significance to the polemic course of 
the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. 
During the various aspects of the discussion in Part I, we suggested the following 
structure for this part. Firstly, we shall consider the traditional theory of historicism in 
order to elucidate its influence on Meyer's stance. Secondly, we shall shed light on the 
political sources and ideological goals of this approach. Thirdly, we shall look at the new 
and alternative methodological challenges put forward by Karl Lamprecht, and the famous 
'debafe on method' between Lamprecht and traditional historiographical scholarship. 
Fourthly, we shall discuss the neo-Kantian response to Lamprecht in its efforts to defend 
the established consensus over the existence of a distinctive methodology for the human 
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sciences compared to the methodology of the natural sciences. Fifthly, we shall examine 
the crisis in classical studies and ancient history to which Meyer responded indirectly when 
criticising BUcher's stance. Finally, we shall explain the nature of the methodological 
debates within political economy. 
The appendix to this part attempts to introduce the original and controversial 
position of Robert von Pohlmann, who attempted to combine ancient history with political 
economy in investigating contemporary political questions. Overall, this part attempts to 
establish how the unprecedentedly turbulent political, social and economic events, which 
were accompanied by serious ideological quarrels, profoundly affected the BUcher-Meyer 
Controversy and were partly responsible for the lack of a satisfying solution to the debate 
and its associated questions. 
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1. Ranke - The Prussian Reformation and 'State Historian' 
Eduard Meyer's paper 'Economic Development of Antiquity' (WEdA) of 1895, 
argued that central issues in ancient social and economic history can only be properly 
understood historically if the historian accepts the predominance of the 'political' in 
history. By demanding this, Meyer committed himself to Niebuhr's and Ranke's 
historiographical approaches, which previously dominated the historical scholarship both 
in Prussia and later in the unified German Reich, throughout the 19th century.l The pre-
eminence of this approach is represented in Meyer's emphasis on the educational and 
political value of ancient history with regard to the present. Meyer even goes so far to 
compare the educational goals of the classical period with the purpose of modern 
education, though without equating the ancient and the modern epoch in all political 
aspects.2 
Meyer's, Beloch's and also Georg von Below's uncompromIsmg criticism of 
BUcher's and Karl Lamprecht's 'methodological aberrations' exemplify that the 
established ancient and modem historians did not in the slightest accept Ranke's and 
Niebuhr's event and individual orientated theory of history under theoretical scrutiny.3 
One of the many rejected theories was BUcher's 'theory of economic stages' 
(Theorie der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstufen).4 Meyer's and Beloch's brisk opposition 
to new methodological approaches not only has its strong roots in the theoretical paradigm 
of German Idealism, of which Ranke was the most influential envoy, but should also be 
regarded as a conservative reaction against positivism and materialism, which were 
deemed to pose a serious threat to the established historiographical method. 
Ranke's work was highly influential indeed. In 1895 Meyer praised him as the 
historian 'to whom we owe everything'.5 Friedrich Meinecke, who greatly contributed in 
making Ranke's achievements known m Germany and throughout Europe's 
historiograhpical scholarship, argued that 'world tradition', 'world momentum' and 
'individual creativity' had to operate together in order to emulate the achievements of 
1 Some- writers argue that Ranke's and Niebuhrs' s dominated German historiography even as long a ftcr 
World War II. See Vierhaus in Faulenbach (1974) p. 32 and Berding in Wehler (1971) p. 10. 
2 Meyer (1918) p. 6 ff. 
3 On Niebuhr and Roman and 'universal' history see Christ (1983) vol. 3 pp. 1-:25. 
4 Schumann (1974) p. 180. 
5 GdA vol. I.l p. 185,1.2. p. 145. 
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Ranke. 'The 'world tradition' was that golden h' f " h' h c am 0 spInts, w IC reaches over two 
thousand years from Plato and Plotin to Herder and Goethe. The world momentum was 
the silence before the storm ... which led during a break in the fever of the revolutionary 
times to a re-determination and, at the same time, to a new-determination of the worthy 
content of the Western culture.'6 Meinecke added that the 'young Ranke has already 
understood this momentum, which matches no comparison and with his genius. for 
discovery has uncovered the principles of historical understanding. 07 
Meinecke praised Ranke for pointing out that the successful outcome of the 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 laid down the foundation of the 2nd Gennan 
Reichsgrundung by Bismarck under the hegemony of Prussia. After some initial doubts, 
this marked for Ranke an important signal for political stabilisation and guaranteed the 
cultural continuity of Western civilisation.8 
Ranke's theories opposed the classicist ideas of German Humanism. In doing so, 
he rejected the idea of progress in history in any form. Instead Ranke argued that 'each 
epoch is directly to God, and its value does not rest upon what may result from it, but in its 
own existence, in its own self.'9 His words were directed against those who believed in the 
idea of the progressive character of world history. For the neo-Humanists, such as Herder, 
Goethe and perhaps most prominently W. v. Humboldt this involved the incorporation of 
ancient values into their modem value systems. 1O Meinecke had already drawn attention to 
this in 1923: 'Ranke rejected this new reading of the ancients.'11 One should rather attempt 
to read them in the same way the ancient historians themselves would have done. That 
which connected historical epoch with God and made it so peculiar and special, 'whose life 
showed traces of God's imprint in his will and action.' 12 For Ranke this was in the spirit of 
Luther, whose achievements found a much-celebrated revival in 1817 with the 3rd 
centenary of the '95 Theses of Wittenberg'. The absence of spirituality in everyday life in 
Ranke's day, which went hand-in-hand with his anti-Humanist criticism is perhaps a good 
example of a conservative and restorationist political position. However, at this point 
6 Meinecke (1948) p. 56. 
7 We should add here that Ranke accepted only reluctantly this constitutional change See LieberschUtz (1954) 
r. 14 f. 
See LieberschUtz (1954) p. 3. 
9 See Meinecke (1948) p. 100. . 
10 The term 'Humanismus' itself emerged only in the early years of the 19 th century. It seems on the. surface 
that this movement rejected entirely the scholastic strongly Aristotelian value system. However, It ,never 
b G d' . t res If they entirely disconnected or even superseded its commitment to be worthy to e 0 s crea u, -
emphasised individual responsibility and freedom. See Engel (1959) pp. 23.+ 
11 Meinecke (1948) p. 59. 
12 LiebershUtz (195'+) p. 5. 
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Ranke committed a fallacy; he idealised the Lutheran piety of the early 16th century and 
ignored the fact that Luther's radicalism was a direct response to a Germany that was 
socially shattered, politically divided and religiously challenged. Hence, Ranke committed 
the same mistake which he had previously accused the neo-Humanists of - that of being 
ahistoric and modernistic. 
His political position resisted any kind of constitutional change and he defended 
the pre-Revolutionary monarchies. 13 Ranke's deep concern about the impact of the French 
Revolution on Western civilisation is perhaps best exemplified by his characterisation of 
this event as having 'created a permanent crisis of the modem world. The idea of equality 
in law and political economy as the extension of the state power, undermined all 
previously existing forms of life, thus awakening a spirit of greed and criticism.' .14 It was 
only after the revolutionary years of 1848/49 that Ranke started to concede that there was 
some justification for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.15 This may signal a 
move away from his originally held position that the outcome of the anti-Napoleonic 
'Liberation Wars' (,Freiheitskriege') of 1812/13 constituted a clear indication of a 
forthcoming completion in the development of independent European nation states. 
However, Ranke seemed to refuse to incorporate an account of occurring changes in the 
socio-economic landscape of Europe in his overall position. As a professor of history 
from 1834, and later also as Chancellor at Prussia's finest and most modem university of 
the day - the 'Friedrich Wilhelms University (today Humboldt University) Berlin' - Ranke 
supported the idea of a united Germany under Prussia's rule with the preservation of the 
powers of the aristocracy as the only guarantee of Western cultural continutity. In 1841 
Ranke was awarded the honour of the 'Historiograph des Preuj3ischen Staates' by King 
Friedrich Wilhelm IV, an honour which he proudly accepted. It could thus be argued that 
Ranke modified his later stance in order to become a theoretical mouthpiece for the 'old 
monarchy' .16 Indeed his defence of the institutional status quo concurs with his main 
argument against the socio-psychological approach in historiography, which began to bear 
fruit amongst the neo-Humanists. Ranke argued that 'it cannot be the task of the historian 
to explain all events out of the minds of the acting persons; there has to be something else 
13 His sympathy for the preservation of the Hohenzollern Monarchy and reluctance to countenance 
democracy can be exemplified in a letter to Wilhelm IV in 1848 recommending a guarant~e. agatnst 
.. . . I' . ,I' fl state affairs See unemployment for artIsans WIth the condItion that they would have no po ItIca tn uence on . 
LieberschUtz (1954) p. 15 n37. 
14 See Gilbert (1990) p. 6. 
15 Vierhaus (1957) p. 31. 
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which stands above and governs them; what ever it might be called, fate, providence, God, 
as well as the event which stands above them and which the acting persons do not create, 
but rather contribute towards its occurrence consciously or unconsciously.' 17 Yet Ranke 
rejected a mere pragmatic-psychological explanation of an event or a historical decision. 
Even though Alexander von Humboldt aimed to create a Weltanschauung, which was 
capable of understanding the meaning of actions and individual aspirations, this 
Weltanschauung would be geared towards a unifying end. In opposition his equally 
prominent brother, Wilhelm von Humboldt argued that it is 'least world-historic, to 
discredit the tragedy of world history to the drama of everyday life, which attempts to rip 
the single event out of the general context and puts it in the place of universal fate - a 
petty loose stuff of mere personal desires.' 18 Ranke maintained contrary to this claim, that 
the meaning of Weltgeschichte, or what makes 'world history' universal, can only be 
established on the basis of a theory of ideas, which are reducible to a primary or single 
universal principle. 'It comes to light that the philosopher, who starts off elsewhere, 
constructs history with a truth found in his own peculiar way. >19 Ranke argued that truth in 
the humanist and the naturalist tradition is regarded as something entirely dependent on 
the condition whether or not the events fit into their terminology and categorical system. 
That is to say, they apparently rejected any notion of 'objective truth' outside the narrow 
limits of their discourse. Further, Ranke asserted that Humboldt and his followers would 
only look into history in order to find the 'infinite' or the 'absolute' with respect to 
biological development and physical motion. The historian however, 'realises the 
existence of eternity in every existing entity, in every circumstance and essence, which 
comes from God - and that is their principle of existence [Lebensprinzip]' and Ranke 
asked 'how something could exist without the divine cause of existence?,20 Yet Ranke did 
not argue against the whole tradition of enlightenment philosophy in general, nor against 
Hegel's claim that absolute knowledge can be achieved by the means of a science of logic. 
Ranke's assertion was rather aimed against the subjective-idealistic doctrine of Kant 
which, according to Ranke, presupposes that every object has its own individual past, and 
that this is as far as history can reach for Kant. 21 Since Ranke did not regard the 'spiritual 
16 Vierhaus in Faulenbach (1974) p. 32. See also Ranke's works on the History of Prussia and for a detailed 
bibliography on Ranke See Dickens (1980) pp. 19-20. 
17 Hinrichs (1954) pp. 109-110. 
18 Humboldt (1841) 1. p. 17. 
19 Ranke (1954) p. 293. 
20 Ranke (1954) p. 295. . .., 
21 Viikari (1977) p. 28. For the philosophical influence of Hegel on Ranke see SImon (19_8). 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 113 
perception' as a method, he rejected the idea of the existence of one single dominant 
world historical idea, as Hegel did. Ranke argued instead for the existence of a finite 
number of dominating historical ideas operating inside and beyond a historical era. He 
believed that those ideas stand above the reality and the history of single entities. They 
characterise a historical period and influence the course of events. Those ideas are partly 
represented in the spirit and actions of historic personalities, of pure politicians and ot~er 
outstanding historical individuals. These ideas become apparent mainly in the aspirations 
of agents who possess great Willpower, religious purity, and who struggle for the 
realisation and formation of an independent nation state. The survival and success of such 
a state is dependent on its efficient and effective bureaucratic apparatus. Ranke is 
therefore not an antiquarian historian, who loved the 'old stuff' and the sources for their 
own sake. The investigation of historical sources forms the basis for the development of 
'political history', which precedes and dominates all other aspects of human life. Ranke's 
concern is not the state or progress of individual fulfilment, but rather the 'individuality of 
the State as expressed in its laws and institutions.'22 He stresses that 'practically the idea 
lives on in the true statesmen and governs their behaviour. On their thought, on their 
ideals depends the spiritual existence of the state'. Ranke however adds that 'the states 
themselves are products of a creative genius neither of single human beings nor of a single 
generation, nor of language, but of a whole and of many types ... and since they are 
derived from a primary energy, they possess laws of their own kind. '23 This emphasis is 
picked out by Lieberschtitz: 'for Ranke the historian has to work in an atmosphere of 
sympathy with the powerful rulers and the great statesmen; without this sympathy his 
reconstruction of the past would be merely that of a moralist or bystander. 24 
Ranke also clearly acknowledged that history is not always governed solely by the 
ideas of leading personalities and admits that material forces and 'social' circumstances 
also play their part in the historical decision-making process of the statesmen. However, 
unlike the historical materialistic approach of the mid-late 19th century, a concept of the 
'masses' and a notion of 'class-struggle' are not created and considered in order to analyse 
social and economic relationships between groups of individuals and the state, but only as 
far they are a factor in the historical decision-making process. This idea should not be 
misunderstood as resembling Hegel's historical dialectic between individual and Geist, 
22LieberschUtz(l954)p.12. . ..... 7 ')8 
23 Ranke Yom Einjlusse der Theorie' p. 244-246 in Samtliche Werke IL-I quoted In VIIkan (197 ) p. - . 
24 See LieberschUtz (1954) p. 11 n22. 
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which Ranke rejected. Ranke's Universalgeschichte, as opposed to Hegel's, vie\vs culture 
in the widest sense as 'alongside the two giants, Church and State, as a third and 
independent force of human affairs. '25 How these factors interact, and how predominant the 
Lutheran 'giant' for the German nation was, is demonstrated in great length in Ranke's 
voluminous work 'Geschichte der Reformation in Deutschland', which appeared in six 
volumes between 1839-1847.26 Jt is however indisputable that for Ranke 'proper' historical 
understanding is only conditional on a certain piety or as Ranke put it: 'in all history 
resides, liveth and is God to see. Every action is testimony of him, every moment preaches 
his name, but most of all ... the coherence of the great history, which stands there like a 
holy hieroglyph.,27 
Despite some scope for varying interpretations of this famous statement, we are 
able to see that Meyer's, and to a lesser degree Beloch' s, notion of the 'important' and the 
'grandiose' in history is clearly influenced by Ranke's quest for the most 'outstanding' or 
the 'glorious' in history. Hinrichs pointed out that 'both historians, Ranke and Meyer, 
believe in the divine idea, which, if all-powerful everywhere and every time, governs 
human beings, in an obvious way. '28 Despite the acknowledgement of the impact of the 
masses on history, which Meyer also accepted, there should be no doubt about Ranke's 
emphasis on the dominant role and importance of the decision making of the politicos. 
This raises certainly the sort of questions which Meyer faced later. After compiling and 
archiving the historical sources carefully and eagerly, the historian has to make a decision 
as to what is, according to his judgement, the truly historically important event or idea. 
Even if this idea or standard shines down most brightly from the inspiration of Luther, 
Ranke has to analyse critically his own moral and political values. 
As one may perhaps suspect, in respect of the perfect or proper form of the state, 
Ranke does not regard every constitution as of equal historical/political worth. Like Plato, 
Ranke searched for an ideal form of state and as we have emphasised above, this ideal 
seems to be best represented in the 'old monarchies' of the pre-revolution period, which 
Ranke refers to as 'holy' to him.29 Ranke regarded states as acting 'individualities' 
(realisations of 'God's will'), with different requirements in terms of their organisational 
structure and their place in Western history. Therefore, there might be a certain general 
25 Dickens (1980) p. 6. 
26 See Dickens (1980) p. 6. 
27 Kirclzenlexikon (1994) VII pp. 1324 f. 
28 Hinrichs (1954) p. III f. 
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form of those states, which would allow each particular nation to prosper politically and 
morally and to acquire its 'natural position' in the European political order. 
With regard to Germany this form would ideally be a non-parliamentary 
monarchy, which was reformed into a parliamentary monarchy after Bismarck's 
constitutional reform in 1871. By idealising the latter system, Ranke clearly opposed the 
liberal tendencies of the years of transition between the spirit of the German reformation, 
which dominated the German enlightenment, and the spirit of modernity which enforced 
the idea of religious and moral purity, economic progress and political imperialism. The 
latter aspect is derived from a kind of innate sense for the historically important moment. 
Prussia's Germany deserved in his view to become a 'super power'. This highlights 
Ranke's general scepticism and his complete rejection of the rising spirit of capitalism and 
value pluralism - a view almost identical with that held by (the later) Meyer. Democratic 
participation of individuals, and 'universal' civil liberties, were for Ranke neither 
universally applicable nor did they hold any kind of objective moral truth. This is not to 
say that Ranke entirely ignored the social and economic component and the often-
desperate living conditions of the working class in the Germany of his times, as Viikari has 
suggested. 30 We see rather that Ranke as well as Meyer rejected the increasingly 
widespread emphasis on social and material forces as being dominant for the historical 
analysis.3l Society, for Ranke, is an inseparable part of the state. It has to be guided but 
also morally enriched by the state. As for Plato, a just society is possible only through a 
just state, which ought to be governed by a wise, and in Ranke's case, Lutheran authority.32 
This is not to say that Ranke and Meyer ever argued that the state should be blind, brutal 
and ignorant towards the social needs of its citizens. However, the state should always be 
in full control of its affairs and offices; that is to govern the citizens, guard its power 
institutions and to advise everyone about their obligations towards the authority. For 
Ranke, and for Meyer too, free market capitalism and communism both represented the 
danger of incorporating or utilising the state for petty moneymaking or for plebeian 
purposes. Giving way to such forces would reduce and undermine any powerful 
constitution until nothing but a laughable 'toy-soldier' is left, which could be forced to 
realise certain short-term interests of the greedy bourgeoisie or the never-fed mob. That 
29 Ranke tries to accomplish his quest for the 'best' state in his work Politisches Gespriich (1835) See \,iikari 
(1977) p. 31. 
30 Viikari (1977) p. 32. 
3l Vierhaus (1957) p. 34. 
32 Extensively on this topic see Dickens (1980). 
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Bismarck's politics in 2nd 'German Reich' effectively encouraged capitalist competition 
and consistently made political concessions to its entrepreneurs who allied themselves with 
parts of the aristocracy were regarded as not worth considering for Ranke and the early 
Meyer. Perhaps Bismarck's imperialistic ambitions to make Germany the centre of Europe 
might have prevented their realising that the Bismarck regime fostered at least indirectly 
the values they both opposed. This suggests that Ranke's idealism and historiographical 
methodology was not of a superior standing, but just part of a different worldview. 
Ranke's paradigm of the superiority of the political therefore led Meyer to hold 
that social and economic history have their justification only as subordinate parts of the 
'state science' (Staatswissenschaften) , which included jurisprudence (Rechtswissenschaft) 
and, from the second half of the 19th century, also NationalOkonomie. These disciplines 
are therefore positive sciences, which are intellectual tools in the hands of the Chancellor, 
but do not and should not dictate any politics.33 Ranke's emphasis on the state and its 
institutions as the historically important factors determining the character of a historic era. 
This also becomes clear in the following quote: he states that 'the character of a nation 
depends on how it treats its soldiers after they have lost a war. '34 This political statement is 
of course not an attempt to reduce the character of a nation to a single factor, but what it 
certainly expresses is the importance of military strength and discipline and the proper 
respect due to it by the state and its citizens. 
From this we are inclined to conclude that Meyer's political position marks a 
continuation of Ranke's views, and is therefore politically deeply rooted in the tradition of 
Prussian nationalism. Secondly, it is theoretically tied up with the philosophy of history of 
Ranke. We already highlighted that Meyer shared Ranke's illusion to be able to develop a 
methodology to aim to discover 'how it really was', which opened the gate for him to 
utilise history for 'legitimate' political purposes. That Ranke's attempt to write history 
with objectivity has been commonly criticised by many modem authors is not relevant to 
our discussion. However, not long ago Moses Finley pointed out in one of his last and 
most profound publications on the historiography of ancient history: 'I don't want to 
shatter this faith, but I have to point out that precision and truth are simply not the same', 
or as Acton: "no historian has uttered fewer non-truths, fewer have made fewer errors. All 
B ' , . ' , h 'n terms of peculiarities in 
. To a degree, Ranke acknowledges certaIn lImIts and restraInS In t e economy, I " 
, I d h' k' g )f economIC alms other then natural resources and the landscape, but thIS thought never e to any ret In In l 
to serve the state and by doing so serving society . 
.14 Meinecke (1948) p, 9. 
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that he says is often true and yet the whole is not true, only the element of non-truth is 
difficult to discover. .. Ranke does not trick us by adding, but through his selection". '35 
Further, even the Greek Atomists did not question the political nature of the 
unchanging human rationality. The latter point seems especially to have been a long 
lasting presupposition in philosophical thought, which regards human rationality as a non-
historical capacity. If human rationality remains unchanged then Ranke's conclusion that 
ancient historians like Thucidides followed roughly the same historic methodology as he 
has done becomes clearer, but is nevertheless based on a fallacy. 
35 Finley (1984) p. 270 f. n 16. 
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2. German Idealism and the 'German Spirit' - the 'Revolution from 
'Top to Bottom' 
I. Political Event History and Bismarck's Grand German Vision 
118 
The second half of the 19th century marks a peculiar period for Western intellectual 
history in general and for Germany's history in particular. The influence of German 
Idealism in philosophy seemed to have declined after Hegel's death in 1831. It was not 
until the late 19th century when, with the neo-Kantians, Heinrich Rickert and Wilhelm 
Windelband, philosophy as an academic discipline celebrated a revival as a dominating 
force in Germany's academic world. After Hegel's death the earlier popularity of this 
discipline was in decline and was gradually crowded-out by the historical studies. It were 
no longer philosophers, but scholars in classical studies (Altertumswissenschaft) , political 
economy (Nationalokonomie) and most notably history (Geschichtsweissenschaft) who 
were at the centre of this significant transformation in European intellectual history. More 
plainly, the paradigms of idealism, which had dominated the above disciplines for a good 
century or more were slowly but steadily undermined by the psychoanalytical and 
sociological methodologies, which gained hold in these subjects from the early 20th 
century. During this by no means smooth transformation in academia it was mainly 
historians and political economists, and not philosophers, that discussed the major political 
and social questions in Germany at that time.36 
Politically, the revolution of 1848/49 (if it can be regarded as one) did not lead to 
the much-desired significantly increased influence of the bourgeoisie on the distribution of 
political power in Germany. Although the emerging and fast-growing working class was 
considered by Germany's nascent bourgeoisie as a highly important 'partner' in their bid to 
gain economic liberties, which other entrepreneurs in Britain and France had already 
enjoyed for decades, they also needed the co-operation of the aristocracy in order to gain a 
stake in the distribution of legislative political power to secure their interests. This became 
particularly apparent after Germany's 'young' bourgeois classes failed miserably in their 
attempt to overthrow the Hohenzollem monarchy in 1848/49. However, in order to 
36 See Schleier (1965) p. 16. 
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achieve at least some political solidity and credibility, the bourgeoisie liased actively and 
openly with the aristocracy, who could no longer afford to ignore them as a political force. 
In the aftermath of this failed endeavour of 48/49, working class leaders accused the 
bourgeoisie of turning, almost oblivious of its revolutionary past and irrespectively of the 
poverty of the masses, against its former ally. The aristocrats, on the other hand, had to 
consider the increasingly economic strength of bourgeoisie in order to continue to stay in 
power, or to maintain at least some kind of political status quo. The political 'tete-a-tete' 
which took place during the 1850s between both classes resulted, though much to the 
disappointment of the early socialist movement, in a strong though hard fought-out alliance 
between the landed aristocracy and the urban bourgeoisie. 
This rather unusual relationship was strengthened by the newly acquired wealth 
and the insatiable desire for status symbols of the upper bourgeoisie, which began 
increasingly to penetrate the ranks of the aristocracy by buying estates previously owned 
by the landed aristocracy. On the other hand, technological and scientific progress brought 
about a dramatically progressing level of modernisation and mechanisation of the primary 
i.e. agricultural sector of the German economy. The productivity increases and 
unrestrained exploitation of 'free land workers' saw profits soar and starvation decline. 
Even the poorest Prussian regions in north and east flourished relatively well. 37 Also, the 
once poor and underdeveloped large scale aristocratic estates turned to commerce and 
benefited significantly from the agricultural revolution, which fostered the interest of the 
upper class in seeing entrepreneurship succeed. 
With both the best farming land and industrial areas in her hands, Prussia was able 
to amend and fortify her position amongst the other small German states and profited from 
their permanent quarrels and disunity. In 1856 Germany was still a disunited grouping of 
365 small states and counties.38 Prussia may have saved the German nations from 
Napoleon in 1813, but its occupation of the Rhineland and elsewhere made it an 
increasingly unpopular power. In some ways the revolution of 1848/49 was a result of this 
cultural and religious occupation, which was also called Klliturkrieg. Eventually, and 
many decades behind England and France, the second half of the 19th century saw a 
phenomenal growth in German industry and degree of urbanisation, which put Prussia's 
institutes of higher education on the forefront of the modernisation and continuous 
innovation. The renowned quality of the 'Humboldtian' universities in Berlin, and its 
37 See Rosenberg ((969) 
38 See Bdhme (1972). 
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'outposts' in Breslau and Bonn in subjects areas including engineering, military science, 
law and history during this period could easily match with the elite, but much smaller and 
more traditional universities in Germany's Southwest (TUbingen, Freiburg and 
Heidelberg). The progression of the 'Humboldtian' universities and their ethos did not 
only bear fruit in terms of technological and scientific excellence, but also satisfied 
Prussia's enormous demands for well educated and politically devoted civil servants. The 
long term political end for Prussia was the unification of Germany's small states in order to 
put a forceful end to the petty parochial politics 'Kleinstaaterei', which clearly stood in the 
way of Germany's industrialisation and Prussia's imperial ambitions. 39 Rapid political 
changes and a 'boom and bust' economy opened the way for better organised pressure by 
the working class on the monarchies and the entrepreneurs. 
In 1871 it seemed that the grand and central idea of the German enlightenment had 
become reality at last - a strong unified nation, for which Ranke, and many other thinkers 
before him, had been desperately waiting for. It was achieved under this peculiar alliance 
of bourgeoisie and aristocracy. What Britain and France had managed to create with a 
'federstrich' (feather sweep) more then two hundred years before, was accomplished by 
Bismarck in 1871 - the Reichsgrundung was a direct result of this 'blood brotherhood' 
between Germany's fading aristocracy and the rising capitalist entrepreneurship, rather 
than due to the pressure of the revolting masses. 
39 See for example Oroysen (1886) for an ideological defence of Bismarck's plans 
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ii. The 'Prussian School' and German Nationalism 
The Reichsgriindung in particular promoted political history as an academic 
discipline as it now had to fulfil a crucial task in that is was an essential vehicle for 
educating Prussia's elite of military personnel, civil servants and chartered accountants 
, 
and thus formed the propagandistic mouthpiece for Prussian-German nationalism. It is 
therefore not surprising that the main academic support for Germany's nationalistic and 
later imperialistic project came from an elite group of Prussian historians. Most famously, 
Heinrich von Treitsche (1834-1896), Heinrich von Sybel (1817-1895) and Johann Gustav 
Droysen (1808-1884)40 were committed and outspoken supporters of a unified Germany 
under Prussian leadership. 
These scholars formed the core of the 'Prussian Historical School'. Central to 
their concern was the idea of a powerful nation state with persistent economic progress. In 
respect of the redistribution of wealth, and in particular political power, the state should not 
have to make too many significant concessions to the bourgeoisie and the working classes. 
All three scholars were fervent supporters of the Hohenzollern monarchy and later of 
Bismarck, Germany's 'Iron Chancellor', who had little interest in constitutional change in 
Prussia, preferring to maintain the status quo and its position as the unifying super power 
amongst the German states.41 Many of their historical works were therefore also intended 
to be political writings. 
The founders of the 'Prussian Historical School' (in short 'Prussian School') 
addressed explicitly modem question when dealing with historic materials. This expressed 
itself in countless patriotic statements of the political importance of historical studies and 
comparisons not only, in Droysen's case, between antiquity and modernity, but also 
between the mediaeval and the early modem epochs of Western and Germanic civilisation 
(Treitschke and Sybel). The members of the Prussian School stood firmly in Ranke's 
footsteps and had an enormous impact on a whole new generation of ancient and modem 
historians, political economists and philosophers, primarily due to its excellent historical 
workmanship and nationalist dedication. 42 This applies particularly to Meyer and Georg 
von Below, but also to Meinecke, Rickert, Windelband and Beloch. The influence of the 
40 See Droysen (1886). . _ 
41 For a critical discussion of Sybel and Treitschke and the political function of the HZ see Schle1er ( 196). 
The study is however published by an East German scholar and does here and there exag~erate the 
reactionary character facade of the above Prussian State historiographers. Also Heuss (1957) pp. :b9-J63. 
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Prussian School extends even over the works of Weber, Laum and Rostovtzeff, whose 
contributions we shall also discuss during later chapters. 
Even if emphatic nationalism may have blurred Treitschke's and Sybel's ability to 
grasp the difference between the objectives of politics and historical studies and 
respectively, between state and society, their patriotism and anti-Semitism, were for 
Treitschke and his collaborators never intended to become substitutes for historiographical 
accuracy in dealing with sources and documents.43 This should, however, not divert us 
from the fact that, for the members of the Prussian School, history became a vehicle of 
their political ambitions - goals that were enthusiastically shared by many intellectuals and 
by the educated public at that time. This created a kind of utilisation or 'employment' of 
historical studies and its subjects of investigation, which Finley in tum called 'abuse' of 
history. Ranke warned vehemently against such misuses.44 One may intend to be as 
accurate in the translation of inscriptions and documents as one possibly can, but the 
selection of which sources are historically relevant and in what way one may interpret 
them, is still dependent on the value judgements of the historian, who never can be entirely 
objective towards his method and the historical event. It is therefore appropriate to ask to 
what extent Ranke and the spirit of German Idealism has methodologically influenced the 
Prussian School? 
Common to Ranke and the Prussian School was a firm belief in the ethical 
responsibility of the state, which develops and changes according to its own laws. Those 
laws, in return, effectively govern the interests of individuals and political groups. 
Secondly, by comprehending these laws which govern the state, it is possible to find an 
'objective' stance with regard to which principles and political freedoms should exist in 
that state and which should be disregarded. However, this selection process can clearly not 
take place on the grounds of norms set arbitrarily by some established political party or 
splinter group (the subjective and relativistic implications for any historical evaluation 
were inevitable and surely too obvious to ignore). These norms should rather be in 
accordance with general historic laws, and therefore would not require further justification. 
Ranke's and the Prussian School's shared concern was not to investigate and apply 
historical laws to phenomena in order to 'understand them scientifically' .45 Those values, 
-
42 Most recently on this topic Southard (1995), which was unfortunately not obtainable for this study. 
43 Schleier blames the lack of familiarity with the philosophy of Schelling, Hegel and Ranke for due to the 
ignorance and arrogance against philosophy. Schleier (1965) p. 112. 
44 See Finley (1984) p. 268. 
45 Demandt (1998) p. 82. 
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however, which were more 'real' (wirklich) than others, in particular the romanticised 
nationalism, differed considerably from Ranke's conservatism. 
The domination of the Prussian School in historical studies, especially in the 
second half of the 19th century, was however not only due to Prussia's and Germany's 
political situation. The enormous increase in scientific knowledge and the industrial 
revolution, together with the epistemologically optimistic spirit of the enlightenment, 
fostered academic specialisation and the emergence of new research fields, which in turn 
benefited historical studies and enabled it, within the space of a few decades, to deliver 
both a holistic and highly specialised view of world history.46 The delimitation of history 
was however not merely a direct effect of the progress in the natural sciences, but mainly 
due to the recent discoveries and specialisation in fine art, architecture, philology, 
philosophy, jurisprudence and political economy.47 The systematic historical approach to 
these subjects in the 19th century gained political history an all-dominating position, which 
led to a stark methodological and political separation between Historie and 
Naturwissenschaft· 
However, the later 'Cinderella' treatment of historical studies by the natural 
sciences towards the end of the 19th century, which had its roots in France and England, 
resulted eventually in a systematic and outspoken arrogance and fierce opposition against 
positivism and materialism. In particular, its intrusion into the pre-eminence of historical 
studies and its neighbouring disciplines was seen not just as a methodological interference, 
but also as a direct political threat. 
Another reason as to why the Prussian School gained such eminence was perhaps 
the Humboldtian concept of higher education, which modernised and later dominated the 
Gymnasien (secondary schools) and the Prussian universities. An additionally contributing 
factor might have also been the frequently voiced scepticism of many historians against the 
advances of modem technology.48 
However, one would be mistaken to assume that we are dealing with a 
homogenous doctrine of thought. Politically, the Prussian School positioned and presented 
itself during the eventful times after the Reichsgriindung often quite independently from 
political trends, and its members did argue with one another as they would with their 
46 We ~nly need to look at the sheer amount of literature on the subject of world history and the history of 
. . I .' } ,It which collects 
antiquity. See for example Paulys Real-Encyclopadle der Classlschen A tertlllllSlllSSeflSC WJ <. 
all references in ancient history since 1893. 
-17 See, for example, Mitscherlich 'Economic Progress. its Course and Nature' (1910) 
48 Demandt (1998) p. 83 f. n12 for Jacob Burckhardt's critical remarks against the railway 
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opponents. It was only towards the 1870s that it seemed that the 'School' had turned into a 
truly conservative force with its unshakeable support for Bismarck's plans of a unified 
German Reich. The programmatic rejection of a materialistic and natural scientific 
reorientation of the curricula of the Gymnasien by the philologists went hand in hand with 
a stiff and continuous political opposition against socialism and the Anglo-American 
utilitarian ethos by the Prussian School. However, one would be mistaken in assumir:tg a 
completely unified hostility against such modernist tendencies. Even amongst the 
members of the Prussian School who supported explicitly the course of Bismarck's 
government after 1871 and during the years of the 'anti-socialist laws' (Sozialistengesetze) 
of 1878-1890, the level of aversion against technological advances and the results of the 
natural sciences differed considerably.49 With regard to politics and ideology, we should 
also not simply associate the Prussian School with the 'far right'. In particular Heinrich 
von Sybel and his colleague Ludwig Hauser obviously opposed 'Groj3deutsche' tendencies 
in politics and history, whose supporters aimed for a German-Austrian centralised state. 
The supporters of this non-federal system of government are also refered to in the literature 
as 'ultra-reactionary' and 'ultra-nationalistic' circles.50 
The fine but important differences amongst the nationalist historians and their 
colleagues in the neighbouring academic subjects becomes perhaps more apparent when 
we consider the concept and role of the state for Ranke and the Prussian School, which is, 
to a considerable degree, a reflection of the Prussian-German Protestant spirit that was 
ingrained in their culture and ethos. According to this spirit, the state is innately concerned 
with unifying the power, law, the military, the economy, education and most importantly 
religion and morality in its hands. 51 Worth noting in this context is that for most members 
of the Prussian School, society and state are two entirely separate entities. According to 
Treitschke, the former has the natural tendency towards discord, diversity and 
disintegration; in short, a tendency towards chaos and injustice. However, the latter has 
the innate potential to form the institutions capable of and designed to create national 
prosperity, and to unite conflicting interests; in short, to provide order and justice. To 
speak with Treitschke's words: 'the relations amongst the social groups towards each other 
cannot be ordered by society itself. Such an order is inconceivable; there cannot be justice 
49 See Demandt (1998) p. 84 n15, p. 85 ~18, nI9.. . .. I-Ficker 
50 Sybel's Historische ZeitsclzriJt was aImed agaInst these tendenCIes and was debated In the Sybe 
. .. ... 20th S S h· der (1959) pp On the debate StreIt' whIch Influenced even the hlstonography In the century. ee C Ie . 
of nation state vs. universal state see Schneider (1941) and Schleier (1965) p. 99 n1O. 
51 Fischer (1966) p. 60 f. 
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stemming from different and Opposl'ng l'nterests '52 Th' t'd " 
. IS an 1 emocratlc attItude which 
clearly emphasised the superiority of the state over society led rather unsurprisingly to 
ignorance of and aversion to social movements and of the economic conditions of ordinary 
people. As Viikari has pointed out, the concern for social and economic circumstances 
amongst Treitschke and Sybel seemed to have been very small indeed.53 Any approach, 
which did not begin with the state as its first premise, was almost naturally rejected. ~ny 
venture into economic history they made took place only in the context of state 
administered policies. This however is not to say that economic changes were all together 
disregarded. For example, Treitschke and Sybel acknowledged the positive influence of 
the emerging railway system, as having a very significant effect on the process of the 
German unification.54 However, they concentrated on non-economic factors. In their 
understanding, being a 'state historian' did not presuppose utter ignorance of social 
changes and potentially dangerous revolutionary movements. Sybel, for example, 
acknowledged explicitly that the French revolution was 'a first rendition of the 
contradiction, which will play an important role in our time. '55 
Treitschke's and Sybel's analyses of the revolutionary forces contained many 
unjustifiable and ill founded attacks against the early communist movement, which one 
might call propaganda or scare-mongering. This was already apparent in the context of 
their treatment of the 1848/49 revolution. For instance, in a chapter on Babeuf in his 
'Revolututionszeit', Sybel characterised communism as the system where the state disposes 
arbitrarily over the property of its citizen, and without respecting any individual rights 
whatsoever. 56 For example, they rejected the distribution of patches of land, free meals for 
the poorest etc - at the end even La Fayette was branded a foot soldier of communism.57 In 
a sense the noisy and continuous rejection of materialism and Anglo-American 
utilitarianism can be regarded as an indirect acknowledgement of the rival existence of 
such worldviews. In holding an almost apodictic belief that the only objective of befitting 
history is the study and emphasis of the 'great men', wars, architects, philosophers and 
artists. Such a view leads one almost instinctively to the suspicion that the working class 
and the bourgeoisie with their daily worries and political ambitions were not rated highly 
52 Fischer (1966) p, 31. 
53 Viikari (1977) p, 46, 
54 Treitschke (1889) vol. IV p, 581. 
55 Cit. by Schleier (1965) p, 59, See Sybel (1853) vol I p, 91. See also Fueter (1911) and Below (1916) part 
I. 
56SeeSybel(l853). . . , 
57 Quoted from Schleier (1965) p, 60 f. See Sybel.(l853) especially the mtroductlon to \ 01. 4 
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enough to form a proper object for historical inquiry. The continuously glorifying remarks 
about Bismarck and the Hohenzollern monarchy illustrate very vividly the political 
dedication of the Prussian School and foremost admiration for the Prussian State and 
Bismarck's goal to unify Germany under Prussia's rule. 58 It may therefore not come as a 
surprise to us that this eminent elite of historians and those following in their academic 
tradition, argued heavily against almost every alternative political view, which reflected a 
deeply rooted condemnation of almost the entire alternative political and religious 
spectrum, from socialism and liberalism to Catholicism and Semitism.59 
Political or traditional history had, as we saw, previously been In a dominant 
position in German academic thought, which originated largely from the unsolved question 
of national identity. The unsolved national questions, the late industrialisation, the small-
minded mentality fostered in the small states and Prussia's imperialistic ambitions provide 
valid reasons to explain this superiority of political history over other 
Geisteswissenschaften. The Prussian School, in particular in the years of the struggle for 
Germany's national unity, acted as a mouthpiece using history to further their political 
ends. The pursuit of political historiography was viewed as part of political activity.60 
For the Prussian School the Geist of one nation is not simply commensurable with 
the spirit of another one. Certain nations and their bureaucratic organisations were viewed 
as being more advanced than others, not primarily economically, but ethically and 
foremost culturally. This belief is based on the historicist method of 'understanding' 
(,Verstehen '), which aims to grasp the unity of the human spirit and was first properly 
introduced by Gustav Droysen as a distinct methodology in the scientific fight against the 
influence of empiricism and materialism in history studies in particular and in the 
'Geisteswissenschaften' in general. 
58 See Wehler (1972) an~ R~sen.be~g (~967). ., . . ., _ Blaschke (1997). 
59 On academic and public dlscnm1OatIOn and distortIOn of CatholiCism and Semltism see . 
60 .. . I h I" Iff Sybel and Treltschke. Their The amounts of monographs exemplify Impressive y t e po ItIca arne 0 . . II h 
. d . I - published by them. Ate political involvement is also transparent 10 the amount of essays an artlc es 
relevant works of that time have been carefully listed and considered by Schleler (1966). 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 127 
iii. Buckle's Positivism vs. Droysen's Method of 'Verstehen' 
Even if the position of the Prussian School and their methodological reliance on 
the achievements of Ranke began to come under challenge by new psychological and 
materialistic worldview from sources outside academia, the consensus in political history 
guaranteed the predominance of the Rankean concept of historiography within the 
university and gymnasium curricula for the time being.61 Whilst reaching its intellectual 
zenith during the 1870s and 80s, the entanglement of Rankean historiography with the 
Prussian School eventually came under methodological scrutiny and ideological critique 
during the 1890s, when the School was no longer in a position to ignore its opponents.62 
The reasons for this attack on this tradition are again manifold and complex. One 
perhaps was the high degree of specialisation and the philological method of source 
analysis, which created a culture of outstanding linguists and editors within ancient and 
modem history itself. Despite all the industriousness, editorial skilfulness and great factual 
detail, this primarily philological method in historiography created very little relevant to 
the burning historical questions of the time. However, the majority of German historians 
were adamant that they had not lost sight of the modem challenges which their German 
fatherland had to embrace. Determined to defy their critics, the members of the Prussian 
School in particular were openly politically biased towards the theoretical and institutional 
challenge posed by empiricism and positivism.63 This created at first on their part a culture 
of dismissal and mockery for non-conforming methods and trends in the theory of history. 
This ongoing dispute culminated in the Lamprechtstreit, which influenced the course and 
the context of the Bucher-Meyer Controversy. 
The precedence of the Prussian School is highly important here, since one its most 
prominent members, Gustav Droysen (1808-1884), influenced Eduard Meyer's philosophy 
of history in a significant manner. Droysen was the one a the few ancient historian besides 
Meyer and earlier Niebuhr 'who discussed fundamental questions on historical 
methodology systematically and extensively.'64 Therefore, having looked at Ranke's loose 
theory of history and the tradition of the Prussian School in general, it is perhaps useful to 
61 The achieved consensus is exemplified with the result of the 'Sybel-Ficker Streit' on German medieval 
history For a good discussion on this debate see Schieder (1959) p. 37 ff. 
62 See Oestreich (1969) p. 322. 
63 Schumann (1974) p. 180. 
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look at Droysen' s theory in particular in order to point to a the third source for ~1eyer' s 
position. 
Common to Droysen and to Meyer was that both argued vehemently against the 
claim that the history of human civilisation as a whole lies at the heart of historic 
explanation. Even more important was a shared wholehearted rejection of any claims that 
history follows certain material laws or principles, which provide us with devices to predict 
the occurrence of events. 65 This was exactly the challenge which empiricism and positivism 
in the natural sciences posed to political history. The increasing influence of this 
movement was reflected in attempts to write history in terms of social events, economic 
crises :md cultural attributes. According to Droysen, such techniques have no right to be 
regarded as serious historical methods since they assume a historic 'coming into being' of 
events driven by social, material and natural forces and causes. Such an account stands 
against the concept of the 'dominating ideas', the 'decisive moments' and the omnipotence 
of the 'state' as a naturally dominating entity.66 
Droysen's criticism is directed against three different approaches which provide a 
naturalistic understanding and categorisation of human history. 'Positivism', 'Economism' 
and 'Biologism' .67 The first term was coined during the French enlightenment. In 1814, 
Laplace published an essay, which used the 'probability calculus' from mathematics 
applied to physics, and which maintained that over the length of time the regular forces or 
distributions are those that succeed and are therefore most worthy of studying.68 This paper 
'Essai philosophiquesur les probabilities' explained the regular course of human history 
on the basis of population statistics, which supplied him with confidence in the likely 
victory of justice, reason and humanity over the erratic evil and irregular forces in history.69 
We mention this work because of its significant influence on later studies by August 
Comte (1798-1857), the great-grandfather of sociology, and Adolphe Quetelet (1796-
1874). Both thinkers applied mathematical and physical methods to explain moral and 
social phenomena. Quetelet's essay on the 'social physics', for example, used curves, 
64 Finley (1984) p. 27l. 
65 Schn-eider in Clader III (1990) p. 423, n32 and the appendix to Buckle (1861). 
66 Schneider (1990) p. 429. . 
67 See Demandt (1998) pp. 86-87. Most of the details in this paragraph stem from thIS source. 
68 See Demandt (1998) pp. 87 f. 69 h' . fl It is doubtful anyway that Belllch Laplace (1995). Beloch does not mention him as one of IS In uences. 
would have jumped on the positivistic bandwagon. 
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formulas and tables in order to calculate the 'average man' in history using statistics in 
order 'to prove the infinite perfectibility of mankind' .70 
When Buckle in 1857 advocated these primarily quantitative methods in his 
History of Civilisation of England, he in the same breath remonstrated that historical 
studies are holding back human progress when compared to the natural sciences. The only 
way forward, according to his understanding was an uncompromising application of the 
methods of the natural sciences and statistics in history. Even if this may all have 
culminated in a vogue of enthusiasm for the physical sciences during the Victorian period, 
which made it difficult for classical economics to resist the fashionable movement of 
positivist philosophy, the German historical scholarship certainly did not open their arms 
for Buckle and his companions.71 'Ranke's and Niebuhr's achievements are backwards and 
outdated' - remarks of that nature infuriated the Prussian School, but even liberal historians 
such as Wilamowitz-Mollendorf voiced his criticism against Buckle. They all felt 
somehow bypassed by the claims to universality and the euphoria for the empirical 
method, based on its scientific achievements in the natural sciences. According to the 
Prussian School, this pseudo-historical method not only started to spread over Western 
Europe but also it attempted to intrude into German historical scholarship. 
The plainest rejection of such intrusiveness came from Droysen, Sybel, Treitschke 
and Dahlmann, who saw in addition to the methodological infiltration an anti-German and 
liberalist plot between the lines of the universalising claims. Already by 1761, Edward 
Gibbon, one of the most influential ancient Roman historians, had complained that lately 
natural philosophers and mathematicians sit on the throne of wisdom.72 Droysen 
complained almost a hundred years later in 1857 that Historie (Droysen's term for proper 
historical studies) seem to have been degraded to the Cinderella amongst the sciences 
(Wissenschaften).73 What is interesting about this, is how the perception of the universality 
of the natural sciences by great historians has continued from the enlightenment into 
modernity. 
Droysen, whose method is associated with the term historicism, argued against 
positivism that universally accepting the method of the natural sciences negated the 
hermeneutic basis of historicism and aimed to subsume the uniqueness and historical 
. d· d 1· f h ld f h ff . Droysen argued that not only would In Ivi ua Ity 0 t e wor 0 uman a aIrs. 
70 Demandt (1998) p. 87. See Quetelet (1835), (1849) and an Camte's Science as a Religion (1909). 
71 Meikle in Steger (1999) p. 85. 
72 See Demandt (1998) p. 84, n13. 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
130 
empiricism or positivism be incapable of revealing the 'spiritual' character of the world of 
human affairs, but its materialistic naturalistic worldview aimed to belittle human history 
to a subdiscipline of the natural sciences.74 
Buckle's History aimed to show that as it is in the world of nature, so it is in the 
world of human affairs and that history is a system, which can be universally and 
consistently explained with universal concepts and in terms of the operation of nat.ural 
laws. Thus he claimed that mental, physical and social laws could be subsumed under a 
system of general cosmic laws, and maintained that the most fundamental universal 
principle amongst all of them is progress, which because of Buckle's monistic worldview, 
could be applied without great difficulty to human history. Armed with Darwin's 
evolutionary theory and a vague and often mechanical notion of social 'progress', the 
natural philosophers of the French and English enlightenment identified and idealised 
scientific progress as being capable of uncovering the laws of evolution in nature, which 
are supposedly the key elements for furthering social, economic and therefore moral 
progress. In order to achieve this reorientation of historiographical methodology, Buckle 
argued programmatically that one might have to create an atmosphere of scepticism, which 
first creates a self-supportive method of scientific enquiry. 
Further, it was for Buckle an indisputable truth that the 'world of nature' continues 
to have faith in the existence of 'so-called objective moral truths', which presented 
indisputable normative moral codes to society. Instead morality is only dependent on the 
speaker's view or descriptions of a moral matter and is therefore sUbjective.75 Buckle 
argues that the state and its churches actively suppress the development of the natural 
sciences and that both institutions therefore stand in the way of true moral progress based 
on social, economic and scientific evolution. Clearly this indicated that Buckle felt society 
would be far better off if civitas and clerus would take a much more marginal role in the 
development of social affairs. The liberal and positivistic elements in Buckle's position 
together with the framework of materialism constituted a serious methodological and 
ideological challenge to event history, without acknowledging that instead of idealising the 
state, the statesmen and wars, he was idealising the method of empirical sciences, natural 
evolution and progress. Moral scepticism as an ideal, does of course immediately create a 
difficulty; that of verifying its own stance as non-ideological. 
73 Droysen (1972) p. 78. 
N On the history of historicism see (1957) pp. 351-360. Highly critical towards the hlstorici~t 
Weltanschauung was Schied (1964). 
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The subscribers to Buckle's modem view even went so far as to degrade Theodor 
Mommsen's and Ernst Curtius' highly valuable contributions to Roman and Greek histon 
as mere collections of anecdotes and bedside-table readings. They held instead that the 
method of proper historical studies should follow the scientific laws of development of 
matter and nature. 76 We shall see later in this part how this spirit influenced 
NationalOkonomie and Geschichtswissenschaft towards the end of the 19th century. Some 
similarities to BUcher's position, especially to his model of the 'stages of economic 
development' may perhaps already become apparent. However, it would be a mistake to 
assume that the Prussian School and its followers resorted solely to fury and indignation 
about the positivistic and materialistic methods. The challenges of cultural history and 
sociology against the traditional historiography not only have their roots in the success of 
positivism in England, but are partly due to a highly developed and undoubtedly 
sophisticated, but at the same time inward looking, Rankean idealistic methodology of 
historical studies in Germany with its continuation by Droysen.77 
If positivism and materialism aimed to distort the idealist separation between the 
world of nature and the world of human affairs and aspired to supersede the epistemic and 
methodological distinction between natural sciences and historical studies with a 
universally applicable and all incorporating 'scientific method', then surely it was practical 
for the Rankean adherents to focus mainly on a criticism of this new method. Indeed 
Droysen not only clarified the idealistic position, but also firmly criticised the positivistic 
method. In doing so, he provided a valuable basis for Meyer's writings on the philosophy 
of history; Meyer's harsh criticism of BUcher's 'economic-theoretical' model provides the 
basis of an explanation to Meyer's allegedly modernising view of antiquity. However, a 
look into Droysen's method of Verstehen (,reflective understanding') will also highlight 
Droysen's and Meyer's methodologically questionable presuppositions. 
Droysen's criticism stems merely from his argument that positivism and 
materialism are missing the point about the nature of historical studies and proper 
historical understanding. Droysen rejected Buckle's demands for a methodological 
reorientation of historical studies. For Droysen, such claims and demands are entirely 
unjustifiable, since the contemplation of human nature, as existing only artificially as 
political beings capable of living without moral and civic guidance was to him an 
75 See Fuchs (1994). 
76 See Demandt (1998) p. 88, n31. Here especially Mone (1858) p. 56. 
77 See Oestreich (1969) p. 325. 
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inconceivable and frightening idea. 78 In this respect Droysen argued that Buckle's approach 
is fundamentally flawed and oversimplified. He asserted that positivism simply measures 
the degree of progress in human civilisation of Buckle's kind merely quantitatively, in 
terms of 'the consumption of soup' of a nation for example.79 For Droysen progress 
manifests itself not through application of materialistic deterministic methods or 
quantifiers, but through the state of collective/national 'Erkenntnis' or internalisation of 
patriotic norms. This 'Erkenntnis' does not only depend on the level of technical and 
economic progress within society, but also on the efficiency of government, its 
nationalistic determination and control of social affairs. Proper progress is therefore 
mainly confined to the 'political' and spiritual and not to the economical or social. We 
must not, however, commit the mistake of reading Droysen's critique on Buckle entirely as 
a mere outburst of patriotic feelings. Undoubtedly his openly nationalistic bias formed a 
central premise in his defence of event history, which as we saw, was echoed in Meyer too. 
However, Droysen leaned also heavily on Kant's idealism, which emphasised individual 
responsibility, moral duty and free will. The historian is therefore not simply the impartial 
investigator who connects events with one another by showing their causal connections; by 
nature he cannot disconnect himself from the 'moral powers' - state, church, education and 
vocation. Droysen argued with Kant that free will could only be truly exercised if the 
subject comprehends itself as autonomous and rationally respects the moral law, which 
presupposes the right system of justice and moral ethos. This foundation, he thought, was 
best provided with the realisation of the Prussian-German nation state, but not with a 
homogenous super state (Universalstaat). Droysen also remained firmly Rankean by 
maintaining that the naturalistic-deterministic method of Buckle condensed into some sort 
of statistical law, formula or table discards the most important aspect in history, the 
particular event and individual. He claimed that, for example, 'those laws, which might 
explain that out of a thousand mothers, up to twenty or thirty of them giving birth without 
being married' is a rather meaningless observation, since it ignores the moral implications 
of such a fact. '80 As the natural sciences operate in the categories of space, history operates 
in the realm of time. In opposition to the naturalists, Droysen maintained that the laws of 
physics are not extendable into the world of human affairs. The historian aims to 
understand the particular and not the general. It is of course possible to predict by making 
78 See Droysen (1937) p. 398 f. 
79 Droysen (1937) p. 399. 
80 Oroysen (1937) p. 399. 
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empirical inferences; for example, during continuous heavy rainfall significantly fewer 
people may leave their homes to watch an outdoor football match, but this does not stop 
me from enjoying the walk to the ground even if it is likely that I might fall ill with a cold 
or the game might be called off due to a waterlogged pitch. The task of the historian is not 
to ignore my behaviour as abnormal and to explain why everyone else stayed in: this may 
be the task of the sociologist or the mass psychologist. It is rather important to evaluate the 
significance of this single event and what impact it may have had on the course of history _ 
in this rather trivial example. This is what the method of Verstehen is mainly about _ 
reflective understanding of the particular event in its contribution to the practical 
realisation of particular ideas. Droysen himself makes this clear by pointing out that in 
history we are looking for the 'changing elements in what remains unchanged ... What 
moves and influences history is not the motion of the atoms, but the will, which is deri ved 
from self-consciousness and determined by it. In addition, the co-operatively operating 
will of the many, which, in this community, in this family spirit, in this collective spirit and 
nationhood etc., have a common self-consciousness that acts analogously (to the individual 
spirit).'81 Droysen's statement emphasises a strict detachment between nature and spirit, 
between the world of necessities and the world of freedom, between the world of nature 
and the world of human affairs - a separation which is apparent throughout Droysen' s 
theory. The positivistic historiography will of course always deny this distinction and 
continued to declare this idealistic paradigm as obsolete and, in the case of the materialists, 
as ideologically laden. 82 
Droysen acknowledged of course that many elements, which make our existence 
possible, are dependent on nature and may be explained by the natural sciences. However, 
this causal and universalisable explanation is simply different from what the historian 
attempts to do. The naturalistic or determinist explanation of an event may have its value, 
for the biologist or physicist, but does not offer the historian an appropriate 
epistemological basis, since he does not seek to subsume crucial individual element in 
history under universal principles. Droysen elucidates the difference between the world of 
nature and the world of human affairs by stating; 'not with the wood and tin of the 
instruments, but with the acoustics of the tones and harmonies, which come from them, is a 
Beethoven symphony explained and understood.'. And further, 'the elements which can 
81 Droysen (1937) p. 12. .. ,. ce WhlL·h was not 
82 Max Muller. for example. tried to construct even classIcal phIlology as a natural SCien • 
only rejected by Droysen, but earned him mockery too. See Demandt (1998) p. 89 n-+-+. 
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be measured with the method of the natural sciences belong to the material conditions of 
the historic life, but they are not the life itself.'83 The method of Verstehen therefore 
incorporates the results of the natural sciences as one element, but it is and ought not to be 
subsumed by them. 
Droysen's historical method consists all together of three steps of comprehension. 
First, the heuristic step, which means working through the material by using the results of 
the natural sciences as assisting sciences (,Hilfswissenschaften') that are at the historian's 
free disposal, for example, archaeology or economic history. The second step is the 
analysis and criticism of the results in order to achieve more certainty. The third and most 
important phase is 'interpretation', which lies in the heart of 'Verstehen' .84 Like Meyer, 
Droysen understood interpretation in a pragmatic way. Where there is enough substantial 
evidence, causal conclusions can be easily drawn, where there are few analogues, there 
motives may have to be invented in order to understand the importance of an event.85 
However, this is not to say that Droysen endorsed the method of conjectural history as 
some enlightenment historians did. 86 It seems that Droysen' s aim was to defend and 
reinforce the validity of teleological explanation of particular action in the light of his 
contemporary moral and political challenges. This is not to say that every action achieves 
its end or is of equal weight. The difficulty for the historian is to decide from which moral 
and epistemological stance he has to adopt to demarcate the historically 'outstanding' or 
'important' personality or event. For Droysen this value was the level of realisation of the 
general will or spirit of a nation, expressed in the quality of its collective actions (e.g. 
Prussian-German nationalism) and more significantly, in the quality of political and moral 
leadership by its statesmen and bureaucratic institutions such as the church, military and 
universities. The primary driving forces in history are moral ideas, which 'develop in 
history, but these moral ideas do grow and unfold themselves only through the human 
being in history. That they continue and grow in that manner is the meaning of history in 
its sole contents. '87 Although the emergence of guiding moral ideas, which can become 
political dogmas in a state, should always be examined in this political context, this is not 
applicable in respect of class struggle and degree of satisfaction of material needs. The 
83 Droysen (1937) p. 13. 
84 See Spieler (1970) p. 75 f. 
85 Droysen (1937) p. 154, p. 340 ff. .. R b 
86 See for example the methodological approach by the Scottish enlightenment historian. \\'dlIa~ 0 ertson. 
who aimed to defend the conjectural approach n historiography. For more detail see Francesconi (1999). 
87 Droysen (1937) p. 181. 
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perspective of the level of realisation is present in the degree of national unity, loyalty to 
the state and obedience to morality. 
Droysen's approach has of course its difficulties, as he himself was quite happy to 
point out: 'it is a delightful occurrence that in all important questions of our science 
['Wissenschaft'] there is discord amongst its masters, that one operates differently from 
one another factually and methodologically. Again and again the question arises whether 
the historian should work artistically or scientifically or both, whether he has to be 
impartial or is at least entitled to be biased towards the good and the true, whether 
historical inquiry has to search for laws or whether he has to be satisfied with the facts. 
The lively interest for history that is apparent everywhere, has brought a wild variety of 
theories onto the market. J oumalists, who represent the opinion of the so-called educated 
public, try to tell us how we should go about in our scientific research. '88 
However, this quote outlines a problematic position. On the one hand, Droysen 
was welcoming the debate on method and objectives of historical studies. On the other 
hand, he seems to deny 'the so-called educated public' an opinion how history should 
proceed. Any criticism from a non-academic or non-German (although this is not 
explicitly maintained in this quote) seems to be unwelcome. Also, and we can draw here a 
parallel to Ranke, it seems to be difficult for Droysen to prove that the guiding historical 
ideas, which the historian should embrace in his assessment of the historically important, 
are not just important to him and his audience. It is certainly possible to accept that 
religious and political ideas have consciously and subconsciously an influence over our 
actions. However, it is difficult to see what kind of ideas do in fact trigger and dominate 
actions, which ideas are worth pursuing because they may bring us closer to the truth, to 
the good and to God. Even if it does not constitute a great difficulty to see Droysen's 
problem in distinguishing clearly between the subjective motives of our actions and the 
objective course of history, the difficulty exists in justifying the criteria for the historian to 
call a certain idea objective in terms of their observable dominants and goodness in history. 
The historian is simply not a supreme historical being, who can free himself from 
political and ideological temptations. Droysen must have been aware of this, but a certain 
academic arrogance and prejudice with regard to the unique position of historical studies 
amongst the academic disciplines and 'outsider' voices remains. It was continued and 
elabo~ated in Meyer's 'Anthropology' .89 After all, it seems somehmv puzzling that whilst 
88 Droysen (1977) p. 3. . 
89 Recently on Droysen's Historik see Ribbe (1989), Momigliano (1991) and Nlppel (1993). 
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both Droysen and Meyer maintained a plurality of explanation; that different subjects 
operate with different methods and concepts, they both maintained the superiority of the 
historical sciences over the social and, to a degree, the natural sciences. 
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IV. Historical Studies and Germany in the 1890s 
Although the Prussian School faced a series of methodological and political 
challenges which originated mainly from outside Germany's universities, the totalitarian 
and all-inclusiveness of Bismarck's government combined with its presumptive and often 
extreme nationalism gave Droysen's historicist method up to the 1890s an almost 
uncontested position in ancient history. However, alongside the previously discussed 
ongoing 'national question' in politics and the increasing influence of positivism and 
materialism into German political thought, the academic world during last decade of the 
19th century was increasingly divided. On the one side, it crystallised itself into a rather 
rigid and at times snobbish historicism primarily within the discipline of history. One the 
other side stood those political enthusiasts in favour of modem methods, free trade, 
progress and liberal philosophies and their colleagues in mostly new academic and semi-
academic disciplines. This factor was primarily responsible for the bitterness and the 
polemic course of the debate between BUcher and Meyer. 
In addition, the so-called 'crisis' in historical studies was possibly brought about as 
an effect of the frequent and devastating economic depressions in Germany as a result of 
which the entrepreneurial optimism of the 1890s suffered many setbacks. The economic 
and social crisis, which lasted more then 15 years, resulted in even sharper class divisions, 
which created a powerful but still politically discriminated against working class 
movement. The rapid urban and agricultural industrialisation created previously unknown 
social and cultural phenomena, which demanded explanation and consideration. The 
poverty of the working class created social tensions resulting in an increase of petty crime, 
social disobedience and religious disenfranchisement. The dramatic growth in mass 
production and technological advances created for the first time in German history a 
consumer and entertainment culture for the middle classes, which was until then, known 
only in England and France. New industries emerged such as tourism, transport and 
media. 90 For example, mass sporting events in football and athletics, aeroplane and 
weaponry shows and advances in telecommunication gave almost everyone something to 
be astounded about and entertained by. Regardless of frequent setbacks, this signalled the 
end of a bitter and long lasting economic crisis and rang in the beginning of a new era for 
Germany. 
90 .. h d I . I proaches see Wehler (1998). Wehler (1975) and very recently In respect of alternative met 0 ooglca ap 
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Politically the beginning of such a new era began perhaps with Bismarck's 
resignation in 1891. The latter event was accompanied by fundamental political and social 
reforms, which the 'Iron Chancellor' had to initiate towards the end of his twenty-year 
highly praised and bitterly condemned spell in office,91 which resulted for the time being in 
a strengthening of the liberal and positivistic forces within politics and academia. It seems 
that the end of Bismarck's era coincides somehow with the beginning of the decline of the 
predominate position of the historical studies amongst the 'spiritual' or 'human sciences' 
(,Geisteswissenschaften '). The word 'crisis' is often mentioned in connection with the 
history of historiography of the late 19th century. Perhaps with Hegel's death the dream of 
objective idealism - that of retaining confidence in achieving a universally objective and 
consistent Weltanschauung - finally faded. Ideologically, the last serious attempt to create 
a universal system in philosophy, the Romanticism and patriotism of the early 19th century 
that inspired the revolution of 1848/49 turned sourly into Prussia's imperialistic ambitions, 
anti-Catholicism and anti-Semitism not only in the new Germany, but also throughout 
Europe.92 Those historians disillusioned with the Ranke's promise of history to discover 
'how it really was', tended to be those scholars that were impressed and almost bedazzled 
by the idea of scientific and economic progress as the sole key for social evolution and 
change, found themselves at home amongst the liberals and even amongst social 
democrats. The increasing political disunity amongst Germany's academics fuelled the 
demands for a reorientation of historical studies. In sharp contrast to the historicism of 
Treitschke, Sybel and Droysen, its advocates based their views on hidden psychological 
forces within the human mind or on the underlying material forces within society as 
expressed in civil unrest and class struggle. 
Regarding the situation at the German universities, political or traditional history 
had, as we saw, previously enjoyed a supreme and unchallenged position in German 
thought, which perhaps resulted from its unsolved 'national question' and the quest for 
national identity. The continuous predominance of the Prussian School beyond 1871 was a 
clear sign that German society and the organisation of its state was still controlled by the 
aristocracy, which saw large parts of that society especially in the north and the east still 
remaining under a feudal economic and social structure. This is not to say that society and 
its institutions did not change according to increasing versatility of the economy, leaving 
91 The social reforms, such as the National Insurance System are often used as an example for his 
achievements. See Wehler (1975). 
92 On Bismarck's failure to win the 'Kultllrkampj' see Ross (1998). 
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the aristocracy and the upper bourgeoisie as sole winners of the 'revolution from the top of 
society', regardless of the economic concessions that had to be made. However, 
Bismarck's reforms of 1873 achieved a kind of 'parlamentarianism a La Bonapart', which 
left rural Germany largely unaffected in its peasant state.93 The static and conservative 
organisation of the state, on the one hand, the fast progressing development of capitalism 
on the other hand, did not resolve class conflict, but had an adverse affect on political and 
intellectual unity. Some of the more liberal voices resounded amongst the newly founded 
and increasingly credible science of political economy. Its first liberal scholars, Rodbertus, 
BUcher and Lujo Brentano used a series of different approachs, which differed 
substantially from the method of political and military history used by their colleagues in 
historical studies.94 
Although the revolutionary years of 1848/49 displayed impressively the mounting 
difficulties of the old aristocratic order in Germany in coping with the development of the 
capitalist system, its political deal with the bourgeoisie had prolonged and stabilised its 
power, even though the uprisings of those years had shown a high degree of organisation.95 
What led to the deep crisis of the old order was not simply a question of socio-economic 
failure, famine and reluctance to implement political reform. Problems of food 
distribution, overproduction and urban squalor resulted from fast growing, functioning or 
disfunctioning markets. The bourgeoisie, who had on previous occasions, at least during 
the American and French Revolution, idealised equality of all men and propagated civil 
liberties, had, towards the end of the 19th century, positioned itself against the working 
class movement and distanced itself conspicuously from any kind of socialist and 
communist ideals. The German bourgeoisie allied themselves with the aristocracy, whilst 
in France and England they kept a more liberal and politically independent profile. The 
peculiar economic effect, as Marx in particular predicted, was an evident concentration of 
capital in the form of large trusts and oligopolies establishing a whole new world of 
industrial concentration and production, which was unknown in scope and in its social 
quality and implications (e.g. the large scale concentration of bought labour to unbearably 
low wages). 
The years of the 'Great Depression' 1873-1896 even benefited the increase in the 
monopoly structure of the economies of Germany and also in the United States. 
93 See Weber (1991). 
94 An almost monumental work on this subject Braunthal (1966/67). 
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Politically, the emergence of trusts and cartels m banking and industry favoured the 
organisation of the proletariat, but led also to a material differentiation amongst the 
working class and the bourgeoisie, which resulted in a less uniform anti-capitalist line 
inside the working class movements. Certain industries and banks could increasingly 
afford to pay higher wages than other industries. Office workers were increasingly divided 
by a growing inequality of income and benefits, which created the claim that the working 
class itself was split into first and second class workers. The modernisation of the 
countryside with soaring productivity and profit mcreases during the years after the 
revolution until the mid 1870s helped Germany's aristocracy to keep a dominant hold on 
German politics. The bourgeoisie had its economic basis only in the cities and since it lost 
its ties with the proletariat, had to co-operate with the aristocracy in order to gain political 
and economic concessions. 96 
Despite a tendency towards political monopolisation and ever-stronger ties 
between bourgeoisie and aristocracy in Germany during the second half of the 19th century, 
it would be too simplistic to assume a homogenous development of the class structure. 
The varieties of political and intellectual arguments are present in the parliamentary 
debates, in the politics of the German banks and in the scholarly debates at the universities. 
This is a fact, which suggests clearly that Germany's intellectuals, politicians and 
businessman were not just a vehicle or mechanism to maintain the monarchy.97 The 
alliance between 'Roggen und Eisen', 'rye and iron', after 1878179 as Alfred Rosenberg 
called it, was more or less an attempt to strengthen the German nation state under the rule 
of Prussia. There were few other common interests between aristocracy and bourgeoisie 
apart from retaining power and increased capital accumulation, but there was obviously 
still enough power to hold back the working class movement in its disunited but 
continuous attempt to overthrow capitalism.98 
In this historical context a certain term reoccurs very frequently in newspaper 
articles and propaganda brochures - the 'social question' or 'soziale Frage'. It refers to the 
situation of the working class in German society during the second part of the 19th century. 
Although the working class was similar to the developed nations like France and Britain 
95 Abo!lt the importance and the background of the revolution in Germany see Schmidt (1972) and Marquardt 
(1974). 
96 For more details see Wehler (1972), pp. 24-30 and Bdhme (1972). . ' \\' hi 
97 For an excellent overview on the political and economic changes and forces dunng that tIme see e er 
(1976) pp. 131-148. . ," h' . 
98 Rosenberg (1967) p. 164. The 'black and blue' alliance also became economIcally \lslble In t e torm ot 
price dictatorship and the creation of 'coal cartel' in the Ruhr area. 
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high in numbers after 1848/49 and in parts similarly well-organised, the late 
industrialisation of Germany and the apparent programmatic opposition against socialism 
and its leaders, made it very difficult for German Social Democrats (including the trade 
unions) to achieve a grade of flexibility, organisation and support known to Britain and 
France.
99 
This lack of unity and flexibility was about to change with the rapid 
industrialisation and its effects on the deep economic recession of the 1870s and 80s 
, 
which gained the German working class movement a leading role, as exemplified by the 
Second International of 1889 in Paris. A clear indication of the new spirit amongst the 
German working class movement was unity-congress of Gotha in 1875.100 Bismarck's 
'Anti-Socialist Laws' of 1878-1890 had certainly had an adverse effect on the progressing 
organisation of the movement, which had resulted in the parliamentary success of 1884 and 
1890. Bismarck and the conservative parties were unable to push back the Social 
Democrats either inside or outside the parliament. The idea was now to win them over, to 
partially incorporate and eventually split the Social Democrats over Bismarck's political 
reforms, which succeeded in the form of a national/nationalistic orientation of these 
political parties to a considerable degree. lol 
The support of the Bismarck government given by a large proportion of the Social 
Democrats was bought with the 'social security laws' (Sozialgesetzgebung), which marked 
the introduction of a National Insurance system, which was in its complexity unmatched in 
Europe. It is however no secret that right up until 1880 Bismarck strongly opposed any 
demands for shortening the working week, the introduction of tight safety regulation and 
the abolition of child and Sunday work, to name a few examples. The introduction of 
social reforms, the national insurance, pension schemes and school reforms were, as 
Bismarck himself admitted, not introduced to relieve the indisputable human hardship and 
misery amongst large parts of the working classes, but in order to create a stronger national 
identity, which was capable of supporting his imperialistic aspirations regardless of any 
social divide. By doing so, he would be able to marginalise the mounting social pressures 
99 Even Bismarck's 'social laws' ('Sozialistengesetze') of 1878 could not break or stop the continuous 
organisation capability to act of the working class movements. See Engelberg (1967) p. 145 f. . 
100 .., d t' t', parts of thiS prnoram. It is not the task here to Judge or explam the revolutIOnary aspects an oppor U~IS Il . " ,~.. . 
. .,. , , th th t'cal 'onslderatlons ot the slllialist In despite of all cntlclsm It plays an Important part m e eore I l , 
movement. See Marx' 'Critique of the Gotha Program' in Marx (1933), Se,e also Engelberg (l:~ I), p, .14J . 
101 Enaelberg (1967) pp. 186-187, p, 238 f., and on the development ot the SOCIal DemocratIL Part~ In 
Germa~y see the bibliography in Wehler (1971), Ritter (1963) and more recently Guttsman (1981). 
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onto the aristocratic-upper bourgeois pact. 102 Large parts of the social democratic 
movements and left-wing liberalism clearly followed Bismarck in his imperialist 
ambitions, which the German aristocracy was longing to realise politically and the 
bourgeoisie economically. The rebirth of the German nation under Prussia's governance, 
the breath-taking industrial catch-up with Europe's leading industrial nations like France 
and Britain was accompanied by a rather backward, polarised and dictatorial political 
system, which on a whole could not leave the academic world unaffected. Indeed demands 
were raised from almost every political section to make the human sciences 
(Gesteswissenschaften) more useful and subservient to contemporary affairs and questions 
of national priority. The internal quarrels amongst historians and the external political and 
methodological challenges led at the beginning of the 1890s to what frequently has been 
called 'the crisis in historical studies' (Geschichtswissenschaften)103 - the once so eminent, 
sublime and lofty discipline. 
It is already apparent that the polemic course of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
was not simply a political matter, nor was it merely a methodological dispute, but rather a 
combination of both, which was mirrored in the conservative nationalistic orientation of 
Germany's universities and the urge of liberalism to create an academic self-image. 
Most institutes of higher education, especially those on former Prussian territory 
remained largely under the influence of the once progressive ideal of the enlightenment of 
a peacefully unified and strong federal German nation state. 104 At that time the academies 
and universities in smaller federal states (e.g. Leipzig, Jena, Heidelberg, and Freiburg) had, 
despite their humanistic tradition, in practice very little autonomy in education affairs. In 
fact the political task of these institutions was to accommodate scientific and technological 
progress, but also to educate and recruit obedient civil servants and bureaucrats. 
Professors and lecturers were civil servants and clearly not put into office in order to resent 
and undermine the newly built federal system, but were instructed to support and further 
the policies of Bismarck's government. Since the universities were largely politically fire-
walled, serious political resistance could therefore only occur from organisations outside 
the academic world, but hardly from within.105 Paulsen even went as far as to claim that the 
102 See again Wehler's excellent representation (1972) p. 459 ff. and Wehler (1975). See also Faulenb~ch 
(1980).. for a comprehensive study of German History reflected in its historiography between the K(llSerelc/z 
and National Socialism. 
103 Metz (1984) p. 6 f. and Iggers (1984) p. 21 f. . ' 1990 
104 For the history of the German universities during that period see Oestreich (1969) and RInger ( )'. 
105 . ' h' b ' . dustries such as the chemical For a favourable comment on the alliance and relatIOns Ip etween ne\\ In ~ . , 
. . . , . E I (1959) p. 1)2 t. See ab\l 
and electrical industry and sCientific research at German Universities see nge - -
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German universities and their curricula 'concerning the whole academic scholarship. 
represents a kind of intellectual aristocracy, including praetors and teachers, judges and 
civil servants, doctors and engineers, who gained access through the universities into the 
well-taught and prestigious professions. As a whole, they all form a kind of "office 
aristocracy" (Amtsadel) , of whom the large majority was incorporated into the 
substructures of local and federal state government.'106 That not all citizens were suitable 
for such positions, especially those from poorer backgrounds, was openly acknowledged. 
To this extent the political and nationalistic orientation of the curricula was openly 
encouraged by scholars such as Meyer and Pohlmann and found a diverse reflection in 
comments and publications about the state of Germany's education system. Paulsen 
pointed also out that the initial trend towards liberalisation in the sprit of humanism 
experienced a severe setback under Bismarck. 107 This created perhaps one significant factor 
for the establishment of semi-academic circles and organisations, which besides the 
spreading of popular science often also followed liberal political values. 
External opposition to the conservative self-image and internal debates amongst 
historians were contributing factors in the setting-up of the 'German Historians' 
Conference' (Deutscher Historiker Tag), which has established itself over the last century 
(since 1893) as an institution of high scholarly and political esteem. Yet although the 
Conference was intended to foster and further the internal and interdisciplinary debate on 
historical topics methodological challenges were greeted with little sympathy. Academic 
'newcomers' like Karl BUcher and Karl Lamprecht, both scholars at Leipzig, earned 
themselves little credibility by challenging the established Rankean consensus on method, 
its general picture of antiquity and its blunt nationalism. That, however, the arguments on 
both sides, as in many other disputes too, have had a clearly politically motivated content 
and background, can not be seriously denied by anyone who studies the newspaper reports 
Wehler (1973) p. 129 f. On a good description of the high demand on conformity. of the universities in the 
state sciences (law and political economy), philosophical faculties and the natural sCiences. 
106 Paulsen (1902) pp. 149-150 See also Paulsen (1912). Paulsen also highlights the .departure from 
enlightenment and rather liberal ideas of allowing poor, but highly gifted children access to higher education. 
The German Gymnasium paved the way for this very selective and elitist educatio~ ~yste.m Paulsen ,< 1902) p. 
161. Paulsen's study, although very complex, shows however also his own political trustratlOn about the 
right-wing conservative and in his view backward education system. . 'd d d 
107 In the spirit of the republican revolution of 1848/49 in particular fraterni ty orgamsatlo.ns provi e. an 
. , .' M and Wilamowltz In BerlIn or fostered less well off students. Without their protectIOnism ommsen S S 
d ··th n academic deOrt~c. ee Icmann Nietzsche and Marx in Bonn would have never been able to gra uate \\ I a to 
(1998), 
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about these conferences and the remarks of some key participants in their autobiographies 
in the early years. 108 
108 Schumann (1974) p. 54 f. 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
us 
3. Cultural History vs. Political Event History 
I. Gothein and Schafer 
The emerging crisis in German historiography was in some ways a product of the 
ideological debate and is characteristic of the modem Zeitgeist of the Wilhelminian era. 
However, whole social divisions and ideological disagreements may form an important and 
informative part of an explanation for the occurrence of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, 
but these reasons are not exclusive. The self-image of history as residing above the human 
sciences was seriously challenged by the psychological, positivistic and partly materialistic 
methodological approaches and not only from semi- or non-academic circles outside 
Germany. 
The first serious academic calls for a reorientation of historical studies in Germany 
have their roots in the late 1880s. Dietrich Schafer's (1845-1929) inaugural lecture 'The 
intrinsic task of history' ('Das eigentliche Arbeitsgebiet der Geschichte') of 1888 
reiterated the Rankean consensus.109 Schafer stated reassuringly, 'the essence of the state is 
power and politics is the art of maintaining the state .... The instruments of power for the 
state are mainly things of political and military nature. "10 By highlighting the 'political' as 
preceding all other human affairs, he claimed that history and its historians ought to 
enquire into the particular event and should highlight what actions and personalities had a 
traceable impact on the present. 111 Cultural history, he added, dealt with the rather 
unimportant banalities of everyday life. In a controversial polemic aimed at Schafer's 
essay, Eberhard Gothein (1853-1923) responded critically that the historian should not 
only focus on 'political event history' (politische Ereignisgeschichte), but also on 'cultural 
history' (Kulturgeschichte). He pointed out that the latter concept incorporates not only 
political and military events, highlighting the glory or demise of its leading figures, but 
also underlines material conditions and cultural peculiarities. ll2 Arguing against the 
historicist historiography, Gothein also emphasised that the 'chronological tradition' would 
-
109 See Oestreich (1969) p. 32l. 
110 See Schafer (1888) Cited in Oestreich (1969) p. 327. 
111 Schafer (1888). ._ 
112 Gothein (1889). Gothein's works in the field of regional economic history may st.'nt.' us ht.'rt.' suttlclt.'ntly 
as example. See Gothein (1892). 
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single out only the results of what went on at a particular time, which leaves the all 
important political event diminished to one of many factors. Gothein was not prepared to 
accept that the 'political' elements in history presides over the 'cultural'; instead, he argued 
that 'event history' reduces history to merely those political ideas and personalities that 
benefited directly or indirectly from the historical battle. 113 
In reply, Schafer complained that Gothein's concept of cultural history was 
entirely focussed on mass movements and by doing so, continuously belittled the 
achievements of historic personalities. One can of course interpret the holistic approach of 
both theories as equally reductivist and hypothetical. One may argue that, on the one hand, 
political event history exaggerates the importance of state leaders and belittles the masses 
and their culture. On the other hand, one could reply that cultural history belittles 
individuality and concentrates overmuch on abstract class, mass and cultural movements as 
well as daily material dispensabilities. It is obvious that Schafer stood firmly in the 
tradition of historicism in which the state and its leaders constituted the 'proper' objective 
of a sound historiographical methodology. For Schafer, intellectual ideas and political 
history include and dominate cultural history. Therefore, from Schafer's point of view, 
'Kulturgeschichte' is only a subordinate part of political history, whereas for Gothein it 
influences and characterises a specific political structure. Gothein however also held that 
Droysen's 'History of Prussian Politics' and Sybel's 'Foundation of the German Empire by 
Wilhelm l' exemplified the cultural approach.114 It is doubtful, however, that either would 
have appreciated such a classification. 
According to Gothein, the task of proper historical methodology is to uncover the 
laws of political development, which lie in the cultural and material conditions of society. 
He concluded by quoting his teacher, Wilhelm Dilthey's 'Einleitung in die 
Geisteswissenschaften' (,Introduction to the Human Sciences; an Attempt to lay down the 
Foundation for the Study of Society and History') that 'the science of the human spirit is 
only one. If we comprehend it from its unchanged basis, then we call it philosophy. If we 
are looking for the changing and the developing in history, then this should be called 
cultural history. 'Tertium non datur' - there is no third way' .115 To consider the 'changing' 
and 'developing' as essential to history was for Gothein and his colleagues a more 
enlig~tening approach which influenced economic and regional history. 
113 Gothein (1889) p. 3 ff. On the discussion of the concept of cultural history as opposed to mere political 
history. Also discussed in Goch (1964) p. 609 ff. and Oestreich (1969) P 3::?6 f.. 
114 See Oestreich (1969) p. 329. 
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It should be added, however, that Gothein did not intend to challenge Ranke's 
eminence in German historiography pUblicly. At the 3rd 'Conference of German 
Historians', he criticised Ranke in a carefully-worded manner for not considering 
adequately the importance of economic aspects in history, but concluded that nevertheless 
one ought not stand against the forefather of historicism. 116 The newly emerged theory of 
Kulturgeschichte had obvious links to the concept of social history, and criticised the 
'static philosophy' of Ranke and its historicist aftermath. The latter branded Ranke's 
historicism as static, conservative and unscientific. The social or materialistic approach to 
human history also became increasingly popular. However, it is difficult to see why a 
deterministic explanation of events under historic laws of development creates a theoretical 
advantage over political history. How would one better understand events by looking at 
general trends instead of the effects of individuals or group of individuals? This question 
was never properly addressed by Gothein and others and was never put to historicism for 
reply. It seems that there was a good deal of arrogance and over-confidence amongst 
positivists and materialists which accompanied the 'progressive' and 'optimistic' spirit of 
what they called a reformed and modem method of historiography, which associated itself 
swiftly with the empirical sciences and the inductive analysis of the sociologists. By doing 
so, they not only created a quantitative dispute over the importance of the single event or a 
political personality in history, but also dissociated themselves qualitatively i.e. 
methodologically from philology, chronology and philosophy. 
Socially and ideologically, Gothein and the liberal minded scholars in his circle 
intended to disassociate themselves from the aristocratic and conservative establishment at 
the history departments of the Reich - a disassociation which was only tempered by the 
nationalistic orientation of German politics and academia in the early 1900s. However, not 
only did new approaches and academic subjects emerge, which dealt with social, economic 
and cultural phenomena but also the conservative orientated historical studies, ancient 
history and philology started to enter into, though perhaps reluctantly, the debate and 
eventually began to compete with the new cultural and social sciences. 117 
Regarding Karl BUcher's position we recall his extensive use of the theory of 
'economic stages of development' and his attention to regional economic history. We also 
stated that political history played a rather small if not insignificant part in his writings. 
liS Gothein (1889) p. 49. 
116 See Oestreich (1969) p. 355. 
117 See Oestreich (1969) p. 332 f. 
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BUcher also argued that history might best be comprehended as a process, rather than 
merely as a sequence of unrelated events. On the other hand, when we consider Meyer's 
and Beloch's focus on the particular historical phenomenon and remind ourselves of their 
methodological remarks, it becomes quite clear that the BUcher-Meyer Controversy was 
part of the wider debate between 'Kulturgeschichte vs. politische Ereignisgeschichte'. 
This hard fought dispute should also explain the background of BUcher's and Meyer's 
polemic arguments and their widely differing ideas about the nature and orientation of 
historical methodology. This is why the disagreement between them has in fact a much 
greater exemplary importance than was previously admitted by those who are satisfied 
with an easy branding of this debate as 'primitivism vs. modernism'. In order to add more 
substance to our claim, we shall try to shed light onto the 'Methodenstreit' (,dispute over 
method') - synonymously known as the Lamprechtstreit - in historical studies. 1I8 
. . I H erstein (1988). Bruch (1989) and 
118 On the situation of historical studIes In Germany see for examp e amm 
Blanke (1991). 
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ii. The 'Lamprechtstreit' 
The ideological and methodological rift between historians of the Rankean 
tradition and the historical positivists and materialists was displayed openly with the 
publication of 'provocative' writings by Karl Lamprecht, who sought to develop Eduard 
Gothein's and Jacob Burckhardt's concept of 'Kulturgeschichte'. 'Lamprecht especially 
tried to redefine the relationship between politics (law) and economy.'119 Despite some 
publicity surrounding the Gothein-Schafer dispute, the real scope of the internal disunity of 
historical methodology came to light most vividly with the 'Lamprechtstreit'. 
In clear opposition to the concept of 'political event history', during the 1890s 
Karl Lamprecht (1856-1915) suggested an entirely new method of historical analysis. This 
triggered a series of furious reactions amongst the established historical scholarship, which 
was unprecedented with regard to intensity and polemic that completely overshadowed the 
previous discussion on Gothein' s thesis.120 
Lamprecht set out to raise serious doubts over the old event and political elite 
driven method, which in Lamprecht's eyes vainly attempted to explain the new social 
phenomena of developing capitalism on the basis of Ranke's old idea of the pre-eminence 
of political history. In this way, the debate which Lamprecht initiated was driven by the 
'social question', and by a changing social and political climate in Germany, but also by 
his rejection of the method of traditional historiography, which BUcher also opposed. 
The debate was provoked by the publication of volume I of Lamprecht's major 
work 'Deutsche Geschichte' in 1890. Yet, as we have pointed out, this publication did not 
demarcate the beginning of the debate about the demands for a reorientation of historical 
studies. It was rather the culmination of the previously outlined ongoing process of 
intellectually challenging publications in new and increasingly popular academic 
disciplines, of which NationalOkonomie and psychology are perhaps the most prominent. 
However, it is rather bewildering how furiously the traditional Rankean-idealistic 
historiography launched its attacks against Karl Lamprecht. Was it perhaps Lamprecht's 
119Yiikari(l977)p.llO. " ' 7'1 ~, F 
120 Iggers (197-+) p. 258. For a biographical sketch on Lamprecht see Yllkan (1977) pp. L_ -L - or an. 
, d' S 'I' (19'15) '\n almost complete II~t of 
overview on the lIterature of the debate can be foun In ellert _.' 
Lamprecht's writing appeared in Schbnbaum (1955) pp. 7-21. See also Oestreich (1969) p. 321. 
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personality, his blunt manner of criticism or was it a particular publication of his, which 
made him the central figure of the dispute? It is difficult to reach a definite conclusion.121 
The approach of Gothein and Buckle as well as some positivists and materialists 
had a relatively unthreatening character and was not seen to challenge the historicism 
predominance seriously. Lamprecht's 'Kulturgeschichte' was taken more seriously. The 
Rankean tradition must have felt considerably under threat by this and related approa~hes 
as it feared the demise of the essential role given to political and individualistic elements in 
human history being drowned in the anonymous ocean of world historical and material 
processes. The demise of the well-established historicist scholarship is to an extent 
symptomatic for the political downfall of Germany's aristocracy and its 'noble' ethos. 
Already in 1885, with his publication 'German Economic Life in the Middle 
Ages', Karl Lamprecht had attempted to avoid simply stringing together events and 
political decisions, emphasising instead common elements that these events apparentl y 
share with each other. Essentially, Lamprecht argued that these common elements form 
qualitatively new factors, which in their entirety create the basis of any historical process 
and are unlike the dominant historical ideas, observable in the day-to-day reality of a 
society.122 In academia his stance found hardly any positive acknowledgement with many 
of his future opponents making sarcastic remarks about Lamprecht's position especially 
after the publication of the first volume of his Deutsche Geschichte. 123 
Lamprecht defended his position by arguing that the historicist tradition employed 
an entirely 'descriptive methodology', which evaluates 'how it really was' only from the 
perspective or interest of the historian. 124 This forms an element of an ideological critique, 
which accuses traditional historiography of committing a fallacy. Firstly, it tries to explain 
a particular event with concepts which are derived from modem concepts. Secondly, 
Lamprecht criticised the lack of methodological discussion over the selection of particular 
historical event. In the light of the apparent absence of such considerations he labelled the 
historicist historiography of Droysen, Sybel and Treitschke as one-sided, since it intends 
only to give descriptions of jurisprudential and institutional history. A proper 
121 On Lamprecht's position within the German historiography and achievements see Heuss (1957) pp. 309-
312. 
In ff SeeMetz(l984)p.5 . . ,. It 
123 Max Lenz in a letter to a relative moaned 'What do you have to say about thiS Opus. ThiS man does nc 
. .. I I" d ed close to higher 
seem to be sane anymore. What he oracles about the Germamc ongma coup e IS 10 e .' . 
. .. ,. f I d t perhaps the mtroductlOn to 
comedy .. .I can Imagme qUite weIl Below s smiley ace. can recommen 0 you . . , . 
. . ..' bl h I'terature tor Chnstmas. Cited 
and the paragraph about maternity protection, which IS sUita e as umorous I 
in Oestreich (1969) p. 331 n44. 
124 Lamprecht (1895) p. 295. 
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historiographical method would not simply give descriptions of 'how it really was', but 
would commit itself to an inquiry into the evolutionary tendencies and development of 
particular institutions in order to uncover the underlying structure of the historical 
process.125 Although Lamprecht's criticism is not well structured, his aim was to establish a 
new concept of 'world history' (Weltgeschichte) , a concept which relied solely upon the 
notion of development and evolution in history - an elucidation of economic, social and 
legal transformation. The critique and rejection of the historicist tradition played an 
essential part in his project. To Lamprecht the so called historical event and its reporters 
are only small parts of the whole collective-psychological process and sub-processes, by 
which the individual is amalgamated by overpowering historical forces. Thus, 
Kulturgeschichte is for Lamprecht not only a methodological concept, but also a new and 
revolutionary view of human history. It is the history of the whole of society and not 'just' 
of some separated and non-connected events with greatly exaggerated and unjustified 
emphasis on the centrality of certain ingenious historic personalities, and on the state in 
history. Economy, politics, social movements and culture should rather be seen as largely 
interdependent factors and should not be separated from one another in the 'proper' and 
systematic historical analysis. This holistic view of world history analyses the state of 
economy and of society; these are the two main causes of what he called a historical event 
or moment. 126 
Lamprecht's frequent use of terms such as 'social movements' and 'class 
struggle' earned him even heavier criticism and angry remarks from the historicists, of 
which Lamprecht's colleague at Leipzig, Georg von Below, was perhaps the most 
prominent. Contemporaries such as Below, Lenz and Meinecke accused Lamprecht as 
early as 1896 of collaborating with materialism. 127 The Marxist historiography, which was 
still in its early days, did adopt at least some of Lamprecht's propositions and was certainly 
less dismissive and prejudiced than Below. Grounds for Below's criticism emerged from 
Lamprecht's openly declared sympathies for aspects of Marxist analysis. On the contrary, 
this was sincerely welcomed by leading thinkers of the social democrats and Marxist 
movement, as it was beginning to leave a mark on historical studies, which was previously 
simply not the case. 128 However, even if Lamprecht saw some useful elements in Marxism, 
125 See-Lamprecht (1895) p. 295. 
126 See Lamprecht (1896). 
127 Oestreich (1969) p. 251 n122 ff. . . . I i 
128 Iggers (198 p. 26, mentions the importance of Ludo Hartmann's Vlertelja~lrscllrift fiu' Soz-w IIIIC 
. . . '. I platform tor ~oL"lal and eL"onOmIC WirtschaJtsgesclzichte. which attempted to be a senous mternatIona 
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Below's accusations were unjust. Lamprecht was never a committed Marxist; he objected 
to the Marxist dialectical-historical analysis of society in that it singled out class struggle 
as being the engine of progress of human history and focused solely on the socio-economic 
factors. In the light of recent discussion about a possibly wide-ranging misrepresentation 
of Marx's concept of history and development due to Engels' and Kautsky's modernisation 
and application of his theory their own for ideological purposes, it seems doubtful whether 
Lamprecht's criticism really applies to Marx or more to Kautsky and Engels.129 Perhaps a 
brief glance at Lamprecht's position should explain more widely the hostility and hype 
about Lamprecht's method. 
According to Lamprecht, what creates society as a whole is more than just the 
mechanically interconnecting parts. It is cultural coherence, connection or common 
context of all these factors that creates the historical. The Prussian School was keen to 
defend the 'Rankean consensus', and the Marxists were stressing the importance of the 
economic and material sphere in society. Regardless of all sympathies with the latter 
position, Lamprecht believed that both schools were based on false and misleading 
propositions. According to his understanding, each needed to individually develop a 
scientific method for historical studies. In particular the Prussian School with its 'insisting 
backwards looking and eclectic approach' towards social and cultural states and events, 
fails in its attempt to be scientific. 130 Here political event history, Lamprecht objected, is 
only able to describe what has happened in respect of what the traditional historian holds to 
be the 'guiding historical ideas', but the historicist is unable to bring events into a wider 
explanatory context of social 'states' which caused them. While arguing against his 
archenemy, Below, Lamprecht emphasised that what is historically important are the 
processes and states, which allow an understanding of 'how things came about' and not 
simply 'how they were in the past'.131 
history. This journal, despite some of its more positivistic orientated contributors, such as Hartmann himself 
and the Belgian historian Henri Pirenne, published also essays by well-known conservative historians such as 
Georg von Below, (Lamprecht's arch enemy) as well as essays by Theodor Mommsen, who did not support 
Lamprecht's method. , , ' 
129 See very recently Steger (1999). Also esp, Meikle 'Engels and the Enlightenment ReadIng of ,M~rx ~n 
Steger (1999) pp. 87-107, Compare also Steger 'Friedrich Engels and the Origin of German ReVISIOnism In 
Steger (1999) pp. 181-196. 
130 See Lamprecht (1896b) p. 12. , , , 
131 See Laum, (1937) p. 2 ff. Here we are perhaps reminded about Marx, who slmIl~rly he,ld that any 
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' " f d t' However unlike t\1an. Lamprec t by the positioning of the mdividuals towards the means 0 pro ue IOn. . 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
153 
One must however not misinterpret Lamprecht's emphasis on historic processes 
as being essentialist and teleological, as Marx saw it. According to Lamprecht, historical 
processes, which he calls 'states', are to be regarded as the historical life and not simply as 
preconditions of events. The successful analysis of such states presupposes comparison of 
different historical periods and ages with each other. Lamprecht defines these 'states' as 
the sum of what has existed in the past and what lives on from it. Secondly, this sum of 
what has been continuously created, was brought about by three forces: firstly, the 'general 
will' ('Gesamtwille'), second, the 'general intellect' ('Gesamtintellekt') and finally the 
'general sentiment' (' Gesamtempfindung') of a nation. Lamprecht added that the 
expressions of the 'general will', which are reflected in cultural identity of a nation, are 
somehow more important and consistent than expressions of the 'individual will' of the 
historic personalities.132 This position forms the basis of Lamprecht's argument to justify a 
reading of history as the history of cultural and thereby social states, which is the 
underlying methodological feature in Lamprecht's main work Deutsche Geschichte, which 
took encyclopaedic proportions with its eighteen volumes. 133 
In detail, Lamprecht aimed to focus his historical analysis on the cultural and to an 
extent social psyche of a nation, in particular the German Nation, its cultural realities, 
literature, art, social movements and so forth, since these are the factors that predominantly 
influence and progress history. The potential attractiveness and utility of such an approach 
to support nationalism becomes quickly apparent. 
Lamprecht's method can perhaps be regarded as the first effort to reconcile the 
individual and event-driven reading of history with collective, social and cultural 
phenomena under one roof. This later received the term Historical Sociology, a subject 
which only became popular with the establishment of the social sciences as largely 
independent departments from the historical sciences in the 1950s.134 Yet, despite the 
epistemological difficulties faced in reconciling the two positions, it seems logical to 
assume that Lamprecht's method must at least have had support from nationalistic minded 
academics, given his openly nationalistic attitudes. However, he was unable to gain 
support for his 'third way' - the unique combination of positivism, national liberalism and 
emphasised the steady general development of history, which leaves the individual in the background and 
emphasises in its historic explanation only the 'underlying social and cultural forces'. 
132 See Lamprecht (1 896a) p. 26. . . , " " 
133 First edition appeared between 1891-1909 of which only the first five volumes were CfItlc~lI) re\le\~cd. 
. . . . d about the contfIbutors to the but heavIly cntlclsed. See for example, Below (1898). For a goo summary 
debate around Lamprecht see also Seifert (1925), Engelberg (1965) and Vllkafl (1977) .. 
D4 On a detailed study of the subject matter and its history see Skocpol (1984). 
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materialism. 135 This would seem to imply that amongst Gennan intellectuals, patriotism 
and nationalism was somehow seen as the default or standard position, which earned no 
one an extra bonus in popularity or even protected any scholar from being criticised for 
challenging the established method in the historical sciences - historicism. Whether or not 
Lamprecht really intended to find a compromise between historicism, national liberalism 
and materialism we may never really know, but to pick and chose the best elements of 
these three distinct theories and to create one all-reconciling position does perhaps invite 
malicious and angry responses. 136 It is questionable in any case whether the materialistic 
elements in Lamprecht's theory are not just part of a slightly modified historicist position. 
One could hold against Lamprecht that he simply idealised a certain 'psychological state' 
of a culture, if such a state really exists, whilst the historicist idealised the uniqueness of 
the historic personalities. 
Since Lamprecht did not intend to belittle the importance of the state as the 
highest form of human community, but simply maintained that political history does not 
preside over cultural history and is indeed only part of culture, it seems that Lamprecht's 
emphasis is only different in scope from the historicist approach, and that his 
methodological challenge is nothing more than an expression of a particular political 
agenda. 137 Lamprecht's analysis of those 'general states' was for him solely a matter of 
empirical analysis, which is centred upon the material, social, economic, constitutional and 
bureaucratic peculiarities of a nation. However, even if the analysis of those states can be 
achieved empirically, it is not clear from where those 'general states' are derived and how 
they can be epistemically justified. Lamprecht suggested statistical methods, which 
represented to him the numerical expression of such steady general/generic developments 
in the national culture. One the one hand, Lamprecht insisted on a strictly empirical 
method of investigation and denied any inherent or inborn purpose in human history. On 
the other hand, he seems to accept that history is inherently a continuously progressing 
process. This is itself, however, a presupposition that can hardly be proven purely by 
means of empirical investigation. How can 'inherentness' be proven, if the only means of 
establishing this truth stems from empirical investigation and lies therefore outside the 
object of investigation? One could however argue against this assertion that all Lamprecht 
135 See-Holborn (1952) p. 340. d' .. 
136 It is worth noting that not only in recent years scholars doubted the qualitati ve and deep-routed Itkrence 
. . . A I 1897 Otto Hintze rejected a radICal between Ranke's method and the POSItiViSt movement. sear y as . , _ . 
opposition between idealism and materialism in the philosophy of history. See Hintze (1964) p .. ' I) In 
Oestreich (1969) p. 360. 
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was stating is that there is a tendency which can be emerically observed and highlighted by 
the means of statistics. 
Lamprecht claimed that history does not exhaust itself in a series of single events, 
which are only connected by so called 'universal ideas' incarnated in the minds of 'great 
men', but rather consists in the whole complexity of events that occur as expressions of the 
'general will', the constitution and cultural peCUliarity (e.g. unemployment, urbanisa~ion, 
public health and education of a society). For Lamprecht political event history faces 
primarily the difficulty of showing that certain events are caused by other events outwith 
individualistic motives. The individual motives or the individual will, according to him. 
are only a by- or end-product of history. One could assert that these are presuppositions, 
which are also difficult to prove. It is worth adding that Karl Julius Beloch, Georg von 
Below and even Eduard Meyer acknowledged that the statistical method in cultural and 
economic history had a certain degree of usefulness. As we have seen, Beloch was 
perhaps the least sceptical of all of them. 
With such a view on history and its 'proper' method, it is hard to see any 
compromise or conversion between Lamprecht's method and the traditional event- and 
individual-orientated historiography of historicism. One can say that it was primarily 
Georg von Below's HZ polemic 'Die Neue Historische Methode' (1898) and his lengthy 
and less polemical, but still critical remarks in his 'Problem der Wirtschaftsgeschichte' 
(1920), which destroyed any chance of a meaningful and argumentative dialogue between 
the two sides. Ironically, one of Below's main objections to Lamprecht's method was that 
he failed to acknowledge the possibility of co-existing methods and added that any search 
for new methods in 'science' (in the widest meaning of the word) should take place in the 
context of an open debate. It is interesting to see how the historicist position had 
weakened by the 1920s, although Lamprecht had died five years earlier. At the tum of the 
century neither Meyer nor Beloch, nor Sybel or Droysen would have agreed with Below's 
invitation to an open discussion. 
Due to little sympathy and academic acknowledgement from his colleagues in 
historical studies, Lamprecht turned to sociology and psychology for support. Rather 
swiftly he declared the latter subject the proper basis of historical studies. 138 In the light of 
h '11 d . t R nke tradition widespread conservatism and arrogance amongst t e stl pre omman a . 
perhaps Lamprecht anticipated that his 'new methodology' would not find much serious 
137 Lamprecht (1896/97) p. 27. 
138 Lamprecht (1896/97) p. 77. 
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and lasting support amongst his old colleagues. 139 The use of the statistical method, as 
Below had pointed out in criticism of Lamprecht, was already considered and incorporated 
in historical studies anyway but under the provision of the predominance of political 
history. The development of a new epistemological framework for historical studies was 
seen by Georg von Below not simply as unnecessary but also as potentially damaging to 
historicism, which had already been scratched by the fast progressing natural sciences. 
Below complained that Lamprecht tried to dissociate himself from the historical studies 
and intended to extinguish a methodological independence of the human sciences 
(,Geisteswissenschaften') from the natural sciences ('Naturwissenschaft') by degrading the 
former to be part of the latter. Below poised his readers to resist the threat of strict 
determination i.e. materialism in the historical sciences. According to Below, Lamprecht's 
materialism aimed at the destruction of the authority of the historic fact, the historic 
moment, the personality and its autonomous decision-making and apparently aimed at 
replacing them with pure fiction. Although Lamprecht distanced himself from the 
application of the empirical methodology of the natural sciences to historical studies, 
Below's assertion that the former did indeed follow such a route is apparent from the 
above elucidation of aspects of Lamprecht's method. 140 Below acknowledged that 
statistical calculations may be useful in economic history, but the subject and its methods 
can never aspire to reach priority over the traditional political historical analysis. 
Below's ardour to demolish Lamprecht's 'new method' bore fruit eventually; it 
was exposed to mockery by historians by the end of the 19th century. Lamprecht replied to 
his relentless critics by arguing that a method based on centralised individuality could at 
best be called art but not science, since it does not aim for generalisations, similarities and 
comparability. Lamprecht had to admit that natural sciences and social sciences are 
therefore not entirely different, but share the same belief in the trustworthiness of empirical 
knowledge. Directed against Below, Lamprecht asserted that 'specific detail should only 
be elucidated in order to induce the fundamental, the general and the most abstract in 
history, because the general and most abstract constitutes the truly theoretically and 
scientifically interesting and worth investigating in history' .141 However, as pointed out 
139 Metz even goes so far to regard the rejection of Lamprecht's method amongst the neo-Rankeans a~ 
'instinctively'. See Metz (1979) p. 475. , ' " 
140 La~precht (1896/97) p. 86. The establishment of generalisations and causal relatl~ns III hIstory by 
, , ' ., I I' d th 'free wIll are clearlv ~Ign~ expenment and observatIon and the neglect of the mdlvldua persona Ity an e . 
of a historical method which follows the methodology of the natural sciences, . 1899) 
141 ' " , h H' 'I M th d of Herrn von Below ( p, See Lamprecht's polemIC agamst hIS archenemy. T e Istonca e 0 
6 ff. 
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above, Lamprecht's philosophy, as that of many psychologists, is driven by the ideal of the 
empirical method of observation and experiment as the only possible source of human 
knowledge. However, that 'all truths are of a social-psychological character', needs to be 
proven first before we can deduce any particulars from this premise. 142 
In order to find support and credibility Lamprecht propagated his 'new method' 
extremely valiantly. Since his theory stood and fell with a proof of a 'general social 
consciousness' and unity, to seek its success became for him also a political crusade, which 
he tried to establish academically by creating and chairing the 'Instituts for Kultur- wzd 
Universalgeschichte' at Leipzig in 1909. Politically he declared his full support for the 
nationalist cause by signing the 'Manifesto of the Ninety-Three German Intellectuals to the 
Civilised World' of 1914 and by visiting the German front line only a month before his 
death in March 1915. 143 It becomes clear through his political involvement that the 
utilisation of his historical methodology went hand in glove with Meyer's, Below's and 
Meinecke's efforts to serve the realisation of the nationalistic goals of German politics 
before, during and after World War 1. This might, however, suggest that the ideological 
dimension of the Methodenstreit, which started off as 'political event history' vs. 'cultural 
history' ended entirely as a debate about the question of which factors or aspects of history 
were the most suitable means to achieve the nationalistic and imperialistic ends of German 
politics - 'crown' or German 'Volkstum' (Aryanism).144 This would however not be a fair 
judgement. Methodological and theoretical issues played an important part throughout the 
discussions and the polemic debates, but were often subsumed under the power of such 
completely overwhelming historical events, which could have easily confused even the 
wisest and most optimistic thinker. 
Lamprecht's critique of the method and intellectual vanity of historicism did not 
hit the conservative historical scholarship unprepared. Already leading thinkers of the 
Historical School in NationaLOkonomie, such as Gustav Schmoller (1838-1917) and Lujo 
Brentano (1844-1931) delivered thoughtful and detailed studies in the relatively new field 
142 Lamprecht( 1895) p. 27. , .. 
143 Amongst other subscribers were such famous names as Ernst H~eckl, ~ax ,Planc~. WIlhel~ R~;:gaennd 
Eduard Meyer, Friedrich Meinecke and Gustav von Schmoller who VOiced their dlsco~tort With the I , 
calumnies with which our enemies are endeavouring to stain the honour of Germany \0 her hard struggle ft)r 
, , h ' Th 'j: t d d a high cultural note: 'Have 
eXistence - In a struggle that has been forced on er. e mamles 0 en e on 
, ,- , 'h d ' 'I' d t'on to whom the legan of a faith In us! Believe, that we shall carryon thiS war to teen as a CIVI Ise na I , , , ~ . 
, h h d h es' Soun.:e \\\\ I-Document Goethe, a Beethoven, and a Kant, is just as sacred as ItS own eart s an om, 
Archive. On Meinecke briefly Heuss (1957) pp, 329-330. , ' b t ". 'n hi's' 
I.J.J h L ht' mailer wntmgs u a sO I . Patriotic and Aryan elements can be found throug out amprec s s 
Deutsche Gescllichte. See Lamprecht (1915) and Lamprecht (1886/87) p, 80, 
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of econOffilC and social history which, in contrast to Lamprecht, earned them some 
acknowledgement and status, even amongst the elitist and conservative historicist scholars, 
Both Brentano and Schmoller developed a conception of social policy ('Sozialpolitik') 
within a historical framework and by including economic and social phenomena, which 
later formed an essential part of the basis for Lamprecht's concept of mass-psychology,lot5 
On the other hand, Lamprecht's concept of 'cultural history' was conceived as the anti-
thesis to the political event and individualistic driven method in historical studies,I46 
The Prussian School, and those who stood proudly in its tradition, maintained 
their claim to possess the only viable method of historical analysis and never accepted 
Lamprecht's method as an alternative to idealistic and nationalistic historiography, The 
documentation of the 'Historian Conference' in Innsbruck of 1897 indicates that the 
'Methodenstreit' at the tum of the century became a major debate about the method and 
'Weltanschauung' of historical studies and its historians. From the perspective of 
modernistic epistemological optimism which dominated the tum of the 19th century, one 
could perhaps see Lamprecht's position at best as having been caught out between two 
extreme viewpoints negotiating for its own good. At worst, one could deprive 
Lamprecht's method of any scientific credibility and degrade it as a humorous or sad spell 
in intellectual history. Eventually, both the historicists and the materialist historiography 
accused Lamprecht of dressing up an 'ideology in the gown of a science' .147 For the 
established idealistic historiography, Lamprecht's statistical and mass-psychological 
generalisations endangered the supremacy of the 'great men' and moments in the history of 
nations. For the new materialist historians, like Franz Mehring and Karl Kautsky, 
Lamprecht's social psychology did not withstand the nationalistic and Aryan temptations 
of the bourgeoisie and left Lamprecht still with 'quite a long idealistic ponytail dangling 
down his back.' 148 Although Lamprecht insisted not being viewed as a mediator between 
the two sides, he was eventually drawn into the ideological debates in the run up to the 
World War 1. Lamprecht of course knew only too well that he was not able to escape 
political categorisation. Lamprecht seemed to be sympathetic towards a progressive 
145 Schmoller and Brentano, however, never distance themselves from the importance of the i,ndivldual 
"d' d' I t' f h'on and dIssocIated character of history. Especially Schmoller expressed hIs 1 eas m a very Ip oma IC as 1 
himself from prioritisincr of the empirical method. See Oestreich (1969) p. 355. Some support for 
o h' . K B . d Otto Hintze See Kocka Lamprecht's methodological challenge came from the lstonans urt reysmg an ._ 
(1981) p. 67 ff. For a sketch of Lujo Brentano's position within the Nationa/dkollomie see Heuss (19)7) pp 
270-276, 
146 9) See Metz (197 . 
147 Iggers (1984) p. 29 f. 
148 See Mehring in Oestreich (1969) p,351 n122. 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
159 
intellectual liberalism, similar to that of his colleague and friend, Karl BUcher, which had 
only just started to gain support amongst younger circles of Gennan intellectuals. 
Lamprecht's philosophy allowed reinterpretation of the social phenomena of his times 
under mass-psychological and cultural parameters, without being entirely associated and 
dismissed as a follower of Marxism. 
Lamprecht saw his 'new method' as an opportunity to combine materialism ·and 
idealism with one another under the modernist ideal to achieve scientific, economic and 
social progress. This notion of progress itself is linked to the modernistic understanding of 
history, which benefited the emergence of political economy, sociology and psychology 
and found its most loyal supporters in these subjects. 149 Symptomatic for these sciences 
was the use of 'ideal-types' in order to fonnulate valid historical concepts. The ideal-type 
fonned also an essential part of Max Weber's attempt to conceptualise economic history. 
we shall return to this point in Part III. Lamprecht explained the use of these types in his 
programmatic essay 'What is Cultural History?' 150 Not discussed, however, was the 
question of on what grounds those 'ideal-typical' concepts emerge? The comparative 
method of historical investigation may have the advantage of enquiring 'how things 
became' rather than 'how things really were', but the ideal-typical concepts have to be 
analysed in a historical fashion too. Otherwise, Lamprecht would also be guilty of 
modernising history, not by analogy but by the use of modem concepts. 
As Georg G. Iggers has pointed out correctly, Lamprecht's challenge did not lead 
to a radical reorientation of historical studies. Yet the Lamprechtstreit is extremely 
important for the development of historical studies in Germany and in the Western 
World. 151 Unfortunately, this debate on historiographical method faced the same fate as the 
BUcher-Meyer Controversy; it did not reach a satisfactory solution or even a conclusion, 
but rather faded out and was eventually discontinued. Beyond this perhaps unfortunate 
development, the Methodenstreit offers a viable explanation as to why BUcher's 
comparative method of history, which carries elements of ideal-typical concept formation 
and a notion of historical progress that was essential to his theory of economic history, 
faced such harsh opposition from Meyer and Beloch not only in its historiographical detail 
but also in its methodology and ideological link to Lamprecht. 152 
149 See Iggers (1973) on progress in history. 
150 Lamprecht(l896/97) p. 82. 
151 3 ) Iggers (1984) p. 1. . h' b' Lam recht. which 
15_ BUcher's use of the ideal types was however more mfluenced by Rodbertus t an) Pp I 1 .. 
.. dB" h' j: rences to Rodbertus. See art .. 11. 
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A short spell of popularity of Lamprecht's ideas at the beginning of the 1930s 
found its end with the take-over of National Socialism in 1933, which put Germany's 
historians again under heavy political duty. 153 In some way, it is surprising that 
Lamprecht's' Aryanism' and notion of 'collective consciousness' rose to a higher degree 
of popularity under Hitler. Although Lamprecht's emphasis on the material and 
psychological forces in history did not stand directly against the ideology of National 
Socialism, it was surely against the presupposed supremacy and dominance of the historic 
individual, the Fuhrer. 
Besides the above mentioned ideological reasons, Faulenbach has argued that the 
'German historiography - unlike the American - had already reached its full shape at the 
beginning of the high-capitalistic age and it was therefore probably easier for the non-
German historiography to explore new ways' .154 We see that this argument is rather weak, 
but what Faulenbach is probably trying to say is that a fully developed and established 
theory is less likely to adopt changes and accept methodological challenges. 
It is also worth considering the unsatisfactory outcome of the Lamprechtstreit and 
its influence on other subjects in social and economic history. Similar disputes in America 
and France (around Turner and Lacombe) strengthened the position of social and economic 
history in both countries, but a reorientation of the German historiographical method did 
not happen until after Second World War. 155 Lamprecht's lack of accomplishment amongst 
the German historiography is surprising when compared to his success in France and the 
Anglo-Saxon world. Here, perhaps due to the advancement of positivism and its influence 
on political economy and sociology, Lamprecht's 'new method' found considerable 
support. For example, Teggart's and Marvin's 'cultural morphology' is strongly 
influenced by Lamprecht. 156 Support came also from parts of the Vienna Circle who were 
forced to flee to the US.I57 
All in all the Lamprechtstreit, regardless of all its public interest and intensity, has 
not enabled the BUcher-Meyer Controversy to reach a solution, or come to an acceptable 
compromise; the rift between the scholars became even greater due to this conflict. 
153 More sympathetic towards Lamprecht's 'Kulturgeschichte' were sociologists, economists and ancient 
historians. The influence, which Lamprecht's ideal-typical and universal method had on other scholars \\ ho 
are more directly connected to the BUcher-Meyer Controversy shall be elucidated in the chapters part III on 
Max Weber and Johannes Hasebroek. 
154 Faulenbach (1980) p. 90. 
155 See Schulze (1974) p. 48 f. 
156 See Metz (1979) p. 475. 
157 On Lamprecht's influence on Karl Popper, for example. see Agassi (1963). 
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However, the philosophical and methodological differences in both stances became more 
obvious due to the apparent ideological and methodological disagreements. 
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4. Windelband and Rickert 
1. The Rediscovery of Kant 
It has been argued that at the end of last century for a German intellectual, idealist 
philosophy was some kind of second nature; almost innate and pervasive in all aspects of 
thought and culture. Hughes argued that 'Kant...remained the dominant formative 
influence on the German mind' until the 1950s. Hegel too 'had built his doctrine from an 
idealist premise that the ultimate reality of the universe lay in 'spirit' or 'idea' rather than 
in mere data or sense perception.'158 Most Hegelians would interpret 'Geist' as the social 
form most adequate to people's needs. A more popular view towards the end of the 19th 
century understood the appearance of 'spirit' (Geist) as a realisation of practical reasoning 
on the grounds of German patriotism, which formed a unity of purpose into one unifying 
world historical context. This interpretation brought Ranke and Hegel closer together 
regarding the political dimension of their historiography. With the 'rediscovery' of Kant, 
their idealistic philosophy formed at least an important vehicle for the continuation of the 
idealist and historicist traditions. Whilst historicism still exercised a strong influence onto 
the Geisteswissenschaften, it also was a pervasive attitude found amongst the aristocracy 
and the upper bourgeoisie. In tum the Anglo-French tradition relied much more on the 
validity of empirical procedures and the supremacy of the sense perceptions as the only 
credible sources of knowledge, a method which is also often used as a simple line of 
defence for the system of Western democracy, utilitarianism and the conception of 
universal (empirical) science in methodology and epistemology.159 However, as we have 
seen above, it is not helpful for a detailed understanding of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
to blame the bitterness of this dispute on generalisations such as the 'German soul' vs 
'Anglo-Saxon positivism.' Such categorisations still feature amongst academics and the 
populist media nowadays, resulting in a deep misunderstanding and fostering intellectual 
snobbery and ignorance on both sides. 
However, it would be equally wrong not to point out the considerable differences 
betw~en the influence of what is often referred to as German idealism. and also the 
1~ 83 Hughes (1959) p. 1 . 
159 Demandt (1998) p. 88. 
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application of the empirical method in sociology and political economy in Britain, America 
and France. As stated earlier, the idealisation of scientific and technological progress 
considerably affected the supremacy of the historical scholarship over the natural sciences 
negatively. We also noted Germany's quest to address and resolve the 'national' and the 
'social question' and the patriotic involvement of its historians. Although it is not quite 
clear why after the era of German Idealism, which is perhaps marked with Hegel's death in 
1831, the interest in philosophy at Germany's universities was dramatically in decline, it is 
widely accepted that for more than fifty years (until the 1880s) historians (mainly from 
Prussia) and no longer philosophers, enjoyed academically and politically elevated status. 
It was not until the late 19th century that a renewed interest emerged in Kant's 
epistemology and moral theory, which helped philosophy as an academic discipline back 
into popularity.160 Wilhelm Windelband (1844-1915) and his pupil Heinrich Rickert (1863-
1936) were primarily responsible for this revival. 
It is certainly true that very few historians during their period of relative academic 
supremacy devoted detailed studies into their own methodology and the philosophy of 
history in general. I61 Part of the swift and arrogant rejection of Lamprecht's and BUcher's 
position was indeed a certain philosophical ignorance or unwillingness to engage critically 
with elements of opposing philosophical traditions. 
Windelband and Rickert though, the leading figures of the 'Southwest German 
School' in philosophy CSiidwestdeutsche Schule'), together with Hermann Cohen (1842-
1918), Paul Natorp (1854-1924) and Ernst Cassirer (1874-1945) of the 'Marburg School', 
attempted to establish a solid philosophical defence line in order to develop Kant's 
idealistic paradigm of an epistemological difference between the human sciences and the 
natural sciences. 162 By doing so they formed the neo-Kantian movement, which was able to 
resist the generalisations of positivism and to further Kant's search for a priori 
transcendental conditions, the epistemological categories of morality, art and history. 
Every scientific concept formation attempts to make generalisations for a 
particular end or purpose. The historic concept formation must therefore be different from 
the concepts and method employed in the natural sciences, since both subjects follow a 
160 .,' d b th bl' atI'on of the 'Kant Studicn' in The renewed mterest lOto Kant's phIlosophy was supporte y e pu IC 
- , 'I'b 0 th h'storv and lenaev of the 1896, which is now a standard journal for almost every um verslty I rary, n e I. ~. 
'Kant-Studien' see Funke (1996), 
161 Finley (1984) p, 265, , ' I L' k Ba ch Cohn 
162 The neo-Kantian 'movement' is by no means a homogenous phIlosophIcal schoo, 0 as . 'vu : 0 0d : 
, ' 't' and elaboratIOn 01 !'I.ant :-, leas Zocher and Homgswald are also part of thIS movement. The lOterpreta IOn 0 II 0 0 0' Id) 
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different purpose. One might assert that biology, for example, also inquires into the world 
of human affairs since it also investigates human life. However, biology investigates only 
the material or natural preconditions of life, but not the diverse world of human actions. 
For Paul Natorp the existence of the human will is signalled via the existence of such 
different scientific ends (,Zwecke ').163 It is not our purpose to outline the different stances 
and the diversity of the neo-Kantian movement. It is primarily relevant to highlight the 
fact that Windelband and Rickert maintained and argumentatively supported the historicist 
claim that scientific historical investigation stems from a different 'theoretical interest' 
than the value free and empirically generalising method of the natural sciences or 
utilitarain and emotivists theories of human action. 164 
Rickert tried to show in his work 'Cultural Science and Natural Science'165 of 
1899 and in his 'Limits of the Concept Formation in the Natural Sciences' in 1902166 that 
on the grounds of Kant's transcendental categories, the individual should remain the object 
of historical inquiry and not the so called underlying general and material processes. 167 
Rickert accused Lamprecht of idealising 'the stomach instead of the human mind' as the 
dominant motive of action. 168 Rickert's and Windelband's stance, which is very similar to 
Below's, maintained that positivistic and naturalistic tendencies in historical studies 
remove the individual from the stage of history and reduce the subject merely to an object 
of speculation and naturalistic determinism. Again such critical comments reflect the 
general situation in academia and amongst the educated public. The natural sciences and 
their empirical method received increased interest at the tum of the century and were 
believed to present the 'true form of science.' 169 This optimistic view that scientific 
invention equals progress in all other spheres of human life from art to morality, is perhaps 
most potent in respect of the purpose of the World Exhibitions. Modernity put its faith into 
the healing forces of world trade, commerce and technology and continued to pursue the 
enlightenment dream of governing the forces of nature and universe with technology. The 
main intellectual difference between the progressive spirit embodied in the Paris exhibition 
of 1900 and the enlightenment ideals of Hegel, for example, was primarily a spiritual one. 
163 See Natorp (1913) p. 22. 
164 See Oakes (1989). 
165 See Rickert (1899). 
166 See Rickert (1902). 
167 RiCKert (1981) p.41-58. . . ,ts 
168 Rickert (1899) p. 60 f. See also Rickert (1902) 'The problem of the historical concept tormatlon con~l~ 
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Hence, it must have been a great relief to the supporters of the supremacy of 
historicism that Rickert and Windelband formulated a philosophical defence of its 
methodology.170 Both reformulated the methodology of the historicist tradition, but also 
distanced themselves critically from Ranke and the Prussian School. History as an 
expression of divine ideas, as in Ranke, or history as an extension of guiding political 
ideas, as expressed in the German-Prussian nation state, in Droysen, Treitschke and Sybel. 
appeared to Rickert and Windelband as rather irrational doctrines. Both were in parti~ular 
critical of the selection of what was historically 'important' and 'unique', which placed the 
historian with his particular Weltanschauung at the centre of historical evaluation. 
Subjectivity and individuality were centrally important to Rickert and Windelband, which 
constituted an important move away from Ranke's attempt to grasp 'how it really was'. 
However, when Hughes argues that the irrational or subjective values of the historian 
suddenly played a part in the considerations of the historian, then we have to remember 
that the historicist movement away from Ranke was rather gradual and not swift. 171 In 
addition one should not be mistaken about the fact that historians prior to Windelband and 
Rickert, in particular Ranke, did not completely deny the involvement of the historian's 
value system in the interpretation of the historical event. Amongst all historicists Droysen 
dissociated himself most clearly from any attempt to gain an 'objective picture' of the 
historical event and stressed instead that historical 'Verstehen' (reflective understanding) 
must include awareness of the problem of the individual judgement or the value system of 
the historian, which, however, did not mean an independence from the political questions 
of his time.172 One cannot deny though that Ranke's idealism was founded on the belief 
that the divine or leading political ideas are capable of guiding the historian to an adequate 
understanding of the material. The proof of the existence and scope of such ideas remains, 
however, the main problem for Ranke. 
170 See Georg von Below's remark in Steinberg (1925) p. 15. 'By reading Rickert's writing I had a feeling of 
. d' h' h I + It rona though anyway but I was happiness to be liberated from the threat of preJu Ices, w IC Ie as w 0 '. ', . .,. ' 
- . h ' d R' 'kerfs "lImits With hiS 
unable to deduce their wrongs to the last mstance. In t at sense expenence Il 
stance against positivism and naturalism with joy [and] poetry of life.' 
171 Hughes (1959)~. 180. . b'ective atriotic ethos of the 
172 Quite the opposite was the case. Droysen and also Sybel emphaSised the su ~ P _ _ , 
. . . 'H' ··k· D mandt (1998) p. 96 n)5. n)~ historian. See also Hitler's appreciatIOn for Droysen s lstoll m e 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
166 
ii. Windelband's 'Ideography' and 'Nomothetik' 
In his Principal Inaugural Speech of 1894 in Strasbourg, Windelband pointed out 
that his contemporaries still seemed to distinguish between the 'theoretical interest' 
philosophy and mathematics as the ' ... "rational" ... ' sciences, on the one hand and the 
'empirical sciences' (,Erfahrungswissenschaften'), on the other. 173 According' to 
Windelband mathematics and philosophy do not deal with one particular or a mass of sense 
perceptions and their categorisation under general empirical laws. This difference in the 
theoretical interest led to the commonly used distinction between human sciences 
(,Gesiteswissenschaften ') and natural sciences ('Naturwissenschaft'), which was firmly 
emphasised by Descartes, Spinoza, Schelling and Hegel. 'As far as I can sense the 
atmosphere within current philosophy and judge the aftermath of the epistemological 
critique it is not anymore self-evident that the difference between the empirical sciences 
and the 'rational' sciences are so fundamental as to justify such a differentiation.' 174 
Nevertheless, an important difference remains. The so-called natural sciences aim for the 
discovery of general laws, which allow us to quantify and explain repeatable phenomena. 
Windelband called them 'law-sciences'. With regard to their methodology the 'law 
sciences' are called 'nomothetic'. Historical studies and the so-called human sciences, on 
the other hand, are predominantly aim to find an adequate description of the particular 
phenomenon or event. Windelband calls them therefore 'event sciences' or 'ideographic' 
sciences with difference between the two methods lying in their objects of inquiry.175 The 
method used in psychology does not simply hold a middle position between the two, but is 
according to Windelband concerned with the epistemological object of the ideographic 
sciences, but employs for its descriptions the nomothetic methodology. 'Ideographie' 
makes particular predications over singular or particular events or objects. 'Nomothetik' 
formulates common predications over x amount of objects or events. 176 The character of the 
object of inquiry and the interest of the researcher lead then to two different methods of 
mqUIry. 
Linguistics is used as an example by Windelband to demonstrate that even the 
human sciences formulate or aim at the discovery of general laws or principles - in this 
173 See Windelband (1904) p. 4 f. 
174 Windelband (1904) p. 5. 
175 Windelband (19040 p. 6. 
176 See Demandt (1998) p. 94. 
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example, grammatical structures and rules. In tum, for example, biology may analyse the 
nature of a specific type of animal as a unique phenomenon in its particular time and place. 
It seems then that the distinction between what is the 'law-like ever continuous' ('das 
gesetzmiij3ig Immergleichen'), and what is in its character formation unique ('das 
gestalthaft Einmaligen') depends on the judgement of the observer. The form of the 
scientific inquiry is then not so much influenced by the object of investigation itself, but by 
the purpose or interest of the explanation, which is relative to what the scientist puts on his 
agenda. 177 That is to say, every object or event can be described scientifically in two 
separate ways. Biology as the 'science of the organic nature' is of a 'nomothetic character' 
when it focuses on biological recurrences. 178 In its systematic character it aims at the 
discovery of the existence of causal connections between biological phenomena. For 
example, if the winter season starts to set in, squirrels tend to collect nuts and other food to 
survive the cold period to come. By explaining the phenomenon with a set of instincts or 
reflexes, which all mammals have in common to some degree, we are using the 
'nomothetik' method. However, if the scientist views the entire phenomenon or process of 
development of the squirrel as something unique to this species only, the scientist would 
follow 'ideographic' method. 'Already Kant, as he constructed the concept of the modem 
theory of evolution, ahead of everyone else, called the person who would follow this 
"adventure of reason", the future "archaeologist of nature" ... >179 It seems that for 
Windelband the distinction between history and philosophy, on the one hand, and physics 
and biology, on the other hand, is entirely dependent on the attitude of the scientist to the 
object. If we take Kant's quote seriously and add Windelband's division of all human 
scientific inquiry into nomothetic and ideographiuc knowledge, then the paradigm of 
German idealism does not appear to be as solid as the Prussian School and Meyer deemed 
it to be. One could lapse into the cynical view that all the 'fuss' about the ontological strict 
distinction between 'Geisteswissenschaften' and 'Naturwissenschaften' and even more the 
superiority of the former over the latter in its shape of political event history, was created 
in order to support and advance PrussianiGerman political agenda. Yet, this would be a 
premature conclusion, which would not strictly follow from what we have outlined so far. 
Windelband only drew an epistemological distinction between the Geistes- and 
Naturwissesnchaften, which is dependent on the research interests of the scientists and his 
177 Windelband (1904) p. 7. 
178 See Windelband (1904) p. 7. 
179 Windelband (1904) p. 7. 
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definition of the object of enquiry. Human kind and nature or Geist and Natur do not exist 
as two separate ontological qualities. 
Windelband's claim that both methods or modes of investigation (ldeograplzie 
and Nomothetik) have to develop scientific ways of classifying observations and 
experiences is very plausible; he calls this 'scientific critique >ISO, with which the trained 
historian is capable of making an educated decision as to whether or not a certain fragment 
stems indeed from Aristotle's hand, or how an astronomer has to be able to learn to 
distinguish between stars and planets. The microbiologist has to learn his art of how to 
search for a suitable object of inquiry when looking through his test results, say to find and 
isolate a cancer cell. Those scientific skills are learned and influenced by the methods and 
stimuli of the previous scholarship, which a young scientist has to learn. Logic has its 
office in scientific critique, but as Windelband admits, has not had the same influence over 
the ideographic sciences as it had over the nomothetic method or mode of investigation. 
Windelband refers here to the success in such fields as precision tools, experimental 
procedures and the probability theory. The deficiencies in philosophy and history are 
excused in that it would 'lie in the nature of things, as history has confirmed, that 
philosophical and natural scientific ['naturwissenschaftlich '] vocations and achievements 
concur much more frequent than the philosophical and historical [vocations].' lSI The 
validity of this generalisation is rather dubious. It also seems that if indeed the difference 
between history and biology, for example, only lies with the evaluation and use of the facts 
(,Tatsachen '), then this could leave the scientists with only a subjective (or inter 
subjective) basis of scientific critique. It may be true, as Windelband maintains, that the 
natural scientist is only interested in a particular object or sample as it represents a certain 
type or concept with which we comprehend it under a general law or principle. However, 
that the historian has the task to 'revive a particular event of the past in its own peculiar 
individuality and to recall it into our ideal present, is not far off Ranke's programmatic 
invocation 'how it really was'. Abstraction may be the virtue or rigor of the biologist, but 
the historian should give the most lively illustration possible of what happened in the past. 
Winde1band concludes that this constitutes a relationship and explain the close proximity 
between aesthetics, history and poetry.IS2 
ISO Windelband (1904) p. 8. 
lSI Windelband (1904) p. 8. 
IS2 See Windelband (190-+) p. 9. 
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However, no matter how appealing Windelband tries to make his distinction, it 
does not solve the problem of the definition of historical critique or critique of sources. 
That an even 'educated', 'normal' or 'common sense consciousness' ('Nonnalbewuj3sein ') 
can 'mislead' us, proceeds from the fact that our norms or what we call 'rational or moral 
common sense' is educated and influenced by a specific and political value system, which 
constitutes conditions of ideographic specialisation and even nomothetic generalisations in 
respect of the theoretical purpose of the investigation. On what grounds, we may ask, 
should the historian regard an event as important? By what means should he illustrate this 
importance? This takes us again very close to the central problem of the BUcher-Meyer 
Controvers y. 
Nevertheless, Windelband's ideographic versus nomothetic distinction highlights 
an interesting crux. According to Windelband, BUcher and Meyer must both be using 
'Ideographie' and 'Nomothetik', only the proportion of their use in the scientific 
propositions is different. To judge the 'economy' of ancient Athens during the classical 
period compared to modem times as 'primitive' or 'modem' means to treat it as a 
phenomenon or peculiarity and is therefore employing the 'ideographic' mode. BUcher's 
method is surely 'nomothetic' in the sense that he uses the ancient economy as a sample to 
elucidate his theory of economic stages - the law-like course of economic development. 
Meyer, on the other hand, follows the 'ideographic' mode of investigation by concentrating 
on the importance of the event and the importance of the personality in ancient history and 
its economy. 183 At the same time though Meyer makes claims about the circular 
development of civilisations, beginning with its rise and development, achieving its 
cultural climax and material prosperity and ending up in its decline. Here he must admit to 
Windelband that he also makes a law-like generalisation and hence shows a nomothetic 
cognitive interest in history. According to Windelband, the methods of gathering human 
knowledge ['Ideographie' and 'Nomographik'] are not of the same kind, but influence one 
another nevertheless. 'Both together cause and explain the event, but neither is the result 
of the former; their connection is not found amongst them.' 184 To judge the 'economy' of 
ancient Athens during the Classical period as compared to modem times as 'primiti ve' or 
'modem' is nomothetic as long as we are aiming to make a generalisation of the specific. 
According to Windelband, the events of the past can never be truly reconstructed or 
repeated. To grasp what changes or develops, we need to have a fixed viewpoint for our 
183 e.g. Meyer's 'Hanibal' in Meyer (1910). 
184 Windelband (1904) p. 13. 
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observation. In order to highlight what remains unchanged we need to contrast it with 
what has developed in order to be able to historically analyse human rationality against the 
law-like nature of nature, which remains unchanged. 185 
Later Windelband's classification became important for Max Weber, who 
incorporated and attempted to supersede the epistemological difference between the two 
methods by constructing the 'Idealtypos' in order to add a possible solution to the problem 
of interpretation and method, which both Bucher and Meyer were unable to solve by 
themselves. However, Windelband's weakly defined notion of 'rational common sense' 
does not solve the problem of the appropriate proportion of cognitive interest in the 
nomothetic and ideographic elements. All Windelband was able to show was that history 
exists in the form of selected facts and values by the historian. If this were true, history 
would ultimately remain subjective or culturally relative. Hence, the neo-Kantian attempt 
to safeguard the objective character of history would have failed. However, Windelband 
argued that the process of selection of those events, values and 'memories' is not an 
arbitrary process. Windelband tried to guarantee that is not culturally relative The 
historian is therefore not guided solely by his own subjective values, desires and wishes, 
but guided by the self-manifestation of important historic processes which he grasped as 
evidently historically relevant and important. In close relation to the Prussian School, 
Windelband argued that what is really historical are those events which had an impact on 
history, those personalities which played an important part in history's course, and those 
nations which stood out and left a mark on the 'big stage of world history', not just those 
who come and gO.186 Such a statement does not lead us any further. The 'danger of 
subjectivity' still persists, since it does not automatically answer a possible disagreement 
about what we may call the 'big stage' and what leaving a mark means. In order to solve 
the problem, Windelband introduces some kind of general task of human history, 
something mankind should as it were 'live up to', which is so to say in mankind's nature. 
He claims, that 'history is therefore the process with which the task of humanity, perhaps 
in a slowly growing amount is fulfilled.' This task is to develop a 'vemiinftigen 
Gesamtsinn' (,collective common sense').187 Here we see indeed how close together 
Windelband and Lamprecht came. Windelband unlike his pupil Heinrich Rickert, did not 
185 See Demandt (1998) 94 f. 
186 Windelband (1916) p. 39 f. 
187 Windelband (1916) p. 57. 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 171 
create a metaphysics of values, as Viikari has maintained. 188 Viikari would ha\e to justify 
the view that the development of such a 'verniinftigen Gemeinsinn' is not a certain value 
but a matter of fact. Furthermore, Windelband assumes that mankind aspires to this task to 
create a 'verniinftigen Gemeinsinn', that human history is something which is ongoing. 
One wonders why, according to Windelband, is the biological development of mankind 
finalised and only a spiritual furthering is possible? Windelband was contradicting the 
scientific evidence of his time, but seemed to suggest here that real becoming or self-
realisation in history is solely a spiritual and not a physical or biological task. That is to 
say, history is for him something solely applicable to the spirit ('Geist') of mankind and 
not to nature. The roots of Windelband's philosophy in German idealism are now clearly 
visible. 
188 Viikari (1977) p. 437. 
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iii. Rickert and the Problem of Historical Concept Formation 
Despite many similarities between Heinrich Rickert and his friend and teacher, 
Wilhelm Windelband, both influenced the German historical scholarship in their own 
distinctive way. Their work is particularly relevant for Max Weber's interpretation of the 
economy and the society of antiquity described in ideal-types. Whilst the discussions 
about the academic and political importance of ancient history and the debate over the 
scientific method in historical studies were both still ongoing,189 the younger Rickert did 
not, as Demandt formulated recently, 'overlook the point of the contact between the 
ideographic and nomothetic generalisation' ,190 but rather extended Windelband's thesis in 
order to reinstate history as a proper science. 191 Demandt's concerns are directed towards 
the remaining (above) problem regarding the appropriate viewpoint of the historian. If we 
leave method and the selection of the material to the disposal of the historian, might then 
one read into an event whatever one wishes? Windelband did however not hold a 
relativistic position, but perhaps invited such incorrect interpretation. 
Rickert addressed the problem of SUbjectivity in historical interpretation more 
directly then Windelband. According to the former, history does not exhaust itself in 
relativism and despair due to the difficulties with a formal definition of Windelband's 
concept of 'normative consciousness', which somehow intuitively and through industrious 
acquisition of skills guides the historian to know what to look for when he studies the 
sources. For Rickert it is not so much the classification or the cognitive interest which lies 
at the heart of the old distinction between the human and the natural sciences, but more 
the problem of the scientific concept formation In the 'Geistes-' and 
'Naturwissenschaften '. This concept formation is however only possible if the 
terminology is adequate and valid. In order to achieve this, Rickert attempted to develop 
Windelband's epistemological distinction between the world of human affairs and the 
world of nature by protecting it against the almost inevitable relativistic interpretation, 
which is tied up with the historicity or temporality of the values of the judging historian. 
Rickert suggests that certain values are transcendental and form moral 
imperatives for both the historian and the natural scientist. The universal validity and 
189 A oood overview about the course of the discussion from the perceptive of the idealistic hl~lonogrJphy is 
t> 
presented by Schieder (1959) esp. pp. 37-63. 
190 Demandt (1998) p. 94. 
191 Rickert (1902) p. 190. 
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objectivity of the laws of nature presuppose that certain judgements are generally valid 
('geltend'). This applies to history as well, since we can equally feasibly assume the 
existence of absolute values in history, which create a different stance or disagreement 
about a certain event - some scientists may follow their particular professional ethos with 
more commitment and discipline than others, for example. This kind of 'metaphysics of 
values' i.e. their objective existence was not the only step towards a 'cultural-scientific 
world view' Ckulturwissenschaftliche Weltanschauung') put forward by Rickert. ln 
Rickert's essential building block was the claim that neither the natural sciences nor the 
historical or cultural sciences are aimed at making true statements about the world, but are 
rather aimed at the validity of presuppositions in respect of a particular scientific interest. 
The difference between the two types of SCIences (the 'Geistes-' and 
'Naturwissenschaften') does not lie in the contradiction between body and mind, between 
the material and the spiritual world, but in a distinctly different way of forming scientific 
historical concepts. Rickert argued that the concept formation of the natural sciences, 
which is very much based on the qualifying method of a physical or mathematical 
explanation of nature, always has some relevance for the world of human affairs, 
especially with regard to past or future usefulness of the scientific description. 
As we pointed out with respect to Windelband, the natural sciences aimed at 
forming concepts about the general. That is to say, the only aspects of an object which are 
important are those which are part of the specific qualification of what makes it part or a 
suitable sample of a species. History, on the other hand, deals with the history of cultures 
and only with natural phenomena in so far they had an observable influence on the course 
of cultures or the occurrence of historical events. Although Rickert acknowledges that the 
natural sciences are capable of forming conclusions about social and cultural nature or the 
destiny of our existence, 'the empirical reality can also be expressed under a different 
point of view, apart from the point that it is nature. 'It [reality] becomes nature when we 
consider it with respect for the general; it [reality] becomes history when we consider it 
with respect of the particular'193 The natural sciences are in the quest for the general, a 
kind of general law or rule, under which they can summarise or theorise and also predict 
our perceptions of reality. On the other hand, history searches for reality in the particular. 
The p~rticular must then be the object of a kind of representation of history. 
192 Rickert (1899) p. 67. 
193 Rickert (1902) 25..J.. 
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For Rickert, the place of history is the world of human affairs, our interaction and 
political involvement. That is of course not to say that no kind of life science has any part 
in the world of human affairs or that history does not playa part in the exploration of 
nature. Rickert rather rejects the aspect of August Conte's claim that human civilisation 
follows certain laws of development, which are derived from nature and its descriptive 
empirical laws (evolution).194 We see that it is not a strict separation of the world of 
human affairs and the world of nature, which forces a difference between the two types of 
sciences, but the distinction between the two scientific realms lies the objects of inquiry 
that each science pursues. This clearly separates Rickert's approach from the radical 
differentiation of the natural world from the historical world as advocated by the 
Neapolitan visionary, Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) in the seventeenth century and 
clearly pursued in the neo-Humanism of Herder and Goethe in the late eighteenth 
century.195 Rickert argued that these two types of sciences differed only in the methods to 
be employed in research. 
By operating within the Kantian framework, Rickert made no effort to separate 
the two sciences logically in terms of their object, but only methodologically. The 
question Rickert faced was how historical knowledge is possible when we don't seek 
empirically verifiable generalisations. The key to solving this problem lies in the 
difference in the scientific concept formation. We can only talk intelligently about objects 
and processes by bringing them under 'valid concepts' ('geltende Begriffe '), argued 
Rickert. Whenever we undertake to describe a historical event or a physical process we 
need to agree on the valid concepts which we use for the description. The object itself can 
never be a concept. Reality is the precondition of concept formation. Each concept is 
therefore only an abstraction of an aspect of reality. Reality is therefore always 
ontologically richer then its concepts, which are merely abstractions and bear only a 
logical connection to reality. Valid concept formation constitutes a precondition for 'true' 
knowledge. 196 
History, on the other hand, deals with the problem of individual concept 
formation. Thus, Rickert concludes, in the historical sciences it is not individuality in 
itself which has epistemic value (Wert), but whether we are able to arrive at valid 
conclusions and form valid concepts. However, if we regard individuality solely as reality 
194 Rickert (1902) 206. 
195 See Berlin (1976). I . I tad' ,tion between 
196 See Lask (1914). Lask was one of Rickert's pupils and pointed out first the oglca con r II 
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we cannot comprehend it in its entirety, but only through conceptualisation. There is no 
doubt, because of the distance between object and the observer, that we can never say 
with complete certainty that a particular event took place in a particular course, but we can 
make true statements about the valid use of historical concepts. This leaves a gap not 
between different objects of investigation but between the irrational character of reality 
and the attempted rationality of concept formation. Reality can never be deduced from a 
concept. 
The epistemological dualism between concept and reality emerged first in the 
philosophy of the German idealist, Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1816), as the so called 
biatus irrationalis, which was taken up by Rickert's pupil, Emil Lask (1875-1915).197 The 
laws of physics are then only rational conclusions from a theory of concepts but never of 
reality itself. Since events do not follow a strict logical course and can occur by accident, 
and since history, according to Rickert, carries a more or less significant element of free 
will, history and its personalities can never be brought under general rules. But how is 
historical knowledge possible if such a biatus irrationalis, the dualism between concept 
and reality, exists? One solution would be to attempt to close the gap and resolve the 
epistemological conflict between concept and reality as Hegel and Herder tried to do. 
This influential neo-Humanist enlightenment conception of history, in which the historical 
flux and diversity are subordinated to universal standards aims to view each age "in its 
own terms" and to presuppose that history constitutes an organic and dialectical process 
which connects the ages with one another. 198 Rickert used the biatus irrationalis as one of 
his presuppositions in order to demonstrate how historical knowledge is possible despite 
this obstacle. 
Rickert introduces five steps in the chain of reasoning in order to show the 
possibility of historical knowledge. They are grounded in a) the phenomenology of 
reality, b) the critique of epistemological realism, c) an epistemological theory of 
cognitive interest and concepts, d) a theory of concept formation in the natural sciences 
and e) the demarcation criterion between natural sciences and historical studies. 199 It is not 
necessary to outline Rickert's lengthy and quite sophisticated theory in detail in order to 
show to what degree it supported aspects of the historicist position and in what way it 
concept and reality. 
197 Oakes in Rickert (1986) p. xvi, , ' f' ~1 
198 ' 'fi 'tl th ethodo\oojcal wntInGs 0 ;, ever, Heae!'s philosophy of history had no slgm ICant In uence on e m c c.-
b , h'l h " - not rediscovered until Lu(a~, Bucher and Weber. Some authors even argue that Hegel s p I osop Y \\ as . 
Adorno and Horckheimer. See Wilkins (1974). 
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became influential on the philosophy of history of Max Weber. Regarding the former 
criterion, Rickert does not insist on the historicist ontological distinction between nature 
and history and their sciences. His criterion is rather based on a so called 'axiological' 
separation of the natural and the historical sciences in the sense that it expresses an 
irreducible difference in their theoretical values, which then reqUIre a different 
conceptualisation of reality.20o This difference in the concept formation follows the 
different interests of the scientist. The natural scientist is more engaged in the 
establishment of valid abstract generalisations, which increasingly dispense with the 
individual or the particular sample. Its importance is subsumed under the general law or 
physical principle. The historical sciences, on the other hand, aim to contemplate the 
individual in its historic importance or value which it has as a unique object or event for 
us. Viewed in such a fashion, historical studies deal with the conceptualisation of reality, 
the comprehension of causes of events, the historical accident and the free will in human 
agency and are therefore also concerned with the irrationality of the reality of human life. 
Rickert makes the methodological difference between the two sciences clear by using 
Georg Simmel's distinction between 'science of concept relations' 
(,Begriffswissenschaft') and science of reality (,Wirklichkeitswissenschaft').201 Any 
science if it has the pretension to be taken seriously will create concepts, but the 
difference between the natural sciences and the historical studies seems to lie in the 
vicinity of reality. We must conclude then that the more abstract and logical the science 
of physics is, for example, the more sophisticated is this academic subject. The more 
empathic, but nevertheless logical, historical studies are, the deeper is the understanding 
of the particular historical phenomenon or event. That the historian, like the physicist, is 
ever able to comprehend and reconstruct an event in all its entirety stems from the biatlls 
irrationalis. This was also acknowledged by Meyer, who perhaps at a less sophisticated 
level maintained that the historian should create valid analogies, but remained unclear as 
to what constitutes 'valid' .202 
If logic should prevail in historical studies too, one needs to ask on what basis 
should the historian form and employ concepts that are rational and are capable of an 
adequate description of an irrational world. That irrational world is constituted by the 
pec,uliar actions of the individual agent. Following Windelband, Rickert saw personality 
199 See Oakes in Rickert (1986) p. xvii ff. 
200 See Oakes in Rickert (1986) p. xxii f. 
201 See Simmel (1977) p. See also the introduction by Oakes to Simmel (1977) 
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or individuality as the focus of all historical knowledge. Every human being is unique and 
by being so, it is also clear that all human beings are all potentially historic personalities. 
Nevertheless, the historian does not judge all human beings as having had the same actual 
historical status or importance. If one would do so, individuality would be subsumed 
under an idea of human history, as the history of the masses whereby every personality 
would be reduced to a single grain of sand in a pile. History as an academic discipline is 
concerned with the importance of individual decision making. The question remains 
though, what are the exact criteria by which we judge an individual as a suitable object for 
historical enquiry? Given that individuality is indeed this reality, it is not possible to 
decide which individuality is worth. If we treat individuality as a general phenomenon 
then history is merely anthropology, which uses the particular personality as a sample to 
establish the general course of development of mankind under evolutionary 
presuppositions. 
Rickert's concern that this is a misrepresentation of the proper task of historical 
investigation goes hand in hand with previous, though perhaps less sophisticated attacks, 
by Meyer and the Prussian School against materialistic and positivistic approaches in 
historiography, which started to gain increasing popularity amongst liberals and socialists. 
Rickert explained their epistemological interest in the material and socio-material forces 
in society on the basis of their idealisation of democracy and socialism as their 'guiding 
cultural idea'. From this he concludes that those people have 'therefore the 
inclination ... to regard the great characters of the past as "unimportant" and hence to 
endorse those phenomena which the masses have created. In addition, the stance of the 
proletariat emphasises more the animal [or material] values, hence only this is truly 
"essential" [in their understanding of history], which stands in a direct relation to them 
that were the economic concerns.' 203 As a consequence, Rickert asserts that the materialist 
emphasis of the conditions of proletarian culture and the relentless criticism of established 
political institutions of his time are derived from an idealisation of human needs and class 
conflict. In other words, the materialist historiography claims to explain the emergence of 
all social phenomena on the grounds of a socio-economic determinism a la Marx and 
Mehring. 204 According to Rickert this explains why the new historiography has abandoned 
-
202 S d' . P I '1 .. ee our Iscusslon art ._.VII. 
203 Rickert (1899) p. 60 f. 
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historical individuality. Rickert does not deny the existence of such class conflicts, but 
simply maintained that they are not the only such forces, without paying much attention to 
such phenomena anyway. 
Historical individuality is called by Rickert 'in-dividuality', as derived from the 
'in---dividual'. Such an 'in---dividual' is a phenomenon, which possesses uniqueness, 
coherence and consistency; the birth of Christ for example. It stands out as a 
phenomenon, because it has value to us in the way that it constitutes an irreplaceable 
unique experience to us, positively or negatively. The historian then attaches naturally a 
certain value to the event, which is of interest to him in the same way as a certain human 
being stresses an interest in a particular event in her or his life, which she or he finds at the 
moment of judgement important to him or her (e.g. marriage, divorce, a physical 
achievement or a discussion with a friend). This 'in---dividual' becomes a historic 
individual and therefore an object of historical interest if it is conceptualised In a 
particular 'value relation' ('Wertbeziehung ') to the judging historian. This 
'Wertbeziehung' is intrinsic to the ideographic sciences. This is to say, a historical 
science, which ignores the value relation between the observer and the in--dividual 
extinguishes the possibility of historical knowledge. 
If Rickert's project does indeed aim to succeed in showing that rational concept 
formation in history is possible, these principles must then have an objective and binding 
character for the historian whether the historian is willing to acknowledge them or not. 
Given the biatus irrationalis it must be possible to arrive at these principles, which are the 
conditions for historical knowledge by reasoning alone. These principles must face the 
historian as a categorical imperative of reason. The credible historian will reason and 
resist any temptation to produce the historically valuable through 'magic', but must test 
them against the constraining principles of validity of historical knowledge. These 
essential principles are according to Rickert the 'historical centre', secondly the 'general 
cultural values' and thirdly, the 'value-valuation dichotomy'. 
The 'historical centre' is constituted by the historical personalities. 'because of 
their practical value commitments--transposed into the theoretical value relevance-define 
the subject matter of history.' A phenomenon, such as the French Revolution becomes 
only a subject matter for history if it is an 'in---dividual' , if it expresses identifiahle 
.. h· which factor does count a~ a advancements of the technical revolutIOn). Debate could emerge owever o\er 
'world historical fact.'. Cf. Friedrich Engels (1907). 
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values, which stem from identifiable persons. Consequently, the historical inquiry deals 
for Rickert with the ambitions, desires, passions and reasons i.e. with the 'mental life' 
, 
which in one way or another manifests itself in events. 205 The historical accident and the 
intended event have their roots with the value system of those characters who dominated 
the event, for example, Joseph Sieyes or the Marquis de La Fayette. The realm of values 
is thus inextricably linked with the cultural sciences and with history. Hence, from the 
formal concept of the historical method, we finally arrive at the substantive character of 
the historical materia1.206 'The value governing conceptualisation are always to be arrived 
from the historical material itself. That is, they must always be values with regard to 
which the beings or centres themselves - the object of the representation - act in a 
valuative fashion. '207 
However, the 'historical centres' alone cannot show us which event or individual 
should become an object of historical study. Every human being is according to Rickert, 
by nature an in--dividual, since we all possess and express values and apply these values 
to the past of mankind in what ever we feel has continuous importance for us. The 
connection to Meyer at this point become perhaps most apparent when we look at the 
second of Rickert's criteria. 'General cultural values'. This means that historical 
in--dividuality distinguishes itself from in--dividuality in the sense that the historical 
in--dividual with his particular value system is still of some cultural relevance to us or 
should still be acknowledged as culturally valuable, a kind of value everyone 
acknowledges or is capable of acknowledging, whether he appreciates or condemns it. 
The historian, according to Rickert, has to take the positive and negative aspects of an 
event or object into account. He may despise the course and outcome of the French 
Revolution, but he should still should report it, since it affected and affects Western 
culture significantly. Only the value neutral objects can be neglected. For example, a 
certain stone may have been used as an important tool to shape other stones as hand axes 
or to carve an important monument. It also may have been used as a weapon in a crucial 
war. All these aspects have to be incorporated by the historian in his assessment of the 
historical significance of this tool. However, the inquiry of physical and chemical 
composition of this stone tool should not be his main focus since this is the office of the 
205 Rickert (1902) p. 116. 
206 Rickert (1902) p. 121. 
207 Rickert (1902) p. 127. 
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mineralogist in our example. The war, the monument or the cultural importance of an 
ancient tribe should be in the focus of his attention. 
Two problems arise from this. Firstly, there seems to be a difficulty for the 
historian to determine, whether a certain object, an amphorae at Hadrian's wall, for 
example, is regarded as culturally significant, and if so what kind of significance the 
historian ascribes to it. This applies also to the importance of 'commerce' in antiquity. 
Just because commerce gained an essential status in the development of capitalism in the 
18th and 19th century, it does not follow that commerce was equally essential during the 
classical period, for example. Secondly, Rickert needs to show, given a certain culture 
that does not acknowledge the anthropological importance of 'trading' amphorae for 
money for example, that he uses the term commerce adequately. The 'economic' concept 
of 'bank', can be described as a safe place to keep money. But this description is too 
simplistic. Does the space under a mattress count as a bank? Even if we argue that a bank 
is a place where finances are kept behind sealed doors during night-time, this would still 
leave us with a far too vague a definition. The linguistic use of the term, indeed the 
formation of the entire concept of 'bank' is bound up with modern economic institutions 
and cultural peculiarities with modern purpose and moral values. Unless someone is 
prepared to equate modern society qualitatively with the entire ancient civilisation and to 
apply such concepts such as 'banking' and 'commerce' uncritically to the political life in 
the ancient world, which was itself highly complex in matters of political organisation and 
ethical standards, the need emerges to formulate meaningful concepts which address the 
problem of historicity of 'economic' concepts. One could however assert that a certain 
anachronism in the reading of history is almost necessary in order to bring the past to 
light. For example, we know that the ancient Greeks kept coinage in their mouths when 
strolling over the agora. When we now suggest that they wanted to protect themselves 
from having their money stolen by beggars and thieves, must we not infer by doing so, 
that the ancients were even more worried about their possessions then we are? Is such an 
interpretation of historical evidence completely unreasonable? 
Rickert argued that 'culture is the domain of meamng defined by value 
relevancies that are articulated in terms of cultural values. Nature is the domain of the 
meaningless-reality conceived as independent of values' .208 The object of the natural 
sciences aims to find value free theoretical abstractions. For example. water freezes at 0 
208 Oaks (1988) p. 83. 
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°C, which does not constitute for Rickert a value judgement CWerturteil') unless I try to 
influence someone not to try to walk on icy water if its temperature is slightly above that 
mark. This is to say that the above process of water freezing at 0 °C has no meaning or 
value in itself. The French Revolution, however, has a meaning for us in one way or 
another. However, since in the cultural sciences 'the concept of value is connected \vith 
the concept of the historical in such a way that the only reality represented historically is 
reality as related to a value. And since the concept of the mental is linked with the 
concept of the value in such a way that only mental beings are valuating beings, then the 
concept of the value also establishes a relationship between the mental ['dem Geistigen'] 
and the historical ['dem Historischen']' .209 
However, even if two or more individuals share certain cultural values over 
'historical centres' both principles are still not sufficient to eliminate the danger of a 
culturally relativist and subjectivist account of historical knowledge. Rickert introduced 
the value-valuation CWert-Wertung') dichotomy in order to solve this problem. Here 
perhaps we should clarify that 'world' and 'reality' are not synonymous for Rickert. What 
the world is can only be understood as a combination of reality and value. The latter do 
not exist as objects in the world but as objects of human understanding. On the one hand, 
part of the historical interpretation of an event is an inquiry into the relation between 
values and cultural artefacts (goods) and, on the other hand, values and the act of valuation 
which is tied to the subject.21O A hand axe, for example, is an artefact that has no value in 
itself but since it is intended to fulfil a certain function, it has value in respect of some 
apparent end. This value should not be confused with the values or the act of valuation of 
the historian. The 'value-good' relationship ('Wert-Gut Beziehung') is something the 
historian has to uncover, it is his object of inquiry, but the act of valuation itself is also 
dependent on the values of the historian. Therefore, goods and valuations are not the same 
as values. 211 Goods and valuations exist, but values are neither subjective nor objective 
entities. However, the appearance of what we call 'good' is dependent not only on the 
object but also on our valuation of it. It must then be the form of conceptualisation of the 
object by our own reasoning that is what we call a value. This makes the value itself 
impossible to describe. Indeed, we end up with Rickert's definition that values are situated 
209 Rickert (1902) p. 121. 
210 See Oaks (1988) p. 99. 
211 Rickert p. 199 in Oakes (1988) p. 101 n16. 
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'in an autonomous sphere that lies beyond subject and oblect '212 Thl's s h . b d 
J' P ere, SInce eyon 
our understanding and not definable as an object, leaves us then with no further possibility 
of defining 'value' as an irreducible external proposition. It is however difficult to see 
what worth such a definition of value has if it is non-definable, but for some reason it is, 
according to Rickert, still apparent to us. The historian then faces the problem of outlining 
which value possesses 'validity' (,Geltung'). This is to say, on what basis can the historian 
claim that his interpretation of a historic event, the French Revolution for example, has a 
particular value or place in world history. In order to achieve any kind of 'objectivity' 
about the documentation and the interpretation of the event, the values cannot just remain 
subjective - they must be universalisable if the event should be of any worth beyond the 
subjective or culturally (i.e. inter-subjective) determined evaluation. 
As for Kant, an authority that claims to be the guardian of moral truth - duty and 
loyalty - cannot simply dictate the objective moral validity ('Geltung ') of an action. 
Logical and ethical validity of propositions must then be independently and 
unconditionally valid regardless of any interpersonal approval or disapproval of any 
number of agents.213 Rickert uses the example of a 'cultural good such as science', which 
he defined as 'the search for truth for its own sake'.214 This good emerged relatively late in 
European intellectual life and is, according to Rickert, still not understood in its essence by 
philosophy, 'which is shown in the attempt to originate the truth value ['Wahrheitswert'] 
pragmatically in its "utility."215 This criticism is seemingly directed against the utilitarian 
and positivistic philosophy, which started to gain popUlarity in the human sciences. This 
opens an interesting analogy between Meyer and Rickert. Neither of them argue that the 
system of what is historically valid is already apparent to the trained historian, i.e. by 
intuition, but rather becomes clear, by what Rickert would call the 'cultural good' and what 
Meyer called his methodology. 
Rickert argued that it lies in the nature of history and philosophy to treat the 
'historic cultural life' of mankind as non-determined and free. This is not to say that any 
cultural good possesses validity beyond its inter-subjective realm. Our attention must tum 
to the necessary existence of truth conditions, which are formally definable, universal, non-
reducible and apprehensible through pure practical reasoning. That in Rickert's vic\\', 
moral, epistemological and historical relativism are self-defeating does of course not 
212 Rickert (1910) p. 12. 
213 See the 'father and son example' in Rickert (191,,],) p. 192 f. 
214 Rickert (1914) p. 183. 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
183 
establish the existence of a single set of general principles, with which to prove the validity 
of a particular historical representation. This is to say, the value-relevancies can hold 
independently of the valuations. 
The key here is Rickert's presupposition that 'culture exists only in a community 
whose members regard certain values as a common concern - that is, as normatively 
general values- and therefore, freely or autonomously take a position to them.'216 
'Whenever social individuals regard the cultivation of goods as a common concern', their 
actions become an object of historical inquiry. This historical inquiry only has validity if 
the historian puts himself under the fewest moral and at the same time most rational 
'presuppositions - a standpoint of the formal affirmation of values by the autonomous 
will. .. As a result we are especially obliged to ascribe objective significance to the 
individuality of these historical acts of wi11.'217 'The historian is always guided by the 
substantially defined values that he has to abstract from the historical, cultural life itself 
with which he is concerned.' Its importance stems from the fact that it has in some respect 
a meaning for us.218 Rickert does not prescribe any particular set of principles, which 
determine the historian's ethos. Clearly though, he deals with the methodology of the 
cultural sciences, which suggests that the historical valuation should express a value-
relevancy and an awareness of his own practical and theoretical interests. The historian's 
valuation itself is, however, always dependent on the historians' standpoint. For example, 
whether the Second Punic War (218-201 BC), which resulted in Roman hegemony over 
the western Mediterranean, had a positive or negative effect on the ancient civilisation, 
may always be a subject of controversy. According to Rickert, however, that the event 
itself has had some positive or negative importance can not be disputed. 
We can infer from this that with respect to the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, the 
positive or negative significance of 'commerce' in classical antiquity for the demise of 
Hellas, can be a matter of dispute. From Rickert's rejection of Lamprecht's method for the 
cultural sciences, we must conclude that the debate over the character of the economic 
development of antiquity involves a clash of different methodological axioms. BUcher and 
Meyer do not simply disagree over matters of which events have positive or negati\'c 
significance, but also over the value-relevance. For Rickert, if the methodology of the 
natural sciences is applied to the cultural sciences, as it had been in Lamprecht's case, then 
215 Rickert (1913) p. 296. 
216 Rickert (1902) p. 706. 
217 Rickert (1902) p. 234. 
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this seems to fail to acknowledge the existence of 'the sphere of purely theoretical value 
relations that are independent of their valuation.'219 This stems from Rickert's brisk 
opposition to August Comte's approach of proceeding with the methodology of the natural 
sciences to uncover "historical laws" and rejecting the teleological and value relevant 
character of history. 'Lamprecht's division of human history into cultural ages can sen'e 
as a typical example of a lack of conceptual rigor that creates flaws in every philosophy of 
history, which pretends to employ a natural scientific method' .220 The fundamental flaw in 
Lamprecht's method lies in the open contradiction between denying the teleological nature 
and the value relevance of history. Yet in practice, according to Rickert, Lamprecht makes 
teleological valuations in the formulation of the principle that history must proceed even to 
as yet unknown ages in the fashion of the 'increasing intensity of the socio-psychological 
life.'221 Rickert's criticism only partly applies to Bucher's theory of economic stages, but 
indicates Rickert's clear rejection of the comparative and empirical method ever being 
acceptable as a sound philosophy of history. 
To summarise, Windelband's and Rickert's philosophy of value has outlined, 
besides a further development of Kant's critique of the epistemological categories, a 
theoretical defence of the fundamental methodological distinction between cultural 
historical sciences on the one hand and the natural empirical sciences on the other hand. 
This distinction is not ontological but epistemological. Whereas Ranke, the Prussian 
School and Meyer defined nationalism and patriotism as the primary values which should 
guide the historian's act of valuation, Rickert and Windelband were unable to show that 
certain values posses formally a priori objectivity and exist independently from the 
acknowledgement of the historian. However, the neo-Kantian movement was one of the 
most powerful traditions during the early quarter of the 20th century. The appealing nature 
of Rickert's and Windelband's arguments offered a possibility of continuing the idealistic 
paradigm formally and gave historicism a modem line of defence against the academically 
repudiated materialism and positivism in philosophy and history. Windelband's argument 
that history and biology, for example, can be investigated in an ideographic or llomothetik 
way, seems particularly plausible. However, Windelband's argument that proper historical 
studies must remain in the realm of Jdeographie could not convince us. 
218 See Rickert (1902) p. 237. 
219 Oakes (1988) p. 90. 
220 Rickert (1902) p. 184 f. 
221 See Rickert (1902) p. 184. 
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With regard to the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, neither Rickert nor \Vindelband 
offered a methodological solution to the debate. Alexander Demandt pointed out correctly 
that 'taken in a rigorous sense, processes in the natural world are equally non-reversible or 
irreparable as a particular historical process or event'222 The discussion about the modem 
character of the economy during the classical period is partially related to the Kantian 
preconception that the rational nature of mankind remains unchanged. The same applies to 
the law-like qualities of nature. Concept formation in history produces and deals with 
generalising concepts such as church, state, bureaucracy, democracy and so forth. Their 
validity can only exist if we abstract from their peculiarities. 
222 Demandt (1998) p. 94. 
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5. Ancient History and the 'Crisis' in Historicism 
The scholarly attention which the BUcher-Meyer Controversy received from its 
very beginning highlights clearly that ancient historians such as Meyer and Beloch were 
eager to accommodate the generally increasing interest in issues of social and economic 
history of antiquity.223 The course, aftermath and publicity of the controversy were moved 
into the academic public arena due to the methodological and ideological challenges posed 
by positivism and materialism to the conservative and Rankean dominated historiography 
during the 1890s.224 However, in order to understand the complex background of Meyer's 
and Beloch's harsh criticism of BUcher's thesis, it is not enough to look solely at the 
political circumstances and the situation of historical studies; an analysis of the particular 
situation in ancient history will bring to light the intricacies of the dispute. 
The study of philology and ancient history traditionally played an elevated role in 
Germany's education system. Even today, still more than 700,000 pupils at German 
secondary schools ('Gymnasien ') learn Latin as their first foreign language. The 
completion of most degrees in the 'philosophical faculties' at German universities still 
require higher grades in Latin and in some cases even ancient Greek. The affiliation 
between the Germans and antiquity is an important historical and cultural phenomenon that 
was much stronger a hundred years ago. We should therefore not underestimate this 
phenomenon when examining the reaction of the, at that time, firmly established classical, 
mainly philological, scholarship against the demands for a reorientation and reformation of 
these disciplines voiced by scholars and politicians mostly from outside the subject. 
Unlike in other mainly Western European countries, the educational value of possessing an 
insight into grammatical structure and the development of the Germanic languages from its 
Latin and Greek roots was seen as an essential educational object. Many of one may call 
the 'achievements of antiquity', in particular philosophy, art, architecture and Roman law, 
were traditionally regarded as constituting valuable roots and cultural links between the 
modern Western civilisation and the ancient Greek and Roman world. Despite the 
pervasive public belief in technological and economic progress, the value of the ancient 
achie~ements was nowhere more cherished and appreciated across the intellectual world 
223 One should note the ambiguities of the terms 'social' ('sozial ') and 'economic' ('wirtscllllftlich '). The 
modern use of the terms may differ from Meyer's and Bi.icher's use. 
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than in Germany during the second part of the 19th century. This acknowledged consensus 
amongst scholars and politicians had never before been seriously challenged.225 
Already in the Renaissance period a rival of ancient symbolism was visible, which 
was represented by the use of Greek mythology in the works the neo-humanism in Herder, 
Schiller and Goethe. 226 The particular value of ancient history was even more accentuated 
by the sensational archaeological discoveries of the second half of the nineteenth 
century.227 The state historical writings of late 18th century scholars, Barthold Georg 
Niebuhr (1776-1831 )228 and later August Boeckh (1785-1867)229 were still dominated by 
the interpretation of historical texts and documents of ancient chronologists such as 
Tucydides. In their immensely influential works in ancient history, both highlighted the 
importance of the individual and politically dominated character of antiquity, which 
alongside Ranke made them grandfathers of the Prussian School. 
A different approach was taken by Edward Gibbon (1737-1794)230 and Jacob 
Burckhardt (1816-1897).231 Both scholars are equally of elevated standing in classical 
studies, and started to develop a reading of history from a more cultural perspective.232 The 
Enlightenment quest to uncover human nature combined with the vastly increasing 
philological material formed an interesting new academic discipline, 
'Altertumswissenschaft' ('the science of antiquity'), a subject which combined scholarly 
rigour in textual translation and interpretation with a humanistic fascination for the 
ancients and the enlightenment idealisation of the homo rationalis in a world historical 
context. Gibbon's enlightenment-typical assumption about the unchanging character of 
human nature was the key to understanding the infinite diversity of historical events, but 
was not deemed to oversimplify human nature under one set of presuppositions.233 In this 
way, Gibbon distinguished himself clearly from his contemporaries Francis Hutcheson and 
David Hume. 
224 Schneider (1990) p. 441. 
225 See Meyer (1918). . 
226 We only need to look into volume two of Goethe's Faust on Proteus in order to reahs_es the central 
position of mythology and natural philosophy (Naturphilosophie). See Goethe (1994) 8219-83)8. . 
227 The archaeological discoveries around Olympia for example marked the creation of the modern OlympIC 
~ames. See also the establishment of the Pergamon Museum of Berlin. 
28 See-Niebuhr (1828-1832). 
229 See Boeckh (1817). 
230 See Gibbon (1781-1788). 
231 See Burckhardt (1964). . 1977 
m See also on Gibbon in particular Pocock (1996) and on Burckhardt see Chnst ( -). 
233 See Pocock (1996) p. 14. 
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Due to the outstanding scholarly qualities of Gibbon and Burckhardt, Nieburhr and 
Boeckh, and despite significant methodological and historiographical differences between 
them, 'Altertumswissenschaft' achieved a very unique and elevated place amongst the 
human sciences in particular at German universities from the beginning of the 19th century. 
-' 
This unifying science emerged from the fusion of the schools of Ulrich Welcker and Karl 
Ottfried MUller, who both stood in the tradition of Gibbon and Niebuhr. In order to 
achieve a more complex picture of the ancient world the scholarship had to take new 
developments and findings into consideration, which sidelined the previous reliance on 
inscriptions and fragments. Altertumswissenschaften also had to inquire into the social and 
historical significance of archaeological findings and into new sources such as papyri.234 
That the study of cultural and 'economic' phenomena belonged largely to political history 
should, however, not be forgotten. 
The discipline of ancient history of 18th century humanism eagerly investigated 
ancient Greek, Roman and even barbaric law as the crucial aspect for the study of the past. 
Because of the pre-eminence of the political, the analysis of the legal systems formed the 
key element to understanding the general operation, or disaffection of a particular state. 
Taking it a little further, one could argue that only through the establishment of an 
operating legal system, was a certain culture was able to flourish and to maintain its 
independent existence from other nations. Somehow a system of functioning custom 
provided the only opportunity for a social formation which was not dominated by a tyranny 
or by a chaotic lawlessness. 
Gibbon and later Burckhardt were perhaps the first ancient historians who, besides 
acknowledging the importance of custom in the particular practice of land ownership, 
argued that the operation of the legal system has a significant influence on the cultural 
peculiarities and identities of a people. The study of the history of law therefore had a 
material and a moral implication for the state of a nation. Although neither belittle the 
importance of the historic personality, it is no longer only the individual - a history of 
episodes so to say - but critically acclaimed antiquity as a whole which seemed to be an 
eternal 'source of academic riches', which by the use of careful analogies, allowed 
comparisons between the different period of antiquity with aspects of modern social life. 
Whilst the political historians and the early political economists had difficulties in 
- . h c· ent history was better 
coming to terms with new social and economIC p enomena, an 1 -
234 Wilamowitz (1893) vol!. p. 11. 
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prepared to form analogies between past and present. 235 Indeed, instead of the relati\el \' 
narrow and uncompromising methodology practices within medieval and modern history. 
the second half of the 19
th 
century saw a vibrant and fairly liberal atmosphere amongst the 
ancient historians, which led to a more or less friendly admission of the increasingly 
popular economic and social questions of antiquity. The predominance of the historical 
personalities and the pre-eminence of the public political life in antiquity remained largely 
undisputed, but AltertumswissenschaJt was never so vigorousl y under pressure to act as a 
loyal servant to Prussian politics. Nevertheless, just as today, the human sciences had to 
justify their existence in an increasingly commercial, competitive and progress driven 
political environment. However, it is not our task to criticise the discipline of ancient 
history for having had to invent new ways of understanding and of contributing to the 
burning questions of the late 19th century. 
Prussian-German nationalism and German patriotism may never have been as 
strong as amongst philologists and ancient historians as it was amongst the 'state 
historians' of the Prussian School, but it was nevertheless present in the former disciplines. 
The wide ranging and influential works of Niebuhr, Gibbon, Burckhardt and Boeckh, on 
the one hand, and the eager efforts to collect more and more knowledge about the ancient 
world on the other hand, may have been the reason for a less hostile and fairly open 
academic research environment at the institutes and departments of ancient history in 
Germany's universities. Already by the mid 19th century AltertumswissenschaJt focused on 
almost every branch of ancient culture, art, politics, law and constitutions, linguistics, 
papyri and craftsmanship, coinage and architecture, family and public life, philosophy and 
technology and thus unified scholars from increasingly specialised and separate 
disciplines. It is impressive how quickly, and in what vast quantities, knowledge about the 
ancients was accumulated, published and exhibited in the newly created national museums 
around the world. 
For most of the second half of the last century after the revolutionary years of 
1848-49, a new generation of scholars - Theodor Mommsen (1817-1903), Ulrich 
Wilamowitz-Mollendorf (1845-1931) and Ernst Curtius (1814-1896) - dominated Roman 
and Greek history with a more heuristic approach, which surely was in the unifying spirit 
h . h· t y towards the of AI~ertumswissenschaJt.236 This, however, could suggest t at anCIent IS or 
235 See extensively Gilbert (1990) p. 47 ff. on Burckhardt, his view on antiquity and the concept of 'cultural 
history' . 
236 See Morenz (1955). 
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end of the 19
th 
century was closer to Lamprecht's concept of 'cultural history' 
(,Kulturgeschichte') than it was to the narrative conception of the predominance of the 
political and the individual in history of the Prussian School. 237 Yet such suggestions would 
give an inaccurate explanation of the situation. Despite the more liberal orientation of 
Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, Curtius and Mommsen, Altertumswissenschajt was still 
dominated by the Rankean tradition. Social and economic aspects of antiquity were .still 
analysed primarily from a political perspective i.e. by studying documents of 
chronologists, which mostly reported and exaggerated the courageous and noble actions of 
their leaders. There were two reasons for holding on to the predominance of the political 
and individual in the historical selection process. First of all, the few historiographic 
considerations in Plato, Aristotle and more so in Seneca show a clear concern for political 
history and not for social and economic history in the modem sense.238 This was recognised 
by Wilamowitz.239 Secondly, the previously discussed argument that human rationality is a 
non-changing but discoverable capacity, which allows us to envisage the ancients through 
our modem eye, opens up the possibility of a recurrence of the spirit and the values of the 
ancients as outlined in Part II.1. 
Nonetheless, as Karl Christ has concluded, the Prussian School did not dominate 
the field of Altertumswissenschajt as heavily as modem history.240 This could have been 
because until recently, ancient historians paid fairly little attention to the methodological 
questions of their subject. 241 Therefore, aspects of social and cultural methodology such as 
statistics and empirical conjectures could more easily enter the subject unnoticed or at least 
unchallenged. Another argument for the relative methodological openness of ancient 
history could also be the stronger influence of humanism in philosophy from the late 15th 
century onwards. The neo-humanists, such as Humboldt and Herder developed a 
remarkable interest in the issue of slavery (ancient and modem), which was driven by their 
political agenda. Henri Wallon's History of Slavery in Antiquity especially gave the first 
comparative study on ancient slavery, which aimed to bridge the relation between ancient 
and modem social questions. 242 This politically charged subject almost invited ancient 
historians to swift compansons between modem day politics and the ancient world. 
237 See Lehmann (1995). . . . . 
238 It is. not necessary for us to enter the on<1oin<1 debate about the scope and nature of Aristotle s economIC 
. 0 0 . b' tl' t' all}' discussed by t\1el kle thought. The arguments and the recent literature on thIS su ~ect were recen y cn IC 
(l995a), (l995b). Cf. Gelesnoff(l923) and Kraus (1905). 
239 See esp. Wilamowitz (1893) vol. 1 p. 100 f. 
240 See Christ (1983) vol. 3 p. 38. 
241 See Finley (1984) p. 265. 
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Besides this particular topic, the writings of the Greek and Roman historical scholarship of 
the mid/late 19
th 
century focused on one recurring central phenomenon - the decline of the 
ancient world. Gibbon at the end of the 19th century had already devoted an encyclopaedic 
work to this subject, which has not lost its fascination and comprehensiveness for present 
day scholars. 
With the debate over the demise of the ancient culture starting to take centre stage 
in the Altertumswissenschaften, the issue of the proper methodological tools reqired in 
order to reach a wide audience did not pass without dispute. Eduard Meyer and 
Wilamowitz debated this issue even before the 'Lamprechtstreit'.243 Although the reaction 
against the materialistic and positivistic tendencies in history was not as bellicose as in 
modem historical studies, it is hardly unsurprising that the alleged 'crisis' in German 
historical studies towards the end of the 19th century left ancient history not unaffected, 
which gave the dispute over the decline of the ancient world renewed popularity.244 Since 
'economic' factors are central to both BUcher's and Meyer's theses, though in a different 
way, we can see that the relative methodological disunity and confusion led to divisions 
within the discipline of ancient history. The scholars of this discipline also generated a 
large amount of polemical writing also as a reaction against debates elsewhere, namely the 
'Lamprechtstreit' and the 'Gothein-Schdfer' dispute. 
Methodological disunity and the debate about the usefulness of ancient history 
have a long and intense history. The first significant reorientation of classical studies 
reaches back to just after the period of the reformation wars between the old metaphysical 
world and the spirit of enlightenment with its urge for scientific and commercial progress. 
However, the medieval scholars did not study the ancient classics for their own sake. 
Classical texts by scholars such as Aristotle, Plato, Seneca and Cicero were regarded as 
eternal treasures and as a powerful source of knowledge for theology and ethical education, 
medicine and mathematics, physics and biology. The battle of the books - La Qllerelle -
marked the time in history where modem sciences parted with their metaphysical roots and 
started to develop their own methods based on the empirical method of experiment and 
observation. This movement alone did not lead to a radical methodological reorientation 
of the philological practices of the medieval period, but rather reflected the effort hy the 
Newtonian scientists to gain scientific and authoritative independence from the church. 
242 Brockmeyer (1979) p. 19. 
W Christ (1980) p. 230 ff. 
2-1-1 Metz (1984) p. 3. 
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Before empiricism and the enlightenment ideal of progress and commerce could take hold 
of Western culture, almost all knowledge of the world was based on the achievements of 
antiquity and was administered by the church in order to provide a unified scientific world 
view, which was in accordance to the Gospe1.245 Faith, ethical self-control, religious 
obedience, material self-sufficiency and the dogmatic defence of ancient wisdom, was for 
the progress-minded band of scientists and philosophers a la Hobbes only metaphysical 
balderdash.246 The new and increasingly independent natural sciences treated antiquity as 
the enemy of reason and condemned it as mere mysticism, especially in France and 
England. Wilamowitz, for example, regretted in the light of contemporary hostility against 
Altertums-wissenschaJt by the sciences that although 'France has taken the lead in civilised 
progress from the start of the sixteenth century, and during that century made an immense 
contribution to classical studies; and it was France that now took the lead in their 
abandonment. '247 
However, the neo-humanist movement, especially in Germany, kept an outspoken 
affiliation for the humane, natural and in parts also tragic character of the ancient view of 
human existence; an aspect, which according to them, was disfigured by the medieval 
orthodoxy. This movement was essential for the great interest that Lessing, Schiller, 
Goethe, but also Humboldt and Herder, took in the mythology and philosophy of antiquity. 
They did not abandon antiquity, but rather incorporated it into their spirit of enlightenment. 
The works of the ancient poets, philosophers and statesman were mostly admired for their 
intellectual depth and expression of aesthetic beauty and harmony.248 Towards the end of 
the 18th century, philology began its independent existence in German university curricula, 
but focused at that time solely on the linguistic interpretation of classical texts. 
However, 'the existing tradition of textual scholarship was gradually strangled by 
the new enthusiasm of the artistic cult for Greek antiquity' ,249 which led nevertheless to an 
increased of interest in ancient city life and its architecture. This obvious neo-classical 
245 Perhaps regard Dante's Divine Comedy was the last major work, which aimed to incorporate all available 
knowledge under the roof of Christianity. See Mazzeo (1960) and Ittorini (1957). . 
246 See Meikle (1995c) p. 77 f. For examples of late 19 th century faith in 'economics' as a progress I ve 
science see Mitscherlich (1910) . . .. 
247 Wilamowitz-Mbllendorf (1982) p. 8. It is perhaps of interest for the reader too that despIte Wdamowltz s 
relatively liberal dispositions, after having taken office as principal of the University of Berlin he wa~ 
. . . h H Helmholtz one of the leading responsIble for the removal of the memonal statue In onour ermann von . . ~ 
. .. . . 'It d t b fit that the natural sCIences German humanIst and SCIentIst, from entrance of the unIversIty. oes no e I 
arrogate themselves a place of domination.' Cit. in Demandt (1998) p. 84. k d H I 
. . d f ·t b t also Ran 'e an ege 248 Not only since Meyer do we know of an enlIghtenment peno 0 antlqUl y. u . II 
. . hi' I . d See SImon (1928). \!u er 
spoke of such periods, which was associated maInly WIth t e c asslca perlO . 
(1997) and Schmidt (1998). 
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trend during the second half of the 19th century was caused by yet anoth 
er controversy 
about the value of AltertumswissenschaJt beyond the existing popular enthusiasm for 
archaeological findings and 'neo-classical' architectural style. 
Ever since August Boeckh's Public Finances of Athens (the first volume was 
published in 1817)250 the amount of remarkably well researched literature on aspects of 
ancient 'economic' and social life was on an increase. After Boeckh, Mommsen. and 
Wilamowitz continued to highlight social and 'economic' aspects of antiquity, but more 
from a historical than from a perspective of accountancy and finance. Their successful 
publications helped AltertumswissenschaJt more popUlarity and high degree of 
specialisation, which reached impressive heights as the early issues of such currently 
prominent journals like Rheinisches Museum, Klio and ZeitschriJt der Savingny Stiftung 
clearly demonstrate to us. However, by the time Nietzsche became professor of philology 
at Basel, the whole excitement of AltertumswissenschaJt seemed to have vanished and been 
replaced by meticulous analysis, which one may call out of touch with the outside world. 
This was apparently one of Nietzsche's main reasons to give up his chair. 251 
Towards the end of the 19th century the degree of specialisation reached such a 
dimension of detail and abstraction that the familiar, ever recurring and pervasive criticism 
about the lack of practical applicability, marketability and general educational usefulness 
of the research results were voiced louder and more intensively. This criticism went also 
hand in glove with the demands to justify the amount of funding for the various academic 
departments, research institutes and the classical education in the Gymnasia.252 
However, around 1890, just before the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, the 
AltertumswissenschaJt found itself in a rather uncomfortable position. The reformation of 
the German secondary school system (' Gymnasialsystem ') forced the demand for a more 
German and national view on history. 'Young Germans should be educated and not young 
249 Wilamowitz (1982) p. 12. 
250 See Boeckh (18l7). 
251 Although Wilamowitz admired Nietzsche initially (He followed Nietzsche to Sch~lpforta and Bonn), he 
eventually fell out with his former idol when Nietzsche was offered a professorship at Base~ aged only 
twenty four. Nietzsche's The Birth of the Tragedy of 1864 was dismissed by Wilamowl~z for Its apparent 
inaccuracies and snobbery. Nietzsche in return accused the philological scholarship (except Jacob 
Burkhardt) from Goethe to his present for their apparent Hippocratic claim that ancient philosoph~rs adored 
mostly themselves. Nietzsche claimed that this applies rather to the accusers, the modern scholarship. than to 
. ., "., 'th . . at"on care and not by assummg the accused. For Nietzsche It was Important to enter antiqUity WI Imagm I . . 
. , . 'h d h' d . t followers \\ere Similar to the that the modern man, m particular enlightened phllosop ers an t elr mo erms .. 
ancients. . . h 
's' , , K I J I' Beloch complained that e\en ng t 
-. - With regard to the situation at the umverslty departments, ar u IUS " ' d I ·k d d 
into the early part of the 20th century, AltertuIllSlI'isse1lsc/zajt was dominated by philologists an J" e goo 
historians. Beloch (1925) p. p. 22. 
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Greeks and Romans', was the harsh and uncompromising critique of Kaiser Wilhelm II. 
which must have hit the usually very loyal and conservative ancient historical scholarship 
very hard indeed. However, the rejection of the Kaiser's claim was not so much directed 
against the instrumentalisation of ancient history as an important educational tool, but the 
assertion that these scholars did not do their job well. Resistance against such attempts to 
belittle the tradition of what classical studies had achieved in the education of the juvenile 
'state's citizen' (Staatsbiirger) came promptly from many southern German ancient 
historians, a fact which contributed apparently to the convocation of the 1 SI German 
Historians Conference in 1893 in Munchen at which Bucher held his controversial paper 
'Die Entstehung der Volkswirtschaft'.253 As a result of the Kaiser's demands, the 
modernised secondary school curriculum was though largely rejected by the philological 
scholarship. However, it was implemented by the government anyway starting from the 
winter semester 1892-93.254 The educational political interest shifted from ancient and 
medieval history to modem events and personalities.255 This forced the classical 
scholarship into a dilemma. Either classical scholarship would have to answer the call and 
make ancient history and classical philology directly applicable for the nationalistic 
pedagogic ideals of Prussian Germany, which would require an even stronger 
modernisation of antiquity. Or they could insist on the historical and cultural peculiarity of 
antiquity and simply highlight the classical languages as a general educational value in its 
own right, which would surely result in negative consequences with regard to the already 
damaged status and academic funding of ancient history. Behind this official ideological 
appeal stood the idea that history (including ancient political history) had to fulfil a wider 
political function, since the 'right' education was and probably still is central to the goals 
of any ambitious nation. In the light of the degree of specialisation for its own sake and 
isolation from the burning questions of its time, the Kaiser's criticism might have been 
well justified. Those scholars who tended to follow Niebuhr's and Ranke's method, 
especially Meyer and Beloch, emphasised throughout their works the value of ancient 
history for modem education and the German nation, which presupposes the presence of a 
shared cultural rationale between the ancients and the modem man. Some modern 
historians such as Below and Meinecke were, however, sceptical about the pedagogic 
applicability of the results of the rather fragmented and eclectic Altertllms~rissellschajtell. 
253 See Schumann (1974) p. 195 and Ritter (1953) p. 514. 
254 Schneider (1990) p. 425. 
255 Paulsen (1885) p. 600 ff. 
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The Munich Ordinarius, Robert von Pohlmann, brought the intentions of the 
governing bodies under a summary in which he defended the Kaiser's calls for the \\ider 
political utilisation of history, but rubbished the Kaiser's criticism against ancient history 
for not following this path. 'Amongst the plenitude of complaints, which in our days flow 
against the humanistic studies, none are as painful and of highest interest for the nation as 
the one, which we recently heard from the Kaiser that the humanistic secondary schools 
failed to educate those professional classes sufficiently, which have an influence on 
people's lives, which aim to preserve the modern state ... .If the school would have done so , 
said the Kaiser, the humanistic youth would have provided the material needed in order to 
fight against the socialist movement.'256 We see that Pohlmann's intention was to refute the 
opinion that ancient history was of no considerable importance for the political education 
of pupils. Pohlmann elucidates his view by claiming that Aristotle's Politics is comparable 
with the most recent demands for a political education of the youth. 257 
To be clear, most ancient historians did not argue against a social and political 
education of the young, but rather against the modernisation of the discipline history in 
which ancient history has been crowded out, since it apparently failed to do its bit in the 
ongoing and intensifying campaign against socialism. However, as Schneider noted, 'the 
present relevance of historiography originates for Pohlmann by no means from a 
progressive political consciousness, but serves rather as support for the monarchy'.258 
A basis for the modernisation of ancient history was laid down by ancient history 
itself. The prominent Mommsen argued, for example, 'it is essential that the ancients step 
down from their shrines back into the real world, in which there is hammering and sawing, 
in which people hate and love, fantasise and lie. That is the reason as to why the consul 
had to become a mayor' .259 In other words, Mommsen was demanding that classical 
education should bring the ancients closer to us in order to make them look more ordinary 
people. The idealisation or glorification of the ancient world by neo-humanism is to be 
replaced by a more realistic and up to date view of antiquity. This includes the demands 
for a reinterpretation of Roman and Greek institutions by using more modern concepts and 
terminology, which somehow correspond to the important issues of Mommsen's time. 
This led to the drawing of parallels between the class struggle in late Roman empire and 
256 Pohlmann 'The Classical Antiquity in its importance for the political education of the modern citizen' In 
Pohlmann (1911) 1 st ed. (1895) p. 1 ff. 
257 Pohlmann (1911). p. 19 ff. For Pohlmann see also the appendix to this part. 
258 Schneider (1990). p.427. 
259 On Mommsen's political views see Wucher (1968), Christ (1972). pp. 68-118. 
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the social division in many European countries in the mid 19 century.260 In his comments to 
Mommsen's highly praised encyclopaedic textbook Romische Geschichte, Bachofen 
objected that 'in general Mommsen rarely deals with Rome and the Romans. The essence 
of the book lies in the effort to realise the latest ideas of the time' .261 
That the modernisation of the ancient world often went too far, was even mourned 
by Pohlmann, who himself was not always the one of the most restrained historians with 
regard to drawing direct analogies between the ancient and the modem 'social question'. 
However, Pohlmann is correct to assert that ancient Greek and Roman history was heavily 
used for political ends not only during the years of the struggle for Germany's national 
unity but also right into the 20th century. He pointed out that 'one of the big problems 
which the national education has left with us from the last century, is foremost the critique 
of the cultural inheritance of antiquity ... Yet this process of settlement of the modern man 
with the intellectual baggage of antiquity made it very difficult, if not sometimes 
impossible to reach a non-biased, strictly historical view and judgement of antiquity. With 
regard to the question, how important the ancients are for us, especially the people of 
ancient Greece, one did all too often ignore and misinterpreted what antiquity was really 
about, "how it really was". One invented a picture of Hellenism in ways it was 
respectively needed or seen useful to these historians. '262 
260 Wehler (1972) vol. 4, p. 21 and Christ (1983) vol. 3, p. 45 f. 
261 Bachofen vol X. (1967) pp. 251,254,262 cited in Christ (1982) ~5 ~f. . -unke 19%) .17. 
262 Pohlmann 'Die Geschichte der Griechen und das 19. Jahrhundert CIted In F ( P 
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6. Historicism and Political Economy 
The reservations of the Prussian School, the debates on method in historical 
studies, the neo-Kantian approach reviving philosophy and the situation in ancient history 
all combined to oppose the influx of a new methodological and ideological spirit into the 
human sciences. A further major factor responsible for the emergence and the 
dissatisfying outcome of the Bucher-Meyer Controversy, we suggest, is the situation in 
Karl Bucher's area of expertise, NationalOkonomie (the science of the national economy). 
As we have seen, Bucher emphasised the self-sufficient character of the ancient economy 
with commercial trade playing a negligible role. We also saw that Bucher, like many, 
viewed ancient economic life in the context of the general line of development of the 
human economy as underdeveloped, basic or primitive. This view became popular in the 
second half of the 19th century and was held by many economists, who in terms of their 
methodology, favoured the empirical and materialistic approaches. 263 
The emergence of theoretical political economy as a new and separate science 
during the second half of the 19th century was strongly connected with European and 
American governmental efforts to control the forces of rapidly expanding markets in order 
to use its benefits for political ends. Whilst socialists, sections of the German liberals and 
conservati ves agreed at least on the need to control and influence the market forces, though 
for very different political reasons, Anglo-Saxon economists saw traditionally only a 
limited need for economic policies, since the neo-classical tradition regarded it as an 
obstacle which would hinder economic progress and prosperity. Depending on one's 
political stance, the approaches towards the character of the economy differed drastically. 
There was, despite all fundamental differences, an agreement on the enormous importance 
of the economic sphere in the modem world. Such views occurred with the epoch-making 
works of Smith, Ricardo and Marx. Their value theory of labour and critique of 18
th 
and 
19th century capitalism and its social phenomena were not seriously considered in Germany 
until the later part of the second half of the 19th century. This rather overdue critical 
acknowledgement of the so called Classical economists might also be connected to the late 
but dramatic industrial development and technological progress, which changed 
263 Note the ambiguous character of the concepts 'economic'. 'economy 
empiricism' . 
and also 'materialism and 
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Germany's urban and rural everyday life on an unprecedented scale, especially in the 
change to last part of the 19th century.264 It was during this period that political economy 
started to establish itself as a political science by analysing unique phenomena such as 
urban and rural industrialisation, market failures, and concentration of capital and mass 
poverty. However, theoretical analysis of such phenomena alone was not enough to satisfy 
politicians who sought practical advice to cope with and address the recurring and 
deepening economic crisis, the rise of a strong and well organised working class 
movement, mass poverty, inflation, trade deficits and demographic growth. 
The pervasive intellectual spirit of the time was, despite substantial differences, 
clearly bound up with the enlightenment ideals of progress, confidence and optimism about 
man's abilities to overcome the challenges of 'mother nature' and society. This was to be 
achieved by putting faith in technological inventions, statistics and formulas, which gave 
the natural sciences and statistical empiricism an advantage compared to idealism, in the 
popular view. 
However, just as in history, philosophy and classics, German idealism and neo-
humanism played an essential part in the establishment of political economy as a credible 
and independent science. Friedrich List (1789-1846)265, Adam MUlIer (1779-1829) and 
Friedrich Karl Savigny (1779-1861) believed, as did Niebuhr, Ranke, Gibbon and 
Burckhardt, that the political precedes the material and social life. The inductive historical 
inquiry therefore maintained its key position in the analysis of economic phenomena. 
Following in the tradition of the above scholars a group of academics including Wilhelm 
Roscher (1817-1894),266 formed what is often called the 'German Historical School' 
('Deutsche Historische Schule '). 
Roscher, though, distanced himself from the Hegelian idea of a single universal 
theoretical system by arguing that economic behaviour and thus economic principles were 
contingent upon their historical, social and institutional context. Therefore in order to 
264 Winkel (1977) p. 7 ff. 
265 List's most influential work was 'The National System of Political Economy' (Das Natiollale System der 
Politischen Okonomie') of 1837, which was written as a polemic to the free-trade doctrines that was, 
predominant in classical political economy. However, this book was by no means a~, ideological ,defence ot 
protectionism as one finds in Milller, but rather stressed the pre-eminence of the political, the nation and the 
state. List argued that it was the government's responsibility to foster the 'productive powers' of a .natIOn 
and, once these were in place, free trade could ensue can flourish but not before the general fisca,l, restnctlOns 
. . h t' . "tages which was and legal regulatIOns are 10 place. More relevantly, he developed a t eory 0 economic S .' . 
. . , f G H' t ·cal School to which Karl Bucher to serve as a valuable baSIS for the 'younger generation 0 erman IS on 
. .. . ('Z II 'ereill') and an advocate belonged. List was one of the maIO archItects of the German customs umon 0 \ 
for the expansion of railroads throughout Germany. 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
199 
establish economic laws, the method of inquiry must draw from history and sociology, and 
is hence interdisciplinary. That is to say, one must look at economic life with the eye of a 
historian and political scientist as well as an economist. Hence, the first task for Roscher 
was to analyse history for its economic content in order to arrive at theories of the nature of 
the relationship between social and economic organisation of society. In order to do so, 
Roscher extensively explored the fields of ancient and mediaeval history.267 As a result of 
Roscher's mainly inductive methodological approach much of the work of the early 
Historical School, especially in the work of Roscher's colleagues, Bruno Hildebrand 
(1812-1878) and Karl Knies (1812-1898), was characterised by theories of stages of 
economic development ('wirtschaftliche Entwicklungstufen '). Indeed, as sketched out in 
part I, theories of economic stages, whether linear (as in Knies, Hildeband and BUcher) or 
cyclic (as in Roscher and Meyer) were quite a common methodological too1.268 
The 'older generation' of the Historical School rejected the descriptive orientation 
of classical political economy in Ricardo, Say, Bentham and Mill and did not tolerate a 
theoretical plurality and openness of Roscher's method. During the last quarter of the 19th 
century, as in history and the classics, the old and somewhat worn-out idealistic paradigm 
began to come under fire from the increasingly popular empirical and positivistic 
tendencies, which sought to challenge a diversity of methods in favour of the universal 
empirical and solely descriptive method. 
The main threat stemmed from the 'Marginalist Revolution' around Jevons, 
Walras, and Menger who in 1883 instigated the so-called 'Methodenstreit' (,debate on 
method' - not to be confused with the Lamprechtstreit), which resulted in a shift from the 
predominantly normative and highly politically instrumentalised inductive historical 
method in the direction of Menger's, Jevons' and Walras' 'Marginalist Austrian School'. 
In 1883 Menger published a work on the method of social science and political economy, 
which he intended to be a challenge to the Historical Schoo1.269 Gustav Schmoller (1838-
1917), who was one of the most sceptical voices amongst the 'younger generation' of the 
Historical School, attacked the Austrian School and neo-classical economists for their 
theories of economic genesis and for pretending to be using solely descriptive methods.
270 
266 See Roscher (1843). This work on the historical method served a key work for the wider methodological 
orient~tion of the Historical School. , . . .., cher I ~()-+ ! 
267 See Also his remarks on the relatIOnshIp of pohtIcal economy and claSSIcal studIes In Ros . ( 
268 . . 0 S h h . 'e ani)' cntlcalh analysed On the history and critique of such theones see ReI! (194). uc t eones \\ er --
and criticised in the 1930s. See also Heichelheim (1932). 
269 See Menger (1883). 
270 See Schmoller (1874). 
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Much of the work undertaken or initiated by Schmoller was directed largely t' , 
o mIcroscoPIc 
analysis of political and economic history, which was criticised by Bohm-Bawerk, a 
disciple of Menger. 271 Schmoller's political and methodological opposition to the Austrian 
School involved him (though probably involuntarily) in a well recognised methodological 
debate between the two sides, which is also referred to as the 'Methodenstreit' , which 
should not be confused with the debate around Karl Lamprecht. Although it has been 
argued that Schmoller lost the debate by not engaging with the arguments raised by his 
opponents (it is reported that upon receiving Menger's' Untersuchungen', he returned the 
book unread to its author after which he simply noted in a deprecatory manner that, indeed, 
the work had not even been worth reading.), Schmoller's political involvement was also 
significant in his rejection of the marginalists. As one of the founders and later chairman 
of the 'VereinjUr Sozialpolitik' (,Association for Social Policy') est. 1873, he advocated a 
kind of corporate state-industry-labour partnership. The central goal of this still flourishing 
association of economists and scholars from interconnected disciplines involved, on the 
one hand, opposing a laissez faire philosophy in social policy and, on the other hand, 
rejecting the revolutionary social ideas of emerging socialism as well. However, heavy 
debates soon broke out within the Verein on how to achieve the association's credo "to 
raise, educate and reconcile the lower classes on the basis of the existing order". During 
Schmoller's long presidency (1880-1917) the Verein began to develop into a politically 
'neutral' and interdisciplinary association in which progressive conservatives, liberals and 
nationalists found a debating chamber. 272 From the standpoint of the Austrian School and 
from a Marxist prospective, Schmoller's 'moral economics' was viewed as being a loyal 
mouthpiece and obedient servant of government and businesses interest, which aimed to 
control markets and to manipulate the working classes. This was openly confirmed time 
and time again when the Verein would come up with patchy justifications for the industrial 
and social policies of Bismarck (see also part III). Economics, Schmoller and his followers 
claimed, was inherently a normative discipline and thus should be employed in order to 
provide tools for policy makers. In their view, history provides us with the necessary 
illustrations and examples in order to solve a particular social problem, such as urban 
271 'We have evidently a double task: we must by means of an improved, more careful. process, a stricter 
"distillation," extract the countless grains of truth still in the old one, and we must at the, sam,e time mme ne\\ 
, " , , 'h h b B t h t ould the historical sl'hool have empmcal matenal for future refining, the nc er t e etter. u w a w . '
, , h II ' f t' Is Thev would ha\e, first llt Instead? They would first of all open an era devoted to t e co ectIOn 0 rna ena, - , 
, '\ h' h I' t'll t )Uehed a second ma~s, II all in addition to the enormous mountain of raw matena w Ie les s I un l , 
, , " "d' '\'" S Bbhm Bawerk (1890) p. 20, 
rossible still larger than the first, before we be~In again to ,IS~I, ee,. -, nlaub 1967, 
72 For a detailed study about debates and political agenda Within the Verem see Linde ( ) 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
101 
overcrowding and mass poverty. The semi-engagement of Schmoller's Historical School 
in the Methodenstreit highlighted, however, the existence of alternative methods, 
especially the increasingly popular positivistic and materialistic tendencies within political 
economy.273 Although Schmoller retained the methodological and scholarly predominance 
over the academic chairs in NationalOkonomie at Germany's universities into the late 
1920s, the trend towards an increased plurality for new methodological approaches 
including materialism within the academic discipline was clearly visible.274 Even though 
Schmoller's attempt to layout an 'ethical-historical economic theory' may have failed to 
win popularity in the aftermath of the Methodenstreit, his nevertheless sophisticated 
analysis of social and bureaucratic institutions regarding contemporary theories about the 
relationship between public institutions and economic policy making was regarded as 
pioneering. 275 
The members of the 'younger generation' of the Historical School were more 
critical towards Bismarck, but shared nevertheless his nationalistic ambitions. Indeed, the 
works of its members, Werner Sombart, Max Weber and Karl BUcher had closer ties to 
Marx's value theory than Schmoller had, both used primarily a comparative method of 
historical inquiry in their works in economic history.276 Weber's, Sombart's and BUcher's 
method acknowledged the dynamic cause of the relationship of state and society and its 
material basis, but did not aim to rid themselves of the distinction between between Natur-
and Geisteswissenschaft.277 
The dedicated support for nationalistic aims of Bismarck remained nevertheless 
unchanged in Weber, BUcher and Sombart. Besides the fact that BUcher belonged perhaps 
to the most liberal forces within the Verein, the 'younger generation' of the German 
Historical School differed from the Prussian School significantly in its continuous efforts 
to stress the political usefulness of economic history and to underline the supremacy of 
273 It is commonly held that the Austrian School is synonymous with a "subjectivist" method of economic 
inquiry. This becomes explicit from its most central principles. Firstly, ,t?e acknowledgement and 
importance of uncertainty in the economy. Secondly, the importance of competItive markets as a key forc~ 
to gain order and stability in the economy. Thirdly, a time-dependent theory of capital. F~urthly, a th.eory o~ 
price and cost formation, which stresses the subjective nature of the commodity value as It IS determtned b) 
I d· 'l'b . I 'I' and margInal the exchange value only. Other features of the Austrian Schoo are IseqU11 num ana ys,s , ' 
. . ., f + d t' g the philosophy ot /msse::-jmre as utIlIty theory. The Austnan School IS perhaps most amous lor avoca 10 
its prime political principle. 
274 4 2 Schwedberg(199 )p.4 . 
275 See Priddat (1995). 
276 See Winkel (1977). .' .' \' within the Confines of a 
277 See Mommsen's paper 'Karl Lamprecht und Max Weber; HIstOrIcal SOLlolog. 
Historians Controversy' in Mommsen (1987). 
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political history over the economy. However, both schools concurred about the essential 
importance of the state and its institutions for social and economic policy making. 
Although BUcher has been accused of materialism and positivism, such assertions 
seem to be unjustified in the light of his involvement in the Verein. His sympathies for 
Lamprecht, the employment of a common methodological tool and a common empirical 
attitude towards economic history only made him an enemy for Meyer because the latter 
was not prepared to let non-historians lead the study of history of antiquity. However, 
political economy like historical studies in general was under pressure to deliver answers 
to the central questions of late 19th century Germany. Both subjects either modernised the 
ancients, like Meyer did, or employed a modem methodology which was dominated by the 
cognitive interests of the economist, as we have seen in BUcher. 
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Resume 
The Lamprechtstreit about the reorientation of historical studies clearly expressed 
the apathy of traditional historiography towards new approaches to viewing history and its 
events from a more sociological and economic basis. This is also a reason as to why Karl 
Bi.icher and his followers did not succeed in their claim concerning the self-sufficient 
character of the household, since it belittled Meyer's more traditionalist view of the 
character of the state. In combination with the bourgeois tradition at the Gennan institutes 
of higher education and the closeness of the German academics to the state, the tradition of 
German idealism dominated the academic world of the late 19th century, with its traditional 
distance from economic and social matters.278 The polemical course but also the enonnous 
significance of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy should be viewed in the light of the 
political, social and intellectual debates during and after the last decade of the 19th 
century.279 
The issues discussed in BUcher-Meyer Controversy were clearly part of the wider 
dispute over more theoretical and methodological questions regarding the nature of 
historical explanations. This is often refereed to as the 'Methodenstreit' (,debate on 
method') around the historian Karl Lamprecht, BUcher's colleague and friend at Leipzig. 
At the tum of the century the well-established philosophical and historicist positions 
seemed to have reached a state of crisis as a result of serious pressure from the increasingly 
popular historical materialistic and positivistic tendencies in historical studies, in classics 
and in political economy. Karl Lamprecht's 'new method' of historical inquiry combined 
with aspects of psychoanalytical and sociological method posed a serious threat to the 
conservative accounts of the well-established event and individualistic orientated 
historiography. The second half of the 19th century and in particular its last decade saw 
the emergence of its rival 'social and economIC history' (Sozial- wzd 
Wirtschaftsgeschichte). This new subject also received increasingly more attention due to 
dramatic social and political divisions within the 'new-born' German federal nation under 
the rule of Bismarck's Prussia. 
278 On the bourgeois character of the German education system see Ringer (19.90). .' ..' -h 
279 If we would follow Windelband and Rickert, we could not even speak of a controH~rsy be[\\ecn BUL er 
and Meyer since the cognitive interests and the criteria for the validity of values are not the same. 
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We aim to show that the crumbling of the traditional paradigm of Gennan Idealism 
within the academic disciplines of history, classics and political economy, which 
dominated these subjects throughout the 19th century, was not so much due to internal 
theoretical weaknesses, but mainly related to the rise of positivistic and materialistic 
methodological and ideological alternatives during that period. The so-called 'social 
questions' (Soziale Frage) and the occurrence of new social and economic phenomena 
(e.g. unemployment, urbanisation and technological progress) was also reflected on the 
question of the usefulness of social and economic history in the light of the new social 
reality. 
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Robert von Pohlmann - 'Socialism' or 'Capitalism' in Antiquity and the 
Pedagogic Objectives of Ancient History (Appendix to Part II) 
The following appendix deals with a more peripheral figure in the BUcher-Meyer 
Controversy, Robert von Pohlmann (1852-1914). Although he never actively participated 
in the debate, his main work 'History of the Social Question and the Socialism of the 
Ancient World' (1925) and a collection of essays called, 'Of Present and of Antiquity' 
(1911) became important works for the study of ancient Greek history in the 1920s. 
Pohlmann's work was predominantly brought to the attention of the public eye 
posthumously by his pupil, the long standing professor of ancient Greek history at Bonn, 
Friedrich Oertel, who himself became involved in the aftermath of the BUcher-Meyer 
Controversy in the 1930s and 40s. Despite the fact that Pohlmann did not intervene 
directly in the dispute, his original position gained attention, and also stimulated critique 
and controversy amongst the historicist tradition in Germany.280 
Pohlmann's schooling at the 'Aite Gymnasium', (a secondary school with focus on 
ancient history and philology), paved his way to studying history at Munich, Gottingen and 
Leipzig. He was strongly influenced during his student years by Heinrich Brunn 
(philologist, archaeologist and ancient Greek cultural historian), Georg Waitz (ancient 
Greek political historian and numismatist) and the ancient historian and economist, 
Wilhelm Roscher, who was probably the most influential upon pohlmann.281 The close 
academic relationship with Roscher provides a good example of how familiar economists 
and historians were with each other's material. A bursary provided by the 'King Ludwig II 
Scholarship' gave him the opportunity to travel to Italy and to complete his doctoral thesis 
on medieval economic history.282 His 1879 Habilitationsschrift at the Catholic University 
of Erlangen, entitled 'Hellenic Views about the Connection between Nature and History', 
indicates already a strong interest in the interdisciplinary areas of ancient history, 
280 There is only a small amount of papers and a few obituaries on Pohlmann's works and academic 
achievement. The main literature until the early 1970 is summarised in Christ (1972) p. 20.1. Fromthls itsl 
see Ulrich Wilcken's obituary (1915), also H. Berve (1959). For the most appreciative revIew of Pohlmann 
works see Oertel's 'Supplement' to Pohlmann (1925). . . h' . I 281 . ' . d d h' . d d' tl· my fIrst soclal- Istoflca 
'Roscher gave my whole hfe's work dIrectIOn an en; e InspIre Irec) . , 
.. . d . ,. R her (1900) p 8 Atter Roscher ~ 
studIes and was, hke to all my later works, sympathetIc towar s It. In osc . 
death in 1894, Pohlmann edited the 22od, 23 rd , and 24th edition of Roscher's influential work, Gnmdlag,ell der 
. ., . h b' I 'A d t'or businessmen and students. NationalOkollomie.( 1900), whIch IronIcally carnes t e su tIt e rea er 
282 See Pohlmann (1878) cited in Christ (1972) p. 204 n4. 
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topography and philosophy, which laid down the foundation of his future achie\Oementso It 
also shows that Pohlmann did not engage into ancient history for its own sake, but engaged 
eagerly from the start in examining the applicability and importance of ancient history in 
respect of actual political problems. This can be highlighted with a remark from his PhD 
thesis: 'If one envisions all these ideas, which alone Plato and Aristotle have outlined 
concerning questions of the influence of nature on custom and ethics, intelligence ° and 
political life, then it becomes more and more obvious, how little new momentum the 
naturalistic view since Bodin and Montesquieu have added to history. '283 This is perhaps a 
good example to highlight that Pohlmann's later 'infamous' modernising comparisons 
between the ancient and the modem world do not stem from the trendy affectation for 
progress and technology of his times, but was rather derived from a strong appreciation of 
ancient Greek philosophy and its culture. Secondly, like many of his contemporaries, 
Pohlmann was deeply concerned about the social-economic and cultural-political situation 
in Germany and Europe, which led him to apply modem economic concepts in order to 
show the nature of ancient Greek polis life. 
The publication of his essay 'Overpopulation of the Ancient Cities' exemplifies 
Pohlmann's worries in an even more suggestive fashion. 284 Human overcrowding in the 
urban centres of central and Western Europe was considered to be a social disease, 
unnatural and alienating, at least by the conservative scholarship. Pohlmann's historical 
work reflected deeply on the social problems in his own day. The dramatic industrial 
growth and the need for a rapid increase in mobile wage labour as well as the occurrence 
of modem economic crises in the industrial centres of England and later in France and 
Germany required urgent attention. 
Pohlmann faced the same problem as his colleague Julius Beloch did: should we 
interpret the growth of the population in a city as a sign of its prosperity or rather as a 
'symptom' of a dawning economic crisis and inevitably a breakdown of the social and 
political order?285 In order to deal with such modem phenomena with the means a historian 
has at hand, Pohlmann turned to antiquity in the search of any cases, which might resemble 
the symptoms from which modem cities suffered. The most obvious match, which was 
already used as a standard example and which is still used today, was that of ancient 
283 Pohlmann (1878). p.74. 
~S.j Pohlmann (1884). 
285 See Part I ch . ..J.. 
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R 286H '1 orne. owever, as many sceptlca voices of such modernising methods have 
maintained, in order to comprehend the complexity of the causes of overcrowding and 
poverty, one is ill advised to take into account only such factors as the number of civilians, 
which share a particular living space. Secondly, Pohlmann should not just have compared 
the population influx rate with the death rate. With regard to the causes of famine and the 
outbreak of epidemics, overpopUlation may only be one possible cause of social. and 
economic crises. Thankfully though, Pohlmann spares his readers the details of lengthy 
statistical calculations, which since Beloch' s publication 'The Population of the Greek-
Roman World' in 1886 have enthralled economic-historical scholarship.287 
Pohlmann does not deliver a detailed explanation as to the full extent to which the 
situation in ancient Rome provides a valid parallel or analogy to his modem overpopulated 
urban industrial cities. 288 Even if we grant a direct parallel in the cyclic development of 
ancient Rome and Western Europe, it is still invalid to blame social discord and poverty in 
the cities solely on overcrowding. Although Pohlmann insisted on not exaggerating the 
political and social peculiarities in Rome in order to soberly capture the sheer scope of 
growth of this metropolis, it was self-evident to him that a good historian should be 
capable of delivering a picture of history or a certain historical event, which captures the 
imagination and arouses the understanding of the interested reader. No doubt this is an 
honorable goal, which historians have all too often ignored when providing their audiences 
with minute and antiquarian detail. However, as many critics have pointed out, his almost 
indiscriminate use of modem terminology and little concern for methodological questions 
in respect of historical concept formation, put Pohlmann in the camp of the so called 
modernisers. 289 As we shall see, such categorisations were unfortunately drawn a little too 
swiftly. It has also been falsely claimed that Pohlmann's work shows explicit ties to 
Marxist historiography.290 Reasons for such an interpretation lie perhaps in the frequent 
references to Marx and the use of the terminology of political economics. For example, 
Pohlmann acknowledged that Rome gained her wealth more or less from political 
activities, custom, fees, taxes, blackmail etc., but claimed that other centres such as 
286 A parallel to Meyer and Beloch becomes apparent, he somehow, amongst many others of thei~ colleagues. 
held the romantic and idealising view that Rome's rise and demise marks the key momentum from \\ hlch 
the world received its impulses' Christ (1972) p. 208. On the large amount of literature see e.g. Chml 
(l970Y, Lehmann (1993), Love (1991) and Deininger (1989). ..' '. , ' , f 
287 Beloch (1886), see also Beloch (1911) and recently an 'economlc-fmanclal ~tud) by Cohen (199_) C . 
Meikle (1995a) p. 186 n34. 
288 On the primarily agrarian character of the Roman 'economy' see Weber (1891). 
289 See Humphreys (1977) p. 139 and the critical remarks by Finley (19980) p. 49 f. 
290 See Meikle (1995b) p. 122 n26. 
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Alexandria created their wealth on the basis of industry. With respect to Marx, Pohlmann 
noted that 'when 'Marx, in his manner, fonnulated it as a general law that 'the 
accumulation of assets, on the one hand, have simultaneously created the accumulation of 
poverty, on the other hand, then Rome in particular - and the ancient metropolis in general 
- offers a dramatic proof for such a fatal concurrence of extremes. '291 Pohlmann, in this 
context, does characterise the Roman economy as a 'proletarian alms economy'. By 
elaborating on observations ?f this kind, Pohlmann drew clear parallels between poor 
housing, public health and the nature of work of ancient Rome and the modem capitalist 
cities of his days.292 Pohlmann and Marx may have had the common perception that social 
inequalities will not continue to leave the existence of the state unaffected, and that 
overcrowding and a one-sided private accumulation of collectively produced surplus is 
likely to lead to radical social unrest and change. However, their political stance and 
historiographical method differed considerably. Whilst Marx would have preferred to have 
witnessed the end of capitalism and the emergence of a society which is more adequate to 
people's needs, Pohlmann, on the other hand, saw the aristocratic order and its 
conservative civic values under threat from industrial urbanisation. With regard to Marxist 
historiography, we only need to look into his paper 'Ranke's Weltgeschichte' to discover 
his programmatic opposition to any new method in historiography. 'And, what should one 
say about the modem interpretation of the "meaning" of history. For example, the 
evolutionary theory of Marxism, for which social class struggle is the "essence" of history. 
Or this pan-economics, which regards the history of mankind as a struggle either for the 
"food distribution" or for the "food-supply". Or the "philosophy of technology", which 
made the baffling discovery that "the whole of human history pervades itself in the 
invention of ever better tools".' 293 Whether the summaries of contemporary theories are too 
simplistic and wrong is not be our concern. It is only important to note that this essay 
demonstrates that Pohlmann distanced himself from viewing materialism and positivism as 
acceptable historiography methods and in tum expressed his admiration for Ranke's 
achievements. 294 In his essay 'A World History on a Geographical Basis', Pohlmann 
blames his contemporary pan-economic worldview for stripping history of everything non-
productive and non-quantifiable. 295 However, if we compare Pohlmann's aversion against 
291 Pohlmann (1884) p. 50. 
292 See Kohns (1961) p. 140 f. 
293 Pohlmann (1911) p. 279. 
294 Pohlmann (1911) p. 291,299. 
295 See Pohlmann (1911) p. 320. 
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materialism and positivism with his main works on . anCIent history, a certain 
terminological and methodological proximity to new historiographical approaches is hard 
to deny, which reflects badly on his theoretical rigour and consistency. 
The title of Pohlmann's main work, 'The history of the Social Question and of 
Socialism in the Ancient World', which emerged out of a similarly entitled study, 'The 
History of Ancient Socialism and Communism'296, during his professorship at Erlangen, 
still causes amusement and ironic comments amongst contemporary scholars, but perhaps 
for the wrong reasons. 
The central purpose of the 'Social Question' (Soziale Frage) was Pohlmann's claim 
that 'the ancient world was moved by the same existential questions, ... which are still 
partially unsolved and tend to bother every honest man. The view of the traditional guild 
[of historians], which more or less believes it is entitled to afford to ignore the great social 
and cultural questions, ... disparages the value which antiquity could bear for the present. 
For if we are unable to develop our science of antiquity into a science about the ancient 
folklore in ALL its aspects of life, than we shall never be able to bring antiquity closer to 
ourselves and to others. '297 It is not clear to whom Pohlmann refers as the 'traditional 
guild', but if it is Gibbon or Niebuhr, his criticism is not justified. It also becomes 
apparent that Pohlmann's attempt to grasp all aspects of ancient folklore puts him rather 
closer to Lamprecht's goals than to Ranke's idealistic Universalgeschichte, which invites 
one to question whether Pohlmann has truly understood Ranke. 
Officially, Pohlmann rejected any attempt to modernise antiquity or to use it for 
political ends seeing it as jeopardising the complexity of the past in favour of inaccurate 
and over-simple generalisations befitting a particular ideology and claiming that 'such 
schematic classifications are only designed to fool the ordinary mind. 298 It seems that 
Pohlmann repudiates the above mentioned reductivist accounts of history, such as 
materialism and, secondly, wants to demolish the myth of a 'sentimental idyllic' and 
harmonious form of socialism or communism in antiquity - a view which had hardly any 
support.299 
296 See Pohlmann Soziale Frage, Pohlmann (1893/1901). 
297 Sozjale Frage I p. 6. 
298 Soziale Frage I p. 9. .' S -h 'khart 
299 Salvioli in Kautsky (1909) and Salin (1923) or the Renaissance idealisation of antlqult?'. See L W~I 
. ., 'Th' tance ot technology m Past (1996). A good example is also Pohlmann review ofRledler s paper e Impor . _ "» 
and Future:' In Pohlmann (.1911) p. 3~2. Against. a romantic.is~d 'ancient SOCI~I~S~ 8~~d. Lommum~m ~cc 
also his article 'The RomantIC Element In CommunIsm and SOCialIsm of the Greeks ( ) 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
210 
However, Pohlmann's declared proximity to political economy, especially to 
Roscher and the application of modem concepts such as 'proletariat' and 'class struagle' 
C',- ' 
raises the question of what exactly troubles him about materialism. Pohlmann declares, for 
example that the patriarchal property rights in i h and 6th century Greece were already 
posing a social question.3°O He maintains that it was not harmony, but class struggle that 
dominated these centuries, which evolved into 'the history of the proletarian movement in 
the Hellenic world. '301 One cannot deny that Pohlmann intended to paint a very complex 
picture of the social and economic changes during the Homeric period. His conclusion 
however that this 'social question' resulted in a 'universal hegemony of money'302 and an 
increase in the pleonexie as a 'necessary companion of the capitalistic national 
economy'303, shows not only an indiscriminate use of modem terminology but presupposes 
the existence of nation states, capitalism, industry and an established money economy. It 
seems that the only difference noted between ancient and modem capitalism is in its scope. 
The former operated primarily at 'national' level, the latter operates globally. When Christ 
in his biographical sketch maintains that 'Pohlmann's definition of Roman capitalism ... is 
still valid' ,304 one may wonder whether the use of the term is at all adequate, and whether 
the Pohlmann description of an ever deepening antagonism between the moral ideals of 
freedom and equality for all citizens and the injustice and poverty of social reality has a 
factual historical basis. The parallels between antiquity and present, between ancient and 
modem capitalism are for Pohlmann somehow inevitable wherever and whenever a social 
question arises. 'The social question had to appear as the result of the inner development 
of the Hellenic polis as in the modem state, '305 The emergence of such a social question, is 
however, equally ingrained into every political structure since it represents the logical 
disjunction between political and ethical ideas and the social and material reality, which 
however takes its own peculiar forms,306 
In order to attain a holistic and more realistic picture of the ancient world as it was 
Pohlmann's agenda not only appreciates and praises the cultural achievements, but also 
seeks to destroy the ill-founded myth of continuous prosperity, harmony and social 
camaraderie amongst the ancient citizens and to bring to light hardship, injustice and 
300 Soziale Frage I. p. 29 ff. 
301 Soziale Frage. I p. 156. 
302 Soziale Frage. I p. 189. 
303 Soziale Frage. I p. 193. 
304 Christ (1972) p. 208. 
305 Soziale Frage. I p. 234.. .' . . . Euro e IS Pcihlmann's paper 
306 A good example for the diverSIty of the SOCial reality In modern and ancIent P 
PART II. METHOD OR IDEOLOGY? 
211 
brutality tOO. For Pohlmann, the greatness and cultural richness of antiquity, its remaining 
legacy and fascinating place in human history were bought at a high price, that of the 
exploitation and suppression of enslaved outsiders and the pauperised working classes. 
Pohlmann's 'pick and mix' philosophy with regard to his attempt to comprehend the 
achievements and disasters of the ancient world are also reflected in his interpretation and 
evaluation of Greek philosophy. According to Pohlmann, the works of Plato and Aristotle 
are to be taken as indirect reactions to important social, 'economic' and ethical debates 
during the classical period. 'The principal debate between individualism and socialism in 
the 4th century Be, fought the fight for us and serves us as an example as in which 
situation we find ourselves now.'307 
Besides his intentions to warn his audience about the dangers of socialist 
collectivism and capitalist individualism, Pohlmann must have adapted a whole set of 
modem presuppositions which he applied uncritically to the political writings of Plato and 
Aristotle. Even if both dealt with issues such as the justification of private property, the 
function of money and exchange and the proper role of government and constitutions, it 
does not follow from this that the modem political sciences in particular economics have 
their roots in ancient Greek philosophy and political practice.308 
In examining Pohlmann's efforts to show how Plato's collectivism was bound to fail 
since it subsumed individuality, it becomes clear that Pohlmann saw himself in the 
tradition of Kantian idealism, rejecting the elitist prejudice common to the Prussian School 
that the 'ordinary man' is incapable of practical reasoning. This applies as well to the 
presupposition of the established historical scholarship that man is simply a herd-animal, 
who requires the historian or philosopher to be his 'god authorised' shepherd. In 
accordance with Kant, 'consciousness, will and reason' are capable of autonomy and 
human beings should be conceived as having such an essential potential. Thought and 
reason should not be suppressed, but encouraged to flourish freely in order to attain the 
realm of positive freedom and morality.309 
Pohlmann's connection with the spirit of the enlightenment is perhaps most 
apparent in a chapter entitled 'The Hellenic polis and the freedom of the spiritual life' of 
his Griechische Geschichte. 310 Pohlmann believed that during the Hellenic period 'the 
'The h~using Shortage in the Ancient Cities'. See Pbhlmann (1911) p. 293 ff. 
307 Quoted from Christ (1972) p. 220. 
308 See Meikle (1989) and in more detail (1995b) 
309 So::.iale Frage. II p. 236. 
310 See P()hlmann (1914). 
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idea of civil liberties and equality of all [citizens]' found their first realisation in the 
social realiti 11 and he referred to the Greeks of the time as the 'most spirited of all 
peoples.'312 Whilst the 'slavery question' remained almost untouched, Pohlmann idealised 
the late 5th and early 4th century as the age of the 'liberation of men by the Greeks.'313 
Pohlmann, in his veneration of this so called 'enlightenment age' of antiquity, argued that 
Hellas aimed to distance itself from any kind of mysticism and superstition. Worship of 
that kind only enslaves the human spirit according to Pohlmann and should be replaced 
by faith in reason. The idealisation of human reasoning, and Pohlmann's failure to define 
it more concisely, could however also be interpreted as being nothing more than an 
idealistic dream, which he, like many of his contemporaries, did read into the Hellenic 
period. 
We pointed out that the decline of the Roman Empire and the political constitutions 
of ancient Greece became a kind of 'arsenal for conservatives and democrats, liberals and 
socialists.'314 Although it is perhaps a little exaggerated to claim that the debates around 
ancient Greek history were a 'seismograph' for the much disputed social and national 
question in Germany, Pohlmann's rejection of the idea of the modern democracy goes 
hand in glove with his claim that, due to the Athenian democratic order, the masses were 
abused as the 'substrate of the technicians of mass leadership. '315 The demagogic 
temptations of Plato and Isocrates are rejected along with those of his democratic and 
socialist contemporaries of the likes of the English historian, George Grote and the 
German Marxist revisionist, Karl Kautsky. Democracy and socialism are the most deadly 
poisons for the flourishing of the 'cultured and free individual', even if the latter's 
numbers is small and their privileges are greater than those of the masses. 
Since for Pohlmann the utopian ideals of ancient collectivism, 'socialism and 
communism' combined with pauperism are largely responsible for the demise of 
antiquity, the darkest force is identified in the shape of materialism and Marxism. 
Pohlmann attacked in particular Karl Kautsky, as one of the leading intellectual 
figureheads of Marxism, for holding an evolutionary theory of economic development. 
which ends with the inevitable socialist revolution.316 Kautsky was indeed the main 
initiator of the 'revisionist movement', which sought to reinterpret Marx as an 
311 Pohlmann (1914) p. 98. 
312 Pohlmann (1914) p. WI. 
313 Pohlmann (1914) p. 123 f., p. 135. 
314 Christ (1986) p. 311. See also Funke (1998) p. 15 f. 
315 Pohlmann in Christ (1972) p. 235 n128. 
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evolutionary economist for whom the antagonism between the proletarian productive 
forces and the capitalist ownership of the means of production would necessarily resolve 
itself in socialism.317 
The downfall of Hellas exemplifies for Pohlmann the short-comings of the 
democratic executive powers, which were governed by political amateurs who were 
incapable of 'attaining a political culture, which was ready to reject the illusion that 
democracy is identical with freedom. '318 And further, 'here we face everywhere the 
corroding and destroying power of the "poison of the tongue of the enticing seducers" into 
which, as Euripides phrased it, the "arrows of isotropy are dipped in", which the 
proletarian greed has pointed at the property owners'.319 Reasoning has no longer any effect 
upon the demagogically seduced masses, Pohlmann lamented. When we consider 
Pohlmann's rejection of democratic ideas as the 'brutal overpowering of minorities by the 
majority'320 or the 'emancipation of the juggernauts of the mere number'321, the idealisation 
of pure practical reasoning as the realm of freedom and his programmatic doctrine that we 
can 'only study and understand our human existence through a study, which equally 
considers the past as well as the present'322, then it is clear that Pohlmann committed the 
same fallacy of which he accused Grote and Kautsky; a point which was overlooked by 
Christ. However, Funke was of the opinion that such a fallacy 'should not to be judged 
negatively' .323 
It cannot be denied that Pohlmann deliberately used the example of the ancient 
world as a weapon against the modem democratic and socialist dream. However, it 
sounds astonishing when we hear his glorifying remarks about the Hohenzollern 
monarchy as personifying a liberal and lawful attitude, with its protection of minorities 
and the idealisation of the class of the highly educated and property owning class, as the 
'natural born envoy of individual liberty' .324 By doing so, Pohlmann abuses antiquity in 
exactly the same fashion as his political enemies and it is surprising that none of our 
contemporary historians have identified this problem. 
316 Pohlmann (1911) p. 394. . ., . 
317 See Kautsky (1912) See also Kautsky' s notion essays on communism In antIqul ty, the middle ages and the 
reformation period in Germany in Kautsky (1909). 
318 Pohlmann (1914) p. 223. 
319 Pohlmann (1913) p. 52. 
320 PohJmann in Christ (1972) p. 236 n132. 
321 Pohlmann in Christ (1972) p. 236 n133. 
m Pohlmann in Christ (1972) p. 235 n129 . 
.123 
, Funke (1998) p. 19. . r' I education of the modern 
3d See Pohlmann's essay 'Classical Antiquity in its Importance for the po Itlca 
citizen' in Pc)hlmann (1911) pp. 1-33. Especially. p. 9 f. 
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One may however not forget that Pohlmann's age, the late 19th and early 20th 
century, was filled with apocalyptic predictions, which in the light of rapid 
industrialisation and urbanisation accompanied by political and economic crises and 
instability, must have contributed to his deep worry that history would repeat itself. We 
know that the modem Europe during the later part of Pohlmann's life faced existential 
. h' h 'b h h ' 325 questIOns w IC must ot er every onest man. However, that these questions can. or 
should be equated to the problems that faced the classical Greece and Rome does not 
follow from this. The idea of the recurrence of human history or a cyclic development 
and demise of cultures was a very popular view amongst historians and philosophers, and 
therefore invited the formulation of historic parallels between particular periods of the 
Greek and Roman culture with modem Europe.326 Like his younger colleague, Eduard 
Meyer, Pohlmann remarked regretfully that 'it is a sad, hopeless circle in which the 
history of European Hellenism is placed under the aspect of the new monarchies.'327 This 
is again an example of Pohlmann presupposing the existence of a set of basic and 
unchanging principles or natures in the dynamics between state, society and its citizens, 
which remain insufficiently discussed by Pohlmann and also by Meyer. 
Pohlmann's intention to give a holistic account of the history of the social question 
of ancient Greece and Rome was heavily criticised by Mattias Gelzer, who wrote a rather 
one-sided review of Pohlmann 'Geschichte des Antiken Sozialismus und Kommunismus'.328 
It must be symptomatic for the historiography of ancient history in Germany, that Gelzer 
disputed only Pohlmann's selection of the historical sources, but did not question the 
frequent modernising approach to ancient history between the social problems of the 
modem industrial cities and the pauperism of the Roman Metropolis, which was primarily 
an agranan area. 
Although Pohlmann employed a good deal of materialist terminology and owes, as 
we have seen, parts of his award winning postdoctoral thesis on 'Overpopulation' to 
Marx329, he ended his 'Geschichte der Sozialen Frage' which was certainly not in Marx's 
spirit with the bitter outburst, ' ... "create yourself a new order and you will experience 
325 Soziale Frage I p. 6. 0 Id 
326 Speculations of this sort are found amongst many prominent historians such as Eduard Meyer, sw~, 
Spengler and Max Weber. The often asserted 'modernisation' of antiquity should however not be treated as a 
.. . I nevertheless E verv event tlr 
sIgn of an ineVItable course of human hIstory, but as a genera concern ", . 
. ., d I" . Th uestion is however, how SImilar personality in history has of course ItS own IdentIty an pecu lantIes. e q 
or analogue historic events can be to justify the formulation of an analogy? 
327 Pohlmann (1914) p. 323. 
328 See Gelzer (1914) p. 102 ff. 
329 See Pohlmann (1884). 
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miracles' , this is the inheritance which ancient socialism left all later [socialisms] ... .It is the 
same belief...through which the communist kingdom of God on earth became a cruel 
reality. The same belief.. .. which is in numerous human hearts still very much alive today 
as it was in the Roman Empire, the hope of the Christians for the 'kingdom of God' _ the 
greatest mass-delusion of world history. '330 Such bitter remarks do not improve 
Pohlmann's credibility in the wider context of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. However, 
Pohlmann's work highlights a number of interesting aspects, which should perhaps be 
considered to have contributed to the controversy. 
Firstly, Pohlmann sought to establish a closer link between AltertumswissellschaJt 
and NationalOkonomie than any of his predecessors and contemporaries. As a political 
ancient historian he continuously highlighted the value of ancient social and political 
history for the education of the young German citizen Pohlmann's analysis of the 
antagonisms, which necessarily emerge in the relationship between the social reality and 
political superstructure seem to point towards the methodology of the political theorists 
Marx, Gneist and Stein.33l All three of these authors inquired into the concepts and the 
relationship of society, state, law and their history. Pohlmann therefore did not reject a 
'socio-economical' and political historiographical method, which Meyer rejected 
wholeheartedly. But even Pohlmann's only methodological paper 'The Method of Ancient 
History' does not discuss the problem of value connection in the formulation of historical 
judgements. Even if Pohlmann was the first ancient historian who discovered the 
importance of political economy and economic history for the study of ancient history, his 
attempts to use certain events of antiquity in order to debate modem political and economic 
problems remain highly problematic. 
One can certainly call Pohlmann's position original since it somehow tries to unite 
what many of his contemporaries would see as impossible to unite. It is therefore not 
surprising that Pohlmann had no direct followers, but his mixture of conservative values, 
the admiration for Ranke and Niebuhr and the belief in some sort of dynamics between 
individual decision making, society and the state does not let us categorise him as being 
between BUcher and Meyer. In terms of the direct comparisons between antiquity and 
modernity and the cyclic economic and political development combined with the a 
nationalistic value system, his position is undoubtedly closer·to Beloch and Meyer. Since 
BUcher tries to avoid such a methodology including the application of modem historical 
330 Soziale Frage. II p. 508. 
33l Pohlmann (1914) p. 5 f. cited in Christ (1972) p. 227 n94. 
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concepts into the ancient 'economy', it is difficult to make out any noteworthy connection 
between the two. However, the obituaries have shown that Pohlmann was genuinely 
regarded as a well-acknowledged scholar, who perhaps deserves more attention than his 
work has received to date. Friedrich Oertel's 'Supplement' and Christ's biographical 
sketch certainly made a valuable contribution to the history of historiography, but a 
historiographical study is still missing which would allow us to determine more clearly 
what influence Pohlmann's work had on historical and political scholarship. 
THE BUCHER-MEYER CONTROVERSY 
Part III - Max Weber and the Aftermath of the Bucher-Meyer 
Controversy 
• See Metz (1979) p. 646. 
'The true tradition is not a witness of a completed past. 
it is a lively force, which stimulates and instructs the 
present...One ties up to a tradition in order to create 
something new.' STRAVINSKY· 
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1. Max Weber's 'Solution' to the Controversy 
Introduction 
In the previous two parts we aimed to show that the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
was not simply a dispute between two scholars who academically, and also on a more 
personal level, had very little in common indeed. After having examined its background, 
this controversy exemplifies the respectable efforts by both scholars to understand and 
evaluate the cultural inheritance of antiquity and to apply its political, social and economic 
status as part of a theory of economic development in one way or another. The 
insurmountable differences in method and ideology between BUcher and Meyer, as well as 
the political circumstances and feuds within academia, hindered the possibility of a 
solution or even a compromise between the debating sides. Under the above mentioned 
circumstances it is difficult to see where and how such a compromise could have occurred. 
Nevertheless, it has been frequently asserted that Max Weber attempted to find a 
solution to the bitterly fought and ideologically burdened debate by attempting to bridge 
the epistemological gap between historicism and the methodologies of the empirical social 
and psycho-analytical sciences. Chapter one of this final part will argue against this 
misconception. Instead, we aim to establish that Weber did not simply introduce a blended 
version of opposing views in economic history, but that he opened a new chapter in 
historiographical methodology and that he made substantial progress in the field of ancient 
economic history in general. However, we aim to highlight the claim that Weber did not 
make a 'fresh start' with his analysis of the ancient economy, but that he built upon 
BUcher's and Meyer's theories.! 
Chapter two will focus on Weber's influence over later generations of ancient and 
economic historians. After Weber mainly Johannes Hasebroek and Michael I. Rostovtzeff 
continued the debate over the nature of the ancient economy. Other contributors such as 
Laum, Rosenberg and Oertel will be briefly considered and examined in the context of the 
BUcher-Meyer controversy.2 We aim to show that the ideological and methodological 
divisions amongst philosophers, historians and political economists can deliver a comple\ 
! Cf Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) p. 3. . " > Ch' 1981 ) 
2 For a good introduction into the connection of Weber and the BUcher-Meyer Contrtners) st.::e nst ( 
pp. 102-116. 
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explanation as to why the question over the nature of the ancient economy is still pending a 
solution, and why this exciting debate seems to have become less popular in recent years. 
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I. Biographical Note3 
Max Weber was born in 1864 in Erfurt, the eldest son of seven children the son of a 
successful nation-liberal politician, Dr Max Weber, who was first a city councillor in 
Berlin and Erfurt and later became a member of the Prussian House of Deputies and of the 
German Reichstag. Max Weber's father's commitment to the German National Liberal 
ideology, which was largely at peace with Bismarck's nationalist and reformist aims, this 
would influence the younger Weber significantly.4 The young Weber grew up in what 
could be called a cultured bourgeois household. Leading academics and politicians were 
frequent guests at the Weber home. Here Weber met well known historians of the Prussian 
School, such as Sybel and Treitschke, but also the highly recognised Roman historian, 
Theodor Mommsen as well as the philosopher, Wilhelm Dilthey. 
With only short interruptions due to his military service, Weber studied law in Jena, 
Heidelberg and Berlin between 1882-1885. During his period of study he was taught and 
influenced by the economist Karl Knies, the ancient historian and expert in Roman law, 
Immanuel Becker, studied medieval and German history with Bernhard Erdmannsdoerffer 
and was introduced to the philosophy of the neo-Kantian philosopher, Kuno Fischer.5 
In 1888 he joined the national-liberal orientated 'Verein for Sozialpolitik' 
(,Association for Social Policy'). In 1889 he was awarded a suma cum laude for his PhD 
thesis and completed his post-doctoral thesis On Roman Agrarian History (Zur Romischen 
Agrargeschichte) in 189l. His 'Habilitationsschrift' was published in 1892 and concerned 
the plight of the East Elbean agricultural workers (,Die Verhiiltnisse der Landarbeiter im 
Ostelbischen Deutschland'). Both works are not only noteworthy due to the scholarly 
excellence with which they were carried out and presented, but they also underline 
Weber's encyclopaedic and interdisciplinary abilities, which earned him a lectureship at 
the Humboldt University of Berlin - Prussia's leading institution for the training of first 
class academics and loyal state bureaucrats.6 
In the previous chapters it frequently came to light that many German academics, 
especially those who took part or were associated with the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
were eager to promote their ideas to a wider academic and semi-academic audience. In 
3 Very comprehensive is Coser (1977) pp, 234-242. More detailed is Zohn (1975). 
4 Coser (1977) p. 234 ff. 
5 Coser (1977) p. 237 ff. 
6 Coser (1977) p. 238 f. 
PART III MAX WEBER AND THE AFTERMA TH OF THE CONTROVERSY 
221 
order to find an audience and in order to be a credible patriotic modern German scholar, 
intellectuals in all Humanities disciplines had to combine the highly specialised and 
sometimes overly detailed research findings with the burning political question of their 
time. As Friedrich Meinecke noted, 'at the turn of the century the number of students 
of...history had ... everywhere sunk to a low figure, after that. However, it mounted again to 
such an extent that the decade prior to the first World War can rank as a golden age for 
historical...and philosophical study. q Due to a dramatically increased popularity of these 
academic disciplines, the scholar was ever closer to the centre of public attention. It is 
therefore perhaps not surprising that Weber's inaugural address of 1895 on The National 
State and Economic Policy, aimed to address a topic of public interest.s 
In The National State and Economic Policy Weber creatively combined findings 
from the increasingly popular field of economic and constitutional history with his own 
national-liberal agenda, which brought him to the attention of a wider scholarly and 
political audience than he had been able to reach previously with his studies in ancient and 
modern agrarian social history. His new recognition led to his post at Heidelberg in 1896 
where he succeeded his former teacher Karl Knies as professor of political economy.9 In 
Heidelberg, Weber not only re-established contacts with his other former teachers, Bekker, 
Erdmannsdoerffer and Kuno Fischer, but found new friends and colleagues, such as the 
legal scholar, Georg Jellinek, and the theologian, Ernst Troeltsch. Weber established 
himself, whilst still remarkably young, as one of Heidelberg's leading academic figures. 
In 1897 Weber's promising and flourishing scholarly and semi-political career in 
the Verein came to an abrupt standstill due to a nervous breakdown from which he was not 
to recover for over five years. Positive signs of recovery are not notable until 1903 when 
he managed to join the Archiv for Socialwissenschaft as co-editor alongside the political 
economist Werner Sombart. This Journal soon became one of the leading German social 
science periodicals. Weber's editorial duties allowed him to re-establish old contacts to 
friends and academic colleagues that he had lost due to his long mental illness.lO 
In 1904 a former colleague and later Harvard scholar and political analyst, Hugo 
Muensterberg, invited Weber to present a paper to the Congress of Arts and Sciences in St. 
7 Meinecke (1941) p. 20. 
S 
Coser (1977) p. 238 f. h h It "I 
9 Not professor of 'economics' as Coser (1977) p. 238 stated. It cannot be stressed enoug t at pOI ILa 
h b· . t' t the nature of the capltah~t economy and 'economics' are not entirely synonymous. Bot su ~ects Inves Iga e .. 
. . ., h' h shape and govern pohtlC~. 
economy but economics assumes a predominance of economic InstitutIOns, w IC. . 
, h (al Importance 01 the State Most political economists still acknowledged at the turn of the century t e essen I 
as the legislator and guardian of the national interest. 
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Louis. The lecture was about the social structure of Germany and was the first he had 
given for six and a half years. In his graduate studies Weber developed ' , an IncreasIng 
interest in the links between Protestantism and the growth and fostering of capitalism by 
the American bureaucracy. His later work on The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of 
Capitalism benefited from those frequent journeys and studies. 11 
Weber's return to his chair at Heidelberg in the winter 1905 marked a new era in 
his scholarly career. Not only did he publish one of his most original works, The 
Protestant Ethic, but in the same year he also became one of the founding members of the 
'Deutsche Soziologische Gesellschaft' alongside the political theorist, Ferdinand Toennies 
and the social philosopher, George Simmel. 
The years before the First World War were probably the most active and creative in 
Weber's academic career. He started to rebuild old friendships and made new 
acquaintances that enriched his work. During these years his working environment at his 
home in Heidelberg can probably be described as vibrant and fruitful. His home and 
academic environment can be regarded as one of the more liberal-orientated centres for 
stimulating and richly varying intellectual exchanges and popular-scientific gatherings. 
Amongst the many scholars old and young are familiar names, such as Troeltsch, Simmel, 
and Sombart, as well as the neo-Kantian philosophers, Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich 
Rickert and Emil Lask, the literary critic and historian Friedrich Gundolf, and the 
intellectual historian Karl J aspers. 12 Young radical Marxist philosophers like Ernst Bloch 
and Georg Lukacs were to join the circle shortly before the war. 13 
After Weber's initial support for the World War, which he shared with most 
German intellectuals and politicians, his enthusiasm faded and turned eventually into 
disillusionment and anger. Much of his time was taken up with attempting to influence the 
German government not to drag America into the war as he prophesised a gloomy outcome 
for Germany's imperialistic endeavour. Though Weber was not a principled enemy of the 
10 Coser (1977) p, 240 f. 
II See Honningsheim (1950), h b' 
12 One only needs to read the collection of appreciation and obituaries by these scholars put to~et er y 
, ' I d ' f Weber was Konig (1985) to realise how the intellect, academiC achievements and the mora etermmatlOn 0 " 
, , 'd' Th' k' also useful in respect of the 
echoed positively from left to right WithIn and outSide aca emla, IS wor IS 
h " C t 'but )rs amon<lst others are political and ideological reflections of those scholars over t elr tIme, on n l cc, 
, Th d H J h S 'humpeter and Fnedfll'h Heinrich Rickert, Max Rehm, Ernst Bloch, LUJo Brentano, eo or euss, osep l 
Meinecke, ' . 
, . bl' h d' . k about thIS VIbrant pre-\\ar 
IJ One of the younger members of the circle, Paul Homngshelm, pu IS e a \\or 
intellectual climate surrounding Weber. See Honningsheim (1947). 
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war, he rejected the overly imperialistic ambitious and doomed cause of the aristocratic 
Junker forces of the 'Right'. 
When Karl Liebknecht In the 'January Rising' of 1919 declared the Socialist 
Republic in Berlin, Weber was appalled about what was in his eyes no more than a bloody 
carnival. But he soon rallied to it and attempted to develop the basis for a liberal German 
policy. The end of the war saw Weber returning to his academic work. With the 
beginning of the summer semester in spring 1918 Weber moved to Vienna; a year later he 
accepted a call to the Ludwig Maximilain's University of Munich. His well-known 
lectures, 'Science as a Vocation' (,Wissenschaft als Beruf') and 'Politics as a Vocation'. 
were first delivered to an audience of students at Munich in 1919, and bear all the marks of 
his attempt to define his national-democratic political and intellectual orientation and to 
highlight the importance of scientific impartiality in this stormy period of revolutionary 
upheaval. 14 During this period, and in the immediate post-war years, Weber also worked on 
his main work, 'Economy and Society' (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft). Although he was 
not able to complete this work, what he finished was published posthumously, as were his 
last series of lectures at Munich, which were to have been the basis for a General 
Economic History. 
Max Weber died aged only fifty-six in Munich 1920. Although Weber's scholarly 
influence over many disciplines in the human sciences, and across national boundaries 
after his death continues to be vast, during his lifetime he never reached the scholarly 
prominence of an Eduard Meyer or Theodor Mommsen, but that was perhaps never his 
ambition. His main achievements lie in his philosophy of science and its applications into 
sociology, social history and the history of political economy, which is why his name 
appears in almost all commentaries on the Bucher-Meyer Controversy. Alexander 
Demandt and Jurgen Mommsen are currently in charge of editing Weber's bequest into the 
Max Weber Gesamtausgabe. 
14 Coser (1977) p. 242. 
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ii. Weber and the 'Traditional' Reading of the Ancient Economy 
Weber's VieW of the nature of ancient ec h f b onomy as 0 ten een mistakenly 
interpreted as constituting a kind of middle position between BUcher and Meyer. 15 Hand in 
hand with this illusive simplification comes the suggestion that one could simply 
disconnect Weber's interpretation of the ancient economy from his intellectual background 
and the traditional reading of the ancient economy in the German historiography. Alfred 
Heuss once pointed out that 'when it is not the sociology of religion in Max Weber, which 
has importance for antiquity [the study of antiquity], then, the conjecture is close, that 
antiquity was picked up by him in its plain 'historicity'. That is to say, in the broadness of 
its phenomena and not, right from the start, under the abstraction of a single peculiar 
aspect.>I6 Heuss pointed out that Weber's approach towards the subject was strongly 
influenced by the emphasis of the dominant political forces in history. It is perhaps 
surprising that Weber advanced so considerably far into the social and economic world of 
ancient Greece and Rome, as he was not a professionally trained historian. However, 
interest in this subject was second nature to almost any scholar in the human sciences who 
attempted to base themselves seriously in the German academic world and who reached 
some kind of prominence. As for BUcher and Meyer, Weber's interest into antiquity as a 
whole derived quite probably from its politically recognised importance as one of the most 
indispensable key elements in the German education system. It was also a powerful and 
pervasive element of the German Gymnasia and university curricula system which, since 
Niebuhr and Ranke, had placed an emphasis on ancient political history and classical 
philology. We also noted earlier in Part II that AltertumswissenschaJt experienced a 
considerable tum towards realism towards the end of the 19th century. By this we mean a 
tum towards a more practical reading of ancient history and its classical authors in order to 
rear and prepare the young and modem German citizens for the patriotic cause of an 
ambitious new-born German nation in the hands of the Prussian aristocracy and their 
entrepreneur companions. Historical realities and national struggles headed by grandiose 
personalities became the focal point of the historical inquiry and accompanied a move 
away from pure 'humanistic values' with an emphasis on textual, rhetoric and drama. 17 
15 Deininger (1990) p. 144. 
16 Heuss (1965) p. 537. 
17 See Heuss (1965) p. 532 f. 
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Eduard Meyer and Karl Julius Beloch, who dominated ancient Greek history in the 
late 19
th 
and early 20
th 
century, became well known during Weber's years at the University 
of Heidelberg. Wilamowitz-Mollendorf, Wilcken and the great Theodor Mommsen had 
already reached the hall of fame of ancient Greek and Roman history. Their impact on the 
subject has already been briefly sketched out in the previous part and is well-documented.18 
Another contemporary of Weber was Ulrich Mitteis, lecturer in ancient history and 
law at Heidelberg. 19 Mitteis fostered and significantly influenced Weber's interest in 
ancient law and history. Evidence of Weber's first steps in legal and economic history 
came to light with the publication of an article on medieval trade-law and trade 
organisations. 20 This work formed the basis for his post-doctoral thesis on Roman agrarian 
history two years later. 21 The Agrargeschichte of 1891 carried, of course, the influence of 
his supervisor, August Meitzen (1822-1910),22 from whom Weber learnt the practical 
concept of the importance of 'fundamental types' of agrarian constitution ('Grundtypen 
der Agrarverfassung').23 Weber was yet to reflect on the methodological implications of 
introducing and defining such types, but they already play an important part during his 
early work. 
For the purpose of this thesis it is of course necessary to outline all possible 
scholarly influences on Weber's interpretation of the ancient world. However, in order to 
indicate where Weber should be seen in the BUcher-Meyer Controversy and to what extent, 
if at all, he has developed the arguments any further, it would be useful to contrast Weber's 
'ancient economy' and his philosophy of history with that of Eduard Meyer. It is perhaps 
here that we can seek clarification about Weber's idealistic roots and the considerable 
differences in the German classical scholarship of the 19th century, of which Meyer was 
clearly a well-known representative and advocate. 24 
It should be pointed out that Weber never actually intended to enter the debate 
between BUcher and Meyer directly. Weber makes explicit mentioning of both scholars 
with regard to the context of the Controversy only very sporadically and is rarely assertive. 
The exception was Meyer's philosophy of history, which Weber scrutinised a 
systematically, but without attempting to question Meyer's achievements as one of the 
18 On Mommsen see Hartmann (1908) and Wickert (1980). On Wilken and Willamowitz see Christ (1996). 
19 On Mitteis see Weiss (1922). 
20 9 See Weber (188 ). 
21 See Weber (1891) in MWG vol. V2 (1986). 
22 See Meitzen (1895). 
23 See Deiniger in MWG V2 (1996) p. l7 f., 19 n25. 
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most prominent ancient historians. 25 Meyer's response and critical analysis of \\'eber's 
works is more fragmented and occasional than vice versa. Overall it seemed that ~eyer 
was primarily pleased about Weber's critical comments regarding the scientific defects in 
the validity of Rodbertus' 'oikos' theory, which almost sums up Meyer's relationship to 
the legal and agrarian historian from Heidelberg.26 
If one does not wish to presume that Meyer nourished scholarly prejudice against 
Weber due to lack of formal ancient historical and classical training of the latter, it must be 
surpnsmg that although both were actively seeking universally substantiated 
Weltanschauung, Weber's work in the field of social and economic history left Meyer 
largely untouched. 27 In return Weber dedicated a substantial part of his writings in ancient 
'economics' to the analysis of Meyer's works from his history of ancient Greece to his 
work on ancient Judaism and the ancient Orient. 
The first considerable work by Weber showing the influence of Meyer was Die 
Romische Agrargeschichte of 189l. The thesis aimed to understand the 'economic' 
implications of ownership in ancient Rome. By doing so it elucidates Weber's interest in 
the ancient economy and in the development of theoretical political economy as a not 
merely historical discipline. This clearly marked an effort by Weber to move away from 
traditional and historical schools of economic analysis. Weber's work shows throughout a 
continuous reference to Meyer's work in ancient history. Most notable is Weber's paper 
on the social decline of the ancient culture of 1897, which can be regarded as a reply to 
Meyer's WEdA of (1895) and the critical analysis of Meyer's philosophy of history in 1906 
as a reply to Meyer's THEORIE. 28 Also worth mentioning are the laudatory remarks 
concerning Meyer's work throughout the three editions of Weber's Agrarverhdltnisse im 
Altertum and at frequent points in his main work, WirtschaJt und GesellschaJt.29 
24 The relationship between the two scholars has recently been sketched out in an article by JUrgen Deininger, 
which provided the basis framework for this subchapter. See Deininger in Calder III (1990) .pp. 132-158. . 
25 See 'Kritische Studien zur Kulturwissenschaftlichen Logik' 1. Zur Auseinandersetzung mIt Eduard Meyer 
in Weber GAWpp. 215-266. . . , ,. , 
26 WEdA p. 83 n1. Weber was particularly critical towards the applicatIOn of Rodbertus Olk?s theorem 
over the entire character of the ancient economy. Weber like Meyer, postulated the return of thiS feature as 
re-emerging at the end of antiquity. See Deininger (1990) p. 139. A previ~us comm~n~ in r:teyer'.sGdA \~'o\. 
II p. 581 was only critical and polemic when Meyer sneered that Weber s lack of hlstoflcal cflt~que Ith 
. ,. t t J·url·sprudence scholarship CIt. In regard to the age of the ager publtcus IS common cus om amongs . .. . 
Deinin-ger (1990) p. 135. Worth noting though is here that one should not equate Rodbertus with Buch~r :-. 
b bl . d d . (fic attack on Rodbertu:-. as an oikos theory. However, it can be argued that Meyer pro a y JU ge a SClen I I 
indirect strike against BUcher's theory of the 'geschlossene Hallswirtschaft'· 
27 GdA vol. 1.2.i. p. ix. 
28 See Weber's Griinde and Weber (1951) pp. 215-290. 
29 WG pp. 5,787 and 816. 
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Even though Weber does not quote Meyer in his paper, GrUnde, some parallels 
between the authors do emerge; likewise with BUcher, which indeed could create the 
impression of Weber holding a middle position between the two. Weber's influential 
paper characterises the ancient culture and its economy as a 'city, slave and coast 
It '30 T t· I I h d cu ure . wo assump IOns are c ear y s are by Weber and Meyer. First of alL Weber 
also assumes that the decline of the Roman Empire was not due to a sudden collapse of its 
power structure, but was a rather gradual process at which end 'stood the recovery of the 
family at the lower layers of society' and 'the restoration of the farming classes' .31 Meyer 
makes a similar point. Secondly, both seem to share the same view regarding the negative 
effects of the ongoing cultural and moral decay of antiquity. The 'Kulturveifall' and the 
decaying ethical standards are for Weber symptomatic and not the sole cause of the 
downfall of the ancient culture. One of the contradictions which emerged from the nature 
of the ancient culture is situated in the dichotomy between free labour in the cities and 
large scale enslavement on Roman fanns that led eventually to a shift in the balance of 
power between the two. It is also interesting that Webber avoids using the term WirtschaJt 
out with the context of culture. It seems that throughout this paper, which should become 
fundamental to his later writings on this subject, the economy is always an aspect of a 
culture, but not dominant. We will return to this point below. Meyer seemed to have 
concentrated more rigorously on the political and moral downfall of antiquity, whilst 
Weber highlighted the cultural decay from a number of social, economic, moral reasons, 
but primarily military reasons.32 This explains perhaps Weber's elucidation in the Griinde 
and can possibly be regarded as an implicit point of contention with Meyer. 33 In opposition 
to Weber, Meyer believed that the reason for the much-debated downfall of Rome was 
rather due to a process of political disintegration and moral corruption. 34 Almost 
categorically Weber maintained in opposition to some of his colleagues in ancient history 
that although it may be understandable if a historian can deliver 'de te narratur tabula' to 
his audience, this seems to be inappropriate in the case of the decline of the Roman 
Empire. He maintained that 'for our current social problems we have very little or nothing 
to learn from the history of antiquity. A proletarian of today and an ancient slave 
understand each other like a European to a Chinese man. Our problems are of a 
30 GrUlzde p. 201-292. 
31 Griillde p. 290. 
32 Griinde p. 29l. 
33 See Griinde p. 295. 
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completely different kind.'35 Therefore, for Weber, the decline of antiquity is only of a 
historical interest. 36 We will see whether he sticks to this premise. 
It is important to note that this conclusion is not based on BUcher's theory of 
economic stages, but on Weber's own research going back as early as 1889 in which he 
already distanced himself from evolutionary theories that postulated the end of the ancient 
civilisation as part of a supersession by something more supreme - modem man.37 
Although Weber does not mention any particular scholar in his paper die Sozialen 
Grunde ('Social Causes'), it was recently suggested that the paper is a direct reaction to 
Meyer's 'famous paper' Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung des Altertums of 1895.38 
However, from the tone and emphasis that Weber used, it is more likely that he criticised 
Pohlmann's and Beloch's all too swift analogies between the social and political 
circumstances of allegedly similar developments in antiquity and the modem world. The 
article in the Handworterbuch continues the analysis, which he had already started in the 
paper Sozialen Grunde and marked a significant contribution to the issues that were 
debated in the BUcher-Meyer Controversy.39 
Since Weber assumes a cyclic cultural development, it is easy to suggest that this 
stems from Meyer's influence. However, Weber argues that the peculiarities of the ancient 
social structure are generally responsible for its decline and he does not put the blame 
primarily onto greedy feudal lords and the decadent lavish immoral lifestyle of the city 
entrepreneurs and politicians as other political historians tend to do. 40 
It was recently suggested by JUrgen Deiniger that Weber was in particular strongly 
influenced by Meyer's analysis of the 'inner political, social and economic development of 
Greek polis.'41 However, it is difficult to assess from Deininger's point whether Weber 
refers to the rich and well-researched material that Meyer revealed or whether Meyer's 
evaluation of the sources influenced Weber's views. From the reading of Weber and also 
from the more recent comments by Mazza, we are inclined to judge the influence of Meyer 
on Weber primarily on the side of the detailed classification of sources.42 It is also difficult 
34 Similar also Spengler (1980) On The relationship between Oswald Spengler and Max Weber see Douglas 
Webster 'Max Weber and Oswald Spengler' in Mommsen (1987) pp. 515-527. 
35 Griinde p. 29l. 
36 Griinde p. 291. 
37 See Weber (1889). 
38 Christ (1988) p. 101, n33, n34. See also Deininger (1990) p. 141. 
39 See Weber (1897). h f tignifieant 
40 This does not exclude Meyer, but as we have seen in Part I, Meyer used also sue ac ors a~ ~ 
causes for the decline of the ancient culture. 
41 Deininger (1990) p. l39. 
42 Mazza (1985) p.535 
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for us to assess whether Weber in the third edition of the Agrarverhiiltnisse adopted 
significantly more of Meyer's theory of decline of antiquity. Even if this were the case, it 
is by no means obvious from Deininger's comment whether Weber's finalised theory of 
the decline of the ancient civilisation marks a close approximation to Meyer's theory.43 The 
critical evaluation of the sources and historic examples used by both authors is beyond the 
remit of this thesis. However, it should be emphasised that Weber's characterisation of the 
ancient economy as part of a city, slave and coastal culture is a typus, with which he went 
qualitatively beyond Meyer's political characterisations. The assumption of a culturally 
embedded economy, which was characterised by slavery, maritime trade and coastal urban 
centres was never modified into the political and individualistic historiography of Meyer 
even if Weber acknowledged the power of the historic personalities and the historical 
accident more emphatically in his later works. Meyer and Weber shared the view over the 
existence and significance of wage labour in the cities.44 However, exaggerations of this 
fact by Meyer's pupil Gummerus did not meet with Weber's approva1.45 By doing so 
Weber separates himself very distinctly from those scholars who saw in every movement 
of commodities a sign of international trade. 'The often praised Roman roads have as little 
in common with modem traffic as the Roman postal system. '46 However, sea trade is 
admitted even though it was primarily concerned with the export of luxury goods. 'Only 
via the sea and along big rivers exists a continuous and regular international exchange.'47 
Roads for Weber were primarily military installations and not trade roots. Therefore, most 
people would have preferred to live away from such roads due to the presence of the 
barracks and their soldiers, and the accompanying rodent population. 
Even if Weber did attempt to deliver a very complex picture of the ancient social 
status and developments by characterising this economy as a city, coastal and slave 
economy, there is a slight suspicion that Weber fell back into a modernising way of 
conceptualising the ancient economy. On the one hand he argues, at least partly against 
Meyer and other colleagues, that the ancient world did not achieve the status of modem 
economy. On the other hand, he concedes to those scholars that the latter's terminology of 
'factory' and 'factory worker', the existence of banking and trade can, at most, be 
43 Deininger (1990) p. 142. . h h h d' "agr" 
44 . ' . '1 I 'th minll scholars Wit woe IS n:~. Although in the Agrarverlziiltlllsse Weber IS simi ar y canny WI na e 
the section on literature shows explicit disagreements with Meyer 
45 Griinde p. 290. See also Gummerus (1902) and (1906). 
46 Griinde p. 292. 
47 G .. d ""9"" run e p. - _. 
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compared with the Middle Ages and the time before the 13th century 48 It . t I f 
. IS no c ear rom 
this in what way the feudal economy is fundamentally different from the ancient world and 
whether even the term 'worker' can or should be used when drawing such a comparison. 
In his early works Weber does not address the problem of the historical and social concept 
formation, an issue which he would address in his earlier Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. 
We know that Weber also argued that mass slavery towards the end of antiquity 
stifled the level of specialisation and competition in the cities where the free labourer had 
lived and worked. Almost in conformity with BUcher, Weber maintained that the free 
craftsmanship in the cities only began to flourish in the Middle Ages. In antiquity though 
we can only speak of a rather thin and extensive net or layer of international trade, which 
occupies the surface of a deeply rooting and characteristic natural economy 
(' N aturalwirtschaJt ') 49 
Weber rejected attempts to interpret the ancient economy as essentially modem 
(17th , 18th century) though, and tId " I . o app y mo em economIC termmo ogy m a 
methodologically unsound manner. This criticism on method applies in some ways to 
BUcher too, although BUcher's argument to characterise the ancient economy (similarly to 
Rodbertus) as predominantly oikos based does not find Weber's full disagreement. It is 
rather the rigid application of theories of economic stages he seems to oppose. For Weber 
the development from antiquity to the Middle Ages was a rather gradual process, even 
though the standards and methods of comparing late antiquity with the 13th century was not 
made clear by Weber. One might wish to add that the application of theories of economic 
stages is also a product of the modem economic theorists and not a universally valid 
methodological tool, as noted in our critique on BUcher. This fundamental theoretical 
issue was not recognised by Weber and therefore not part of his argument. 
It seems, however, that although Weber did not agree with Meyer's characterisation 
of the modem character of particular periods in antiquity, the former nevertheless owed 
much to Meyer's commonly well acknowledged excellent collection of textual sources on 
ancient economic life. 50 Meyer also influenced Spengler and Toynbee, but unlike Toynbee 
clearly acknowledged a difference in the political organisation of ancient Rome and 
modem Europe at least in his early and non-political writings. 51 Meyer does not dispute 
Weber's interpretation of the ancient economy as a slave, coastal and city economy. 
48 Grullde p. 293. 
49 Grullde p. 294. 
50 Deininger (1990) p. 144. 
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Meyer, seemed to have gone about simply a little too light-minded for Weber's taste \\ith 
the use of modem economic terms and the qualitatively similar scope of production and 
trade during Hellenic antiquity and early capitalism. In the Argrarverhaitnisse \ve only 
hear that although 'Eduard Meyer aimed to summarise in particular the economic 
development [ of antiquity] ... The sharpness of his economic concepts leaves however 
somewhat to be desired, and for the Roman period he probably has to modifv his view 
. , 
significantly. '52 The predominance of the political decision making within the city is 
however disputed by neither Meyer or Weber. 
Many of Weber's theses and investigations in the field of ancient economic history 
were not superseded by later works or criticism. Even Mario Mazza, who opposed 
Weber's position in many ways, pointed out that 'everything that was written about the 
economIC situation in the ancient world, goes more or less directly back to Weber's 
visions.'53 Weber's essay Griinde does not single out one factor in the decline of the 
ancient civilisation, but sheds light onto the whole complexity of 'economic' life In 
antiquity. 54 In conjunction with this topic, Weber uses the concept of capitalism In 
antiquity, but aims to distinguish it from modem capitalism. The very fact that he used 
such a modem concept to describe aspects of the ancient cultural world makes one 
suspicious that he may have been closer to the modernisers' position than he realised. On 
the other hand, in the Griinde and the Romische Agrargeschichte Weber emphasised 
strongly the self-sufficiency of the household in the rural regions as characteristic for the 
late period of the Roman Empire. However, the growth or rebirth of the self-sufficient 
oikos contributed as a major factor to the decline of the ancient city and thereby also to the 
demise of the production of commodities for exchange i.e. for commercial purposes. 
Weber acknowledged Rodbertus' point that a disparity existed between the 'money 
economy' and barter, but he had already rejected, in the Romische Agrargeschichte of 
1891 Rodbertus' claim that the self-sufficient household was the predominant , 
characteristic throughout the entire period of antiquity.55 Weber believed that with an 
increase of mass-slavery the rural areas cut themselves off from the dependencies of the 
cities, which led to a breakdown in production and crafts in the cities that were no longer 
51 Cf. Toynbee (1954) p. 232. 
52 Weber (1897) p. 18. 
53 Mazzarino (1966) p. 149. 
Sol Kneissl (1988) p. 100 n27.. . . . , f the self-sufficient oikos 
55 Rodbertus believed in almost dIrect OpposItIOn to Weber, that the breakdo\\ n 0 I dl d t' 'I 
I h' f the 'the an ess an ami y-led to the downfall of ancient culture. See MWG 112 p. 317. We a so ear rom 
'I I I t' 'RA 31St' P ~-+')tl and Griillde p.303. less slaves even trom arge-sca e s ave arms, p. ',. - - ' 
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required. The large-scale farmers and landlords gained more political weight, the city with 
its culture was in decline, which benefited the growth benefit of the rural areas. Again 
similarities to Meyer become obvious. Such a crowding-out would not only have 
economic effects but would result in the decline of the 'slave', 'city' and 'coast culture', 
which according to Weber used to dominate antiquity. Weber stated that the state 
economy, which had already developed a sophisticated use of money as a medium of 
exchange faced the problem of coping with a considerable shift towards barter. 56 In the 
Romische Agrargeschichte Weber assigned trade an important role in the early Roman 
Empire, but this aspect was in decline during its downfall.57 However, Weber's view is 
essentially different from Meyer's. He argues against Meyer by claiming that trade 
between the ancient coastal cities may have included a large number of objects, however, 
trade was at the same time quantitatively insignificant. Only a 'small number of the 
possessing class' benefited from it. 58 Other important factors contributing to the decline of 
the Roman Empire were the concentration of forced labour in large labour camps due to 
the 'international' transport over the Mediterranean. In order to explain the decline of the 
ancient city, Weber returned again to the contradiction between urban coast culture and 
rural inland culture. 59 The vast numbers of slaves in the late stages of the Empire settled 
again in rural area and returned to the farmers' life which was still familiar to them, since 
most of these humans were captured and taken away from villages and small settlements.60 
For Weber, it was the inability of the Roman conquest to accustom its urban culture to the 
increasingly rural character of its northern territories and to adapt the highly bureaucratised 
system of government.61 We can perhaps infer from this that Weber's agrarian capitalism 
coincides with a system of imperialistic goals, where large-scale trade was state 
administered and bureaucracy worked on a low level of rationalisation. In the Romische 
Agrarverhiiltnisse as well as in the Sozialen Griinde, Weber seems to use a concept of 
capitalism, but is denying its industrial character. The agrarian forms do dominate the 
economic life of antiquity. The formulation of the agrarian laws, which aimed to resolve 
the accumulating problems between claims of ownership of landed property, contributed to 
a higher level of economic rationalisation. This was the sole purpose of the lex agora of 
56 See Kneissl (1988) p. 108 n63-n67 
57 MWG 1/2 p. 101, 216f., 239, 241 n53 
58 Kneissl (1988) p. 109 and Grunde p. 294f. 298f. . f 
59 Weber (1988) p. 344 f. The increase in rural settlements is used by Weber to elUCIdate the emergance 0 
the Medieval rural centres. 
60 See also GVANp. 10 n3l. 
61 See Deininger in Kneissl (1988) p. 112f. 
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111 BC.62 Weber points out that these laws did not resolve all arising conflict. In fact it 
was quite the opposite, speCUlation with landed property continued and was only prevented 
for a short period of time.63 According to Weber, the full effect of all this was a kind of 
agrarian ancient capitalism on a large scale of development. JUrgen Deininger pointed out 
recently that although Weber tried to distinguish ancient and modern capitalism, the 
reproach remains that he was a moderniser by using the term at all and this despite 
Weber's conceptualisation of the ancient economy as a coast, slave and city culture in the 
Griinde.64 This creates a dilemma; if the ancient economy was indeed fundamentally 
different from the modern economy, is the term 'ancient capitalism' not all together 
inappropriate? Alternatively, if certain practices, like property speculation and money 
lending were in scope and principal capitalist, then the economy of the later Roman 
Empire would be of a capitalist nature like ours. However, to what extent can we draw a 
clear and plausible distinction between the ancient and the modern economic order? The 
decline or downfall of the Roman Empire lies according to Weber in the inner logic of the 
Roman economy and its bureaucratic organisation leading to an 'internal disintegration of 
the ancient civilisation' .65 The major difference to the modern capitalist system of Weber's 
times is that in antiquity, a system of production for mass consump~ion in which the market 
played a crucial role never emerged. Similar to Marx's base/superstructure dynamic, 
Weber sets out the general dynamics in the separation between an exchange economy or 
market economy ('Tauschwirtschaft'), which emerged as a superstructure, and its basis, the 
barter or natural economy ('Naturwirtschaft'), which was still expanding, and 'in which 
needs are met without exchange. '66 Even the production by slaves on the farms was not 
designed for market exchange, but rather to satisfy the needs and wants of the latifundi. 
BUcher made the point earlier that the estate owner took pride in the self-sufficiency of his 
farm and that he was looked down upon when having to buy commodities which he should 
be able to produce in-house at market. All profit that was gained from the slaves could 
then be used to import luxury goods or to buy masters of craft in order to show-off to his 
neighbours and friends how skilful and well-trained his slaves were in providing him with 
riches, elegant gowns and other treasures. 
62 Love (1991) p. 19. 
63 MWG 112 129 and Love (1991) p. 1 n9) 
64 Deininger (1990) p. 144 f. 
65 See Duy (1932) p 191. 
66 WG p. -\.-\.8. 
PART III MAX WEBER AND THE AFTERMA TH OF THE CONTROVERSY 
A significant step in arriving at the conclusion that ancient Rom ' II e was essentIa y 
capitalist is Weber's example of the institutionalisation of the right to landed property, 
which he discussed in great detail. However in distinction to pn'vate 0 h'" 
, wners IP, It IS a 
communal or clan-like ownership that was characteristic. Individual use stood against the 
institution of individual ownership. Gradually this difference disappeared, and so rules 
which stipulated that property could only be passed on for a specific purpose, such as' gift 
or reward giving, were abolished and undermined. What remained was the exclusion of 
foreigners. The lex agraria of 111 Be according to Weber was the institutionalisation that 
followed the imperial trend. Such a law allowed for the complete possession of landed 
property by titles, which still exists in some European countries today. 
In summary, international trade increased the size of the estates to large, still fairly 
self-sufficient farmyards that were run on the basis of forced labour. The self-sufficient 
rural estates undermined and crowded-out the local exchange based economies of the 
cities, by being able to produce commodities cheaper and in larger quantities.67 'An 
intermediate authority was interposed between the state and the colonies - the 
landowner...the old simple distinction between free and forced labour had been replaced by 
a division of society into landowner and land-free peasant. '68 A series of changes, each in 
itself quite gradual, together constructed a development towards this new social structure, 
which economic and legislative conditions brought about - feudalism, which started to 
emerge in the Later Roman Empire. 69 Whereas under the previous system, market access 
was very restricted and trade for profit was deemed to be immoral, the new system, as 
Love asserts, did not even have the space for small exchange value production.70 The 
Empire as such was to become a self-sufficient household with no need for fiscal 
regulation. The attempts to run the system with a high degree of efficiency and gain 
financial control failed and resulted in an even more bureaucracy. State administration 
could no longer cope with regional uprisings. Even efforts to reorganise the military forces 
failed because of disintegration in its ranks. In that way, extensive and self-serving 
bureaucracy was as a major factor in the decline of the Roman Empire. 
It seems indeed that at this point we could say that Weber's interpretation of the 
ancient economy lies between that of BUcher and Meyer, since Weber at first glance forms 
only a quantitatively different view from the two, leaving the rejection of the theory of 
67 Weber (1988) p. 396 ff 
68 See Weber (1988) p. 345 f. 
69 Weber (1988) p. 345 f. 
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economic stages aside. The field of expertise also seems to bear a problem: as \ve noted 
earlier Meyer regarded BUcher's theory of the 'closed household economy' as an 
inadequate schematisation of ancient history by a non-historian. Meyer's categorical 
rejection of BUcher's thesis carries however the nasty undertone of academic pomposity 
and arrogance with it. BUcher, on the contrary, tried to theorise over a specific and 
complex phenomenon called the ancient economy from an economist's point of view and 
the tools at hand to him - in BUcher's case the theory of economic stages - were to some 
degree reducing the richness and complexity of the political and cultural life of the ancients 
under the stage of the household economy. 
Weber though approached the subject from a legal historical angle, which may 
have put him between the two sides. From a political and theoretical angle, he had to 
criticise BUcher and the school of historical political economy for assuming some kind of 
gradual development of the economy from the lower (not necessarily primitive) household 
based system to the sophisticated market economy. This however is not to say that Weber 
rejected the Rodbertus-BUcher view about the oikos character of the Roman agrarian 
constitution.71 In an extensive essay Untersuchungen auf dem Gebiete der 
Nationaloekonomie des Klassischen Altertums ('Investigations in the Field of Political 
Economy of Classical Antiquity'), Karl Rodbertus undertook to deliver an explanation of 
the emergence of the Colonies72 and believed that the oikos was the truly determining 
factor of every kind of ancient economic state.73 The latter aspect was mainly important 
for BUcher, since Rodbertus formulated the theorem of the 'Oikentheorie' ('oikos theory') 
of the ancient economy, which for most contemporary ancient historians is now entirely 
outdated.74 Although intellectual compliments and frequent references to Rodbertus in 
Weber's Romische Agrargeschichte are very rare, certain parallels are clearly visible and 
should not be ignored, especially in the light of Weber's acknowledgement that the 
70 Love (1991) p. 28. . ., . 
71 'For Rome I regard my initial standpoint, which I expressed already extensively In my. Roman Agra.nan 
History' (Romische Agrargeshcihte), and which were inspired by Rodbertus, as correct m all malO POInts, 
despite some juvenile mistakes.' Weber (1891) p. 18. . ' . 
72 The structure of his work is based the focus on a legal interpretation of the ancient economy SImIlar to 
Savingny. The abstract economic analysis and the use of the ideal-type g?~S back to Jo~ann HeInnc~ \'on 
Thuemen and Karl Rodbertus, who also used and admits, perhaps surpnsIngly, the eXIstence of fleXIble 
capital in antiquity. Deininger MWG 112 p. 24 n 52. . I" I 
73 This is of course not to say that according to Rodbertus, the ancient economy was In rea Ity pure y 
, . h' I b t t' n the most fundamental household based. The 'Oiken WirtschaJt IS rather a t eoretica a s rac 10 , . , 
. . , . II d t '1 the 'economIC appeafan(e~ Of 
characteristics or basis of 'economic lIfe and does not represent In a e al 
. .,. D ., . MWG 1/" p "0 n 11 and Rodbertu~ 
reality of the everyday life of the ancient CIVIlIsatIOns. See eInInger In - - -
(1864-1868) vol 5 (1865) p. 342 n3. 
74 Deininger MWG 1/2 P 21 n33-38. 
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groundwork for the 'Oikentheorie' was delivered by Rodbertus. The main emphasis of his 
basic methodological approach is to try to understand the ancient economic sphere in a 
theoretical manner. The 'Oikentheorie' seemed to cover initially the essence of this 
economy and Rodbertus deserves the credit for having attempted such a theorisation. 
However, the reliance on the works of Rodbertus becomes perhaps more apparent in 
Weber's work Die Agrarverhiiltnisse im Altertum of 1897.75 Weber, like Rodbertus, 
recognised that the strong state administration which carried state-imperialistic 
characteristics protected and used the relative self-sufficiency of the households for their 
political purposes. From an economic theoretical point of view, of which Meyer was no 
expert, Weber rejected swift modernising parallels between periods of antiquity and early 
modem capitalism, which became mostly apparent with Meyer's lack of sharpness with 
regard to an account of a scientific concept formation in economic history.76 However, 
Weber primarily takes issue with the extent of exchange in antiquity, rather than with 
Meyer's limited theory of historical concept formation and philosophy of history.77 The 
latter will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Weber's strength, compared to Meyer, was not to add sources of evidence to the 
subject of ancient social history, but the penetration of the ancient society with a new 
theoretical approach. He shows a far stronger analytical depth and awareness of the 
manifold factors in his attempt to conceptualise the problems of ancient social and 
economic life. Hence, it would not be satisfactory to claim that Weber simply developed 
Meyer's analysis; he was to set a new conceptual framework to supersede Meyer's position 
despite being influenced by the latter and the tradition of the Historical School. Weber did 
not abandon legal and political history, but added the essential social and economic 
component as a fundamental representation of the degree of rationalisation of the 
organisation of a civilisation. 
7 . d' 't Th H Idworterbuch article was a 
5 Heuss praised this work as one 'whIch was solely devote to antIqUl y. eat. I . 
f h . (Y' I entures and continuoUS \ 'proper' book. In respect of its context it was one 0 t e most OfloIna, v. . 
forcefulness description in ancient economic and social history'. See Heuss (1965) p. 538t. 
76 See Mazza (1984) p. 537. lid inter-ioI.:al exchanl!c 
77 See Weber's sceptical remarks in the Agranoerhiiltllisse about the scope of ~cba aCn1897) 18 as' 'Ibove~ 
. . . I D rce \\' e er p.. L • in antiquity due to the Increase of mass slavery as a predomInant socIa 0 . 
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iii. Weber and the Historiographical Methods of his Time 
In the following section we will investigate whether Weber was able to resoh'e am 
of the methodological problems that became apparent with the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
and the Lamprechtstreit, which coincided with the controversy. As proposed earlier, we 
will analyse in what way Weber's approach towards historical concept formation different 
from that of the historicist tradition. Here Eduard Meyer's theses in his THEORIE and 
Anthropologie, which Weber scrutinised in his Kritische Studien, will serve us as the first 
cornerstone for investigating in what way Weber's position has departed from the doctrines 
of the Historical School with its emphasis on the importance of the historic personalities. 
As we have seen, Meyer was certainly influential for Weber's groundwork in 
ancient legal and agrarian history even though Weber analysed the ancient economy in his 
early works primarily from a legal historical perspective and later from a cultural and 
sociological perspective. However, the world of bureaucracy and authority never lay very 
far away from political decision-making or the law-making of the historical personalities. 
Weber always acknowledged the role and potential influence of such historical 
personalities in antiquity and the modem Western world. Hence, the concepts of political 
history always played an important part in Weber's analyses of the ancient economy. 
However, Weber showed himself much more open to new methodological approaches in 
this field, not the least because he aimed to built his economic history on a firm 
philosophical basis, something many of his predecessors and contemporaries have 
neglected to do. 
Meyer, as Finley noted, was one of the few ancient historians who aimed to 
establish a scientific methodology in ancient history.78 Meyer's theses in the THEORIE and 
in parts in his Anthropologie, which both formed the conceptual framework for his lifetime 
achievement, Die Geschichte des Altertums, were critically examined by Weber in his 
Kritische Studien zur Kulturwissenschaftliche Logik of 1906.79 The title of this essay 'Zllr 
Auseinandersetzung mit Eduard Meyer' reveals clearly that Weber was keen to confront 
d h' th 80 Weber Meyer's philosophy of history, but not because he was oppose to IS eory. 
rather pointed out that it 'must awake great interest, if one of our first historians [Eduard 
78 See again Finley (1984) p. 271 f. 
79 Weber GA W (1951) pp. 215-290. .. ,I 'fi {' -/'11 Lor:ik in G.\ \\' 
80 This essay forms chapter 1 of Weber's Kritisclze Stl~dlell ;:,ur KllltunllSSellS( I{l t /( It, C 
., . . . C t' . Histoflcal Causallt\ Chapter 2 is entitled 'ObjectIve POSSIbIlIty and Adequate ausa IOn 10 . 
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Meyer] saw reason to render an account of the aims and avenues of his own subject.'s, Bv 
doing so, Meyer clearly departed from his own subject and entered the field of 
epistemology and philosophy of history, by which, according to Weber, 'Meyer writes a 
'medical report by the patient himself rather than by the doctor. '82 From the context of this 
work, Weber does not so much criticise Meyer for elevating himself into the dizzy hights 
of epistemology, but rather states that Meyer's presuppositions in this field are underlined 
by general errors within the traditional historiography. Weber regarded Meyer as one of 
the main representatives of contemporary historical studies with whom it was worth havin a 
b 
a debate on methodology, and he praises the transparency of Meyer's thesis.s3 With this 
analysis in the Kritische Studien, Weber was not aiming to participate in the 
Lamprechtstreit or in the dispute between Bucher and Meyer by concentrating his criticism 
on Meyer. 84 It is rather his aim to apprehend the relevance of Meyer's position in respect to 
the meaning of a 'logical historical enquiry' .85 Whether Weber himself formulates an 
independent and alternative method, with which he seriously departs from the predominant 
scholarly background of historicism, is to be investigated later. 86 
Central to Meyer's thesis are the following claims which we already discussed in 
detail in Part I, ch. 2.vi. Firstly, he objected that history is based on a single universal 
principal. For example, Hegel's concept of 'world history' as the materialisation of the 
Weltgeist or an underlining materialist principle, those of class struggle, for example.87 
Both approaches, which were to some degree present in materialism and empiricism, 
increasingly challenged the predominant position of Political History. According to 
Meyer, part of his opponent's universality claims was the agenda to belittle the actuality of 
the 'free will' of the historical individuals and to demean the power of ideas and the 
essential importance of the presence of the accident in the creation of historical events. In 
fact, events themselves are, according to Lamprecht's and Bucher's theories, completely 
subsumed under material process and economic stages, Meyer asserted in a familiar 
81 Weber GAWp. 215. . .. 
82 For a more detailed analysis of the comparisons of Weber's and Meyer's text see Lleberschutz (1963) p. 
272 ff., p. 303ff. 
83 GAWp.216. 
84 GAWp.231. 
85 
GAWp.217. h' th,t he does 
86 Weber expresses even his 'unlimited admiration' for Meyer's scholarly career and emp aSlses dJ h':' 
, S H ' h' P' 'Max Weber zum Ge aee tms not take anythin u away of Meyer's scholarly standmg. ee omgs elm, " I' h' 
b M I F I' e to the cone uSlon t at in Konig (1985) p. 206 f. It is therefore difficult to see how . ' me; earn '\1 . \\' b 'J 
" . (1984) 271 S e also Tenbruck ,ax e er an Meyer's work was 'torn apart by Weber m Fmley p,. e 
Eduard Meyer' in Mommsen (1986) p. 242f and n47. 
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exaggerated manner. 88 Instead, Meyer stresses that the doml'natl'ng db' an most 0 \'IOUS 
element in history is the political history and since human beings are f '1 I" I 
' or .v eyer po ltlca 
beings, this dominant character will remain predominate until man 'chan h' . ges IS nature , 
Cultural and economic history are reductive. 'The political events are most influential and 
most important to our life' .89 Secondly, essential to Meyer's THEORIE was also the claim 
that scientific historical judgements can be 'objective', that the perspective of some 
historians is closer to the historical truth than that of others.90 
Weber argued against Meyer that a historian cannot separate the past from his 
entanglement in a certain political doctrine or value system, or his 'present'. It is therefore 
impossible to produce an objective and unconditional picture of the past. 91 Weber asserted 
in particular, that Meyer's concept of the 'effective' das Wirksame, once applied in 
historical judgements, is dependent on the specific evaluations of the historian. However. 
the epistemological roots of these evaluations are situated beyond the historical detail and 
are therefore logically separate.92 By failing to acknowledge this difference. Weber 
suggests that Meyer does not grasp the fundamental difference between value relations and 
causal analysis, its importance and missing application to the concept of the 'effective' and 
of 'historical interest' in historical methodology. Furthermore, the concept of the causally 
'important and effective' is in Meyer's view only assigned to events. Weber asserted that 
this displays a far too narrow understanding, because it excludes the 'important and 
effective' in the biography of the individuaU3 Meyer seems to over-simplify the causal 
importance and weight that the single event may have for other historical events. For 
example, Meyer believed that the outcome of the Persian Wars had an impact on the whole 
of ancient thought, the Politics of Aristotle, the development of Judaism, or the II Punic 
Wars on the whole political development of the ancient world. 94 What Weber seems unable 
to accept is that there is a strict ontological difference between a development and an 
event. That historians deal only with the latter and how the event came about, that is either 
87 That Hegel's 'philosophy of history' was based on idealist presuppositions and, that Meyer _maY"have 
misunderstood his stance does not fall directly into the remit of our discussIOn, See RIedel (1962) ).+1 tt, 
88 See Part I.2, vi. 
89 THEORIE p. 56 f. See also Tenbruck in Mommsen (1986) P 350 f. , ' . 
90 W ' "f' b' , 'h' t ' I k ledge I'n Part I 'VI pp 6'-64 whIch ~hould not e dIscussed Meyer s notIon 0 0 Jective IS onca now ,-, . , - '" ' 
, , , b I' d M 'th s concisely In the KntlSchell Stud/en, be mIsinterpreted as Universally infallIble, We er Iste eyer sese 
See GA Wp. 218. ,I" be more 91 Cf. -THEORIE p. 37f, 45f. Meyer's thesis is not correctly Interpreted by Weber, \\ hat ~t:t:ms t~ 
, hi' t b somehow more 'ob,eL'(IVe than the befitting is to criticise Meyer's faith in a worldview t at calms 0 e ' 
alternative approach by the empiricists, 
92 GASW pp 249-251 
93 THEORIE p, 47 ff. 
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through causes by other events or 'free' decision-making of an individual, does not 
logically separate it from a process. 95 Weber suggests instead is that although the scope and 
impact of a historical event might be subject to values, the fact as such, when supported by 
sources, can be an object of scientific enquiry. These take the form of inter-subjecti\'e 
results like in the natural sciences.96 
Weber's very balanced and by all means appreciative presentation of Meyer's 
Theorie, includes besides the many acknowledgements of Meyer's position, a considerable 
shift away from the paradigms of Meyer and the Historical School. The reproach remains 
that Meyer fails to convince his readers that there is indeed a logical distinction between 
ethical value judgements and causal explanations in history, which, according to Weber, 
are not separable.97 
Weber pointed out against Meyer that in order to maintain a causal historical 
analysis one cannot only consider the 'Realgrande' i.e. the 'historical object' in its own 
right, but the historian has to be aware of his own epistemology and its methodological 
limitations too, that his way of historical analysis is also dependent on a value structure, 
which remains historically relative. This includes an acknowledgement that this 
epistemology is value dependent and not independent. That is to say, past and present are 
generally linked not only through causal relations, but also through the epistemology of the 
historian. 98 
The historical 'Historische' is, for Weber, not determined by either the 'mass 
typical' 'Massenerscheinung' or by the specific 'Individuelle' or by the causally effective 
'das Wirksame '. It is rather based on 'value relations', 'Wertbeziehungen '.99 The causally 
effective is in his understanding rather than our perception of the past, which is determined 
through certain values, something we project into the past regardless of whether there is 
any direct or indirect link between the ancient culture and ours. The writing of history is, 
for Weber, always influenced by the interests of the present and therefore necessarily 
includes not only causally effective judgements, but things which are parts of culture 
'Kulturbestsandteile' .100 It is this latter element that Meyer seemed to have complete I y 
subsumed under the political. As we have seen in Part I, Meyer was by no means denying 
94 See Deininger (1990) p. 149 f. and Meyer GdA vol. III 1 190 ff, 
95 GAWp.221. 
96 We are remind on the philosophical relationship between Heinrich Rickert and Weber. 
97 GAWp. 223 f. 
98 GA W p. 234 ff. 
99 GA W p. 221 f. 
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that the historian has to judge what is from his stance historically effective and important. 
Weber only disagrees in as much as there can be nothing objective to determine the 
historicall y important. 
However, besides all this criticism, Weber is by no means denying the existence of 
historical accident nor is belittling the importance of historic personalities. He agrees with 
Meyer that it cannot be the task of historical studies to formulate 'laws' of history as in the 
empirical sciences. However, the mere analysis of the 'individual event' or simply the 
individual aspect alone, is not sufficient to deliver a scientific historical analysis. Weber, 
however, remains nevertheless closer to Meyer and the method propagated by Historical 
School of Nationalokonomie, which viewed the political elements and constitutional 
components in history that manifest themselves in the social and cultural life of human 
civilisations, as the 'actual backbone of the historical' .101 In opposition to many historians 
of the historicist tradition, Weber did not see a rational principle or idea that was human 
history.l02 However, rational principles can be found in the development of political 
institutions and legal systems within cultures, which can be investigated by the historian 
with rational concepts that grasp both the general and specific character of historical 
phenomena on the basis of rational concepts formulated by the historian. 
Besides Weber's highlighting of some obvious weaknesses in aspects of Meyer's 
historiographical method, Finley's argument 'that Max Weber did not think it was worth 
the trouble to demolish his [Meyer's] theory and method of history,' cannot hold true. 103 
Such an alleged intellectual snobbery would perhaps be more applicable to Eduard 
Meyer's, and particularly Karl Julius Beloch's, scepticism towards scholars in other 
academic disciplines, who, according to them, tried their luck in vain in ancient history. 
Weber though, analysed in a very detailed fashion the weaknesses and positive elements of 
Meyer's theory and held the latter scholar in great regard especially for his groundwork in 
ancient history. Weber rejected the idea of a universal history that was presupposed by 
Ranke, Niebuhr and Meyer, which assumes the possibility of a general intercultural, inter-
subjective historical viewpoint, which allows for inter-temporal or ahistorical comparisons 
between cultures. Weber's own view of how scientific historical concept formation 
100 See Meyer THEORIE p. 30 Important for Weber is not the historical object itself, but rather it.s effect on 
other events in the past and its possible continuing effect on the present. See GA W (Kritisclze Studll'll) p. 259 
101 GAW (Kritische Studien) p. 228 f. 
102 See Viikari (1977) p. 435. . ' . 
103 Finley (1980) p. 159 n94. Weber's suggestion does not follow from hIS rather rare ~ommenh and trom. 
the intellectual connection between the two authors, which certainly has shown slmdantle~. In respect ot 
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becomes possible is perhaps best explained by focusing on Weber's development of the 
'ideal-type' as an adequate means to find valid abstractions to describe historical e\ents 
and processes. Weber's theory of historic concept formation will also lead us to shed light 
onto his usage of the concept of 'ancient capitalism' and will assist us in determinino 
~ 
Weber's position within or outwith the BUcher-Meyer Controversy more clearly. 
So far we have only indicated Meyer's influence on Weber, in perception and 
critique. Some authors emphasise a stronger intellectual influence of Meyer on Weber, but 
they rather seem to take a conjectural form. Emanuele Narducci, for example, traces 
Weber's interest into the 'bureaucratisation' of late antiquity back to Meyer. 104 There is 
little evidence that this connection can be made so swiftly. Meyer's discussion of 
bureaucracy as a main factor of the decline of Rome in the WEdA and the GdA, was in 
some way proceeded by Weber's ground work in legal Roman law as early as 1891 in his 
Romische Agrargeschichte. 105 We will focus on this aspect of Weber's academic work for 
an understanding of Weber's philosophy of history and the effects this stance has on his 
description of the ancient economy. 
,. . . h s BUcher had at least a gll(}d rea~()n 
Meyer, Finley's assertions are, like BUcher's, ,tdled with poleI:llc, were; .271. 
to do so. See also Finley's remarks on Meyer s W£dA. See FInley (198 ) P 
104 Narducci (1981) p. 35. 
105 RA p. 291 n..J.. 352. 
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iv. Rational Agency and the 'Ideal-Type' 
As we noted earlier in Part II, historical studies as an academic discipline reached 
an intellectual maturity and political influence in Germany towards the end of the 
nineteenth century.106 Not only had political and military history reached a high degree of 
comprehensiveness, but also the history of law, in particular of Roman law. Also- the 
history of religion, and late in the century the history of bureaucratic institutions. When 
we add the elevated status and importance of the history of the cultural inheritance of 
antiquity in general for the education of the German citizen, then we can perhaps 
understand why Weber and many of his colleagues dealt not only within strict disciplinary 
confines of their own subjects but ventured well beyond their own remit. We have already 
noted Meyer's versatile interests in religion, philosophy and economic history. Weber too 
was a master of the history of political institutions and all related matters. Unlike his 
predecessors Bockh and Blichsenschlitz, Weber's reputation was not built as a historian, 
but as scholar of the history of Roman law. However, the increasing interest in Roman law 
from the early 19th century onwards, became an essential component of academic teaching 
and focus in the training of Prussia's bureaucrats. Besides this, Weber seemed to have had 
the rare gift of 'seeing history as a concatenation or a linking of unique events and not 
repeatable complexities', as Collins described it. 107 This must of course also include 
processes. With the adoption of civil law-based codes across Europe in the 19th century, 
the status of the study of Roman law changed from pure historical interest to actual, 
political interests. This is of course not to say that Roman law was practised in Prussia, but 
its study formed the fundamental basis for every law student to understand and work 
alongside the newly established legal system of the Bismarck legislation. 108 With the rise of 
Roman law history and ancient history in general came the question, posed by Savigny, 
over the relevance or justification of Roman legislation over the peoples and states 
annexed by Rome, who already had a legal system, an ethics and their religion. Weber's 
main work WirtschaJt und GesellschaJt reflects to a considerable degree on this 
controversy surrounding Sanvigny. Weber aims to show how the way in which the process 
of rationalisation in the law and in other crucial areas of political life is entangled with 
other-historical processes and events. Weber knew from the history of law that even the 
106 See Collins (1980) p. 935. 
107 See Collins (1980) pp. 925-42. 
108 Cf. Factor (1994) p. 138. 
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most fundamental concepts of human agency have changed through history, that the 
maxims of everyday life do not necessarily match with what is legally prescribed by the 
state or socially acceptable by society. This becomes more obvious when we consider the 
dilemma every human-being faces when contemplating how one acts and how one should 
act. Hence, any science that attempts to understand human agency, whether collectively or 
individually, has got to deal with the problem of conceptualising social and historical 
phenomena. The key to understanding how Weber tackled this problem in the social 
sciences is connected to his view of conceptualisation in civil law. Weber saw the 
discrepancies between our cultural categories and those of other historical periods not as 
something absolute, but as being relative to the standpoint of the scientist. Hence concept 
formation in the historical sciences is also a mundane and practical problem. 109 The 
concepts formed in these sciences also have to be tailored to the understanding of the 
audience. On the other hand, our habitual modes may not apply to the historical material 
that we aim to comprehend and therefore concepts have to be defined, which best describe 
to us the specific historical phenomenon. Such concepts are called ideal-types by Weber. 
The 'ideal-type' provides a basis for comparative historical studies, a method that 
BUcher relied on heavily in the EdV. The ideal-type is not to be confused with the best, 
perfect or most useful entity. Weber's description of ancient economy as a 'city, coastal 
and slavery culture', does not depict any of those aspects as ideal for anyone. An ideal-
type is an analytical construct that serves as a tool to the historian in order to detennine the 
character and extent to which particular historical social institutions are similar or different 
from our own. 11O 
Weber's discussion of social action is an example of the use of an ideal-type. The 
ideal-type involves determining the 'logically consistent' features of a social institution. In 
this way, the ideal-type does not necessarily correspond to a particular concrete reality but 
is a description to which we can compare reality. The fonnation of such ideal-types, as we 
have seen to some degree in BUcher, holds of course not only the problem of generalisation 
and isolation, but also the problem of selecting and neglecting materials that do not fit the 
'ideal-type', but do not jeopardise the application of such a type. Objectivity in historical 
studies, as for Ranke and the historicists, to grasp a phenomenon 'as it really was'. is an 
illusion for Weber, due to the absence of completeness and finality in historical processc~ 
109 See Factor (1994) p. 141. 
110 See Coser (1970) p. 236. 
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or events.
111 The ideal-type is for Weber part of conceptual schemes, which aIm to 
comprehend historical phenomena, but the pragmatic interests of the historian also govern 
their formation, 'they are purpose relative, relative to our purposes as historians and in our 
culturally pre-given sense of significance.' 112 
The legal sciences are for Weber, dogmatic SCIences 'The line between the 
dogmatic sciences of law and history as pragmatic sciences of history runs through the 
category of legal history.' 113 The former deals with valid statements, the latter with 
statements that have practical significance. 114 This leaves history, including economic 
history to be a tool for particular interest groups, a possibility Weber was aware of. 
Weber's solution to this problem is tied in with his approach towards concept formation in 
history, which he developed from the neo-Kantian philosophers, Windelband and Rickert, 
and the significance of the economy and its institutions as an expression of the level of 
rationality in society. 
If the historian imagines that explicit abstractions are 'useless or dispensable for his 
concrete heuristic purposes, the inevitable consequence is either that he consciously or 
unconsciously uses other similar concepts without formulating them verbally or 
elaborating them logically, or that he remains stuck in the realm of what is vaguely felt. 
Against the Historical School, who according to Weber, dispute the validity of economic 
concepts in the historical sciences he argued that 'those, who are so contemptuous as to 
dispute the "Robinsonades" of classical theory, should restrain themselves if they are 
unable to replace them with better concepts, which in this context means clearer 
concepts.' liS 
The employment of such concepts bears of course ethical presuppositions and value 
statements from which no historian can rid himself completely. Influential to Weber's 
dissolution with the ideal of a universal worldview, based on a set of objective truths, was 
the work of his contemporary, Ernst Troeltsch. He sought an explanation of how it was 
possible that Ranke and the Historismus, which once been the source of 'liberation and 
intellectual uplift', had become in the contemporary world a burden and a source of 
'perplexity' .116 Troeltsch found his answer in the relativist, and in parts sceptical, 
III Factor (1994) p.142. 
112 Factor (1994) p.142. 
113 
Factor (1994) p. 148. . . I"k " Ro~ -her and 
114 CAW (Roscher und Knies) p. 94. Here Weber criticises his colleagues 10 N~tlOlla 0 0I1O"'1t . L. 
. ., .' I bl . Histoncal politIcal Econom~ . Knies. The essay IS entitled 'Roscher and Kmes: the Loglca pro ems 10 
115 CA W (Objectivitiit der Sozialwissellsclzjtlichell Erkell II til is ) p. 171 f. 
116 Troeltsch (1916) p. 12. 
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interpretations of the totality of human history in the works of Dilthey, \\'indelband. 
Bergson and Croce. ll7 Troeltsch knew that the study of history could not pro\'ide an 
unequivocal ethical guide. He was disillusioned with the search for a universal code or set 
of indisputable historical facts.ll8 It was the example of Troeltsch which brought Weber 
even closer to the conclusion that there is no such a thing as a historical fact. ll9 Only the 
empirical data combined with the previously formed concepts allows us to read meanin o 
o 
and purpose into history. 
With regard to this particular view, Weber and Rickert are in agreement. Where 
the two differ from each other is that Rickert rejects all metaphysical support for his own 
values of objectivity and ethical neutrality. Impartiality and ethical neutrality are of course 
not immortal values. However, Weber intended to emphasise, against the common 
practice of his time, that professors at German universities used their post for political 
propaganda and received protection from the state when they commented on public 
matters. However, it is also a well-known fact that Weber himself used his academic 
position in order to make passionate statements about social and political matters. 'An 
attitude of moral indifference', Weber insisted, 'has no connection with scientific 
objectivity. >120 This meant for Weber a kind of mutual interaction between attempting 
scientific concept formation in the cultural and historical sciences and the awareness of 
personal values. The method is useful in order to show which values are somehow 
consistent with one another and which are not. It could determine the consequences or 
implications of a proposed course of action. It could estimate what 'an attainment of a 
desired end would cost in terms of the predictable loss of other values, but it could not 
make the act of choice itself: that is the sole responsibility of the acting individual'. In 
short, 'an empirical science could not tell anyone what one should do, but rather what one 
can do - and under certain circumstances - what one wishes to do'.121 For Weber, that 
ultimately meant that it is only the value 'Wert', once employed by human beings, which is 
capable of giving our existence meaning in the double sense of comprehensibility and 
purpose. This meaning for Weber is nothing else but culture i.e. social culture, which is to 
be understood as something human beings have a general attachment to; things that beyond 
117 
See Hofer (1950). . .,' . K-'s hilOS(l h\ 01 
118 Troeltsch made his critical break with idealism already In 1904 With hiS cntlque on ant. p . p . 
history. See Troeltsch (1904), but see also Troeltsch (1916) " (1987) 
119 See also Graf 'Friendship between experts: Notes on Weber and Troeltsch' In Mommsen . 
120 GAW (Objectivitiit) p. 157. 
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our possessions and family have a meaning and significance to us 122 'T t 't . I 
. 0 pU 1 ver) sImp y. 
Weber maintained that the social and cultural sciences, the method and objects, that 
precedes the method of investigation and the theory of knowledge, were simply different 
aspects of the same thing.' 123 
Whilst Rickert and Windelband, on the one side, and Dilthey, on the other. 
disagreed about the problem as to whether the natural sciences are fundamentally different 
from the cultural sciences in the object they pursue or by the methodology they employ. it 
was not the central focus for Weber. Weber believed that the object of investigation 
defines itself through the very method that is employed. It is immaterial as to whether one 
emphasises the object or method of investigation. 124 Thus, the whole philosophical debate 
about the validity of our knowledge of the historical and social world would simply fall 
apart. 'Philosophy cannot define what historicity is; it can only tell us how historical and 
social phenomena are investigated.' 125 
Weber departed from Rickert and Windelband and moved towards Dilthey's 
position. He abandoned the possibility of the absoluteness of value judgements and 
discarded all metaphysical support for objective ethical norms. Weber viewed the position 
of the scientists as being mutually determined by the progression of the investigation and 
the cultural world one is embedded. This was a complex unilateral method, being 
incapable of making any finite conclusion about economic history and its method. He had 
arrived at a subjectivist perspective leading him to the conclusion that a fixed reality in the 
social world does not exist and no methodology can ever achieve such a fixed angle. This 
however would make it pointless to choose between object and method, because neither of 
them are deniable or true. 
Let us return to the 'ideal-type' and Droysen's method of Verstehen mentioned in 
Part II.2.iii. Verstehen was the method that all investigations about society amongst 
historicists had previously employed. It was the origin of Dilthey' s 're-experiencing' and 
Croce's 're-thinking'. It was what Hughes called the method 'to feel oneself into' a 
historical action or situation by putting oneself into the place or mind of the action or into 
the mind of the agent. - a method of psychological sympathy - a method that distinguished 
121 . ;: h t W b means by a kind of liberalism Iha! Ethical neutrality is perhaps the wrong translatIon lor w a e er . '. , 
. k " h' h . ther negatl\'c term tor amont: 
claims_ to be morally neutral He calls it 'Gesinllungs/oslg 'elf, w IC IS a ra -
deliberately oblivious towards ethical questions. GA W (Objecfivitdt) p. 158. 
122 GAWp. 83,174. 
123 Hughes (1959) p. 309. . .. G4 W .3-+ ... H 
114 Explicit reference to Dithey is only made in the essay 'Roscher and Kntes In, P 
125 Hughes (1959) p. 31-+. 
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sharply between the 'inner' investigation of the human world from the merely external 
investigation 'Anschauung' (view point) of the natural world. 
What Weber was criticising and tried to achieve in his economic history was that 
one cannot exclusively rest at Verstehen. 'He sought to limit its range and aimed to 
combine it with a causal explanation of the quasi-positivist type. 'Verstehen' he asserts, 
must...be controlled so far as possible by the ... usual method of causal imputation, before 
even the most evident interpretation can become a valid intelligible explanation.' 126 
Knowledge derived from Verstehen must be verified by empirical testing 'Of necessity it 
had something arbitrary about it. It was frankly and unashamedly a construction of the 
human mind.' 127 
Weber's definition of the ideal-type' was clearly related to the notion of cause. An 
ideal-type might be conceived as a unilateral complex of causal explanations. 128 This might 
be class, or genetic concepts, so called 'Gattungsbegriffe' - ideas in the sense of thought 
patterns which actually exist in the mind of human beings, ideas which govern human 
beings, ideas with which the historian approaches historical facts - theoretical constructs 
using empirical date illustratively - historical investigations which utilise theoretical 
concepts as ideal limiting cases, various complex combinations that might be multiplied 
indefinitely.129 First, they are genetic types or classifications of social phenomena, for 
example, church and government. Secondly, they are idealised individual complexes of 
phenomena such as socialism and capitalism. Also, the purpose of ideal-types is, for 
Weber, to order and understand the historical sources.130 The ideal-types are only justified 
in so far as they are beneficial in understanding a particular historical phenomenon. This 
of course leaves us with the problem of determining what constitutes the nature of 
scientific historical understanding. The use of the ideal-type as a methodological tool is 
fundamental to Weber's definition of ancient capitalism, and will give us further 
clarification about his position within the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. 
126 Weber 'Kategorien der Verstehenden Soziologie' in GA W p.428. 
127 Pearson (1956) p. 78 
128 Abel (1948) p. 212. 
129 GA W (Roscher lind Knies) p. 8. 
130 See GAW p. 216 and WG pp.3-4. 
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v. Ancient and Modern Capitalism 
During the writing of The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilisation between 
1897-1909, Weber wrote the Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism and other 
essays such as 'Objectivity' in Social Science and Social Policy in which the epistemology 
of the 'ideal-type' was developed. Through these works it became apparent that Weber 
recognised the problem of the growth of modem capitalism as a very complex issue in 
definition, development and historicity that can only be understood by addressing the heart 
of the problem, that of institutional rationalisation and rational agency. 
Confronted with BUcher's EdV, which attracted Weber's attention directly after the 
3rd German Historian Conference in 1893, probably through the correspondence in the 
Verein for SoZialpolitik, of which he and BUcher were both members, Weber was not so 
much faced with the issue as to whether the ancient economy was primitive or modem, but 
whether we can grasp its importance for the emergence of modem political economy and 
sociology through concepts which enable us to conceptualise history without reading it 
completely from the perspective of the modem world. Here the question of how social, 
'economic' and legal institutions became more rational than previous ones played a crucial 
part. In order to understand and determine the nature of the modem bureaucratic structure 
an understanding of the history of its insertions and culture is essential. 
Having outlined the utilitarian and materialist interpretation of the social and 
'economic' nature in Beloch and partly in Pohlmann, we saw that their writings are 
dominated by the idea that the economic/capitalist rationality of the German or European 
mind was to a degree deliberately pulled over the heads of the ancients. This allowed swift 
and exaggerated analogies between the status of ancient and modem economic life to be 
drawn, regardless of the attempted complexity in their account of the 'economic' and 
social conditions of the ancient city. Weber, on the contrary, attempted to deliver a 
solution to overcome the methodological discrepancies between the social and the 
historical sciences by emphasising the cultural categories and norms in his time compared 
to other historical eras and cultures of the past. Here again the fascination for the ancients 
. d' b ed 'IS havino in the Romantic tradition of the enlightenment and In mo emlty can e assum ~. b 
had a strong influence on almost every German scholar in the late 19
th 
century. including 
Weber. 
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In the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 01 Capitalism Weber I d d 'h 
, conc u e WIt reoard b 
to his own age, that of capitalism, that 'man is dominated by the making of money, by 
acquisition as the ultimate purpose of his life. Economic acquisition is no longer 
subordinated to man, as the means for the satisfaction of his material needs. This reversal 
of what we should call the natural relationship, so irrational from a naive point of view, is 
evidently as definitely a leading principle of capitalism as it is foreign to all peoples not 
under a capitalist influence.' 131 
The concept of the ideal-type evolved in the system of modem capitalism with a set 
of conceptual clarified notions, which include rational economic action, rational 
calculation, and rational division of labour and rational technology.132 'Ideal capitalism' for 
example is not, according to Weber, a system which is ideal to all human beings living 
under its power, but according to the ideal-type, consists of private ownership, pursuit of 
profit and laissez faire. Clearly, none of these features are particularly ethical per se - a 
point Weber was aware of. In reality, all capitalist systems deviate from the theoretical 
construct that Weber called 'ideal capitalism.' However, according to Weber, the 
construct allows us to compare and contrast economic systems of various societies to this 
definition and allows a comparative analysis between different systems of social cultural 
order. 
Modem capitalism is compared to some previous forms of behaviour in antiquity 
more rational than the ancient order. This brings us again to the question as to what 
constitutes a rational action or a capitalist activity by an ancient. According to Weber, in 
the ancient economy, capitalist activities included sea trade for profit, slave trade, 
imperialistic colonisation, tax farming, and professional money lending. The development 
from such forms into the industrial capitalism of the modern age of Weber's times was not 
causally conditioned by a shift of the purpose of the economy as in Marx for example, but 
by an increase in the degree of economic rationalisation. 133 Modern capitalism is therefore 
131 Weber (1904) p, 44. , . 
132 Weber's distinction between 'economic action' and 'rational economic action' and substantive and formal 
rationality. WG pp. 44-45 " 
133 Marx makes the point in Cap. I.iv.3 p. 17 for a discussion of the concept of use value and exchange \Jlue 
, ' X h' 'P I" I E omy which J~ an 
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mdependent SCience, first sprang mto bemg dunng t e peno 0 manu ac u , . ' > 
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- I f h . g . )mmodltles and hurrYing on 
commodities with a given quantity of labour, and, consequent y, 0 c eapenm L( h . I 
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not ideal capitalism, but in terms of the realisation of its purpose that f fit k' . 
, 0 pro 1 rna mg. IS 
more rational than any previous form of economic organisation, for example, slave farming 
in antiquity. That is to say, economic rationalisation is not to be understood as the all-
embracing characteristic of Western economic history, such that the so called 'irrational 
forms' of economic action are no longer significant. 'The most important question, which 
stands behind his enquiries [in the Greco-Roman history], and his philosophy of religion 
too, is: What is the essence of modem capitalism and modem rationality? How did it 
emerge? In what way were the outer-European world culture systems 
(,Weltkultursysteme') not capable of having them?'134 Based on the Grundriss, the General 
Economic History is Weber's last work in which we find an account of the coming into 
being of capitalism. 135 
Capitalism is 'rational' in the sense that it is based on rational decision-making 
driven by speculations of likely returns. This presupposes some degree of predictability of 
the outcome of 'economic' interaction, which in order for it to work, would itself 
presuppose a stable and functioning legal system - a legal system that supports institutions, 
which furthers the interests of the speculators and merchants. Otherwise private 
investment for money would not be as profitable as intended. A 'well-operating' system of 
capitalism also supposes that there are free markets for products and for labour and other 
factors of production, and that these markets are open - gi ven such open markets some 
innovation in search for profit has room to get under way. Max Weber's concept of 
rationalisation in economic life, law, administration, and religious ethics, involves the 
phenomenon of the depersonalisation of human relationships; an increasing emphasis on 
specialised knowledge, improvements in the techniques of calculation and measurement; 
and a widening degree of control over social factors and to a degree limiting the extent of 
natural disasters. 
Weber describes actions as value-rational ('wertrational') that are deri ved from the 
agents belief that acting in a certain way is inherently of worth it for the sake of those 
principles regardless of its potential utility or benefit for the agent or any other person. 
Instrumentally rational actions ('zweckrational'), which Kant also referred to as 
hypothetical imperatives of prudence and skill, originate from the agent's expectation that 
- . d b d', -' f labour If the urowth of obtained anywhere. Hence both product and producer are Improve y 1\ ISlon 0 . c . 
, .., I d 'th" 'e to the greater abundance of the quantity produced is occasionally mentIOned, thIS IS on y one WI relerenc . .... . 
. . I th h apeninn of commodltle~. \Iarx 
use-values. There IS not a word alludmg to exchange-va ue or to e c e c 
CapiaII.iv.3. MEGA p. 277. 
134 Heuss (1965) p. 539. 
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the end result of a certain action will be the best means to achieve another apparent end or 
purpose. 136 Moreover, the subjective expectations of the agent prior to the action are highly 
important in determining the type of rationality employed by committing an action. 
Among the social preconditions of the original development of capitalism is a predictable 
legal system and behind it is a state bureaucracy. In order to establish open markets, a 
habit of treating all people as having equal rights and being possible partners in law-
regulated commercial dealings has to be fostered in order to encourage entrepreneur 
activity. The ancient cities often emphasised a strong distinction between insiders and 
outsiders. 137 According to Weber, those societies which do not encourage commercial 
bargaining with strangers in particular, do not recognise the rights of outsiders in general. 
'Universalistic' religions such as Christianity break down such distinctions. This is why 
we find behind the legal order of the Roman nations of the Western World the idea of 
universal citizenship, which equip citizens with rights to give them the impression of not 
being solely subjects at the ruler's discretion. The legal order also requires a bureaucratic 
state to enforce the law - professional administrators and jurists. 
According to Weber, the bureaucratic state arose partly by rational selection, which 
one could be tempted to call natural selection. Because such states can create larger and 
better-organised armies with better weapons and training, they are more likely to succeed. 
They then also have a natural tendency to increase in size followed by an increasing 
detachment of the ordinary citizen to their authorities. In this context Weber makes an 
analogy between capitalism, in which workers do not own the means of production, where 
office workers do not own their offices or means of administration and armies using 
centrally supplied and team-operated weapons. The bureaucratic state presupposes 
literacy, which religion may foster, and various other factors. 138 Religion is therefore a 
means to further the course of economic growth. Weber especially asserts this for the 
impact of Protestantism on the development of capitalism. Protestantism, for example, 
aimed to abolish the monasteries. This abolition of monasteries is important in order to 
remove an obstruction, namely the preoccupation of people with the strongest religious 
motivation and replace it with other worldly ends.139 According to Collins 'Weber's 
constant theme is that the pattern of relations among the various factors is crucial in 
135 See Collins (1980), pp. 925-42. 
136 WG p. 24. 
137 WG p. 37. 
138 WG p. 250 f. 
IJ9 WG p. 346 f. 
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determining their effect upon economic rationalisation. '140 If one factor by itself, religion 
or free trade for example, is too dominant, then, according to Weber, capitalism will not 
develop. For example, if the state is too strong by itself, it has a tendency to crowd out 
private investment and enterprise. A total hegemony of the Church and the state would 
create a sphere of uncertainty, which makes a functioning market economy impossible. 
The other extreme, a non-regulated economy, would lead to a monopolisation of 
the economy, a state of fear in which only the most parsimonious would survive. Such an 
economy fails to address human needs intentionally, since it is not driven by the end or 
purpose to function of providing the environment for development of the individual. How 
social factors influence one another is for Weber not a question of simple causation. As 
for many historians and social philosophers before him, a distinction should be made: 
between a 'one-factor' causal relationships and dialectical relationships, whereby it is not 
so much important to determine which cause exactly initiated a process, but how each 
factor progressively and continuously transformed the other. 
Perhaps the transformation was the reinforcement or strengthening of capitalism 
and the corruption or weakening of Protestantism. Indeed by the 19th century 
Protestantism in Germany had become a convenient supporter of other social institutions, 
not a critic or a threat and a shadow of its former self. If the relationship to capitalism was 
one of mutual or reciprocal influence, or of a feedback, then neither the 'superstructure' 
nor the 'base' was the originator of social change. What kind of implications does this 
have for Weber's account of the origin of capitalism? 
The instrumentally rational institutions involve instrumental and strategic social 
relations in which individuals operate as means to a set political end, which may be 
fundamentally different from the goals the individual aims to pursue. Economic and 
bureaucratic institutions in the market economy develop direct and economic 
dependencies, which are, or became, ends in themselves and are founded upon domination. 
This implies that humans are treated not as ends in themselves and that these institutions 
address their needs rather as means, as consumers, as labour costs etc. Hence, domination 
is a necessary means if individuals are to be used as means for wider political purposes, 
. I Th" the reason that which may even be unnatural or estranged from theIr own goa s. IS IS 
Weber could argue that increasing rationalisation involves increasing domination i.e. 
140 Collins (1980) Especially the chapter on 'The Causal Chain' p. 929 f. 
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discipline and function but not without giving the individual the illusionary belief of seeing 
themselves as being free from constraints. 
Political rationality as power manifests itself in ancient and modern bureaucracy. 
Bureaucracy is inevitable and inherent in formal reasoning. It may be accidental that we 
fail to realise that institutions do increase in size and scope, to be commanding 
organisations and live to some extent a life and purpose of their own. In turn, those who 
hold an interest in the growing effectiveness of bureaucratic organisations and state power 
may encourage such ignorance. It is however, the task of the citizen in a proper democracy 
to assess the performance of its institutions in order to prevent these institutions from 
becoming an end in itself. This understanding of reason is the essence of Weber's 
important journey into ancient social and economic history. 
Regarding the overly simplistic question, whether the economy of classical 
antiquity is primitive or modem, we need to give a brief summary of Weber's analysis of 
ancient capitalism and how he defined the capitalism of his time. As a matter of fact, 
Weber maintained that 'ancient Rome passed through a capitalistic development' .141 This 
thesis descends partly from Theodor Mommsen's Romische Geschichte and appears first in 
Weber's Romische Agrargeschichte of 1891.142 Regardless of Marx's substantial criticism 
of Mommsen's thesis, he stuck to this argument throughout his work.143 When Weber 
speaks of constraints in the development of capitalism in antiquity, one gets the impression 
that without those restraints capitalism would have emerged, or that its emergence was 
historically necessitated. 144 
A significant difference between ancient and modem capitalism is for Weber that 
the former is dominated by slavery. Slaves played an important part in the social and 
economic life of classical antiquity. We shall now discuss how relevant this whole issue 
became in the light of Weber's conception of ancient capitalism. 145 
Often overlooked but of great importance is Weber's definition of the economy and 
economic activity 'Wirtschaft' and 'wirtschaften' in the Outline to the Lectures on General 
("theoretical") Political Economy of 1898. 146 Besides the excellent bibliography, which 
141 RA 8 p .. 142 MWG U2 p. 24. 5 .+1 
143 See Marx' remarks in Cap. (MEGA vol 23-25) 23 p. 182 n25, 25 p. 339 n46, ibid. p.79 n _. 
144 See Spahn (1984) pp. 301-323. . . -' . d discontinuity 
145 Although Deininger in Calder III (1990) p. 139 fdoes not see substantial dl tterences an h··.· h· 
. . G d I b r ve there IS more emp aSls In t I~ between the Romisclze Agrargescluchte and the Sozwlell ruen e, e Ie . bl "th th' 
. f I h' h is to be Insupporta e \\ I \.: latter work and famous piece in historiography on the Issue 0 savery, w Ie 
whole issue of the ancient economy being modern or primitive. 
146 GVAN p. 29. 
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gives an extensive overview on the most important works on this subject during Weber's 
time, we learn also about how Weber attempts to synthesise political economy. Starting 
with the most general tasks and methodology (introduction), Weber carries on to define the 
terminological and theoretical foundations of the economic history (book I). Book II is 
supposed to discus the natural foundations of the economy, such as demographic 
considerations as well as constraints of natural resources. Biological as well as 
anthropological considerations playa part too, the concept of law in political economy, 
natural selection, as well as cultural and social peculiarities. A striking feature of the 
Outline is that books III to VI deal with the historical foundation of the economy and its 
theoretical history. The strong emphasis on the growth or development of the economy 
rests on Weber's belief that social and political entities are going through 'stages' of 
development. 
Also important is Weber's definition of the national economy ('Volkswirtschaft'), 
which he formulates in the Outline: I47 'Economic activity is to be understood by us as a 
special kind of external goal orientation - that means, conscious plan orientated behaviour 
in relation to nature and to human beings - which is caused by those needs l48 , which require 
external means for their satisfaction - no difference whether they [the needs] are of a 
'physical' or of 'spiritual' nature, - and which serves the aim of provision for the future, -
'economy' is that complex of measures, which are caused by economic activity of an 
individual or of a human society.' 149 Exchange is defined: 'the peaceful appropriation, 
between several co-existing economies, finds its limits at the other political territory. The 
normal means of peaceful appropriation, which are in a foreign political territory, is thus 
only exchange; that means, the rewarded transaction of commodities, between the single 
economies. >I 50 What constitutes fairness in exchange is explained with the marginal utility 
theory, fashionable at the time. I5I According to Weber, modem capitalism, though, is 
distinct from antiquity because of its level of rationalisation. This is not to say that 
antiquity lacked any kind of economic rationalisation. One might even argue that the 
ancient commitment to human goods in their social ethics demands a higher amount of 
147 GVAN p. 29 Book I _ The terminological foundations of Political Economy § The Economy and its 
elemental characteristics. _ , ' ' 
148 We translated 'Bediirfnisse' as needs not as wants, since this is in ,line of :Veber'~ later detlmtlOn 01 
'Bediirfnis'. See also GVAN pp, 32-33 for a discussion of the concept of economIC good, 
149 -GVAN vol. I.6.b p. 35, 
150 GVAN vol. 1.6.b p. 40. I' t t' " 
151 ' " I 'I' hi' -ed the Anstote Jan eoncep 0 U~L: 
- We need to take mto account that theones of margma utI Ity ave rep JC , _ 
" f . h' IT power at the market. whICh IS 
value, measuring the usefulness of a commodIty m terms 0 Its pure asmc 
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rationalisation than any profit-making activity. There is even evidence to suggest that the 
Romans employed a higher rationality with respect to economic matters than the Greeks. 
For example, 'when a Greek city required credit or leased public land or let a contract for 
surplus, it was forced to incite competition amongst speculators.' According to Weber, 
Rome in contrast was in possession of a rational capitalistic class, which played a 
restraining role on the state. The capitalists of this class were, however, entirely dependent 
on the state and the favouritism of governmental institutions, in the leasing of the ager 
publicus or conquered land, and of domain land, or of tax farming and the financing of 
political adventures and of war. Those activities influenced the public policy of Rome in a 
decisive way at times, although it had to make concessions to the constant interference of 
the official nobility. 152 
Weber summarises the features of ancient capitalism in companson with the 
characteristics of modem capitalism and concludes that 'we are faced in widely separated 
periods with a multiplicity of non-rational forms of capitalism. These include first, 
capitalistic enterprise for the purpose of tax farming ... and the purpose of financing 
war. .. second, capitalism in connection with trade speculation, the trader being entirely 
absent in almost no epoch of history; third, money-lending capitalism, exploiting the 
necessities of outsiders.' 153 All those forms of capitalism relate to spoils, taxes, the benefits 
in holding office, and finally to tribute and actual need. 154 Profit making is defined as 
seeking continus and recursive power over goods. 155 
The implications for Weber's definition of 'ancient capitalism' are thereby clear. 
Only where one city-state or nation trades commodities with another one, do we find 
'exchange'. The household and the village community do not engage in exchange in an 
economic way. If the combined purposes of all individuals were simply geared towards a 
collective purpose in a city, according to Weber's definition, exchange would not have 
taken place in the polis. This is a surprising result. We discussed earlier Meyer's and 
Beloch's arguments against Bucher 'closed household economy'. Meyer's and Beloch's 
understanding of exchange seemed to be different from the way Weber defined it as taking 
place in modem capitalism. Meyer and Beloch saw any kind of commodity exchange or 
trade for profit on a larger scale as bearing resemblance to modem economic trade. 
. ... I· d I d·d not take place According to Weber, capitalism on a natIOnal and mstltutIOna lse sca e 1 
152 Weber (1961) p. 247. 
153 WG p. 165. 
154 Weber (1961) p. 246-47. 
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in antiquity. By 'exchange as an institution', Weber outlines clearly that such an exchange 
is different from that in the isolated rural economies. An exchange economy evolves with 
the expansion of commodity exchange and the rewarded interchange of these goods 
between different communities. Paragraph 3 in the GVAN helps us to finalise our analysis 
of ancient capitalism. Weber differentiates the VolkswirtschaJt 'national economy' from 
the previous economies. 'VolkswirtschaJt, in a strict sense, is the one which is regulated by 
exchange. The satisfaction of needs is achieved on the territory of a nation. '156 Also worth 
noting is Weber's claim that all previous and also all communist social organisations have 
in common that they only deal with items of use value and produce only those.1 57 However, 
the later clarifications of the definitions do not achieve their end. It is, for example, 
difficult to see where the so-called 'a posteriori' difference between the modem economies 
and the ancient economies lies, if it is simply a question of emphasis on self-sufficiency 
versus exchange. Those who look for an absolutely precise answer in Weber's separation 
in the definition of exchange and the characteristics between ancient and modem 
capitalism look perhaps in vain. It is also unclear why Weber, in the Agrarian Sociology, 
admits the existence of 'ancient capitalism', but denies that capitalist activity can take 
place outside a national economy.158 If there is no exchange on a national scale i.e. any 
VolkswirtschaJt, how could there be capitalism in antiquity at all? A solution to this 
conceptual problem was not put forward by Weber. Could a definition of capitalism be 
delivered, which would accommodate the problem of defining the ancient economy in its 
different stages or eras with adequate historical concepts, or secondly, if there would be a 
consensus over what we could call capitalist activity or behaviour or agency, the BUcher-
Meyer Controversy could have been resolved by Weber. Weber's definition of modem 
capitalism does not emphasise the unifying character of capital as Marx previously did. 159 
However, Weber used the term institutionalised capitalism. What he probably meant by 
ancient capitalism was existence of exploited wage and state-administrated trade, a kind of 
political capitalism, which he later called imperialism. 160 
Taxes, mobile capital (mainly money), exploitation and a class structure are for 
.. . h·l h . r days sufficient indicators to most SOCIOlogIstS, economIsts and p I osop ers even III ou 
speak of capitalism in antiquity. Again the telos or purpose of the political institutions in 
155 WG p. 6l. 
156 GVAN p. 43. 
157 GVAN p. 42. 
158 WG p. 65l. 
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antiquity was different from the market and profit bound orientation of modern political 
and economic institutions, if we should believe Marx. A similar problem exists with the 
definition of ancient imperialism, since its modem form was clearly associated with a 
governmental goal for economic strength and gains. If one is happy to call the 
expansionist character of Roman politics towards its neighbouring communities 
imperialistic behaviour of the state, then imperialistic tendencies may indeed have had 
their significance in antiquity. The First Attic Maritime Trust of 422 BC is perhaps a good 
example of this.161 However, suppression and exploitation as well as money and 
commodity exchange are not peculiar to capitalism alone. Weber therefore made a 
mistake, which gave some ground for the unfortunate misinterpretation of identifying his 
stance as a so called 'middle position' in the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. That such a 
reading of Weber is doubtful, if not strongly over-simplified, has been shown. 162 
Finally, let us discuss briefly what someone may call 'capitalist activity' In 
antiquity. It is possibly correct that in antiquity landed property was used as a source of 
income rather than profit making through enterprise. This however does not really solve 
the problem of the possibility of an agrarian capitalism or socialism. One could suggest 
that Weber wanted us to believe that ancient capitalism had some features in common with 
modem capitalism. However, that money lending existed, that profits were made out of 
speculation, that people were exploited for the purpose of wealth and power is clearly not 
unique to antiquity and not to capitalism either. Even ancient Egypt knew forms of private 
property.163 Or should we rather say that anyone, who exploits or speculates, trades and 
produces for the sole purpose of money is a capitalist? Then 'capitalist activity' would not 
be dependant on a specific capitalist environment or society geared towards profit 
maximisation. This would lead us to the conclusion that what characterises a society is not 
'simply' defined by its innate purpose or end, but by the sum of the activities of its 
individuals and their goals, which find their reflection in an added up purpose of its 
political and social institutions. Thus, there would be no space for a teleological 
understanding of society apart from piled up individual preferences and desires. Such an 
f · d 164 understanding has links to John Stuart Mill's empirical concept 0 socIety an economy. 
-
160 WG p. 524 ff. 
161 Heuss (1965) p. 547 and Weber in WG p. 625 and RA p. 130f. 
162 Deininger (1990) p. 144. 1988) 110 I. 
163 Weber was one of the first scholars who acknowledged that fact see Weber ( p. -9 
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Secondly, and we have focused on this point before, a discussion about the exact 
proportion of capitalism in antiquity and capitalist activity has not been delivered by 
Weber. If ancient capitalism existed in some form, was it significant, typical or 
characteristic for the ancient world? If so, how significant were these forms? The 
connivance, toleration and occasional exploitation of private enterprise and 'capitalist 
activity' served a purpose, the enforcement of a certain political order or enabled 
expansionist or defence warfare. 'Capitalist activity' could also not have ansen as a 
counterpart against politics, according to Weber's model. Weber's analysis arrives 
eventually at a concept of ancient imperialism, which itself is a misleading concept too. 
Although Weber can perhaps escape the problem of a 'capitalist activity' without 
capitalism, modem imperialism did not only use the commercial powers for its political 
ends, but, as Weber also occasionally acknowledged, paved the way for capitalistic activity 
in general. It encouraged commerce, even if it hampered it unintentionally. However, on 
the other hand, Weber points out too that 'by no means all profit-making enterprise with 
capital accounting are doubly orientated to the market and sell their product or final 
services there. Tax farming and all sorts of financial operations have been carried on with 
capital accounting, but without selling any products ... .!t is a case of capitalist profit-
making which is not orientated to the market.' 165 'Tax farming is capitalist because it is a 
form of profit-making involving the operation of organisation (,societates publicatorum '), 
which utilised calculations in terms of capital.' 166 A state that collects money taxes by tax 
farming is a favourable environment for the development of political orientated capitalism, 
but it does not encourage the orientation of profit-making activity towards the market. The 
granting of rights to benefactors and the give-away of landed property as public honours, 
tend to hinder the development of [market] capitalism by creating vested interest in the 
maintenance of existing sources of fees and contributions. 167 
According to Weber the distinctiveness of ancient capitalism is shown very clearly 
in the legal institutions involved. 'The significance of the essentially political basis of 
ancient capitalism is indicated by the fact that those legal institutions that were lacking for 
private business were recognised already in the private law of the early Empire with 
respect to publicans (socii vectigalium publicanorum), i.e. groups of private businessmen 
165 WG p. 99. 
166 50 Love (1991) p. . 
167 WG p. 199. 
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to whom the state farmed out the levying taxes and the exploitation of the state owned 
mines and salt works.' 168 
Heuss pointed out correctly that Weber was aware of the danger that his account 
would not eliminate the creation of parallels and analogies between the modern and ancient 
'forms of economy>169 In Weber, Heuss argued, we are dealing with political capitalism as 
opposed to industrial capitalism. The latter form could never have occurred in antiquity. 
since the ancient large-scale factory consisted rather of an occasional merger of workforce 
for seasonal duration. The large-scale factory or production units consisted simply of a 
combination of traditional forms of production, which did not constitute a new quality in 
the economic landscape and the 'economic' logic of antiquity. 'Ancient capitalism did not 
know standing capital as Weber calls it. >170 'There is no distinct and associated 
craftsmanship, which would make them a separated and distinct class.' Demiorgous does 
not describe such a professional type or status. The' guilds' do not exist and therefore no 
corporate interests of classes of producers. This is, however, not to say that Weber ignored 
the societies and association. 
Although, Heuss' observation might be correct, this does not solve the problem of 
the usage of the term ancient capitalism. Marx believed that capitalism only operates 
efficiently if the logic of the market economy would merge into and political 
superstructure of society and would continue to dominate it from there. If the economic 
basis does not exist in the first place, how could one call a system capitalist if it does not 
operate according to the rationale of the market economy, to produce and exchange 
commodities for profit? If there is a dialectical relation between economic base and 
political superstructure, as Weber seemed to have acknowledged, he should have denied 
the existence of capitalism in antiquity all together. Now, is this to say that there are no 
parallels between modernity and antiquity? Is this to say that we cannot learn anything 
from the social problems of the ancients? Weber's definition of ancient capitalism does 
not constitute a 'genuine capitalism' similar to the modem phenomenon, since it lacks the 
plain existence of the mass markets, rational organisation and extensive division of labour. 
It also lacks the technological innovation which is characteristic of modern times (in the 
form of intensifying labour or improving efficiency).171 However, for Weber technological 
168 WG p. 710. 
169 Heuss (1965) p. 541. 
170 See Heuss (1965) p. 54l. 
171 See Love (1991) p. 43. 
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advances alone do not create large-scale industry. It is rather their commercial usage and 
marketability that encourages such a development. 
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Resume 
Weber's contribution towards a conceptualised ancient economic history, the 
course of social development, his influence on political thinkers, philosophers, historians 
and other social scientist is vast and comments and reflections of his works are almost 
countless. However, despite the fact that Weber's material on ancient economic history 
covers probably enough ground for several doctoral theses, for some reason it has yet to 
gain the level in popularity compared to his well documented and widely appreciated 
sociological writings. Perhaps the ongoing dispute in historical studies as to whether the 
historical or cultural sciences should maintain a distinct methodology as compared to the 
physical or empirical sciences, has had a negative effect on the reception of Weber's 
writings on the ancient economy history. Austin and Vidal-Naquet acknowledged though 
that after BUcher and Meyer, apparently 'a fresh start was needed to emerge from the 
impasse, and the credit belongs to the great German sociologist Max Weber for the 
initiative which led to a better understanding of the position held by the economy in Greek 
history.'172 Their analysis of Weber's arguments, however, almost ends with this short 
praIse. 
What remains is to discuss whether Weber's effort to find a solution to the 
controversy formed only a mediating or middle position to the Controversy. Pearson for 
example, asserted that 'it can hardly be said, however, that Weber resolved the issues in 
this secular debate, for while he sketched in the outlines of a new approach, he did not 
provide the conceptual tools with which to answer specific questions like trade 
organisations, money use, and methods of exchange.'173 We have noted that Weber's 
conceptual tool was the ideal-type and a neo-Kantian understanding of 'rational agency', 
and he therefore aimed to supersede the debate by identifying the methodological problems 
in both BUcher's and Meyer's theories. Although Weber's use of the term ancient 
capitalism makes him look as simply compromising between both positions, his 
conceptualisation of the ancient economy as a 'city', 'slave' and 'coastal culture' identifies 
this economy as clearly separate from modem capitalism. Recently, Mazza highlighted 
positively that 'what he [Weber] has certainly achieved, was to break down the old-
fashioned views and frameworks that characterised the debate between primitivism \'S, 
172 See Austin and Vidal-Naquet (1977) p. 3. 
173 See Pearson (1956) p. 7. 
PART III MAX WEBER AND THE AFTERMATH OF THE CONTROVERSY 263 
modernism.'174 We only have to add here, as we have seen from the discussion in Part I 
, 
that such a distinction or classification of BUcher's and Meyer's position forms an 
oversimplification in the first place. Recently, John R. Love praised 'Weber's mature 
approach that avoids the extremes of both excessive "primitivism" as well as anachronistic 
" d . "q 75 Th th t h . d h f h mo ernIsm . e au or seems 0 ave Ignore t e act t at Weber's own position 
rather critically absorbed and superseded both BUcher's and Meyer's approach. 
Weber's complex alternative characterisation of 'ancient capitalism' in antiquity is 
problematic and gave rise to criticism by Johannes Hasebroek and Michael I. Rostovtzeff. 
However, Alfred Heuss noted correctly a hundred years [1965] after Weber's birth, an 
exact analysis of Weber's prepositions in economic history has not yet been conducted by 
the 'specialists'. 176 The academic discipline of ancient history seemed to have carried on 
regardless of Weber's works - a concern repeated by Finley in 1980.177 Nowadays, apart 
from a few exceptions, many ancient or economic historians seem to be eager to make 
renewed fresh starts and reflect on Weber's attempt to find a solution to the old debate in a 
few paragraphs in their introduction overlooking the comprehensiveness of Weber's 
discussion of historical concept formation and economic rationality. It seems that Alfred 
Heuss is still correct in claiming 'that ancient history as an academic discipline went its 
own way, as if Weber had never lived.'178 The integration of Weber's works in ancient 
history has yet to happen. The continuing work on the MWG by Alexander Demandt and 
JUrgen Deininger is certainly both pioneering and groundbreaking. 
174 Mazza (1984) p. 538. 
175 Love (1991) p. 55. 
176 See Heuss (1965) p. 554. 
177 See Finley (1980) p.20. 
178 Heuss (1965) p. 554. 
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2. The Aftermath and Reflection on the Controversy in Contemporary 
Literature 
Introduction 
In January 1919 Max Weber presented a paper entitled 'Science as a Vocation' 
('Vom Inneren BeruJzur Wissenschaft') in Munich.179 His words were passionate, which in 
a way, reflected the revolutionary spirit in Germany at that time - merely a month before 
Walter Rathenau would proclaim the 'Riiterepuhlik'. Weber argued against the 
irresponsible and half-thought out demands by revolutionaries for 'a kingdom of love, 
beauty and reason.'180 Politics, Weber claimed, is swamped by such demands, which are 
not its office. Karl Lowith, who listened to Weber's paper, regarded his words 'as a relief 
after all the polemic quarrels and revolutionary speeches of liberal activists.' 'At first 
glance, his paper is about the ethos of the sciences. In the heart of the matter, Weber tried 
to answer the question, how the desire for a meaningful life can still be possible in the iron 
cage of the "rationalising" civilisation.' 181 He emphasised that even though science can 
provide us with powerful tools, that even if it can be a means to fulfil our ambitions, it does 
not answer any fundamental existential question. It cannot answer any of Tolstoy's 
questions, 'how should we live?' It seems that philosophers and historians were unable to 
provide an alternative to this modernist faith into science and technological advances. 
Many ancient historians tried to raise the profile of their discipline by making 
anachronistic comparisons between present and past, between historical personality as well 
as events. Historians such as Oertel and Rostovtzeff were certainly not amongst such 
academic charlatans but their works show a clear influence of the anachronistic reading of , 
history during the 1920s, and with regard to Meyer, almost apocalyptic comparisons 
between antiquity and modem Europe in his later and mostly political writings. 182 As we 
have seen, such analogies had a long and prominent tradition going back to the 18th 
century. That this tradition was able to continue with anachronistic comparisons was at 
179 MWG vol. 1.17. 
180 See Safranski (1995) p 113 f. 
181 Safranski (1995) p. 113 ff. 
182 See the discussion Part I.2.v. 
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least partly due to the political and intellectual climate in Germany during the 1920s and 
early 1930s. 
Significant for this time and age was also Oswald Spengler's 'Untergallg des 
Abendlandes' (,The Downfall of the Occident'), which reached a publication rate of over 
600,000 copies in first edition. I83 Other visions of the future reached inflationary 
proportions at a previously unheard of rate, and offered everyone with a loud voice- and 
demagogic promises a modest income and even lucrative political positions. Messianic 
proclamations and philosophies flooded the political spectrum from the Left to the Ri uht 
b 
like Reichsmark notes. Toller and Miihsam, both part of the Riiterepublik in Munich, 
enacted a bill in order to transmute the world into 'a meadow of flowers'. Hierarchy and 
jurisdiction were abolished and newspapers were obliged to print poems of Holderlin and 
Schiller, Goethe and Herder. Weber's appeal for an ideological caution in philosophy and 
historical studies did not fit into the desires of the time. Eduard Spranger, full of 
enthusiasm, said that 'Religiously ... expects the young generation its deepest rebirth .... The 
young human being breathes and lives more than ever before by his totality of his spiritual 
organs .... There is an instinct of polity. And at the same time religious craving; a fumbling 
back from artificial and mechanical circumstances into the everlasting welling 
metaphysical. >184 The glorification of the past accompanied with the fears of the repetiti ve 
character of history, brought philosophers like Nietzsche with his critique of modernity and 
affiliation with ancient virtue ethics as well as the whole subject of the course and fate of 
antiquity into a very new and important perspective. 
On the other hand, there were revolutionary theories developed from the Leninist 
interpretation of Marxism. Not only messianic missionaries appear occur during the 1920s 
and also 30s, but also Marxism was regarded as a strong radical political force willing to 
become, with the theoretical contributions of Lenin, an applicable and positive theory for a 
new society. It should be noted, however, that Marxism was never an intellectual force at 
German universities before 1945. It rather gained its strength politically with the October 
Revolution, the German Revolution of 1918119 and Rathenau's Munich Republic. 
The political and economic 'ups' and 'downs' of the 1920s could not possibly leave 
any intelligent person untouched. However, care should be exercised not to interpret 
Oertel, Hasebroek and Rostovtzeff's approaches towards the BUcher-Meyer Controversy as 
being entirety ideological motivated or triggered by politics. Ancient historians did not 
183 See Demandt (1998) p. 84. 
184 Safranski (1995) p. 117. 
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live a separate and solitary life away from the fast moving social and political affairs 
during the 1920s. Quite the opposite, their works are to a considerable degree reflections 
of modem political and economic problems.!85 
. " I it as a whole during the 1920s \CC 
185 For a very profound read on the situation In AltertwllsH IssellSC za 
Flashar (1995). 
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i. Use or Abuse of Ancient History during the 1920s and 30s 
Ancient Greek and Roman history were strongly influenced by the discussion about 
the character of the ancient economy. The debate between BUcher and Meyer brought to 
light not only an initially perhaps fairly minor and subject specific issue, that of the 
character of the ancient economy, but quickly involved the whole complexity of political, 
social and cultural as well as methodological problems of historical studies and its position 
during the turbulent events to come during the 1920s and early 1930s. BUcher and Meyer 
were therefore only the initiators of the dispute. Their extreme positions and the variety of 
issues they touched began to fascinate a large number of scholars who felt obliged to 
comment and add to the issues. This became particularly apparent during the 1920s and 
30s. 
Recently Ines Stahlmann, Beat Nat and Andreas Wittenberg have all separately 
addressed the situation of Altertumswissenschft (ancient history) during the 1920s. 186 Their 
investigations show a common opinion on the significance of the efforts of ancient 
historians of that time to use the subject of Greek and Roman history in many ways in 
order to address modem political problems and highlighted the continuing educational 
value of the academic discipline for the upbringing and edification of the young German 
citizen. 
By concentrating on aspects relevant for the continuity of the BUcher-Meyer 
Controversy we hope to clarify that the characteristics of ancient political and economic 
life are seriously important for answering the challenges of the post World War I period. 
Nat pointed out recently that 'self-evidently, one frequently draw parallels between 
antiquity and German history'187 during the 1920. There is of course nothing self-
explanatory about this, but our discussion in Part I and II support this observation. The 
main characteristic was a general nationalistic undertone, which came primarily from the 
tradition of the Prussian School in historical studies. The engagement with current 
political issues by ancient historians had mainly two reasons. On the one hand, these 
scholars aimed to demonstrate that ancient history and the whole of 
Altertumswissenschaften was capable of maintaining an indispensable key importance in 
secon-dary and higher education by being essential for the education of the 'young state 
186 See Flashar (1995) table of contents and references below. 
187 Naf in Flashar (1995) p. 282 f. 
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citizen' ('Staatsburger').188 On the other hand the traditional historiography, which still 
held an influential position at most German universities, aimed to position itself against 
rival approaches from the new social sciences and economic history. Politically, the 
Versailles treaty and the ongoing political and social problems, as well as the rise of the 
organised communist and nationalist front in Germany, made even Jewish historians like 
Viktor Ehrenberg put up with ideas of the Germania triumphans. 189 Apart from the socialist 
historian, Arthur Rosenberg and perhaps the political economists Bernard Laum and Edgar 
Salin as well as the ancient historian Johannes Hasebroek, the majority of the German 
historians regarded themselves as 'the guardian of the holy fire on the altars of the past.' 190 
Most ancient historians regarded it as their political duty to make ancient history accessible 
and applicable to modem problems. This is not to say that analogies between ancient and 
modem times were used in an utterly arbitrary manner. However, the political polarisation 
of Germany during the 1920s, the practical incompetence of the 'Weimar administration' 
and the restrictions posed by the Versailles treaty, combined with the largely conservative 
Rankean tradition, resulted in an even stronger and less selective attitude towards analogies 
between the modem and ancient world. 191 
Due to the predominant scholarly influence of the works of Droysen, Nietzsche, 
Burckhardt, Beloch, Pohlmann and Eduard Meyer, it was common for ancient historians to 
address questions in the field of history and theory. Their works have influenced and 
shaped the discussions of the 1920s. Although the calls for a reorientation of historical 
studies became more articulate, a significant methodological break with historicism was 
not forthcoming. 
Politically, in the aftermath of World War I, the 'national question' of Germany 
and its place as an imperial power in the world still remained unsolved. l92 The discussions 
at the German Historian Conferences during these years clearly indicate a continuity of the 
historicism debates in historical studies, classics, political economy and philosophy. This 
allowed the previously modernising views of periods, and aspects of the ancient world 
antiquity, to be perpetuated and to be partially reasserted.193 This posed a serious difficulty 
for Hasebroek, Laum and Salin in gathering support for their stance. Even if the younger 
188 The concept of the 'Staatsburger' was coined to emphasise the link between individual c~vic rights and 
. .. . d' h t d t follow its laws and patriotIC demands. public duties In particular the duty to be obe lent to testa e an 0 
See Meyer (1918), Ehrenberg (1923) and Lenschau (1932). 
189 Naf in Flashar (1995) p. 282 n6 and the letter of Ehrenberg to Eduard Meyer llIOIl? 19. 
190 See in particular Kahrstedt (1921) 'The duties of the historian in the new Germany p.708 
191 See Below (1926) See Munzer (1925) 'The legacy of the ancients' p. 9. 
192 See Fischer (1961). 
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generations of ancient historians, like Oertel and Erb, criticised the totality of the Rankean 
paradigm, a fresh start was never made during that time. As indicated in Part II, positivism 
enjoyed increasing support amongst political economists, but their views were 
continuously rejected by the historicist historiography, which did not help to resolve the 
methodological and often ideological differences between these scholars' views. However, 
some direct criticism was voiced against Meyer's 'one-sidedness' and Beloch's lack of 
'historical couleur'194 However, in 1932 Erich Stier noted that the' 1920s were a period of 
quest and of experiment in all areas of life', and added that 'one does not err if one 
identifies dismay and desperation as the characteristics of that time, but somehow trust in 
the intellectual work of the past generation slowly reappeared' .195 Since the largely 
historicist methodology remained the predominant conceptual framework, with the 
intellectual public turning its interest towards antiquity again, ancient history was not 
urged to rethink the theoretical foundations of its discipline during the 1920s. Also, the 
Lamprechtstreit left the historicist framework within ancient and modem history largely 
intact due to the unacceptable weaknesses in Lamprecht's approach. As Naf has pointed 
out, during the 1920s ancient history maintained its tendency towards making historical 
generalisations and to increasing the degree of specialisation within the discipline, but also 
attempted to utilise the results of ancient history in an apparently new way 'in order to 
highlight the "purpose and importance" of ancient Greek history'. 196 For example, Ulrich 
Wilcken characterised the history of Hellas as possessing an extremely crucial place in 
world history.197 The same applies of course to the importance of ancient history for the 
humanistic education of the modem citizen. Almost similar to Pohlmann's critique against 
attempts to diminish the influence of ancient history, Mattias Gelzer noted in 1926: 'As it 
appears to me, ancient studies ['Altertumswissenschaft'] today have to face two tasks. On 
the one hand, it should serve the humanistic edification, that is to say, it should preserve 
the most indispensable values for the present, which the older and later humanism 
rediscovered for our culture. On the other hand, the historical sciences should represent a 
193 See Schumann (1974) p 180. 
194 See Gelzer (1930) p. 624 and Berve (1928) p. 479. See Naf(1995) p. 284 n21 ff. 
195 N1tf in Flashar (1995) p. 285 n23 Cf. Stier (1932) p. 28. . . , 
196 Nat in Flashar (1995) p. 285. In this context N1tf highlighted the prevIOus modernisation In an<.:lent 
history and unjustly equated Wilamowitz-Mollendorf with Beloch, Pohlmann and Meyer. . Although 
. . . f h" t' ht analogies between antlgu\t\ and WIlamowitz made references to political problems 0 IS tIme, s ralg . ' . . . 
. . (1893) I 1 'A I . S of Aristotle s PolitiCS and \(:-, 
modernity could not be detected. See.WIlamowltz vo. na YSI 
literature' .. 
197 See Wilcken (1926) p. 1 and Otto (1925) p. 69f. n26. 
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colossal piece of human history, which is called antiquity, in its entirety. >198 This was a 
large burden of responsibility for ancient historians. Max Pohlenz's paper 'about the 
education of the citizen in Greek school lessons' exemplifies in a very precise \vay the 
political importance of the classical education of the youth. 199 'That the political sense of 
our boys is strengthened, if they engage in the spirit of the good times of the Greek polis, 
does not need to be emphasised. '200 Clearly, Pohlenz advocates a selective study of the 
classics, by picking and choosing the progressive and stable elements during the Greek 
antiquity. However, the object of such a methodology was not to encourage a uniform 
understanding of the Greek polis, but to sharpen the understanding of students for issues in 
the relationship between state-citizen and society.2ot 
The interpretation of a historically uniform Greek polis is mainly found in Viktor 
Ehrenberg's interpretation. The interest in the political foundations of the polis and its 
importance for a modem period is, as we saw, not unique to the 1920s. In the light of 
Meyer's and Beloch's stance one might already speak of a tradition of modernising the 
Greek polis against the aims and conflicts of the Weimar Republic. The search for the 
meaning of history and the mission of the German nation was subject to often intense 
debate from the early 1920s onwards until the end of the Second World War. The 'Sinn' 
or meaning of ancient Greek and Roman history was for many German historians always 
related to the fate of the German nation. 202 The use of ancient history and the emphasis on 
its political structure, ethos and anthropological presuppositions involved economic history 
mainly only within this political framework. 203 
This is of course not to say that the utilisation of ancient history led inevitably to a 
uniform school of thought within Altertumswissenschaft. A good example of the variety of 
views within ancient history as an academic discipline is Hans Schaefer who highlighted 
the non-utilitarian character of the Greek ethos, where material competition was seen as a 
expressions of manhood, but not for money's sake. Schaefer argued that Greek ethics, 
which were largely based on virtues, dominated all other aspects of life including the 
economy.204 In fact, for Schaefer, it was the shift away from these virtues and the 
encouragement of egoism, which led to the political and economic disintegration of the 
198 See Gelzer (1927) p. 185 ff. 
199 Se~ Meyer (1918), Ehrenberg (1923) and Lenschau (1932). 
200 Ntif in Flashar (1995) p. 289 n35, n36. I 
201 We need to note here that si nce Weber the notion of society as opposed to 'state' had taken a more centra 
role in the pedagogic jargon. 
202 See Ehrenberg (1923) p. 378. 
203 See for example Jaeger's 'The Education of the Greek Man' (193-1-) vol. I p. 16 t. n1 
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ancient polis. 205 The use of ancient history in all its aspects to answer questions of the 
present was continued throughout the 1930s and still enjoys popularity today.206 
A further development in ancient history during the 1920s and 30s was the popular 
attention given to the economic and legal history of antiquity. As we shall see in the 
following section, Oertel's modernising position, enhanced Beloch, Meyer and Pohlmann's 
views. However, his stance did not remain unchallenged. Johannes Hasebroek especially 
tried to revive and enrich the declining view of the none-modem character of the pre-
Hellenic ancient 'economy'. Examined in the context of the challenges and the rapidly 
changing social environment, ancient history regained importance as an academic 
discipline and as an essential tool in secondary education. That the German culture during 
this period 'aimed for new creativity and livelihood' and that this new spirit was 'certainly 
not due to the participation of the ancient historians' signalises for Stahlmann that only the 
progressive liberal attitude was capable of encouraging changes. However, even if the 
political views of the elite of ancient historians were dominated by obvious national-
conservative sympathies, it should be pointed out that lively debate and opposing views 
were not rare. 207 An example is the aftermath of the Bucher-Meyer Controversy with the 
contributions of the more conservative Michael Rostovtzeff and the liberal Johannes 
Hasebroek. 
One of the most extreme and embarrassing expressions of the calls for a revival of 
Classical antiquity by an ancient historian can perhaps be found in Walter Otto's call for a 
new 'Fuhrer': 'immense labour, labour more than anything else is required of us. Bitterly 
needed is also a regeneration of the spirit, which only religion is capable of providing. We 
also need a leader, not one of the many, who were created by pernicious personal cults, but 
the great all-conquering people's hero. Will he be created by the revolution like Cromwell 
and Napoleon, will he be its accomplisher and superseder? Or will we still need to wait for 
the saviour for a long time to come?'208 Ringer pointed out that in the aftermath of World 
War I, it was especially the intellectuals who felt themselves to be haunted by a 'ghost of a 
soulless modernity' and predicted a 'cultural crisis' or a decline of education, values and 
the national spirit in genera1. 209 Stahlmann argues that the impression of living in an age of 
204 Especially this idea was later picked up by Polanyi and partly adopted by Finley. 
205 Naf in Flashar (1995) p. 293. 
206 Losemann (1977). 
207 See Stahlmann in Flashar (1995) p. 304 n2, relies on a remark by Christ (1981) \'01. 1. p. 160. . _ 
208 Otto (1919) p. 86 cited in Stahl mann (1995) p. 304 n5. For more detail on the polttH:al commitments 01 
German academics see Ringer (1990) and Faulenbach (1980). 
209 Stahlmann in Flashar (1995) p. 307. 
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decline triggered the ancient historians to tum their attention to similar problems in 
antiquity. The study of subjects such as the downfall of the Roman Empire were however 
not peculiar to the 1920s. As we have seen before, Weber, Meyer, Pohlmann and Beloch 
had already worked towards the end of the 19th century on similar and influential papers. 
To them it may have been the educational goals of the Willhelrnian era or the threat of 
positivism or the challenges of understanding modem economic and technological 
phenomena, which led them to inquire into the field of the decline of the ancient 
ci vilisation. 
The devastating political and economic results of World War I for Germany and 
Europe raised fundamental and existential questions for the German nation that were not 
resolved during the 1920s. It is not surprising that historians looked for examples in the 
past, which constitute similar existential fears of decline of a civilisation. This 
presupposes that one regards the possibility of drawing historical analogies as a completely 
legitimate tool. Although the subject of the decline of the ancient civilisations only started 
to be researched before World War I, Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes, 
Ernst Stein's Gexhixhte des Spiitromischen Reiches and Matias Glezer's 
'AltertumswissenschaJt und Spiitantike' continued the search for explanations about this 
dramatic phenomenon. Gelzer, for example, saw the main cause of decline in the 
increasingly unmanageable amount of bureaucracy, which during the late Roman Empire 
apparently amounted to forms of 'state socialism', similar to the way in which 'fascist' and 
'Bolshevik' political constitutions subsume and destroy the individuaU lO Although Gelzer 
was well aware of the dangers of uncritical comparisons and analogies between antiquity 
and modem times, his statements represent a good example of the commonly held view 
about the importance of late antiquity for the political situation in Germany and Europe. 211 
The 'social' and 'national question' in Germany of the 1920s was not only the 
centre of attention for conventional political historians, but also attracted the attention of 
ancient historians such as Pohlmann, Gelzer and Oertel. Gelzer called the 'social question' 
during the 1920 the most important problem of his time. He stated, 'the social question is 
very justifiably of fashionable interest in our days. The unlimited technological 
development of the last century did lead to tremendous changes in the area of trade and 
210 See Gelzer (1927) p. 177. . 
211 For a good example see Gelzer's discussion of Pohlmann's Gesclziclzte der So:.ralen Fra.ge lind des 
Sozialismus in der Alltiken Welt in Gelzer (1914) pp. 102-106. Gelzer argued that Pohlmann tned,to brush 
. .. . d . tl activelv modern polItICS. But we 
aSIde 'the anCient tendenCies a modern catch phrase In or er to m uence . 
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industry, which brought about...entirely new forms of human social ll'fe Ov I 
.... er severa 
hundred million people were hit by misery .... Hence, it is no surprise that not one thinkin o 
b 
mind in our days can distance himself from these problems.'212 Clearly the majority of 
scholars in ancient history were, despite their conservative political orientation, not 
oblivious to contemporary social problems, but most maintained a sceptical attitude with 
regard to economic factors and their influence on politics. This became apparent through 
the discussion of the political situation and the legal organisation of Rome. It was claimed 
that 'despite the increased popularity of economic history at the end of the 19th century, 
especially in the area of ancient history, which clearly inspired a number of new 
publications in this field during the Weimar years, this period produced little of permanent 
value.,2\3 The following chapters will show that this point has been misguided. 
It was perhaps due the lack of political leadership and intellectual orientation that 
historical studies including ancient history focused on how particular historic personalities 
- the 'great men' of the past - managed politics in times of crises. There is no need to 
illustrate the conservative and nationalist attitude of modern and ancient historians who 
affiliated themselves with the spirit of anti-Semitism and fascism with its glorification of 
the Roman Empire.214 Their work is not relevant for us. A good example of the continued 
utilisation of ancient history to sharpen the historical mind of the modern men is, however, 
Gelzer's statement: 'the purpose of historiography is to learn from the past. Understanding 
and judgement develops with the study of the great, cause and effect incorporating 
complex political affairs'.215 The political fate of a nation is, according to Gelzer, strongly 
linked to the abilities of the statesman, such as a quick understanding of the complexity of 
particular political tendencies and political creativity to guide a nation into a new era. 
With this commonly supported agenda of historiography, ancient history as political event 
history and with the 'analogy' forming an essential tool in order to learn from the past, 
Meyer's, and his supporters', reading of the ancient economy remained the predominant 
view during the direct aftermath of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. 
saw of course that the phrase "different times, different social questions" does not move us a way from 
viewing ancient history as entirely separate and relativistic. 
212 Gelzer (1920) p. 154. 
213 Stahl mann in Flashar (1995) p. 324. . . . 
214 For some examples see Stahl mann in Flashar (1995) p. 321 ff. The intense focus and glonficatlon 01 the 
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ii. Friedrich Oertel and the 'Social Question' of Antiquity 
Although Friedrich Oertel is perhaps better known amongst ancient historians for 
his papyri studies, he published a great deal of essays and reviews on ancient economic 
thought and its literature. Most famous in that field is his appendix to Robert von 
Pohlmann's Geschichte der Sozialen Frage. Oertel presented papers at the Ge~an 
Historian Conference in 1926 and continued to discuss issues corresponding to the 
outcome of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy. Nevertheless, comparisons and attempts to 
modernise ancient history are present in his works; regardless of all modesty Oertel stood 
firmly in the tradition of the historicist historiography of Meyer. 216 However, without 
Friedrich Oertel's appendix to Robert von Pohlmann's Geschichte der Sozialen Frage und 
des Sozialismus in der Antiken Welt of 1925, the BUcher-Meyer Controversy would 
perhaps never reached the legacy that it has for contemporary writings in the history of 
historiography. The importance of Oertel's essay does not lie in the unique and precise 
interpretation of the issues debated between traditional ancient history and modem political 
economy; rather his essay aided the continuity of the debate. 
Even if Oertel argued that capitalism existed in some form in antiquity, his analysis 
of capitalism is not an ode on this political system or the free market. Oertel claimed that 
'There can be no doubt that a capitalist way of thinking and operating existed in 
antiquity.'217 For Oertel such forms did not have to have a mass character on a large scale. 
Forms of ancient socialism and capitalism were always present. The act of lending and 
borrowing of slave labour elucidate capitalist rationality. 'The goldsmith acquired gold in 
order to produce jewellery for a ready market; Aristarchus, who took a loan because of 
Socrates' advice in order to buy woollen for his fortune female workers, acted in a 
capitalistic manner. '218 What was valid for industry, for Oertel is simultaneously valid for 
agriculture. 
Oertel clearly supported the views of the ancient historians against BUcher 'and 
recently also Salin', but acknowledged that many difficulties and misunderstandings are 
due to the definition of capitalism. Oertel himself suggests the division of the concept of 
216 Cf. Schumann (1974) for a discussion Gelzer's 'Die Periodell der Grieclzischen Geschichte' and Oertel 
(1927) 
217 Oertel (1925) p. 514. 
218 Oertel (1925) p. 515. 
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capitalism into two aspects, a wider definition and a narrower definition.219 Oertel 
maintained that on the basis of a money economy, the purpose of 'economic acti\'ity' 
(,Erwerbsstrebens') was the accumulation of assets. He argues that a capitalist mode of 
production existed with an impersonaIised form of capital. The kapitalistisclze 
Produktionsweise does exist even on a small-scale in craftsmanship and in farming. By 
quoting Weber he claims that major and longer periods of antiquity operated in a 
capitalistic way and states that 'in particular socialism gained its character through the 
capitalist mode of production.' In order to elucidate such a development it is important for 
Oertel to address the question of the capitalist heavy industry. The question of the 
existence of heavy industry is not only a terminological problem, but also a question of the 
interpretation of the archaeological sources. Oertel, unlike Meyer, did not simply assume a 
kind of capitalist attitude of moneylenders and the workshop owners to make money, but 
assumes a highly developed capitalist national economy with centres of trade and 
exchange. In this light we should comprehend Oertel's summary of the BUcher-Meyer 
Controversy as only addressing the question of the scale of production and trade in 
antiquity: 
'Are we to conceive the economy of antiquity as having reached a high level of 
development, or, on the contrary, as essentially primitive? Should the 5th and 4th century 
be regarded as an age of national and international business, a receding agriculture, an 
advancing industry, large scale manufacturing on capitalistic lines and growing in scope 
with factories working for export and competing for one another for sales in the world 
market? Or should we assume, on the contrary, that the stage of the closed household 
economy had not yet passed, that economic activity had not yet attained a national, even 
less an international scale, that no regular commerce involving long distance trading was 
carried out and that, consequently, no large-scale industry producing for foreign markets 
existed? In brief, was the character of economic life still agrarian or rather industrial? 
Was commerce still restricted to a peddling of particular wares, the work of craftsman 
producing without any aid of machinery and using the raw-materials that were locally 
available to them?,220 
This often quoted summary exemplifies similarities, but also shows differences 
between Oertel's interpretation and other interpretations of the Controversy. We noted 
before, that the real difference between BUcher and Meyer lies in the historiographical 
219 Oertel (1925) p. 516. 
220 Oertel (1925) p. 516-17. 
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method. BUcher was influenced by positivism and social democratic values, which 
welcomed the Smithian ideal of fair commutation in free markets. BUcher did not beJie\e 
in the modern character of antiquity, since its economic complexity was more primiti\'e 
(household based) in the development of human civilisation.221 Meyer, by arguing that 
political history, and hence economic history, repeated itself, was in fact not modernising 
antiquity in order to justify the system of rising capitalism; rather he warned of the dangers 
of free market capitalism undermining the nation state. That he believed that there were 
some striking analogies between modern political situations and ancient epochs lies in the 
nature of the Rankean paradigm of the primary character of the guiding political ideas. 
Oertel noted that the extreme positions 'in the debate between BUcher and Beloch 
have been recently reaffirmed by both authors'. Oertel also noted the development of a 
Mitteltheorie or a 'whole lot of middle theories' by Weber, Francotte, Zimmern and 
Siegwart.222 It is perhaps this statement that marks the beginning of a misinterpretation of 
Weber's position as a mediator between BUcher and Meyer. Oertel's interpretation seems 
to commit the error of interpreting the nature of the differences between BUcher and Meyer 
as merely a question of the quantity and scale of exchange. The fundamental question, 
how important trade and profit-making really were in antiquity, can only be properly 
addressed in the wider discussion of the nature of political life in antiquity. As Polanyi, 
Finley and recently Meikle have suggested, a system of capitalism could not have emerged 
in antiquity due to the lack of basic capitalist characteristics; the extraction of surplus in a 
free wage labour economy.223 This implies of course that the artisan who worked for their 
wages had little impact on the economic constitution of the polis. Secondly, it is argued by 
those scholars that antiquity never developed institutions, laws, contracts and the necessary 
material and social condition for an economic system that are essential for the industrial 
and commercial development of modern Europe. The 'negative' theory of BUcher, Oertel 
argued further, was obviously opposed to the 'positive' theories of Meyer and Beloch.224 
The former was negative in respect of his denial of the interpretation that antiquity ever 
reached the stage of an economy operating on a national scale. BUcher continued to 
maintain the self-sufficient character of the classical period and would only allow that 
Athens was an exception to this. On the other hand, the 'positive' theory refers to a 
affirmation of modern structures in economic life, such as markets, industry and trade. 
221 For the Darwinian evolutionist influence on Bucher see Leroy (1925). 
222 Oertel (1925) p. 517 Below (1926) p 11. 
223 Meikle (1995b) p. 161 f. 
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Oertel argued in agreement with Meyer that 'the Peleponesian War, although 
though Thucydides remains silent about this, had a very significant economic-political 
importance. '225 Besides the conjectural tendencies in this observation, what angers Oertel 
mostly is that BUcher seems to deny the import of raw materials for industrial production. 
However, Oertel's argument is inconclusive. 'The iron which the slaves processed for the 
father of Demosthenes into J-laxalJ-lal could hardly have been mined in Attika. '226 Further. 
'elephants which could produce the ivory for the handles of the J-laxall1al did not live in 
Athens either'. As much as BUcher was unable to disprove the suggestion that industrial 
raw-material were imported, so was Oertel unable to refute the existence of the textile 
industry of Megara. Megara, with the evidence provided by Meyer and Beloch (after 
Xenophon and Isokrates), shows systematic production by the artisans for the purpose of 
trade and wealth creation. Most striking for Oertel is the appearance of amphorae in 
different parts of the ancient world clearly standing out as an important piece of evidence 
for an early ceramic industry developed on a large-scale. For Oertel there seemed to have 
been only one way 'how these amphorae of Athenian style could have existed in large 
numbers in Italy', and that was by the means of trade.227 BUcher suggested that these were 
gifts. Even if Oertel is correct, that such large numbers of amphorae were not handed out 
as gifts, BUcher's claim of the travelling crafts or other alternatives of skilled imported 
slaves, has not even been mentioned or discussed by Oertel. Yet, after little more than two 
pages Oertel concludes, 'After all we can conclude that BUcher's extreme statements 
cannot withstand scrutiny.' And further, 'Attika remains as Pohlmann and others have 
maintained, an outstanding example of the ancient economy; raw-material has not only 
been imported for shipbuilding; the existence of an industry working also for export is 
difficult to deny. '228 Although Oertel notes that an identity of an economy is not warranted 
by such a fact, yet he concludes (not without some criticism of Beloch' s statistics, which 
made conjectures about the GDP of Athens and the money value of the Drachmae 
compared with the Reichsmark), that 'Beloch hit approximately the correct numbers, but 
that there are errors which Beloch himself recently admitted. '229 
224 Oertel (1925) 517 
225 Romstedt (1914) p. 47 ff. and Oertel (1925) p. 519 
226 Oertel (1925) p. 519. 
227 Oertel (1925) p. 520. 
228 Oertel (1925) p. 520. 
129 Oertel (1925) p. 521. 
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However, Oertel turned also critically against Meyer and Pohlmann who both in 
, 
his view, exaggerated the scope and scale of production and trade. He points out that the 
'plant based production' might have been smaller than initially assumed.230 Whether we 
should take the number of slaves into account by calculating the gross domestic product is 
not relevant for the understanding of Oertel's position. To him, commerce was of course 
present, but the scope of trade and commerce was strongly limited to technical and natural 
resources. As for the 4th century, Oertel pointed out the lack of food i.e. the need to import 
nutrition forced Athens to produce goods for export. Oertel stated that 'already Solon 
acknowledged this. However, if this fact is rather disputable, then it is even more doubtful 
that the conditions existed for a factory based large-scale industry.'231 Oertel notes too for 
the pre-Hellenic period that the transport of goods, especially between the country towns, 
was often very difficult mainly because of the customs bans but also due to sea robbery.232 
The premium for success must have been very high indeed, and any insurance according to 
Oertel was very expensive in interest rates. A competitive transport fleet could not 
develop because the small ships were unable to travel during winter time. With interest 
rates, according to Oertel's estimates, ranging between 14 % and 27 % commercial 
transport was expensive and dangerous, which is for Oertel a good reason to assume that 
international competition between different cities for markets could not emerge. In 
addition, it is difficult to imagine how much mass-produce was needed since there was 
little information exchange between the cities, especially during the winter time. This also 
meant that travelling for business or other purposes was rather rare. Whilst the import of 
raw material was, because of scarcity, rather welcomed, the export of goods was in 
comparison quite difficult. Since a functioning postal service was missing, no goods could 
be easily ordered or accounted for. Any corporate relation and agreements between cities 
were highly difficult, so that there could not have been any institutionalised production for 
exchange. 
To Oertel it is equally important to warn against swift comparisons in the form of 
the organisation of work. Terms like 'large-scale factories' or 'heavy industry' might be 
tempting indications to assume the same complexity of labour division, technological 
advances, general organisation and management as in modern times. m Oertel noted 
correctly that since the modern factory is in its social placement different from the ancient 
230 Oertel (1925) p. 523. 
231 Oertel (1925) p. 523 Cf.. Zimmern (1915) p. 352 f. 
m Cf. Ziebarth (1929). 
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'manufactories', the controversy is therefore 'not only a debate about words' .234 Like 
Weber previously, Oertel emphasised that despite an existing division of labour and 
specialised crafts that must have increased efficiency, machinery and technical progress 
were missing, and therefore the area of production was rather static and underdeveloped. 
'Therefore, organisation and production methods essentially remained craft-based. 
Technology remained static not dynamic, production was not yet mechanised. '2:15 
Therefore, the difference between workshops and factories is considerable. Oertel sees the 
larger workshops as being only occasionally factories, in terms of the numbers of workers. 
Regarding their technological structure, however, they were based on handicrafts and 
manual labour. Most importantly, regarding the possibility of capitalism during the 
classical period, Oertel clearly denies that workshops are the result of a capitalist mode of 
production.236 To Oertel, Demosthenes' often mentioned 'sword factory', lacks the 
characteristics of a capitalist factory. Not at least because of the relationship between 
capital owner (the workshop owner) and his 30 odd workmen, who were purchased as 
deposits. 237 Further, Oertel maintained that 'the capital owner dominates and not the capital 
- the personal and not the material aspects are essential in the relationship between owner 
and slave. The industrial slaves belong to the house, where they are also catered for - a 
parallel to the servant's room appears. Therefore, the "Groj3betrieb" is not an organic 
whole, but is based on an accumulation of crafts. '238 
Oertel concluded that the difference between small and large workshops is merely 
quantitative and not qualitative.239 The larger workshops might produce a higher output, but 
do not show any progression in the build up of 'Groj3industrie' in relation to 
'Kleinindustrie'.240 Large workshops therefore do not benefit the process of production and 
cannot gain any dominant role in the economy. Oertel argues, almost alongside BUcher's 
position, by concluding that 'capital has not commenced its creative role; it is only through 
.. I '241 Its predommance that a natura economy can emerge. 
233 Oertel (1925) p. 526. 
234 Oertel (1925) p. 526. . k 
235 See Kaerst (1917). That indeed the processes of production employed mostly manut~ctured .work (\\ or . 
. h . For a very JnterestJnl! stud v ot 
with the hand) is explicit on the many frescoes and pictures on t e ceramics. L -
the forms and tools of craftsmanship see Grassl (1990). 
236 See Oertel (1925) p. 125 n103 Cf. Busolt (1920) p. 191 n3. 
237 Oe~tel (1925) p. 126 n107. 
238 Oertel (1925) p. 128. . ' f modern manufacturing. 
239 He still uses the words 'Groj3- und Kleinbetriebe', which are more appropnate or 
240 Oertel (1925) p. 529. 
w Oertel (1925) p. 529. nlli. 
PART III MAX WEBER AND THE AFTERMA TH OF THE CONTROVERSY 280 
Oertel's analysis of the historical sources and discussion of Hellas during the 
classical period appears carried out with care and depth. A so-called 'primitivist' might 
perhaps label some of the terminology used by Oertel, such as 'factory plant' 
('Groj3betrieb') and 'large-scale industry' (,Groj3industrie'), as misjudged. However, 
Oertel deserves support and acknowledgement in his efforts to highlight the versatile but 
non-capitalistic character of the Hellenic economy. For the classical period, Oertel 
mentions three factors which 'got in the way' of a possible capitalist mode of production. 
First, uncertainty, secondly, the differences in the acquisition and form of capital and 
thirdly, the peculiarities of slave labour. 242 
Although one could imagine that the defenders of the view of the existence of 
ancient capitalism in Hellas, such as Meyer, Beloch and Gumrnerus, would have criticised 
Oertel's criteria for defining the economy of the classical period, it is however not difficult 
to speculate what kind of arguments these authors could have raised against Oertel. Three 
arguments can constructed that are fairly obvious. Firstly, we could argue that the 
development of modem capitalism was accompanied by even more political unrest and 
devastating warfare than ever present throughout antiquity. Secondly, resulting from 
political uncertainty, the money economy was not only underdeveloped and frequently 
thrown back into barter in ancient times, but also in modem history. Regarding Oertel's 
claim that no serious banking and giro exchange took place, we could also assert that 
during the early stages of capitalism, problems of acquisition of money capital and raw-
material was extremely difficult. Finally, even if BUcher was correct in claiming that slave 
labour in the form of slave armies are exaggerations of the extent of slavery, and that 
Weber's is correct in pointing out that slaves belonged and lived under the roof of the 
household or estate owner and were part of a social structure, still, this is not eradicating 
the possibility of the existence of capitalism in antiquity. The development of capitalism 
has shown in more than one case, that capitalists looked after their workers, or created a 
kind of company town environment. That the modem worker was free to leave does not 
seem to lead to a strong factor for the development of capitalism but could, on the other 
hand, make slave labour less effective, mainly because of a permanent duty by the owner 
to look after them. 
If not capitalist, what was the nature of the 'economy of classical Greece'? For 
Oert~l it is difficult to come to a definite conclusion, because of the amount of contrary 
'4) ~ ~ Oertel (1925) p. 529. 
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historical sources and the different developments within different cities. It seems to be 
certain that Oertel had strong doubt about Pohlmann's analogies between leaseholder, co-
operations and industrial trustS.243 In respect of the debate between BUcher and Meyer, 
Oertel perhaps held some kind of 'middle position' regarding classical Greece, which had 
previously been suggested about Weber's interpretation. Oertel states that 'I can save 
myself to address the question whether the just characterised economy was, in BUcher's 
terms, more national or city based, because we cannot expect a positive furtherance by it. 
Since the structure was monetary, not barter, but also not loan orientated, in the 
Hildebrandian sense, it should be clear without a doubt, that it had a strong exchange 
orientated character. '244 That this strong exchange orientated weft was still not enough to 
provide the stable conditions of a capitalist economy has been made clear above. 
Remarkable in Oertel's analysis is certainly careful and knowledgeable dealing 
with the historical material, which should be noted positively in mind when analysing his 
elucidation of the 'social question' in antiquity, especially with regard to the discussion 
about the possibility of socialism and capitalism in antiquity. We hear that 'so far, I have 
concentrated on the Athenian circumstances of the 5th and 4th century, since they form the 
precondition for the socialist ideas of antiquity, which developed during that time'.245 In 
opposition to BUcher, Oertel maintained that the 'economic climax of the ancient economy 
and therewith ancient capitalism was reached during the Hellenic period i.e. during the 
flourishing period of the Roman empire of the second half of the 2nd century Be until the 
end of the 2nd century AD. '246 Oertel further argued that the relatively long peaceful period 
after the 2nd Peleponesian War created a very new political, social and also 'economic 
atmosphere'. As in Meyer, Beloch and Pohlmann, Oertel refers to technological advances, 
which brought about better and safer means of transport. The building of roads, for 
example, allowed an improvement in communication, new coastal cities emerged and the 
flow of trade advanced. Businessmen created a kind of exchequer to exchange not only 
goods, but mainly information and deals. A coastal guard secured the transport of those 
d d t t '247 'A k d goods etc. 'The accumulation of capital took place to an unprece ente ex en . In 
of giro exchange occurred ... , the pay and banking system took modem shape, ... even if 
243 Oertel (1925) p. 531. 
244 Oertel (1925) p. 537. Cf also Riezler (1907) p. 98. 
245 Oertel (1925) p. 537. . . 
246 BUcher argued that the archaic period of Athens expressed the highest development In terms .ot w.ealth. but 
. I' 0 I" t t ment appears In thIS respect did not claim that such a period could be regarded as SOCIa Ism. erte s s a e . . 
rather as conjectural. Oertel (1925) p. 537. 
247 Oertel (1925) p. 538. 
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initially the bank monopoly hindered the money exchange still, those manacles \\ ere 
removed during Roman times.'248 Oertel's enthusiasm for the 'economic boom' in antiquity 
on a capitalist basis seems to have no limits. We hear of the development of 'industrial 
centres in great style', 'a real aspiration towards acquiring an export territory played an 
important role in the large-scale politics', 'Egyptian papyrus flooded the ancient world' as 
a mass-product. 'In short, everywhere enjoyed an economic boom!'249 
For some reason, Oertel discusses the textual evidence in far less detail than in his 
previous chapter on the non-capitalist periods. 'U[lrich] Wilcken in his paper 'Alexander 
der Groj3e und die Hellenische Wirtschaft' calls this period quite rightly mercantilist. .. We 
can observe a progress during the blooming Hellenic-Roman period, a progress in the 
dimensions of capitalism, in the dimensions of exports, the international commodity 
exchange and the plants.'250 Of course, we should not overlook Oertel's efforts to separate 
ancient from modem capitalism. However, this difference is for him mainly a question of 
scope or quantity. Surely, the political environment and the degree of rationalisation as 
well as technological progress are qualitatively different i.e. more underdeveloped, but it 
seems that Oertel is no longer sensitive towards a distinct terminology. This 
methodological slip as well as the lack of consideration of almost any arguments by Edgar 
Salin or Karl BUcher triggers him to formulate the 'labourer question' (,Arbeiterfrage') 
even more strongly than Pohlmann did. 
Oertel returns to his analysis of the circumstances of 5th and 4th century Athens. 
'That free labour existed in general can be said without a shadow of doubt. It belongs to 
the achievements of the positive theory to have destroyed the erring belief that 
craftsmanship was mainly slave work. '251 Free labour existed, but according to Aristarchus 
and other sources, it is something unethical and involuntary. 'Nonetheless, in our days the 
desire to engage in wage labour with wages of a private businessman is not very great 
either. .. But because of the fact that inside a society there are less pleasurable tasks, it 
becomes the core of the modem social problem'.252 However, whilst modem society does 
not provide a solution to this problem yet, for Oertel, antiquity found a solution in slavery. 
Enslavement was not only a material condition in order to secure a successful harvest. but 
also a step towards preventing continuous aggression by enslaving the enemy. The 
248 Oertel (1925) pp. 538-539. 
249 Oertel (1925) p. 539. 
250 Oertel (1925) p. 441. 
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proportion of slave labour was calculated by Oertel to be 50 % of the popUlation towards 
the end of the 5th century. 
Similarly to Weber, Oertel blamed the increasing use of slave labour, which 
apparently crowded-out the self-employed craftsmen, as a key factor for the development 
of a social question or crisis. The social effects forced the native population to work side 
by side with the slaves. Living conditions worsened and the native population were forced 
into dependent services or even faced unemployment unless there was some kind of public 
investment (e.g. temple building). 'Unemployment was further increased by the laziness, 
which originated in the disregard for labour activities that were usually carried out by 
slaves, and on the other hand, by the state socialist payment system. '253 The state of the 
economy in archaic and classical Greece constituted the basis for a working-class question, 
which developed a kind of 'consumer proletariat'. 
For Rome, Oertel assumes the same process occurred after the Punic wars. This 
was the process by which 'on Greco-Roman soil it came to the pauperisation of the masses, 
only the causes and the shading are different from the modern age. '254 Even if Oertel 
defended Pohlmann's main observation in this respect, he made a considerable effort to 
modify the former's results concerning the different character of the archaic and Hellenic 
periods. Oertel acknowledges the importance and achievements of the Athenian political 
constitution, which geared collective effort and private enterprise towards a public good. 
However, Oertel does not carry out a detailed analysis. 
Despite his efforts to avoid following Pohlmann's extreme position by presenting 
'a slightly different' interpretation, Oertel does not discuss the 'negativists' assertions in 
detail. Instead, in the fourth and final part of his supplement, the reader learns about the 
existence of ancient socialism, which Oertel, to his credit, tries to distinguish from modem 
socialism. Ancient and modern socialism are distinct from one another in terms of the 
altered premises about the nature of the economy and the proletariat. Pohlmann 
highlighted the claim that it is not possible to describe a system as socialist by only 
considering the state of ownership in a society. However, besides noting the different 
idealistic and political circumstances that gave different city states a different shade of 
socialism, Oertel fails to discuss the question of whether the term socialism can be applied 
at all adequately to certain periods in antiquity. If we simply make the question of 
owne-rship the criterion of the nature of society, then we have no reason to believe that 
253 Oertel (1925) p. 548 n223. 
25-1 Oertel (1925) p. 549. 
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there was ancient socialism or capitalism. Oertel has obviously ignored the fact that 
property relations are set in a certain historical framework. State socialism is not 
necessarily the kind of moral economy which Aristotle demanded in Nicomachean EThics 
or in the Politics.255 Nevertheless, Oertel also pointed out correctly that the 'collective-
economical' basis stands in a relationship to the 'capitalist mode of production' .256 This 
mode of production has certain essential characteristics such as factories and monotonous 
labour, with a strict separation of capital and labour and a 'subjection' of labour under 
capital. However, all these careful definitions seem to be applicable only to certain periods 
of antiquity. Further we hear of 'mass-individualism', a tendency towards subjectivism in 
the spiritual life, which Oertel claimed to be the period of the ancient enlightenment. 
Undoubtedly, Oertel rejected Pohlmann's generalisation, which overlooked the complexity 
of the ancient social development on purpose. Finally, we are also informed about ancient 
communism with the example of the Cynics.257 Oertel's idea of socialism in antiquity is 
characterised in the tendency towards sharing the means of production, and is therefore not 
a definition of genuine common ownership of the means of production. Oertel seemed to 
have reduced the social question to a political question. This indicates that he saw himself 
more in the tradition of the historicist than on Lamprecht's side of social and cultural 
history.258 
To summarise Oertel's stance: At the beginning of his discussion of Pohlmann's 
'Soziale Frage' discourse he advocated caution and aimed to avoid oversimplifying 
generalisations. He noted too, that the debate between BUcher and Meyer, Beloch and 
Pohlmann is not only one of words, but of a fundamental character. At the end of his 
enquiry it is difficult not to have the impression that Oertel only elaborates and clarifies 
what has been previously said by Pohlmann, and partly by Meyer. In terms of the 
arguments raised by BUcher, Oertel seems to agree that at least for the classical period the 
Hellenic economy was not national and capitalist. Although, in general his supplement is 
valuable for its bibliographical detail and discusses a large amount of literature in the field 
of the history of the historiography of the ancient economy, his work remains oblivious of 
the methodological questions that made the positions between BUcher and \1cycr 
incommensurable with regard to the methodology that both employed. Despite Oertel's 
best intentions, he reduces the problems surrounding the Controversy to be merel \' a 
255 See Wilamowitz (1893) vol II and generally Meikle (1995b) ch. 5.6. 
256 Oertel (1925) p. 549. 
257 Oertel (1925) p. 550 n228. 
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quantitative matter. He seemed to have failed to acknowledge that a debate about words 
can also be a debate about concept formation. In Oertel's paper 'Class Struggle and 
Socialism in Ancient Greece' he expressed even more explicitly an application of modem 
concepts into the ancient past simply by stating that modem socialism/capitalism is entirely 
similar to ancient social forms. 
7 I 0 Oertel himself (1925) p. 3~ t 
258 See Christ (1981) and Stahlmann in Flashar (1995) p. 51 ,a s 
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iii. Johannes Hasebroek - 'Ancient and Modern Imperialism' 
The relationship between the present and the past represented in analogies was also 
of importance in Johannes Hasebroek's considerations about the nature of the ancient 
economy. According to the modern interpretation of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, it 
was Johannes Hasebroek who separated the debatees into 'primitivists' and 'modernists'.259 
However, nowhere in Hasebroek's works does he actually make this distinction by using 
such terminology.260 Hasebroek's own contribution to the controversy is often 
underestimated and although his name appears in many modern contemporary works, only 
a few serious attempts have been made to discuss his academic achievements and stance. 
Erich Pack, in his essay 'Johannes Hasebroek and the beginnings of ancient history in 
Cologne' gives the only detailed overview of his works and achievements. 261 It is still the 
most useful and complex discussion in the history of historiography of Hasebroek's works. 
1995 would have been Johannes Hasebroek's 100th birthday. Sadly, apart from a 
small column in the Neue Ziiricher Zeitung this anniversary was hardly noticed amongst 
ancient historians. His premature death, poverty of means and long illness prevented him 
from producing voluminous amounts of literature in ancient history, for which some of his 
colleagues are known for. However, regardless of his short scholarly career, it is 
nevertheless surprising that his work is so little recognised, even today; with the exception 
of Moses I. Finley of course. 262 
Regardless of the fact that Hasebroek has not reached the fame of Theodor 
Mommsen or Eduard Meyer in ancient history, he was one of the most original and 
influential scholars of his discipline during the 1920s. His early works and lectures 
indicated that he already had a strong interest in economic and political matters of 
antiquity.263 His lectures 'The Ancient Polis, State and Political Theory of the Greeks', 
'Alexander the Great', 'History of the Roman Private Law' and 'The History of the 
259 Humphreys (1978) p. 139. . . 
260 Someone, who draws straight analogies between ancient and modern events, IS not necessanly a 
modernist. Nor is someone who believes in the primitive character of the ancient economy necessanly a 
pnmltlvlst. Such generalisations tempt all to quickly to assign other attributes found in modernism and antl-
modernism (for and against modernity). . 
261 There is so far only one more detailed study on Hasebroek, which was carned out by P~ck (1987) .Oth.er 
articles mentioning Hasebroek include Berve (1959) and Brake (1937). However, the maIO IOsplration tor 
this chapter is taken from Pack (1987). . . . . . . . 
262 See especially Finley (1965) p. 1 ff. 'Haebroek's receives the ment tor re-est~bl1.s~lOg economic lite 
within the cadre of the polis.' Finley refers here also to Will's acknowledgement of thiS tact. 
263 Pack (1987) p. 11 ff. 
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Decline of the Ancient World', indicate that Hasebroek had a wide range of interests in 
what one would today call the social and economic history of the ancient world. 
The works of Eduard Meyer, who during the first quarter of the 20th centurv was 
-, 
one of the leading German ancient historians of international standing, clearly dominated 
the discipline of ancient history and became text book literature during Hasebroek's years 
of study at Heidelberg. Despite the later apparent disagreement between Meyer and the 
younger Hasebroek about the character of the early Greek economy, Hasebroek rated 
Meyer very highly as an influential historian and was influenced by his way of 
characterising the ancient economy.264 Apart from Meyer we should also mention Ulrich 
Wilcken's influence, who proposed Hasebroek for the post of academic assistant in 
papyrology at Heidelberg. Hasebroek's article about the Greek banking system of 1920 
was still very much in line with the Beloch-Meyer position of the modem character of the 
ancient economy Greek. 265 
The publication of his papers 'Modes of Operation of Greek Trade' (1923) and 
'The Imperialistic Idea in Antiquity' (1926) indicated a change in his stance towards 
BUcher. Both works also formed the basis of his two major works in ancient 'economic' 
history; State and Trade in Ancient Greek (1927) and Greek Economic and Social History 
until the Persian Age (1931). Both books stand out not only in terms of the detailed 
discussion of sources, but also in terms of their intellectual depth and effort to grasp the 
important aspects of the pre-Hellenic polis. In referring to Walter Otto's Kulturgeschiclzte 
des Altertums (1925), Hasebroek asserted that 'today there is a reaction against the familiar 
idealisation of antiquity, and the theory that it reached an advanced stage of economic 
development has found support. '266 And further, 'on the whole it is coming to be 
recognised that the extreme modernising attitude, hitherto prevalent, can no longer be 
maintained. The household-economy theory of Rodbertus and BUcher was exaggerated, 
but there is no longer any reason to doubt that BUcher was right in repudiating the 
conventional view, or that the economic conditions of the 5th and 4th century were 
relatively primitive. The old views of ancient industrialism have been largely modified 
and in particular the fantastic picture of an industrialised Greek state is steadily beginning 
264 In this context we should refer to Pack's claim (1987) p. 9 n15, that it is not clear whether Hasebroek and 
Meyerhad any kind of contact about the issue involving the controversy. It is unfortunate that Hasebroek 
wished to have his academic correspondence destroyed after his death. .' .-th 
265 See Hasebroek (1920) pl13 f. Here Meyer receives explicit praise for having hIghlighted t~e POInt that) 
and 4th century Hellas stood pretty much under the influence of developed money economy . On the other 
. . d' .. f th n'lent econom\ as hmltln ll hand Rodbertus and Bucher are criticised for theIr schematIc IscnptIOn 0 e a c . ::-
the scope of the use of money. 
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to fade.'267 Whilst in the ancient Mediterranean sea trade a money owner was solely a 
landlord, who mostly laid out capital for the merchant i.e. the ship owner without 
participating in the actual business in any kind of form. In the medieval commellda, the 
stans is for the most part an experienced elderly professional trader, who continues to 
shape and influence the business. Although there are examples of priests who lent money, 
they were not actively involved in the business activities.268 
Hasebroek, in his article on the 'Imperialistic Idea in Antiquity' of 1926 draws a 
very sharp distinction between ancient and modem forms of imperialism. He states that 
'What connects all lawful communities and societies is the high ideal of the people's 
family and the people's solidarity.'269 The pax christiana was created in order to protect 
that spirit of the community. It was not until modem times that nationalism became a 
dynamic force in the construction of independent states which promoted the special interest 
of churches. 'Antiquity probably came into the consciousness of the cultural solidarity of 
the peoples. First of a pan-Hellenic, then - the concept of the oikomene - spanning over the 
whole of humanity, but never of a political solidarity. '270 'Plato and Aristotle never talk 
about foreign politics', Hasebroek asserts. This rather traditional stance of relying on 
written documents rather than on archaeological findings was continued after Rostovtzeff 
in the methods of Polanyi and Finley. Both argued, similarly to Hasebroek 70 years 
earlier, that 'the will to live of the ancient states found its support by the ethical 
commitment of its citizens and the constitution of the polis, but not by the desire for power 
over other states.'271 That is to say, that according to Hasebroek, the ancient aggressive 
policies towards neighbouring polis was mainly driven by the ideal to achieve superior 
autonomy amongst these city states. The driving forces in the wars and disputes over sea 
rule and rule over territory was not about export markets, but about pride and autonomy. 
Hasebroek maintains, that 'only at a much higher human stage of development do we see 
wars fought in the name of trade politics. '272 'Corinth was not a commercial city with a 
merchant fleet, nor was the commercial spirit penetrating its public life, and it was never 
266 Hasebroek (1933) p. v 
267 Hasebroek (1933) p. v-vi In this context, Oertel, Weber, Bolkenstein and Franc?tte appear as exJmpl~s 
for such a modified view. However, it is debatable in the context of the prevIous discussions whether t.hclr 
views are simply modifications of the modem view. At least in the case of Weber. we can see a UnIque 
~osition not just middle or modified view. 
68 See Hasebroek (1966). 
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the centre of an export bound industry. '273 Antiquity, Hasebroek concludes, is based on 'a 
state of fighting' for the sake of salvaging ones' pride.274 
Although Hasebroek had warned his readers earlier about the exaggerations of the 
modem character of the ancient economy, he himself did just that for the Hellenic period 
and Rome. The exact motives as to why Hasebroek turned his back on the event orientated 
and modernising historiography are not clear from his publications. Unfortunately, his 
correspondence was destroyed after his death. Pack suggested that Hasebroek's relative 
reservation against quick analogies between ancient and modem times and events might be 
due to his liberal upbringing275 The liberal and less intense working environment of ZUrich 
in the early 1920s, perhaps provided Hasebroek with a more independent view on modem 
problems away from the frantically changing political climate in the Weimar Republic.276 
His move to Cologne may have marked the beginning of his scholarship in ancient social 
and economic history. His first lecture in June 1927 was called 'homo politicus', which 
used elements of Aristotelian political philosophy in his thought.277 His two books were 
preceded by a number of short articles on the peculiar and independent character of the 
ancient Greek world. 
Max Weber's writings clearly influenced Hasebroek's stance, which was more 
orientated on BUcher than on Meyer and Beloch. The Weber-reception began halfway 
through the 1920s and evidently influenced Hasebroek's position.278 Naf emphasised that 
during the 1930s the anti-modernistic interpretation gained the upper hand. However, this 
position is difficult to reconcile with his judgement that the anti-modem view of 
Heichelheim and Hasebroek did not benefit their career. 279 Heichelheim, as a member of a 
Jewish family, had to resort to emigration. Hasebroek retired from academia 'on health 
grounds' due to a conspiracy against him in 1937.280 
273 Hasebroek (1926) p. 9. 
274 Hasebroek (1926) p. 10. 
275 Pack notes (1987) p. 11 n55 that all people he was able to ask about Hasebroek judged him as very 
democratic. 
276 Pack (1987) p. 12 
277 Hasebroek came from a middle class background. His personality and liberal attitude seemed to have 
influenced his historical writings so to avoid the pompous vocabulary used frequently by t~e traditiona~is~s 
Meyer, Pohlmann and also Droysen. It is therefore no surprise that Hasebroek did not, unlIke, many ot hiS 
colleagues, participated in nazi propaganda. Pack pointed out p. 18 that Hasebroek :-vas very lIttle a. 
'politi<:al' scholar, who believed like many others to have the opportunity to 'over-wmter' the years ot 
Hitler's regime. This was however not granted to him. Hasebroek belonged to the few scholars who 
supported the Weimar Republic in all its weaknesses and deficiencies. 
278 Cf. Heuss (1965) p. 556 f. 
279 Ntif in Flashar (1995) p. 299. 
280 Pack 1987 p. 14. 
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Hasebroek summarised the difference between the ancient and the modem citizen 
in the following way: 'the capitalistic feeling of the medieval city is primarily concerned 
with trade and craftsmanship; the ideal polis citizen is farmer and landlord. '281 Hasebroek 
argued that the Greek polis did not support and promote trade, but at the most rather 
exploited it fiscally. The Greek polis followed rather imperialistic aims and sought to 
satisfy its citizens with basic needs. 
Although Hasebroek's position appeared initially very isolated in ancient history, 
his two works found a very wide circle of readers as well as reviewers.282 That the Blicher-
Meyer Controversy was of course still part of the wider debate about the usefulness of 
ancient history and therefore should not be disconnected from general issues of historical 
methodology, is indicated by Hasebroek himself in a letter to M. 1. Rostovtzeff in which 
he noted that 'I still regret it, that German ancient history does possess not enough interest 
and therefore not enough knowledge about all these problems. Oertel and me [Hasebroek], 
we are almost the only ones who deal with economic questions. '283 Hasebroek did not 
mention Laum, Salin, Ziebarth, Schwahn and Heichelheim. The reason for this 
unawareness is not clear. Perhaps Hasebroek regarded those historians still in the tradition 
of political history as opposed to cultural history it la Lamprecht. Indications that this 
might have been the case are suggested by Pack. 
Before Hasebroek was forced into retirement, he worked on a counterpart of his 
Greek social and economical studies for Roman history, which exists only as an 
unpublished manuscript. 284 His Staat und Handel was positively received in the English 
speaking world after its translation in 1933.285 In addition, Eduard Will paid considerable 
tribute in his well-known Annales article of 1957, in which he aimed to summarise the 
debate about the character of economic life in antiquity.286 That this article 'summed up the 
old debate in a most influential way, setting the standards for all future discussions and 
paying a very honourable tribute to his German predecessor' is however only partly true 
and more or less an exaggeration of an undoubtedly important piece of historiography. 
Apart from Will's clear sympathy towards Hasebroek, the English speaking tradition with 
Polanyi and Finley also show clear signs of Hasebroek's influence. In Germany we might 
recall the Christian Meier School of the 1960s and in Italy of course Mario Mazza, who 
281 See appendix of the Neue Ziiriclzer Zeitung 
282 See Pack's bibliography (1987). 
283 Pack 1987 p. 8 
284 Unfortunately this work was not available. 
285 See Pack (1987) p. 33 
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produced the most comprehensive interpretation of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy to date, 
including a good discussion on Hasebroek's arguments. 
286 See Will (1954) pp. 7-22. 
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iv. Bernhard Laum and Arthur Rosenberlf87 
Original contributions towards the subject of ancient economic history, apart from 
Hasebroek, were relatively rare during the 1920s. As previously emphasised, the 
traditional conservative attitude against economic history as part of social history remained 
and was not seriously influenced by the argumentative reinforcement of Wilcken and 
Oertel. However the political economist, Bernhard Laum, and the historian Arthur 
Rosenberg, added interesting contributions to the topic which had an impact on ancient 
political history of the post war period. 
Laum's work Die Sakrale Funktion des Geldes 'The Sacred Function of Money' 
focused on the sacred function of money in antiquity. By using Homer's Iliad and the 
Odyssey, Laum attempted to show that 'the value measurement in cows did not operate for 
the purpose of exchange, but that it was rather an intra-social value measure. 288 Laum also 
believed in theories of economic stages and positioned himself alongside BUcher in the 
controversy.289 Laum himself seemed to interpret the BUcher-Meyer Controversy as a 
debate between the pros and cons of theories of economic stages, which makes his 
interpretation quite unique. 
For Laum the origin of trade is non-economic since public events, such as the cult 
feasts, offered the best opportunities to have social intercourse and exchange scarce 
necessary objects. 29o Laum is most criticised for his account of the origin of coinage. 
Again he emphasises the religious importance of the mint and inquires about how it 
became a 'world means'. Money is not circulated and kept because of its quality to 
preserve exchange value, but rather to symbolise belonging to the 'totemistic society'.291 
'The face of the coin is a holy symbol', which in fact guarantees the ability to purchase. 
Even if Laum's explanations might sound plausible to someone who emphasises the anti-
capitalist character of the ancient economy and its ethical depth, we need to note that 
Laum's hypothesis of the origin of coinage is a rather arbitrary assumption which was 
never sufficiently substantiated by sources. 
Money is, in accordance to Laum's investigations, a creation of the religious-
political order. It is natural that every scientist has the inclination to emphasise newly 
287 See Schachenmayer (1964) p. 135 ff. See also Rosenberg (l921a) and (l921b) 
288 See also Laum (1922) p 417f. 
289 Wittenburg in Flashar (1995) p. 269. 
290 Laum (1924) p. 100. 
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produced results. 'This happened here too. Such a proceeding is not dangerous, as long as 
it does not become a dogma. '292 Laum argues, in the 'universal spirit of Max \Veber', 
against the 'isolated theory', which does not take non-economical elements sufficientlY 
into consideration. The isolated theory or a rather primitive or simple explanation is then 
to be found amongst the 'modernisers' of the ancient economy and not amongst the 
'primitive' interpretations. 
Laum tries to escape the schematics of 'primitivismus vs. modemismus' by 
drawing and emphasising the peculiarities of the Greek history and its social life; he seeks 
to avoid 'the rather worn rails of a diverse and irreconcilable discussion.'293 Although the 
intellectual ties with Weber are clearly visible and Laum mentions Weber's work very 
frequently, it is questionable whether Laum grasped the complexity of the Controversy 
adequately. 'In Homeric Greece, the type of the "closed household economy" is almost 
completely realised' .294 Wittenberg suggested that Meyer argued the opposite i.e. that trade 
was the leading factor of the cultural development' .295 This is correct, but Meyer did not 
argue that the whole of antiquity was embedded in flourishing trade. As we saw, the 
Homeric period follows a feudal agrarian type of economic development in antiquity. 
Against Meyer, Laum points out that the desire to possess commodities of foreign origin 
was not a desire that dominated the ethos of the ancients entirely. By developing the 
concept of the 'Schenkende Wirtschaft' (gift-giving economy), exchange during the 
Homeric period was a time of giving and taking of gifts. 296 Exchange was limited to kings 
and dukes, and not so much carried out by the ordinary citizen. Only the aristocracy were 
able to shift commodities as signs of their power and wealth to their neighbours. 
In terms of his historic method, Laum does agree with Meyer in rejecting the 
comparative method. He points out that 'ethnology is not a historic science. '297 The 
primitive cultures are very far apart from us. However it is not clear whether Laum is 
asserting that the whole of antiquity or at least the Greek history is of a primitive character, 
whilst ours is of a civilised nature. 
Laum, as I mentioned, moved from being an ancient historian to become a political 
economist, but his works, perhaps due to the dominant position of the modernising 
291 Laum (1924) p. 140-14l. 
292 Wittenberg in Flashar (1995) p. 268. 
293 Wittenberg in Flashar (1995) p. 269. 
294 Wittenberg in Flashar (1995) p. 270. 
295 Laum (1924) p. 90 
296 Laum (1960) p. 139. 
297 Laum (1960) p. 5. 
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tendencies, found little support among either side of scholarship, as his supporter \Villhelm 
Gerloff noted in 'Die Enstehung des Geldes und die Anfdnge des GeLdwesens' of 1943.298 
What seems to be unfounded in Humphreys' often mentioned introduction to his 
Anthropology and the Greeks, are the accusations that Laum defended the 'closed 
economy' of Nazi Germany.299 Bernard Laum's Schenkende Wirtschaft is supporting the 
negative theory of the liberal Karl BUcher. Soon, however, he was accused of using this 
concept as a propaganda tool to defend the state economy of the Hitler government. 3OO 
We argued earlier that the rather traditional view of ancient history based on the 
Rankean paradigm and influenced by the Prussian School remained dominant throughout 
the 1920s and 30s. It is therefore not possible or necessary to outline all the historicist 
contributions towards ancient history which dealt with social issues. We might therefore 
concentrate rather on an alternative approach and see how the traditionalists i.e. the 
historicist tradition dealt with it. 
Arthur Rosenberg's interpretation of the ancient economy was also, to some 
degree, politically motivated. Although Rosenberg came from a conservative background, 
as did most ancient historians in Germany, he gained his reputation as one of the few 
historians on the political Left. His essay Demokratie und Klassenkampf im Altertum was 
characteristic of his stance.30I He emphasised 'the view that the essence of all history is to 
be found in class struggles, and affirms itself completely in the considerations about 
antiquity. '302 It was not the use of modem Marxist vocabulary, which we surprisingly also 
found in Oertel and Pohlmann, which gave Rosenberg a unique position amongst 
historians, but rather his effort to challenge the hijacking of antiquity by the conservative 
nationalistic orientated historians a La Beloch and Meyer. 
Besides his work as a part-time lecturer at the Friedrich-Willhelm University of 
Berlin, he educated workers at a local evening college open to the public. Rosenberg did 
not oppose the use of ancient history to warn about modem trends and developments. 
Rather, he argued against what he called 'the conservative abuse of ancient history' .303 By 
doing so, he tried to deliver an alternative account of classical antiquity 'von untell' from 
298 See Gerloff (1943). 
299 Humphreys (1977) p. 38. . B . 300 - . hi' th t L m was a strong NaZI supporter. elng J We could not detect any eVIdence to support t e c aim a au . '. ~ 
member of the NSDAP was nothing unusual for an academic scholar dunng that tIme .!Od almo~( 
unavoidable as well. 
301 Wehler (1982) pp. 19-102. 
302 Wehler (1982) p. 23. 
303 Wehler (1982) p. 23. 
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the social basis of society. However thl' s alte t' 11 
' rna lve was not a so-ca ed primitive 
interpretation a la BUcher and Rodbertus. 
Rosenberg followed his mentor Eduard Meyer, despite having a very different 
political outlook. Clear parallels to Meyer's attempts to interpret certain periods of 
antiquity by implying a modem structure of the economy regarding ownership relations 
and class conflict can be seen in Rosenberg's work. 304 Nevertheless Rosenberg still very 
much followed the tradition of political history, which placed him much closer to the 
Prussian School and Meyer than his contemporary Johannes Hasebroek was.305 Regardless 
of his political aims, the anachronistic use of terminology and the use of politically 
motivated analogies put Rosenberg more in line with the historicist tradition, who differed 
from him mainly in respect of the political aims but not methodologically. Stahlmann 
states correctly that such an attempt to understand ancient history by employing the 
traditional method in order to create a new Marxist-materialistic picture of ancient 
economic life was bound to fai1. 306 
The following examples should underline Rosenberg's use of modem concepts and 
Marxist terminology: 'The older Rome during the 6th and 5th century was ruled by the 
Roman aristocracy. During the 4th century the aristocratic rule was replaced by the 
property owning classes as a whole. In the year of 287 Be, the class of the small farmers 
took over the political power and created the Roman democracy' .307 'The rule of the 
Roman credit institutes was forty years long; it shattered the state completely and threw the 
subjected country into misery. Only after a bloody civil war were the loyal citizens and 
farmers under the leadership of Sulla able to break the power of the capitalist party (in year 
80). '308 
In criticism of efforts to modernise ancient history, Gelzer warned as early as 1920 
of 'the modern arrogance, by employing its pre-prepared practical theories, to win power 
over the past and to master it with its own patterns. There is no better means to block 
access to the true historical circumstances than this one.' 309 
304 Wehler (1982) p. 37 ff. . 
305 Stahl mann inferred that Oertel was lacking this interest In Flashar (19~?) p. 318. Perhaps he was more 
interes'ted in economic issues, but he always viewed them as part of the poittlcal too. 
306 Stahlmann in Flashar (1995) p. 319. 
307 Wehler (1982) p. 84. 
308 See Rosenberg (1921a). 
309 Gelzer (1920) p. 154. 
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v. Michael/. Rostovtzeff - the Decline of the Russian and the Roman Empire 
Hasebroek's aversion to attempts to understand the nature of ancient economic life 
with modern concepts was not appreciated amongst the so called 'modernisers'. Oertel, 
who is also regarded as a moderniser reviewed Hasebroek's books, with serious criticism 
especially regarding Hasebroek's dealing with the historical material. Howe\er. 
Hasebroek's book Staat und Handel set out to address a wider audience and to be an 
indroductionary book for undergraduate students. Michael I. Rostovtzeff (1870-1952), on 
the other hand, belongs much more to the tradition of conservative historians of the 
Rankean kind. His works were therefore much more in line with what was regarded as 
serious Altertumswissenschaft. Rostovtzeff also entertained the modem view of the 
ancient economy that is, we can draw analogies between events during certain periods of 
antiquity which possess the same pattern or are of the similar kind as modem problems. 
Again, we should not understand similarities as sameness. No serious historian in our 
analysis has claimed that antiquity and modern capitalism are exactly the same. However, 
in terms of how far such an analogy between modern and ancient times between different 
periods of history can go, 'no historian, regarding that period [antiquity], has achieved 
more for the modern view than M. I. Rostovtzeff, ... who can only be compared with 
Theodor Mommsen's achievements.'310 We shall see on the following pages whether Karl 
Christ's praise is justified in respect of Rostovtzeff. Certainly, Rostovtzeff one most 
influential ancient historians during the second quarter of the 20th century.311 
Rostovtzeff who was born in Kiev, unifies uniquely the modem European tradition 
with the values of aristocratic Czaristic Russia. Influenced by the well-known philologist 
Taddeus Zielinski, Rostovtzeff gained a solid education in the classics at St. Petersburg 
University. The archaeologist Kondakov was also enormous influence on Rostovtzeff. 
The influential works of Mommsen and Weber began his interest in Roman 
political and economic history. The leading position of the German scholarship in ancient 
legal and political history as well as his first major publication, his doctoral thesis, brought 
310 Christ (1972) p. 334. ,.' ") h' 
311 Since there is still no monouraph available on Rostovtzetf we wiIl conce~trate ~)n Christ (197_). t l: 
b . f M . (1998) d the tnllowmg literature. Be\ cr bibliographical detail has been obtamed largely rom a.n~1 . ,a~. ff" . 1 W s 1990) 
(1994), D'Arms (1977) and Momigliano (1954). On the political news ot Rostovtze sel: a sO e. ( . 
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him closer to the German classical and historical scholarship.312 Meyer and Wilamowitz 
already viewed Rostovtzeff's early work positively after an important tum towards ancient 
painting and archaeology as well as the interpretation of ornaments of southern Russian 
and early Iran-Greek tribes.3i3 Due to the October Revolution, Rostovtzeff fled into exile in 
England where he wrote polemic articles against the new political system. In 1910, under 
the influence of Ulrich Wilcken and his work on the social and administrative history of 
the Roman Empire, Rostovtzeff published his Studies of the Roman Colonate, 'a major 
contribution which made his reputation. '314 
Rostovtzeff failed to receive a permanent position at Oxford in part because of his 
heavy Russian accent. Hugh Last, who would later become Camden Professor of Ancient 
History at Oxford and who did not much care for Rostovtzeff personally, wrote, 'in those 
days his pronunciation of English was, at least in the lecture-room, extremely difficult to 
understand; and it must be added that, like other unfortunates in exile, remembering that 
his knowledge was his main claim to consideration, he was apt to force it on his listeners in 
conversation with a vigour, which was sometimes thought excessive as was the tone he 
adopted in some of his reviews of the works of even quite junior scholars.'315 Although 
Last did not appreciated Rostovtzeff's strong personality, it seems that he appreciated 
nevertheless the scope of his work up to the time of his appointment at Oxford, an 
appreciation which evolved into a deep respect for the Russian's later work.316 It was at this 
time that Rostovtzeff became most active in voicing his anti-Communist position. He 
wrote a number of articles in Struggling Russia, The New Russia and other periodicals 
concerning the fate of Russian education under the Communist Party.317 Rostovtzeff was 
always a nationalistic orientated Russian patriot and welcomed as a liberal the early stages 
of the revolution by openly supporting the provisional Kerenski government, which he 
perceived as being capable of preserving cultural and certain political institutions.318 To this 
purpose he wrote a small volume entitled The Birth of the Roman Empire. As one of the 
initial founders of the Constitutional Democratic Party, Rostovtzeff detested the ideology 
312 His thesis was called Romische Bleitesserae, Ein Beitrag zur Sozial- und WirtsclzaJtsgesclzichte der 
Romischen Kaiserzeit (1905). . . 
313 The whole scope of Rostovtzeff's importance and achievements in that area of ancient history cannot be 
sufficiently considered. For a bibliography see Wes (1990) and more briefly Christ (1972) p. 342 n181 
314 See Momigliano.(1954) p. 335. 
315 Last (1953) p. 133 cited in Christ (1972) p. 344. . . . . . 
316 Last explains that it was probably better that Rostovtzeff did not receive .the,Cam?en C~alr at ~\tor.d 
because in England at the time he would have found it very difficult to obtam tmanCial assistance tor hiS 
~reat campaign of excavation at Dura Europos (1928-1938) . 
• 17 See the Selected bibliography for a list of seven political papers .. 
318 Rostovtzeff (1920d) p. 459. 
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of the Bolshevik government of Lenin as 'a regime of violence, bloodshed, dictatorship, 
slavery and enmity towards true culture. '319 For Rostovtzeff the intelligentsia in Russia had 
always represented democracy and freedom.320 'The Bolshevik seizure', Rostovtzeff wrote, 
'meant the complete enslavement of Russian citizens, the death of liberty and morality as 
well as religion and the complete destruction of culture.'321 In his essays and articles 
Rostovtzeff illustrated the total devastation of the Russian educational system at the hands 
of the Bolsheviks. This of course was not the only element of the new ideology in Russia, 
which personally affected the intelligentsia immediately following the revolution. A 
number of Rostovtzeff's colleagues in the Russian Academy of Sciences died in 1918 due 
to their support of the Russian bourgeoisie and intelligentsia?22 His bitterness and fury was 
obviously manifold. Whether it was the loss of his supreme academic status, his home or 
family, such drastic political changes could not leave him unaffected. 
After overcoming the difficulties of leaving his home country, he published the 
work which earned him lasting crediblility as an ancient historian. The Social and 
Economic History of the Roman Empire of 1926 marked a very important career step for 
him, which he continued at Yale university. His work became a success and was published 
in a Gennan edition in 1929, in Italian in 1933 and in Spanish in 1937.323 Of equal success 
was his Social and Economic History of the Hellenic World, which was published in 
1941.324 This encyclopaedic work stood out because of its systematic brilliance which 
showed clearly that Rostovtzeff drew many results from his own long research rather than 
drawing on material from second hand sources. 
Characteristic of him was, however, a complex but modem interpretation of parts 
of ancient social history, which in scope and detail were not challenged by any scholar of 
the non-modem interpretation, such as Salin or Hasebroek. 'Rostovtzeff always 
emphasised the aristocratic character and urban legation of the ancient culture. His social 
background, his personal experience and the dangers of his own class conditioned a certain 
one-sidedness of his social views and judgements. '325 It is therefore not really surprising 
that in his analysis of the class structure in antiquity the 'ancient bourgeoisie' formed the 
most dynamic social group in the social and economic development. This is expressed in 
319. 'Why the Russian Intelligentsia is opposed to the Bolshevik Regime.' in (1920e) p. 793. 
320 Rostovtzeff (1920e) p. 793. 
321 Rostovtzeff 'Should Scientists Return to Russia.' (1920c) p. 370. . 
322 Rostovtzeff (1920d) p. 486. Rostovtzeff himself counts seventeen of his colleagues who dIed at the hands 
of the communists in that year alone. 
m For the widely recognition of Rostovtzeff's work see Kahrstedt (1930). 
324 A German edition was published in three volumes in 1955/56. 
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his argument that the flourishing times of the Hellenic period and the Roman Empire were 
mainly an achievement of industrious traders, specialists and merchants. Without them , 
argued Rostovtzeff, the Hellenic world would have never achieved its high standard of 
development. Momingliano pointed out -that, despite all his substantial field work, a 
realistic interpretation of the social history of the Hellenic world could not be achieved , 
since Rostovtzeff underestimated, 'typically of an aristocrat', the role of the farmers and 
craftsmen. The failure to resolve social problems led eventually to the collapse of the 
Roman Empire. Antiquity receded into 'primitive' state of the household based economy, 
which Meyer and Weber described as 'Naturalwirtschaft'.326 Rostovtzeff linked this 
downfall to the increasing barbarism originating from inside the new Soviet govemment.327 
The increasing impoverishment of the cities led to a fallback from the flourishing city 
economies back into the barter economy. Consequently the class structure experienced a 
decline in the intellectual spirit by the invasion of the land into the cities, which led to a 
regressive decline.328 The sudden collapse of Russia and its fall into barbarism, as 
Rostovtzeff understood it, and the decline of the Roman empire taught Rostovtzeff an 
important lesson: no culture or civilisation should rely on the leading qualities of one 
superior class. Rather all classes had to engage into conscious political action. It is not 
quite clear though, what kind of democracy or mass participation Rostovtzeff envisaged.329 
Rostovtzeff was one of the first ancient historians who argued strongly in favour of 
the use of archaeological findings to be used in conjunction with the analysis of historical 
documents. Such archaeological findings not only supported and complemented his two 
greatest works which emerged between 1926 and 1941, but also earned him a reputation 
close to the standing of Mommsen, Meyer, Grote and Gibbon. The Social and Economic 
History of the Roman Empire (1926) and the Social and Economic History of the 
Hellenistic World (1941) were quickly recognised as outstanding contributions of historical 
writing. Tam referred to the SEHHW as 'a very great book alike in terms of its vast 
learning, the ease with which the author handles his huge and complex mass of of ten-
refractory material, in the closeness of its reasoning, and in the sanity of its judgements. '330 
These 'sane judgements' would eventually come under severe criticism by later historians 
325 Christ (1972) p. 344. 
326 Grande p. 294. 
327 Rostovtzeff (1949) vol 2 p. 238. 
328 Rostovtzeff (1949) vol 2 p. 240. . , . . 
329 Rostovtzeff (1949) vol 2 p. 247. See also Rostovtzeff's essay 'The decay of the ancIent \\orld and Its 
economic explanations' in Rostovtzeff (1930). 
330 See Tarn (1941) p 165 cited in Christ (1972) p.246. 
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of the Roman and Hellenistic worlds. Bowersock maintained in his 1975 review of the 
SEHRE that few contemporary historians would accept the basic thesis offered by 
Rostovtzeff but no historian could reject the greatness of the work itself. For the time 
being, however, Rostovtzeff, due to his sober and enlightened use of materials, which up to 
that time had not really been utilised as materials for a general history of the ancient world, 
was seen as a new force in the study of history. The newly developing field of social and 
economic history were, according to Rostovtzeff, especially neglected by ancient and 
contemporary scholars. 
For a long time, history was mainly political history. Although this includes the 
historical narrative of an account of the most important crises in political life, or an account 
of wars and 'great men', Tucydides has already recognised that the incidents of man's 
history in politics and war were important. It is nevertheless significant to ascertain the 
causes of these incidents and their connection with one another and with the other 
phenomena of the life of communities. It was clear to Rostovtzeff that the origin and 
course of wars were closely connected with the development of economic, social, and 
religious life and civilisations.331 The Rankean tradition of historiography did not ignore the 
importance of social and economic issues, but like Rostovtzeff, regarded cultural and 
social factors only as part of the political make up of a state. These factors therefore have 
no independent existence from the history of predominant political ideas. 
Certainly unique in Rostovtzeff's view was the use of detailed archaeological 
findings combined with the study of classical texts. Even today, with the current level of 
knowledge of archaeology, historians still neglect its importance to the study of history. 
That is of course not due to its uninteresting character, but perhaps due to its unresolved 
methodological problems. Rostovtzeff felt strongly that the business of the historian is to 
collect the factual evidence of man's life, not only from the written records but also from 
the material evidence left behind. This material evidence shows clearly man's 
development at different periods of time. According to Rostovtzeff, archaeology must then 
be completely known by the historian, because much of human existence has not been 
recorded in a written form. Rostovtzeff was also interested in philological and 
palaeographical sources, since he thought that the historian must know the languages in 
which historical documents are written. This is a precondition in order to acknmdedge the 
historic changes those languages went through. Also the historian must be knowledgeable 
331 Rostovtzeff (1941) p. 7. 
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with respect to the various systems of language with their cultural peculiarities. Historical 
geography, which is the science of our relationship with the earth we inhabit, and the 
distribution of mankind on earth are valuable supportive evidence for the historian who 
must know the conditions of man's life in different places and at different times of human 
existence. However, such demands on the systematic and encyclopaedic abilities of the 
historian were not unique to Rostovtzeff alone, but exemplify once more his attempt to 
combine the strong tradition of Western, mainly German, philology and Russian 
archaeology with Beloch's demographic method. 'He [the historian] must know, too, the 
changes that have taken place in the distribution of mankind upon the globe, the location of 
this or that people, and the main centres of life of separate nations and of the different 
kingdoms and empires.'332 Also the art and the monuments which man has created 
provided Rostovtzeff with valuable tools in his approach to the study of the ancient world, 
and the illustrations he offers in his greatest works are treated with great detail. For 
Rostovtzeff, the art and monuments of the ancient world 'not only throw light upon various 
aspects of the ancient mind, but bring before the eyes either the great characters of the age 
in portraits which are often remarkable, or separate scenes from life, as they were 
represented in the fancy of the ancient sculptors and painters. '333 
As to Rostovtzeff's theories, it is clear that the experience of his exile loomed large 
in the formation of his historical work and he was constantly criticised because of it. Like 
the historicist historiography, the scholars of the post World War I generation concentrated 
disproportionately on certain events, under the impact of this devastating event, which 
because of this, gained a new significance. Rostovtzeff was not immune to the tendency of 
'using' ancient history for what he was hoping to find as causes in present phenomena. 
Gibbon's thesis of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire was a prevailing theme 
in ancient history right through the centuries. In describing the fall of the Roman Empire, 
Rostovtzeff found what he wanted to find. The Emperors from Augustus to Marcus 
Aurelius, through a policy of urbanisation built up an empire based on the success of the 
urban aristocracy and the city, which fostered inevitably a conflict between the 
'bourgeoisie and the peasantry' .334 After the failure of the Severi to resolve the conflicts 
between the classes, the power struggle degenerated into civil war, which found its 
ultimate expression in the crisis of the third century and the eventual collapse of the 
332 Rostovtzeff (1941) p 1. 
333 Rostovtzeff(l941) p 9. 
334 Rostovtzeff (1920d) p. 460. 
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Roman Empire. An alliance between the 'Italian bourgeoisie' and the 'Italian proletariat', 
headed by ambitious politicians and military leaders, resulted in the collapse of a possible 
collaboration of the two privileged orders of Rome. The senatorial and the equestrian, 
which had fonned a class of large 'half-feudal land owners' and 'businessmen', earned 
their material prosperity from the exploitation of state resources and from their political 
privileges. Rostovtzeff pointed out that 'the activity of Augustus benefited the victory of 
the middle and lower classes of Roman citizens, and forced the state to compromise. The 
middle class in all the cities of the Empire ... fonned the backbone of the state, and it was 
consciously developed by the Emperors. The constitutional monarchy of the 
Antonines ... rested on the urban middle class throughout the Empire and on the self 
government of the cities. '335 
Rostovtzeff recognised that the civilisation of the Roman Empire was essentially 
urban. In this environment lay the foundation of the empire, the 'Roman bourgeoisie'. 
Civilised life was peculiar to the cities of Italy and the important provinces of the empire. 
The rural communities, in contrast, lived by the most primitive means. The entire 
'cultural' and intellectual life took place in the cities and not in rural provinces. Their 
language, although occasionally mixed with derivatives of Greek or Latin, was basically 
that of their territorial heritage. Yet this was the class of people, which 'the urban 
bourgeoisie' and the anny relied upon for agricultural products and other goods.336 They 
did not, however, wish to open their ranks to the peasants. According to Rostovtzeff, the 
peasantry was always outside the civilisation of the Empire and grew increasingly resentful 
of the urban elite, 'hives of drones', as Rostovtzeff calls them.337 'The activity of the urban 
middle class degenerated into a systematic exploitation of the lower toiling classes ... The 
exclusiveness of the bourgeoisie ... prevented the lower classes from raising themselves to a 
higher level and improving their material welfare ... Thus the burden of supporting the life 
of the state lay entirely in the working classes and caused a rapid decline of their material 
welfare.'338 
Rostovtzeff defines the ancient bourgeoisie in economic tenns, as a class of men 
who had become successful as a result of their own efforts or through inheritance and held 
a certain level of wealth. These people lived off the interest accumulated from their 
investments. The main distinction between the bourgeoisie and other classes was the fact 
335 Rostoytzeff, SEHRE yol. I p. Xl. 
336 SEHHW yol. 1 p.IIS f 
m SEHHW yol. 1 p.l13 
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that they were not professionals, craftsmen or employees, but investors and employers of 
free and forced labour. 339 According to Rostovtzeff, the more advanced sectors of the 
ancient economy were established by this bourgeoisie who were essentially the forerunners 
in implementing an 'ancient profit motivated capitalism' .340 
The bourgeoisie is 'the average citizen ... not an aristocrat by birth and wealth ... He is 
a middle class landowner, a businessman, or a rentier, well-to-do but not extremely rich' .341 
This class is clearly idealised by Rostovtzeff in both of his works on social and economic 
history of antiquity. For Rome during the Julius-Claudius dynasty, Rostovtzeff claimed, 
this class was the leading economic and social force and on this class rested the power of 
the emperors.342 In his SEHHW Rostovtzeff emphasises the 'sturdy character' of the 
Hellenistic bourgeoisie and its commitment to maintain Greek culture for the benefit of 
livelihood. 'In my opinion', he states, 'it was the city bourgeoisie that was chiefly 
responsible for the great struggle for liberty carried on by the cities [of the Hellenistic 
world] '343 
Bowersock's critical statement of the unsatisfactory nature of Rostovtzeff's thesis 
explains it as resulting directly form his exile. He suggests that Rostovtzeff wanted to find 
in the Roman Empire of the Antonius age (238-244 AD), the period which he considers the 
highly flourishing era of the Roman Empire, a ruling class based on the merchants and 
entrepreneurs for whom he had much appreciation. The mistake that Rostovtzeff made, 
according to Bowersock and most other critics, is his presupposition of a third century 
capitalist economy, which was more important than agriculture during this period.344 
The rural and urban peasants found an opportunity for rebellion, as they became 
more associated with the Roman army. This army, by the third century, did not only 
acquire wealth but a social position as well. This alliance between the rural proletariat and 
the military led to the destruction of what was to Rostovtzeff the most important social 
class of the third century, the 'urban bourgeoisie' .345 The breakdown of the empire 
338 SEHRE vol. 1 p. xi 
339 SEH HW vol.l. p.1l5 f . I 
340 SEHRE vol. 2 p. 543 nr. Cf. Meyer (1948) p. 369. 'These judgements and valu~s of Rostovtzeft revea a 
pattern of social ideology, which probably took form during the turbulent transItion fro~ Czansm to the. 
Soviet Union. Rostovtzeffs understanding of the term 'bourgeoisie' must also be pla~e~ In the conte~t ot 
. ' . b'I' I' "ddle class' draWIng ItS Income both tram pre-Soviet RUSSIan socIety. The RUSSIan no I Ity was tru y a ml , 
commercial and industrial enterprise and from rationalised agriculture.' 
341 SEHHW vol. 1 p. 163. 
342 SEHRE vol. 1 p 103. 
343 SEH HW vol. 1 p. 166. 
344 Wes (1990). p. 19. 
345 Wes (1990). p. 18. 
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henceforth lay in the intrinsic hostility between the 'progressive bourgeoisie' and the more 
backward masses of the countryside. The revolution of the humiliores, in an alliance with 
the military, against the honestiores, was an essentially social rebellion, which resulted 
from the deliberate exclusiveness of the ruling class in Rome. The army during the 3rd 
century fought against the bourgeoisie and continued their pressure until the social prestige 
of the elite was completely eliminated and they were forced to 'lay prostrate under thefeet 
of the half-barbarian soldiery. '346 Rostovtzeff viewed the Roman army of the third century, 
the primary force in government at that time, 'as a class conscious mass of proletarians 
assaulting the bourgeoisie' .347 That this revolution included the bulk of the masses is an 
idea that has received much criticism. Last offers the contrasting opinion that the prime 
movers in the struggle were the army with its leaders, and the masses maintained a more or 
less passive attitude, or in certain places gave tacit support to the movement. Momigliano 
interprets Rostovtzeff's military theory by stating the red army of the third century ruined 
the Roman State of the Caesars, just as the Red Army of the twentieth century ruined the 
Russian State of the Czars. Although the evidence does not support his thesis in relation to 
the fall of Rome, Rostovtzeff, because of his personal experiences and his admiration for 
the bourgeoisie, drew parallels with the Russian experience of 1917. 
A.H.M. Jones' criticism of the SEHRE also rests with Rostovtzeff's treatment of 
the army in the third century. He states that Rostovtzeff's thesis is based on weak evidence 
at best; that the army of the third century was recruited largely from the peasantry. 
Rostovtzeff failed to comment on the largely hereditary nature of the third century Roman 
army and that their raids were disruptive not only to the cities of the empire but frequently 
the country and the peasantry itself. Momigliano stated that Rostovtzeff's image of the 
Roman army of the third century and its collaboration with the peasantry to undermine the 
power of the bourgeoisie 'took hold of him'. He was unable to integrate this theory with 
his later interpretation, which evolved after his preoccupation with Russia had paled. The 
fall of the empire, Rostovtzeff wrote later, was due to a combination of constant ci viI war 
and fierce attacks by external enemies. 
The plan for Rostovtzeff's Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World 
was similar to his earlier great work; illustrations, thoroughly described, and exhaustive 
explanatory notes. For Rostovtzeff the Hellenistic world was 'a stupendous creation of the 
Greek genius and it had far reaching influence on the future. The influence lies mainly in 
346 SEHRE vol. 6. p.495. 
347 Jones (1948) p. 361. 
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the field of literature, art, religion, philosophy, SCIence and learning, but it was 
considerable also in the social and economic sphere. '348 The treatment of the period was 
much more detailed than that of his SEHRE and Rostovtzeff himself admitted in 1941 that 
if the Roman Empire had been done on the same massive scale as the SEHHW, it would 
have occupied 'a shelf-full of volumes'. In this work, the economic aspects of the 
Hellenistic World are given a full attention. Rostovtzeff introduces us to the beginnings of 
the Hellenistic world in chapter two when he describes the economic problems of the 
Greek and Persian worlds in the 4th century Be; problems provided the impetus for 
Alexander's conquests and the Hellenisation of the East through Greek migrations. 349 He 
continues with the disruption of the fifth century equilibrium in Greece between production 
and demand and how it was losing its export markets for both agricultural and industrial 
products when new centres of industry and agriculture were growing, especially in Thrace, 
the Bosphorus kingdom, Italy and Sicily. 
If it is natural to assume that if the establishment of a porto-franco in Delos had 
such a disadvantageous influence on the trade at Rhodes, it must have had the same effect 
on Athens. Regarding this factor, the evidence at hand offers us no indication.350 Part of 
Rostovtzeff's aim, is that the Hellenistic period was a 'good historical period', in which the 
cultural superiority of the Greeks brought civilisation to much more advanced technology 
and a higher state of development compared to the 'inferior races' of the Eastern Orient. 
In a Presidential Address delivered before the American Historical Association at 
Chattanooga on December 28 in 1935, Rostovtzeff stated emphatically that during and 
after the period of Alexander 'the Greek city-state definitely and finally came out of its 
political and cultural isolation and tried to absorb and to Hellenise the Near East. '351 In 
contrast to Rostovtzeff's theory of a Greek intent to Hellenisation we can refer to Peter 
Green and previously to Hasebroek who both entirely reject the "pernicious myth" that 
Alexander and his successor kings and for that matter Greeks of the fourth and third 
centuries in general, consciously sought to bring their 'enlightened' culture to the 
barbarians. 
For Rostovtzeff, civilised society depends on the cultural elite for its survival. The 
declining influence of that segment of society is a major factor in the downfall of both the 
Roman world and the Hellenistic world as well. This idea, the 'barbarisation of culture by 
348 SEHHW vol. 2 p.131 
349 SEH HW vol. 1. p.124 f. 
350 SEHHW vol. 2. p.742 
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the uneducated masses' is, according to Brent Shaw, one characteristic of Western 
historical scholarship of the period in which Rostovtzeff is writing. Rostovtzeff flatly states 
that the Macedonian soldiers and commercially interested Greeks who 'exploited' the 
peoples of the Hellenistic kingdoms, could in no way be considered culturally elite. 
A. Momigliano asserted that Rostovtzeff is 'essentially correct in assuming that 
both the Hellenisation and Romanisation of the territories of the Roman Empire resulted 
from the activities of the urban middle class.'352 But Rostovtzeff did not make a thorough 
enough study of the problems of political liberty in the ancient world. He oversimplifies 
the economic structure of the HellenisticlRoman era and never defines the term 
'bourgeoisie' in detail. He also neglects the social structure of peasant life, because he 
focuses so heavily on the middle classes and the activities of the urban centres. 353 For 
Rostovtzeff, in both his works, the bourgeoisie were primarily responsible for the 
accomplishments of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds. 
Michael Rostovtzeff's works culminated in a complex attempt to describe the 
social, political and economic achievements and failures of both the Hellenistic and Roman 
world. Experiences and turbulence of his own time often overcast his interpretations, as 
was the case in the writings of many other well-known ancient historians, such as Meyer 
and Beloch. Rostovtzeff offered historians and non-historians a view of the Greco-Roman 
world, which was more enriched by a combination of sources creating a synthesis which 
may reflect on the downfall of Rome as a mirror image of the downfall of Russia. His 
knowledge was vast. Archaeology, papyrology, numismatics, epigraphy and monuments 
all served to enlighten his readers in ways seldom seen before. 
New approaches to the study of ancient social and economic history since the death 
of Rostovtzeff in 1952 reveal the weaknesses of his findings and the bias in his 
interpretations. Momigliano called Rostovtzeff's approach cynically 'more intuitive than 
logical, as most Russians are, and therefore he seldom thought out his theories clearly' .354 
This is a rather harsh criticism. The two Social and Economic Histories are certainly of 
high scholarly quality with regard to the detail and depth of historical analysis. However, 
Rostovtzeff's analogies are certainly extreme and anachronistic. It seems, though, that his 
modern interpretations are not so much dominated by his lacking knowledge of the 
351 Rostovtzeff (1930) p. 205. 
352 Momigliano (1954) p. 101. 
353 Momigliano (1954) p. 103. 
354 Momigliano (1954) p. 103. 
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historical sources, but rather unfortunately driven by his own bitter experience and political 
agenda. 
In respect of Rostovtzeff's position within the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, we can 
conclude, that he regarded especially the 3rd century AD, with its political and economic 
problems, as exemplifying the demise of his own aristocratic class in Russia. Although 
this outstanding encyclopaedically-minded ancient historian has shown great interest and 
an ability to synthesise all aspects of ancient social and political life, methodological 
questions regarding the nature of a sound historical evaluation are not sufficiently 
addressed. Together with the problem of coping with the burning questions of his times 
and his class origin, this led Rostovtzeff to make a modem assumption about the nature of 
the ancient economy.355 
355 For a detailed bibliography on Rostovtzeff see Wes (1990). 
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The immediate aftermath of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy shows a rich variety' of 
interpretations and levels of understanding of the problems surrounding the ancient 
economy. Each mentioned contribution has its point and foundation. However, in the 
light of the most recent literature, it seems that although more authors than ever before take 
notice of the controversy, relatively little effort has been made to understand the 
complexity of this important part in the history of historiography, apart from Schneider, 
Mazza and implicitly Finley. This is partly due to the perception of the controversy itself 
amongst its contributors and its immediate aftermath. There has never been open debate 
about all the connecting issues, perhaps due to continuous ideological and scholarly 
differences. 
Oertel, it seems, discusses mainly the sources of dispute and to a significantly 
lesser extent the problem of concept formation and the difference in the philosophical 
historical methodology between the debaters. Nevertheless, Oertel chose two very 
interesting terms in order to separate the sides. According to him, BUcher's position is 
'negative' not only in respect of the denial of the existence of capitalism in antiquity, but 
also in terms of his strategy of argument, which to a degree became the way of the 'anti-
modernists' always eager to state what the ancient 'economy' (if the word 'economy' is at 
all appropriate) was not about. The 'positive' theories of Meyer, Beloch, Pohlmann and 
Rostovtzeff had a clear vision of antiquity not because of superior knowledge of antiquity, 
but by making swift comparisons between modem and ancient political and therefore 
economic phenomena. As we have seen, these authors have shown plenty of imagination 
in the evaluation of the historical detail and when it comes to filling the gaps in the 
testimony of the ancient writers and chronologists. Meyer, Rostovtzeff and many who saw 
themselves in the historicist tradition were often quick to make conjectural statements 
about the modem character of certain periods of the economy of antiquity. Whether their 
accounts are correct or whether they include very problematic assumptions, as well as wild 
conjecture, should be clear to the reader too. However, one may argue that it is contrary to 
the ethos of a historian to make swift generalisations about a possible modem character of 
a particular historical event or entity such as the ancient economy, since we still know too 
little about the past and face many unresolved methodological problems. 
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The revision of contemporary literature mentioning the BUcher-Meyer Controversy 
is still incomplete. However, what arises from the contents is that it appears insufficient to 
judge the controversy as a matter of whether antiquity as a whole was 'primitive' or 
'modern' . It would perhaps be useful to investigate the methodological foundations of 
both sides and to work on a new historical conceptual framework that allows us to 
understand the ancient economy in a more complex and accurate way. 
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Appendix 1 to Part III - Hasebroek's Essay 'On Ancient Economic 
History' 
310 
We have selected an important but largely unrecognised paper by an important 
author. Hasebroek's work appears here for the very first time in an English translation. 
Where the translation of certain terms from German into English created some diffi~ulty 
due to the different etymological history of some of the terms, the German word is put in [] 
sIgns .. 
'On Ancient Economic History' 
Inaugural address by Prof Dr, Johannes Hasebroek held on February, 6th 1926 of 
the University of Zurich 
Original Text in Neue Ziiricher Zeitung 147 Nr. 266. 181211926 
It is due to the peculiar development which classical ancient studies have taken, 
that the problem of the ancient economy languished for a long time. The problem of the 
material basis of the cultures of antiquity belongs to the most disputed in the subject of 
ancient history, and we are still today very far away from understanding ancient economic 
history. Already the fundamental problem of the degree of economic development is 
subject to extremely opposed opinions. As it currently looks, two theories are 
irreconcilably opposing each other. For one theory, the economy of the 5th and 4th century 
is already highly developed, an economy of a more or less modem character, a truly 
national economy [Volkswirtschaft] with a far reaching inter-local commodity exchange; 
the other theory does not let antiquity grow beyond the stage of the closed household 
economy until its decline. Although the oikos theory is faulty, on the contrary, there can 
be no doubt that we face with the 5th and 4th century an unmatched boom of the Greek 
intellectual culture, we still see a relatively primitive economic culture. The big break for 
the economic development of antiquity lies with the beginning of the Hellenic period, and 
this new historical epoch reveals itself even more dramatically the more we compare it 
with what is still missing in the 4th century. 
The correct understanding of the degree of the development of trade and industry in 
the 5th and 4th century has to be decisive for the characterisation of the general economic 
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structure of the pre-Hellenic epoch. As with industry as well as with trade, the import of 
modem economic concepts and ideas into the pre-Hellenic economy became fatal and led 
to shallowness in interpreting the very particular ancient economic phenomena. This is 
especially true of the transmission of the concept of trade policy [Handelspolitik] of the 
mercantilist and modem state in the pre-Hellenic period. They assume a political 
orientation towards trade by reinterpreting political factors as expressions of trade. and 
trade domination, which present the driving force for the whole politics of the pre-Hellenic 
polis to be an expression of commercial goals. It has also been taken for granted that the 
great leading statesmen of that time had commercial interests implicit in their policies. 
However, such assumptions lack the necessary conditions, mainly: that commercial 
activity is not developed in the Greek world, by the state and by the community, expressed 
by the masses of its trading citizens. 
The Greek inter-local, professionally executed trade [Handel] in the 4th century is 
still carried out without capital. The supporting forces of that trade are proletarians, mostly 
craftsmen, who stand in sharp contrast to the rich and the well-off, the capital-owning 
social groups concentrating mainly on the money lending business, in order to stay outside 
the trading business. The complete separation of money owner and trader, which exists 
today, was not a fundamental characteristic. The credit lender pockets the profit made by 
trade; the merchant himself, if he gains a fortune, he pulls out of trade business. Under 
such a condition the assumption of a trade and merchant aristocracy in this epoch also runs 
into difficulties. The capital-owning landlord only engages in petty trade with the large-
scale farmer or aristocrat and exploits by imposing customs and contributions on those 
who engage in trade. Only by an impoverished existence does the aristocrat reach the 
professional Emporie. Only real merchant cultures have innate aristocratic instincts. Not 
one reliable source states that the Greek aristocracy would have found a new means of 
acquisition in the merchant profession. 
However, the Greek inter-locally operating professional merchant is not only 
proletarian, but belongs usually also to the class of non-citizens and is a foreigner who 
does not posses full civil rights. Also the Greek crafts are largely dependent on a non-
Greek population, who are settlers for a longer or shorter time (therefore still travelling), 
who are politically disadvantaged. The Greek Metoike is surely disadvantaged compared 
to th~ full citizen in a private legal and a political sense, but in the respect of the execution 
of his profession never regarded like the 'guest' in the medieval city. The foreign policy of 
the Greek State is characterised by the tendency not to keep away the trading and crafttng 
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foreigner as an unbearable competitor, but rather to attract him.356 The immense importance 
of the Metoikie, common to all Greek states, as long as they are not totally apart from the 
main exchange, proves to what a weak extent the Greek full-citizen dominated trade and 
craftsmanshi p. 
The full-citizens of the Greek states cannot be regarded as representatives of labour 
and of the national production. The capitalistic spirited citizens of the medieval cities were 
primarily merchants and craftsmen; the ideal polis citizen is primarily farmer and landlord. 
The disrespect, not only for all physical but also for any technical professions, is deeply 
innate in the Greeks. Nevertheless all technical work is mainly based on free labour, not 
on forced labour; but it rests mainly upon free Metoikie, not upon the full-citizen. This 
disrespect for all technical labour, which confronts us even in statements from that time to 
such a large extent, is not simply an aristocratic prejudice, which was formulated solely as 
an ethical theory of the Greeks expressing a strong reaction against the failing democracy. 
We are faced with one of the deepest expressions of the peculiar psychology and world 
view [Weltanschauung] of the Greeks compared with the human being of the occidental 
world - a characteristic of the Greek mind. The desire for immense profit beyond the 
sustaining of one's needs is also innate to Greek life. However this desire, viewed in an 
ideal-typical way, finds itself satisfied with other means than the work expressed in the 
merchant and craftsmen activity. 
Trade and craftsmanship of that time are not national but rather cosmo-political and 
lie to a strong degree outside the state, for the state, in a state-legal sense, consists of the 
amount of citizens necessary in order to sustain the self-sufficiency [of the state] and not of 
the foreigners who settle on its territory. The Greek city does not know any promotion of 
trade to benefit the trading class amongst its citizens. The state therefore does not know 
the concept of the duty of protection, the fundamental principle of all trade politics in a 
true sense.357 Its behaviour towards traders is only dominated by two factors: [firstly] the 
opportunity of the exploitation of trade for fiscal purposes and [second] the desire to use 
trade for the very elementary nutrition problem. The driving forces of all power 
development of the Greek states are not commercial, but blunt imperialistic aims. It is this 
primitive, but a dominating radical Greek democracy, which expresses still the dominating 
desire to subject the weaker, in order to make him obedient, to live off his costs [and] to 
put all labour onto his shoulders. With Korinth, Miletus, Athens and the other cities. we do 
356 foreign policy = immigration policy 
357 trade politics perhaps economic policy = Halldelspolitik 
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not deal with closed trade areas, but rather with political centres of power. The Greek state 
founded its colonies not for commercial reasons, like the mercantilist state did, but solely 
in order to get rid of its surplus population. The daughter-city is not connected to the 
mother-city by commercial ties, but merely by religious ones. The Greek 'trade contract' 
is not a trade contract in our [modem] sense. It is solely a supply contract, which one polis 
makes with the other polis in order to secure the nutrition of its citizens or the supply of 
necessary materials for its shipbuilding. The Greek 'trade embargo' is not a trade 
embargo, but a general traffic embargo, which coincides with the ancient principle of 
foreign policy.358 
Only after the emergence of the great Hellenic complex of cities, which creates 
besides large political areas also economic territories, one can speak of a trade policy with 
associated trade political phenomena, which are capable of standing comparison with 
modem phenomena.359 
358 foreign policy = immigration policy _ 'I" b t it seems from the context he refers III 359 od 'tl' II Hasebroek does not define neu"elt IC I, U 
-- m ern = lleUzel IC ' 
the mercanilian states of the 16th century, 
mE BUCHER-MEYER CONTROVERSY 
Conclusion 
After having elucidated the original arguments between BUcher and Meyer, 
including additional contributions regarding the nature of the ancient economy, we can 
draw the following conclusions: 
Firstly, the view that this controversy can be defined as being between 'primitivism 
versus modernism', as asserted by many contemporary scholars, is based on a 
misrepresentation of the original debate. That is an inadequate oversimplification of 
BUcher's and Meyer's position. However, this is not to categorically deny the modernising 
analogies used by Meyer, or that BUcher assigned only a limited scope to the role of 
exchange and trade in classical antiquity. 
Secondly, our analysis of the debate about a possible methodological re-orientation 
of historical studies, which coincided with the BUcher-Meyer Controversy, has had an 
influence on the perception of the original positions, and has thus made a solution to this 
debate ever more difficult. As we have also seen, this debate on method was highly 
ideologically charged. It provides us with an impressive example of how the historical 
interpretation IS influenced by particular philosophical, and also ideological 
presuppositions that put both BUcher and Meyer, whether to their liking or not, into 
opposite camps of the political academic spectrum. As shown, the political debates that 
also carried on within academia in Germany during the last quarter of the 19th century and 
first quarter of the 20th century were not necessarily the same issues that are debated today. 
Also, although BUcher and Meyer may have been influenced by the ideological quarrels 
and political demands imposed upon them by their institutional authorities, which added to 
the inconclusive outcome of the controversy, it was more the continuing misuse of this 
debate as a battle ground for ideologies that made a solution to it impossible. This is 
particularly true in the light of the fact that the writings of a number of contemporary 
authors in this subject seem to create the impression that the controversy never took place, 
and proceed by committing similar errors that Meyer and BUcher were guilty of.360 
Thirdly, unfortunately, no matter how laudable Max Weber's solution to the 
controversy was, his theory of historical concept formation did not resolve the 
meth~dological and conceptual difficulties that deeply divided Meyer and BUcher. It is 
only recently that the historical scholarship has begun to study the intellectual depth of 
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Weber's writings about economic history of antiquity in greater detail. We noted that 
Weber's solution to the controversy should not be viewed as an attempted middling 
compromise between BUcher and Meyer. Instead sarcasm aimed at methodological 
discourse and continuing methodological ignorance filled the lack of understanding 
between the sides during the 1920s and 30s. Yet in 1975, M. 1. Finley still saw reason to 
criticise the lack of interest in philosophical questions - a point that was reaffirmed by 
Meikle only six years ago in 1995. To address these theoretical historiographical issues 
adequately, which are directly relevant to this controversy, in order determine how far a 
historian can generalise over the historical sources, or how a particular historical concept 
was formed, whether there are historical facts, and how the historian should be assessing 
his/her own code of scientific practice, would perhaps help to overcome these tall-grown 
walls that have emerged within the historical scholarship during the aftermath of this 
famous controversy. All in all, it is hopeed that this study has contributed to a better and 
more detailed understanding of the BUcher-Meyer Controversy and its associated literature. 
360 This point was previously made by Austin & Vidal-Naquet (1977) p. 7. 
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